China viewed India as its rival in Asia and was giving full support to Naxalites in India. The tribes of the North-east were ideal targets for fanning insurgencies and keeping Indian troops tied down.
The first gang to China, about 100 strong, was led by Thinuselie and Muivah. It crossed the border in Tuensang in November 1966 and trekked 1,000 km through Myanmar’s territory before reaching Yunan province in mainland China in January 1967 and returned in January 1968 with arms, ammunition and equipment. They set up a camp at Jotsoma, which was turned into a regular training camp for the underground army.8
The second batch of 500 led by Mowu Angami and Isak Swu crossed the international border in middle of December 1967. By this time the peace talk was deadlocked, but the suspension of hostilities continued. While the gang was undergoing training, China offered to support a Naga government in exile. The proposal neither found favour with the underground leadership in Nagaland, nor did Phizo approve of it.9 In Yunan the Nagas were trained at Tengchung and Fuking. In April 1968, another gang of 450 under Dusoi Chakesang crossed the border in Tuengsang area but Dusoi lost direction and was taken captive. The main body wandered in the jungles: tired, hungry and hunted by Myanmar’s forces, they returned to Nagaland in small batches. Dusoi and 76 other Naga hostiles were handed over by Myanmar forces to the Indian Army at the border town of Moreh on April 11, 1969.
According to official estimates, a total of 1650 Naga hostiles went to China during 1967 and 1968 out of which about 700 had returned till the end of 1969, and out of them 275 were captured.10 About 150 of the apprehended lot, were released on 31 December 31, 1969 and January 1, 1970. Only the hard-core guerillas were tried for anti-national activities, violation of Passport and Arms Acts.11
Chinese support to Nagas began to taper from early 70s. There were many reasons for it. The security forces had tightened the cordon along the international border, making both ingress and egress hazardous. There was greater coordination between the Indian and Myanmar’s forces following the meeting between Indira Gandhi and General Ne Win in March 1968. The border was sealed more effectively, night patrolling was intensified and intelligence on rebel movement was exchanged more frequently. The Chinese had also begun to have second thoughts about the ability of Naga rebels to wage a prolonged guerilla war against India. The Chinese were also alarmed by the large-scale surrenders by the Naga rebels. Based on the Governor’s address to the 1970 Budget Session of Nagaland Assembly, 1,049 Nagas had surrendered in 1969 alone.
The cooperation between Pakistan and China to lend support to various insurgent groups operating in the North-east was even more serious
The capture of the entire gang led by Mowu Angami which was on its way back from Yunan (China) not only demoralised the underground but the dissension amongst the leadership based on tribal loyalties put a question mark on their ability to put up a united front. The Chinese were naturally alarmed at this turn of events, but continued their support through much of 70s. In April and July 1971, fresh groups of underground were reported to have gone to the Yunnan via Chin Hills of Myanmar. The defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war with India, however, altered the geo-strategic situation dramatically. The insurgent groups lost their bases in Bangladesh, but only temporarily.
The loss of safe sanctuaries in Bangladesh did not deter the Naga rebels from sending another gang to China. Sometime in August 1974, a decision was taken to send a gang under Muivah. The journey started on September 5, 1974 with 73 gang members including nine women. The security forces prevented the majority from crossing the border, but about 30 odd crossed over to Myanmar. This was the first time that an outgoing gang was hotly pursued and mauled.
The number that had crossed over to Myanmar was not large enough to proceed to China, and possibly the Chinese had laid down the minimum number that should report for training. So another attempt was made to send additional strength in December of that year. But this time the army was well prepared to foil their attempt. The bits of information that were trickling in suggested that the gang was likely to cross Chanki-Mokokchung Road between Chungtia and Khensa on night 4/5 January 1975. Between 18 and 23 January, 23 hostiles were apprehended at Mokokchung. 10 Assam Rifles apprehended another seven on 23 January. In the next few days another 72 were apprehended. Thus ended the rebel’s last attempt to send a gang to China. The troops under command of Maj Gen ‘Ganjoo’ Rawat had achieved a remarkable success. The units and formations and the staff of 56 Mountain Brigade, particularly the Brigade Major, Maj N Bahri, played a very important role.12
The cooperation between Pakistan and China to lend support to various insurgent groups operating in the North-east was even more serious. The trek to Yunan was proving to be long, arduous and dangerous. On return from China, underground Brigadier Thinusellie was sent to East Pakistan in late 1968 to coordinate arrangements for training of guerillas in bases in Pakistan. The Chinese, therefore, opened a guerrilla-training centre in East Pakistan to train North-east insurgents. A small airstrip was constructed at a place near Rangamati in CHT to train insurgents in air operations. On July 26, 1970 the Government of India sent a strong protest note to the Chinese against arms supply and guerrilla training to Naga and Mizo rebels. The note also referred to a meeting of hostile Nagas and Mizos held on February 15, 1969 in CHT, which was attended by representatives of the Governments of Pakistan & China and where discussions centered on developing East Pakistan as a centre of inter-tribal coordination.13 But the emergence of Bangladesh after Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 war changed the situation altogether.
Pakistan’s Support to Mizos
Pakistan’s support to Mizos was more crucial. Mizo guerillas had an ideal sanctuary in CHT across the border. The long border of Mizoram with East Pakistan provided many ingress and exit routes. Laldenga and his associates had crossed the border in the first week of December 1963 and established contact with Pakistani officials, who were only too willing to help. The secret plan to send Mizo guerillas to East Pakistan was delayed due to Laldenga’s arrest on his return journey by Assam police, but was revived immediately after his release.
…a meeting of hostile Nagas and Mizos held on February 15, 1969 in CHT, which was attended by representatives of the Governments of Pakistan & China and where discussions centered on developing East Pakistan as a centre of inter-tribal coordination.
Within weeks of Laldenga’s release from the prison in early 1964, a group of 20 Mizos crossed the border to finalise the arms supply deal with Pakistan. They took delivery of arms from Pakistan’s military intelligence at Dohazari, a railway station near the port city Chittagong, from where the supplies were taken up in boats to Rumabazar and thence to the border village of Hmunmuan. The entire cache was hidden in deep forests near a Mizo village on the Indian side of the border half way between Aizwal and Lungleih. The support given by Pakistan was crucial in the success of Mizo uprising on February 28, 1966.
Months after the Indian Army launched counter-insurgency operations, large number of Mizo youths, many studying in Shillong, headed for East Pakistan, where Pakistan’s covert intelligence agencies had set up facilities for their training. Soon after, in the first week of July 1966, Laldenga left for Dacca to seek international support for the Mizo cause.
In the aftermath of 1971 war with Pakistan, Mizos lost a secure sanctuary in East Pakistan. After the defeat of Pakistani forces on December 16, 1971 the MNA organised a brilliant escape from East Pakistan to Arakan. On 17 December Biakchhunga organised seven motor launches at Rangamati; each boat could carry over hundred people. Thus began the great escape to Arakan, which met resistance en route by Mukti Bahini units, but the ordeal ended successfully and was one of the high points of Mizo resistance movement.14
The emissary of Laldenga contacted the Pakistani Consulate in March 1972 in the coastal town of Akyab (Myanmar), which helped Laldenga and his retinue in obtaining fake passports. Finally, in April 1972 Laldenga flew to Pakistan on a KLM flight from Rangoon under the assumed name of “Mr Zolkeps”.15 He would remain in Karachi to an uncertain future, till he was allowed by the Pakistani intelligence to go to Geneva sometime in 1975, again on a fake passport, to internationalise the Mizo problem.
Situation after Emergence of Bangladesh
After the liberation of Bangladesh, it was hoped that support to North-east insurgents would come to an end, but it was not to be. They lost their sanctuary but only temporarily. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Mizos regained some of the lost ground in CHT, not as associates of Chakma militants but as collaborators of the local authorities, helping them in settling Bengali Muslims in CHT and ensuring their own refuge in return.16
China’s Support to Mizos
The first attempt to send Mizo rebels to China for training and procurement of arms was made in 1968. To pave the way for the smooth passage of the gang through Myanmar’s territory, KIA was contacted for support. Earlier Lalhmingthanga, the MNA chief, had met Chinese diplomats in Dacca in preparation for the dispatch of 1,000 guerillas to Yunan (China) for training. Bualhranga, ambassador designate to China, led the gang. The gang met opposition from Myanmar’s forces but despite that the gang reached Chindwin River in August 1968, only to find the river in spate. To add to their discomfiture Myanmar’s troops had been alerted.
The Chinese trained Meitei insurgents not in Yunan but in Lhasa. The Meiteis under the charismatic Bisheshwar took an unconventional route via Kathmandu to reach Lhasa.
The journey through Kachin territory to Yunan was, therefore, aborted.17 Another attempt to send a gang to China was made in 1972. Unlike the earlier attempt, the second gang of nearly 70 led by Damkoshiak made it to Yunan through the Kachin corridor. But while returning from China, they surrendered to the Indian authorities, which was facilitated by an undercover operation by the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau.18 Unlike the Nagas, the Mizos were destined to fail in their efforts to forge a successful Chinese connection.
Pakistan’s Support to Meitei Insurgents
As narrated earlier, by the end of sixties, UNLF had established a fairly wide network of supporters in the Imphal Valley. This was also the period when after Indo-Pak war of 1965 the relations between the two countries were strained. Pakistan was looking for an opportunity to start fresh ethnic trouble in the North-east. The Meteis were at the same time looking for sanctuary and material support from Pakistan to give a boost to insurgency in Manipur. In 1968, a group under Oinam Sudhir was sent to East Pakistan to seek help. The group established contact with the Meitei community at Sylhet.19
But before Sudhir could convince the Pakistani intelligence, a group of 200 Manipuri youths landed at Sylhet prematurely, which upset the Pakistanis. They were not yet fully ready to give direct support to India’s insurgent groups, so soon after the Tashkent Declaration. The group was apprehended and put in jail in Maulvi Bazaar for a month, and later handed over to the Indian Army at Tripura border. They were lodged in Dharampur Jail till their release in 1972, in a general amnesty by the Government of Manipur.20
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