Indian Defence Review

DRDO excels in empire building and has spawned numerous laboratories engaged in similar and overlapping activities, thereby indulging in wasteful duplication of facilities. For example, a number of laboratories are engaged in the field of electronics and could expediently be merged into one entity to save resources. The Institute of Technology Management (ITM) at Mussoorie offers training in the areas of technology management, project management and R&D management for DRDO scientists and other government functionaries. ITM can be conveniently closed down and the same courses can be run at the Defence Institute of Armament Technology, at Pune which is a deemed university.

A visit to the web sites of the much acclaimed research establishments of DRDO can be revealing. Their much trumpeted achievements are so mediocre that one starts wondering whether their existence is justified at all. Instead of developing cutting-edge technologies, they produce many commonplace items and assign high-sounding nomenclature to them.

New DPP and DRDO’s Wish List

In a recent press interaction, DRDO chief VK Saraswat put across the following suggestions:-

• Instead of the current allocation of 5.2 percent, DRDO should be allocated 7 to 8 percent of the defence budget to enable it to deliver the systems that the armed forces need. He cautioned that the current gap of 2 percent would have a serious impact and force DRDO to prioritise projects.
• The armed forces must plan ahead to allow enough time to DRDO to develop the needed equipment.
• The armed forces must accept the concepts of ‘spiral development’, wherein capabilities are imparted to the armed forces in increments with inbuilt provisions for future enhancements.
• An investment fund should be created for MoD to fund selected technology projects by private sector companies, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
• Defence Equipment Manufacturing Zones (DEMZ) should be set up on the lines of Special Economic Zones to help defence industries.

DRDO is a member of all decision making bodies in MoD and carries immense clout. Therefore, the suggestions made by the head of DRDO merit serious consideration.

Establishment of DEMZ will certainly help build clusters of defence industries with common and interrelated infrastructural facilities. As regards setting up of an investment fund, it is a well accepted requirement. Taking cue from the Kelkar Committee Report, the Defence Production Policy of 2011 had also promised setting up of such a fund. No progress has been made towards that end so far. It is reported that DPP-2013 also contains a similar provision with SIDBI promising loans and venture capital.

Spiral development is defined as an iterative process for developing a defined set of capabilities within one increment. In this process, the requirements are refined through experimentation and risk management. There is continuous feedback and the user is provided the best possible capability within the increment. Each increment may include a number of spirals. India is already using spiral development through procurement of Mark 1, Mark 2 and so on versions. Arjun MBT and Tejas fighters are being inducted accordingly. For that matter, induction of a number of radars has followed the same path. However, the services cannot be expected to accept a Mark 1 version which is outdated and of little operational value.

Coming to the point of advance planning, DRDO has always been given unduly long time. It is not justified in putting the blame on the services. Even after decades, DRDO has not been able to produce MBT, fighters, training aircraft and infantry combat vehicles. The list is endless. MoD has been highly indulgent towards DRDO by granting it frequent extensions. Relevance of any technology is an incontrovertible function of the time period in which it is made available. Services should not be offered a technology which has already become obsolete due to delays in its development.

DRDO’s inability to deliver is not because of shortage of time. It is because of its sheer incompetence. Even if DRDO is able to make some progress in a few cases, it is always done with major compromises with respect to the stated qualitative requirements. The services are forced to accept sub-optimal equipment with the promise that subsequent deliveries would conform to the parameters, which never materialise. In any case, by the time equipment is developed and delivered, it becomes obsolete. Thus, the services are forced to live with outdated and useless equipment.

Coming to the crunch issue of additional funds, it is a totally wanton demand. On the contrary, a detailed audit is required to ascertain justification of the funds being expended at present. DRDO cannot ask for additional funds for empire-building. Every DRDO establishment boasts of world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls and hostels. A major part of its budget is spent on activities unrelated to real research work. Mediocrity thrives due to propensity for non-scientific activities.

DRDO has let the nation and the armed forces down. It has failed to justify its existence. Demand for extra funds should be considered only after DRDO proves that the allotted funds are being judiciously utilised. It must concentrate on ‘strategic, complex and security sensitive systems’ only. Ruthless surgery is needed to cut flab to make it lean, focused and mission oriented. All laboratories engaged in unrelated activities must be closed down to save vast resources. Considerable funds can be saved by amalgamating many analogous laboratories.

Conclusion

DRDO is always wary of conceding its inability to develop a system in the given time frame as it reflects adversely on its competence. More importantly, every import means loss of an opportunity to expand its own domain with associated budget. On numerous occasions, the services have been denied urgently required equipment because of DRDO’s false claims of indigenous development.

The case of weapon locating radars is symptomatic of the unreliability of DRDO’s claims. In 1997, India was on the verge of signing a contract for the import of Weapon Locating Radars (WLR) when DRDO intervened to stall it with claims that they were on the threshold of producing indigenous WLR. India went into the Kargil conflict without WLR and suffered considerable casualties. Incidentally, DRDO has not been able to produce WLR to date and India had to buy WLR from the same previously selected producer in 2003. There are numerous such cases.

Internally, DRDO suffers from a crisis of identity as regards its mission and role. It has forgotten its basic raison d’être and lost focus. Externally, it suffers from a lack of credibility. The services who are the primary customers have no confidence in its competence. It is quite understandable as DRDO’s past track-record is dismal. Most consider DRDO to be a white elephant which consumes considerable resources and produces little. DRDO must appreciate that credibility has to be earned through producing results and not glossy brochures.

Demand for additional funds sounds hollow when one sees wastage of current allotments. DRDO has to carry out a detailed and honest introspection to identify reasons for its failure to deliver and for the current state of total despair. Lost prestige can be redeemed only after all infirmities are objectively analysed and radical corrective measures initiated.

Finally, it needs to be recalled here that during the 1990s, no equipment could be imported unless DRDO gave green signal. Resultantly, modernisation of the armed forces suffered immeasurably as DRDO failed to fulfil tall promises that it made. If India fought the Kargil War with grave deficiencies of equipment, DRDO’s sub-optimal performance and failure to deliver are to blame. India should not fall into the same abyss again.

Whereas it is right to give priority to indigenous procurements, the policy cannot be carried to unreasonable limits. Claims made by DRDO should be taken with a pinch of salt. More importantly, DRDO must be made accountable for the promises it makes. It should not be allowed to hold the modernisation of the armed forces to ransom.