Let us now summarise some of the salient lessons learnt:
- Selection and Maintenance of Aim This is the first principle of war and has been revalidated in this campaign. The original Israeli plan called for a high tempo campaign – one week of Air Offensive followed up by a major land offensive with three divisions. In actual conduct, this was badly diluted and the Air-Land campaign lost its synergistic impact. There was a tendency on the part of the Israeli Air Force to “go it alone” and the Israeli Ground Forces have been vociferous in their complaints of a lack of intimate support.
- Massing Effects Effects-Based Operations can be successful if they are compressed in time. The synergistic impact of a massive Air-Land offensive delivered in a short timeframe has a far greater impact than if the “effects” of air strikes, artillery bombardment and tank assault are diluted by dispersion in space and time. The rate and tonnage of explosive delivery per minute has a telling impact upon morale and the will to flight – Battle Field Commanders must, therefore, strive to “mass effects”.
- Conventionalising a Low Intensity Conflict Despite these patent shortcomings, the one month long Israeli Conventional Campaign seems to have succeeded so far in deterring the Hezbollah from continuing its Low Intensity Campaign against Israel. That is a very vital Cost Benefit evaluation which merits deep introspection by other armies and armed forces.
- Layered Anti-Tank Defences This war has highlighted the efficacy of third generation, tandem war head Anti-tank Missiles and RPGs against Modern MBTs when fired in swarms from deep, well layered and well dug in defences, they can play havoc with a tank assault – (especially if it is delivered in driblets). This is one aspect that merits a very serious look and deep analysis on our parts. The Russian Second World War Krusk style deep, layered Anti-tank defences (with the modern Kornet E and Matis M Missiles) have proved to be formidable. We urgently need to study the Hezbollah, tactics and provide all our tanks with the Active Protection Systems like the Russian Shatora or the Israeli Iron Fist or Trophy or matching systems.
- Need for Heavy APC The Hezbollah made innovative use of Anti-Tank missiles against the Israeli Infantry. They were thus able to separate the tanks from the infantry and destroy the cohesion of the Israeli Combat Teams. The Israelis are considering a heavily armoured APC based on the Markava – 1 MBT chassis. We could consider a class of heavy APC possibly based on the Arjun Chasis or uprated Vyajanta chasis.
- Logistics Support Intimate Logistics in battle must be provided by the divisions. The over centralised Israeli Regional Logistics Systems failed dismally in this war. The Division is a tried and tested battle formation whose organisational soundness has been validated in successive wars. We should not tamper with such time-tested organisations to suit peace time cost cutting exercises. Heavily protected MBT chasis based APCs may also be essential for Immediate Replenishment Groups when attacking such dense layered defensive system.
Communications
The Israelis had created a Secure Communication Network. However, rolling the grid forward into Lebanon proved difficult as most of the key radio links were jeep/ vehicles based and could not survive in such a dense Anti-tank environment. There is a strong and urgent need to base such communication links on heavily armoured APC based on MBT chasis.
Aerostat Systems
The Israeli use of tethered Aerostat Systems for radio relay proved to be a very effective innovation. The Indian Army must consider acquisition of Aerostats for surveillance as well as communications relay.
Fiber Optic Cable
The Hezbollah terrestrial network was based on underground fiber-optic cable and has proved to be highly resilient and successful. It prevented the Israelis from jamming or intercepting their communications. This network maintained its integrity right till the end of the war, despite very heavy pounding by the Israeli Air, Artillery and tanks.
Hybrid Wars
The US Marine Corps has drawn attention to this as a new generation of hybrid war where non state actors like the Hezbollah make extensive and innovative use of high technology, like third generation Anti-tank Guided Missiles, Tactical Ballastic Missiles and unguided Rockets, Anti Ship Guided Missiles and very sophisticated and survivable communications. The Hezbollah made very methodical and detailed preparation for this war and have given an excellent account of themselves at the tactical level. In the subcontinent, we can anticipate that terrorist groups will employ increasingly more sophisticated technologies in the years to come.
Employing Anti-Tank Guided Missiles in Anti -Personal Roles
A major lesson has been the effective use of Anti-tank Missiles in an anti personal role in urban and semi – urban built up terrain. US and other Western Countries are now using Thermo- baric war heads on their ATGM for employment in Anti-Personal or Bunker bursting roles. We should examine and emulate this trend. 50 out of the Israeli 119 casualties were due to Hezbollah Anti-tank missiles. One such missile shot down an Israeli Helicopter.
Escalation Dominance
One of the major constraints of Israel was to avoid escalation to a level, where Syria would be forced to intervene. A major psychological degrade were the memories of the almost two decades long earlier intervention in Lebanon which had become Israel’s Vietnam (or quagmire). At each step of the escalation ladder the Israeli political leadership felt constrained by the historic memories of the earlier quagmire and the concern over not unduly alarming the Syrians. Perhaps it was these concerns that led to a serious dilution of the initial contingency plans drawn up well before the war. In any case the political and military overcaution displayed was somewhat uncharacteristic and not in tune with the “Sparta image” assiduously cultivated by Israel (in view of its lack of strategic depth). However, it did succeed in preventing an escalation of this conflict to regional levels. An air alone option does seem to have escalation dominance spin offs which must be weighed against the synergistic impact of a high tempo – Air – Land campaign which masses effects by compressing the time dimension.
Integrating the Special Forces
While centralising or integrating the logistics element proved to be some what of a disaster, this war clearly highlighted the need to create an Integrated Special Forces Command (being called the Deep Command by the Israelis). This seeks to integrate the three wings of the Israeli Special Forces:
- Sayeret Matkal of the Israeli Intelligence (AMAN)
- Shaldag of the Israeli Air Force
- Shayetet 13 Commandoes of the Israeli Navy
All these units operated deep inside Lebanon. However, their operations exposed difficulties in the units ability to operate jointly and coordinate operations due to different communications systems being used.
Special Forces Command (Deep Command)
To overcome these difficulties, the IDF have decided to establish a Special Forces Command – (dubbed Deep Forces Command) which will be responsible for commanding and coordinating all operations beyond Territorial Command Theatres. Headed by Brigadier General Tal Russo, a Veteran Special Forces Officer, it will become the IDFs eighth HQ authorised to operate Forces (to include the IAF, IN, AMAN and the Northern, Central, Southern and Home Front Commands). The Deep Command has been established with potential conflicts in distant theatres (like Iran) in mind. Previously the IAF exclusively was responsible for preparing for a potential conflict with Iran but now the Deep Command will be responsible for the ground battle aspects of such a conflict.
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