Indian Defence Review

Conclusion

So, the question arises, how do we deal with an enemy which is fighting a very different form of warfare with a well-laid-out strategy and tactics? The answer would be to train our own forces according to the principles of guerrilla warfare in which the Maoists profess to excel. The Maoist movement is based on certain ideology, the ideology of Marxism-Maoism and Leninism guided by the rules of asymmetric conflict. The Indian government can’t win this kind of warfare without defeating the ideas for which the Maoists stand to fight. The Maoists will never accept on their own that their ideology has become redundant. They will have to be shown the fruitlessness of their ideology by first weakening their fighting capacity and then by talking to them regarding the uselessness of their warfare. History is replete with examples of nonstate actors never agreeing to negotiation until and unless pressure has been mounted on them through offensive measures.

For example, ever since Operation Green Hunt was launched by the Government of India, several efforts have been made by different sections of the civil society to facilitate dialogue between the Indian government and the CPI-M but with no positive outcome. Offensive against the Naxalites will never succeed until the forces dealing with them have an understanding of their basic strategy and tactics, which means that the forces fighting the Naxalites will need to be trained on the pattern of fighting asymmetric warfare incorporating the principles of fourth-generation warfare, like movement in small units, less dependence on logistics and decentralisation of control and command.

The present initiative by the home ministry of launching a joint operation taking along all the states affected by Naxalism is a good attempt. States like Bihar and Jharkhand are not willing to be a part of this offensive, but they need to understand that Naxalites are not “citizens who have lost their way.” The recent episode where the Naxalites abducted four jawans in Bihar and even killed one of them during the first week of September clearly shows that Naxalites are in no mood to suspend their activities. They are manipulating the support of the “disgruntled tribals” that have lost faith in the Indian democratic system, guided by the principle of asymmetric warfare. The offensive is against the Naxalites who are waging a guerrilla warfare based on principles of fourth-generation warfare, misleading the tribals and using them to achieve their well-laid-out objectives. The sooner the states realise it, the better it will be for the counterinsurgency forces that are facing casualties every day in their fight against the Naxals. Individual attempts of states will lead to half-baked results because it will give the Naxalites an opportunity to shift their bases to adjoining states, a tactics of asymmetry which they have been following since time immemorial but which the government at the centre and the state fails to perceive.

Notes and References

1. For details concerning the fourth-generation warfare theory and its tenets, refer to the works of Lind, Hammes, Martin, Steven, Alexander and others.
2. United Press International. “Outside View: Exploring 4Th Gen War.” 14 January 2006, <http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Outside_View_Exploring_4Th_Gen_War.html>, (accessed 11 February 2010).
3. Bevin Alexander. “How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War—From Ancient Greece to the War on Terror.” <http://www.bevinalexander.com/books/how-wars-are-won-into.htm>, (accessed 23 April 2009).
4. Mao Tse-Tung. The Little Red Book- Quotations from Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Oak Grove, 2008.
5. There is mismatch in the references…this one seems to be missing
6. Ilyich Vladimir Lenin. Essential Works of Lenin: “What is to be Done?” and Other Writings. U.S.: Dover Publications, 1987.
7. Maurice Meisner. “Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China.” China Quarterly vol. 45, no. 2, January 1971. p. 36.
8. Party programme released by CPI-M in 2004 after the merger of PWG and MCC into CPI-M. <http://www/satp.org>, (accessed 21 January 2010).
9. Ibid.
10. Brynjar Lia, editor. Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab al Suri. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
11. Al-Suri is one of the most important contrarians and theorist-practitioners in the history of al-Qaeda. Ackerman has pointed out that “If bin Laden’s lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is analogous to V.I. Lenin, Al-Suri is the jihadist Leon Trotsky: eager to pick a doctrinal fight and inject a reformist current into Al Qaeda’s operations.”
12. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali. “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 30, June 2006. pp. 1–14.
13. Op cit, n. 7.
14. Sanjay K. Jha. “The Neglected Naxalite Arsenal.” Outlook, 24 July 2003. <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?220851>, (accessed 19 February 2010).
15. The message of MPP to the “Convention Against War on People.” Red Sun Magazine. <http://www.redsun.org/mpp_doc/mpp_200912_India_En.html>, (accessed 19 February 2010).
16. Op cit, n. 7.
17. Op cit, n. 7.