Indian Defence Review

The Northern Areas form a large chunk of territory annexed by Pakistan in 1947. It provided the bulk of the manpower for the intrusions in Kargil, consisting of the Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistan army.

The area also provided the logistic base from which operations were launched and sustained in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC). The area for intrusion and the military units chosen suggest that Pakistan had in mind to put into practice a covert plan, which depended on surprise and called for the non-participation of the main part of the Pakistan army consisting of Punjabi musalmans, in order that India did not become aware of the plan.

It is in this context that this paper studies the region, its people and its military component. It argues that the Kargil intrusions have brought into focus the NA and this India must take advantage of as a foreign policy tool. In other words, just as Pakistan keeps referring to Kashmir in international fora, India too must also refer to PoK and the NA and the state of affairs there.

The Area, People and History

The Northern Areas of Pakistan consist of the five districts of Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Skardu and Ganche. The total area is 28,000 sq miles, with a population of 1.2 million. The district of Chitral has always been a part of the Northern Areas till the arrival of the British in the 19th century. Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, as it known in Pakistan) on the other hand is just 4,494 sq miles, with a population of 1.5 million.

The Northern Areas border Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republic of Tajikstan and Xinjiang province of China. On the south it has 300 miles of border with Kashmir and Ladakh.

Ethnically, the Northern Areas and Chitral have a Tajik, Uzbek, Mongol, Turkmen and Greek population. Also the area has Baltees, Shins, Yashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladakis and Turks who speak the dialects of Balti, Shina, Brushaki, Khawer, Turki, Tibetan, Pushto and Persian. Shias and Sunnis in the area have their own sub-­divisions. The Shias are sub-divided into Asharis, Ismailis and Noor Bakshis.

The Northern Areas (NA) are administratively not part of PoK and are ruled directly by the Pakistan government from Islamabad. It is governed by the Frontier Crime Regulation framed by the British.

The NA are ruled directly by the Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas (Pakistan) with the help of six officers, all non-natives. In 1990, a writ petition was filed in the High Court of Azad Kashmir by various parties to bring the Northern Areas under the administrative control of the Azad Kashmir government. In March 1993, the High Court gave its verdict in favour of the petitioners.

The NA remains a neglected area with no university or professional colleges. There is no industry and subsistence is largely on tourism. While people from POK can emigrate, those from NA need an exit visa which is rarely issued.

According to one source, adult franchise is also a distant dream in the Northern Areas. No person or party can call for self-determination, even though the Pakistan government has itself admitted to the courts that Northern Areas are not part of Pakistan.

In 1994, the Pakistan Federal government announced reforms, which included elections to the Northern Areas Council. However, these changes are cosmetic. A Pak commentator notes that people of the Northern Areas are denied representation in the parliament and unlike in the case of Kashmir, they are also denied a semblance of self-government and have been forced to accept Islamabad’s hegemony.

The earliest sectarian clashes occurred in Chitral in 1981, when a mob led by Maulana Ubaidullah stormed a hostel run by the Aga Khan Foundation. A year later, Sunni–Shia clashes occurred in the area. The Shias organized themselves under the Tehrik-e­Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffariya (TNFJ). The Ismailis and Noor Bakshis, though followers of the Fiqah -e-Jaffariya, were not accepted into the fold of the former party. The two groups did however play a balancing role in the area.

The Aga Khan Foundation has been a premier institution working for socio–­economic development in the region. The Aga Khan is reported to have commissioned a in-depth study of the region. The study says poverty and economic deprivation have made the area a breeding ground for sectarian militancy.

The study also pointed to dangers that Ismailis faced in the Chitral region. According to one Pakistani writer in Chitral alone, about 10 percent Ismailis converted to Sunnism, either out of financial motives, or to save their lives, or escape the pressure of the social boycott imposed on them by Maulana Ubaidullah’s fatwa.

PoK has also not been quiet in 1998–99. Trends indicate an on-going power struggle on several issues. In June ’98, a no-­confidence motion was passed with more than two-thirds majority in the PoK Assembly against the Speaker Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, Chairman of the People’s Party (N) and Raja Assar Ahmad Abbasi, the latter being the Deputy Speaker in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. Actually Rathore had alleged that the PoK government was corrupt and he sought change of the present government under Sultan Mahmud.

And towards the end of June 1998 came news that AJK Assembly, debating the 1998­–99 fiscal budget came down heavily on the government for not coming up to the expectations of the people and for not fulfilling its commitments to resolve their problems and grievances.

Opposition party Amir Jamaat-e-Islami and Azad Kashmir leader Abdul Rashid Turabi criticized the AJK government and said that corruption culture had developed in the area and funds were being misused. The Minister for Forests Latif Akber demanded that the Pakistan government pay the royalty for the Mangla dam to the AJK government and shares in the income of the state’s property in Pakistan.

Columnist Fahid Hussain paints a picture of PoK that speaks two voices. At one level he writes of migration from PoK due to lack of employment opportunity. Second, the problems of development, but high levels of community participation in development. Also of note is mention of the fact that PoK has little income generation of its own, with most of the revenue coming from Pakistan.

Two societal problems remain and are on the increase. There is corruption in the top echelons of the PoK government and society, and there is a timber mafia that is rapidly denuding the area of its forest cover. Where does that leave the area?

Politicians still have to take an oath of allegiance to Kashmir accession to Pakistan. They have to sign a declaration that Kashmir is part of Pakistan. And no Prime Minister or minister in PoK can assume office unless a similar oath is taken.

All high ranking officials are appointed directly from Pakistan. These facts must be highlighted to show the control that Islamabad exercises over PoK. Under Article 32 of the interim constitution, the Legislative Assembly cannot make any laws relating to defence and security of the area, currency, external affairs and trade.

It is worth noting that while Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side has a special provision in the Indian Constitution (Article 370), to protect the interests of the state and its people, there is no such thing in PoK or in the Northern Areas. India has held democratic elections in the state on several occasions. This has hardly occurred in either PoK or NA. The people in Northern Areas are neglected and ruled with a firm hand by the Pakistan government.

The Northern Light Infantry

During the 1880s, after the annexation of the North West Frontier Province, the British raised local tribal units to manage the region. These were Pakistan militia and scout units, which were employed in the front and on the flanks for gathering information and protection.

Later the role of these units was changed to picqueting and guarding of routes well before the main military force could be deployed. At the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the militia and scouts were gradually organized and equipped with modern weapons.

At this time, the area had the Karakoram Scouts with HQ at Skardu in Baltistan. The Northern Scouts with HQ at Gilgit, and the Gilgit Scouts also with HQ at Gilgit. In 1973 all these units were reorganized as the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions. A 1993 study of the Pak army showed the recruitment to the NLI from Gilgit to be at 55 percent, from Baltistan 35 percent and from other regions 10 percent.

The ethnic composition of the NLI battalions shows they consist of 18 percent Sunnis, 49 percent Shias, 23 percent are Ismailees and 10 percent are Noor Bakshis.

The NLI are actually special troops, trained in anti-heliborne, commando operations and snow warfare. The commando trained personnel are also deputed to the Special Service Group (SSG).

The Kargil operation was planned and executed by the Pakistan army. It had been planned several years ahead, but its final shape was given by Gen Musharaff and his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Mohd Aziz Khan.

Also involved were the Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA) and the GOC 10 Corps, under whom the NLI was operational. HQ FCNA has under its command four infantry brigades — 32, 60, 80 and 323. To keep the operation secret and to make use of the special training of the forces in the area, the NLI was chosen for the task of intrusion and occupation of heights of Kargil.

In order to further strengthen security, the NA were placed under the operational control of the Pak army. This prevented media teams and others from asking too many questions. The main aim of the employment of the NLI was secrecy, expertise in this mission and to prevent any backlash of failure reaching the Punjabi heartland.

These troops stiffened by Special Services Group (SSG) companies organised the intrusion backed by logistic support from the Mujahideen in POK. Military estimates put this figure as 2,000. Of the NLI battalions who were active in Kargil — 3th, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th and 12th.

The enemy, when initially infiltrated, had plans to occupy and stay. And then the purpose was to interdict the Srinagar–Leh road. Once the Indian army and air force reacted to the incursions, it became difficult for Pakistan to hide the facts. The soldiers of the NLI fought well, and as they were placed on the ridgelines in well entrenched positions, they could and did launch counter-attacks when their main positions were taken.

Leadership was poor and logistic supply being difficult, morale dipped in the pockets of intrusion once India put the pressure on. Radio intercepts often spoke of the low rations and morale, but the Pak troops managed to get reinforcements from areas which the Indian troops were unable to seal.

It was only after the decision to withdraw was taken, was it possible for the NLI troops to return across the LoC. But even for this they had come prepared. The withdrawing forces planted thousands of landmines across the path, to prevent the forward movement of Indian forces. This has led to large number of casualties for the army who had to clear virtually every inch of the ground.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan succeeded in tactically gaining ground in this operation, but failed to gain strategically. Once the intrusion was discovered, the choice before Pakistan was to either withdraw or to stay and fight. The latter they chose to do, but without apparent plans to force the issue.

The Northern Areas thus suddenly came under the limelight and it witnessed the visits of the Pak Army Chief and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Both promised major SOPS to the people and to the men of the NLI. Monetary packages, as also infrastructural development were announced with much fanfare.

It was also announced that every dead soldier of the NLI would get a compensation of $10,000, while the families of officers would be given a plot of land in any place of their choice in Pakistan. This was clearly a move to reduce the resentment building up within the NA.

In fact, interrogation of the soldiers taken prisoner by the Indian Army during OP Vijay in Kargil show that NLI personnel resented the fact that they were being used as cannon fodder by the Pak Punjabi musalman population.

The varied ethnic composition of the NLI provides us now with some clues about the variety of linguistic groups found in the intercepted radio conversations. The employment of the NLI served Pakistan’s interest, both in terms of operational secrecy and for the specialized training and equipment of the NLI.

Events

The Kargil situation brought home the fact that Northern Areas were not being treated at par with the rest of Pakistan. The Pak military took over Gilgit and Baltistan. The fear of a popular uprising for the restoration of basic rights prompted Islamabad to remove civilian rule.

In fact, in a significant development in May this year the Supreme Court in Pakistan directed Islamabad to make the necessary amendments to the Constitution to ensure that the people of the Northern Areas enjoyed their fundamental rights of being governed through their chosen representatives and to have access to justice through an independent judiciary. The SC directed that this action be undertaken within six months.

The situation in NA was also reflected in a letter written by a Senior Superintendent of Police Amir Hamza, posted in Gilgit to Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General. In it he compares the present conditions in the areas as being worse than that of the East India Company. Additionally, he lists several areas in which Kashmir on the other side of the LoC was much better off.

The police officer picked on evidence from an official statement in the Pakistani supreme court, which says that Parliament “has by law yet to admit into the federation Northern Areas on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.”

The post-Kargil environment in the Northern Areas witnessed local uprisings against the Mujahideen who had retreated from Kargil. Clashes between locals and militants belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Skardu in August 1999 led to clamping down by the army. Similar disturbances were also reported from Shigar, North East of Skardu and Rondu, west of Skardu on the Skardu–Gilgit road.

Locals met with the 62 Brigade Commander and other local police officials, demanded that all the remaining militants in the city be removed within 24 hours. The cause of the unrest was the bitterness of the people of the Northern Areas about the militants getting all the credit for doing nothing, while the NLI took heavy casualties. The local people made so many sacrifices but could not appreciate that the army was disguising themselves as militants during the Kargil crisis and paying them also.

The fact remains that focus on the NA has increased due to Kargil, both in Pakistan and outside it. There is an important lesson for India. It is for India to explain to the world how the people of the region live, in comparison to which the state of Jammu and Kashmir is better off, and its people, though plagued by insurgency, do manage to make a living for themselves.