Indian Defence Review

India’s ‘Look-East Policy’, initiated during the early 1990s as a part of India’s attempts to cope with the post-Cold War shifts in world and Asian politics, has picked up the threads, lost during the 1950s and 1960s, of seeking intensive engagement with the ASEAN region.

Asia’s emergence in world politics has in a significant way, been concretized with the holding of East Asia Summit (EAS) on December 17, 2005. This is a firm first step towards building a broader Asian strategic community that can address the basic challenges of the region in the areas of trade and investment, energy security, revival of cultural bonds and ensuring of peace and stability.

The US has not been a part of EAS but it has formidable strategic presence in the region and the security relationships will be decisively influenced by its preferences and priorities. And yet, it may be in Indias long term interests not to project itself in the region as an ally of the US, particularly in building any anti-Chinese coalition.

There were initial reservations among some of the East Asian countries on India’s participation in the EAS but they were eventually set aside. India’s preference has been that the EAS, like the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) be driven by ASEAN and this has been so accepted. At the EAS, India, in no uncertain terms, underlined its commitment to build the Asian community, a vision that was articulated by Nehru in the concept of “Eastern Federation” at a time when India was still struggling to liberate itself from the British colonial domination. Nehru’s vision was lost in the whirlwinds of Cold war, great power domination of the region and the Asian rivalries. Since then, India has generally remained shy in taking any bold and imaginative initiative to revive its Asian vision. In the recent years, China has launched its Boao Forum and Japan has been pursuing the concept of JACIKA (Japan, China, India and Korea).

Even Thailand has floated the idea of Asian Cooperation Dialogue, that includes India. But India has remained a hesitant participant in some of these initiatives. The EAS provides a great opportunity for India to engage itself with the dynamics of new Asia that is coherent not only economically and culturally but also strategically.

Equations with the regional powers

The strategic architecture of Asian community will evolve at three levels–from the interaction of major players, the dynamics of regional integration and interdependence, and the substance of bilateral cooperation and understanding. At the level of the major powers, India’s emerging strategic engagement is constructive. It has strategic partnerships with the US and China and is building areas of understanding with Japan, South Korea and Australia. The US has not been a part of EAS but it has formidable strategic presence in the region and the security relationships will be decisively influenced by its preferences and priorities. And yet, it may be in India’s long term interests not to project itself in the region as an ally of the US, particularly in building any anti-Chinese coalition.

There is a lose talk of structuring an “Asian NATO” to ensure that a powerful and assertive China, in the years and decades to come, does not dominate the region. It would be in India’s own long term interests to ensure that no single country dominated the region, but the coldwarish coalitions would in general be counter productive. India’s efforts should be geared towards keeping such coalitions off the region, and not participate in them if they are forged.

The major strategic concern in the EAS region arises from the rise of China and its consequences. India has a complex framework of engagement with China”¦

The major strategic concern in the EAS region arises from the rise of China and its consequences. India has a complex framework of engagement with China where there are areas of competition, cooperation and conflict (C3) operating simultaneously with varying paces and thrusts. Therefore while taking cognizance of the area of incompatibility and even conflict, India must vigorously pursue its constructive engagement with China. This may in the long run hope to moderate and soften incompatibilities in the interests of the two Asian giants. There are indications that China is also aware of this potentiality and would want to ensure, at least in the short and medium term prospects to ensure that India does not join any of the China-containing coalitions forged by the US, Japan or other major powers. Defining its role in the emerging balance of forces in its eastern neighbourhood without vitiating its relations with China is the real challenge for India.

In this respect, statements like that of India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, at the India Economic Forum in New Delhi on November 28, 2005, that “India and the United States can contribute to a much better balance in the Asian region”, tend to mislead. The problem lies not with India’s aspirations to contribute constructively to the Asian peace and stability but in clubbing itself with the US, or any other major player in the region for structuring regional balance. As against this, Prime Minister has been forthright in asserting that India is not in the business of counterbalancing or competing with China in Asia. This does not preclude India from cooperating bilaterally or multilaterally with the US or any other country, or group of countries, in ensuring maritime security as India did in Malacca Strait by escorting US ships in 2002.

It would be better to broaden this concept at the Asian level without encouraging such alliances or coalitions that prompt and reinforce conflictual or antagonistic engagements and threaten the stability of the regional balance.

Similarly, India has also established strategic partnership with Japan, which may be dominated by economic interactions in the immediate context but will not exclude security and strategic relationship as it evolves. ASEAN constitutes the core of EAS as mentioned above. It has consistently evolved a resilient multidimensional strategic balance in the region through constructive engagements both with the regional as well as extra regional powers. This is evident in the ARF where India is an important partner, by virtue of being a dialogue partner of ASEAN on the lines of other countries like the US, Japan, China and Russia.

It would be better to broaden this concept at the Asian level without encouraging such alliances or coalitions that prompt and reinforce conflictual or antagonistic engagements and threaten the stability of the regional balance.  The elements of this approach were inherent in Shyam Saran’s India Economic Forum statement where he elaborated by saying “We believe in terms of managing the emerging security scenario in Asia, we need to bring more and more countries within the discipline of a mutually agreed security paradigm for the region”.

It is this thrust in India’s approach that is reflected in India’s ship visits, naval exercises and strategic dialogues, with or without the label of “strategic partnership” with all the major players in the region including the US, China, Japan and Australia. India’s participation in the core group constituted to respond to the Tsunami disaster was an important initiative in this respect. It was constituted under the US leadership and other members included were Japan and Australia. India was one of the fastest to reach the disaster sights and it was also the first to complete the assign task and get out of the affected countries. There was some misunderstanding initially on the size and nature of deployments.

The independent India tried to revive and reinforce its engagement with the extended neighbours in the east”¦

The US also stayed longer in sensitive locations like Aceh, where it came under criticism from Indonesian media and commentators for its alleged strategic objectives covered under Tsunami relief operation. India has been careful in avoiding such situations and should do so in future also while participating in multilateral operations of strategic importance. The substance of interaction with these neighbours of course differs in each case depending upon the commonality of concerns and interests.

Criticality of ASEAN

At the level of regional integration and interdependence, engagement with ASEAN is of critical importance to India. India has centuries’ old cultural and civilisational bonds with the ASEAN region. These bonds manifest even today in diverse and varied forms at the level of people to people relations. Strategic perspective was added to these bonds and nursed during the British period. India has to cultivate this strategic perspective without the aura or the stink of imperial and colonial domination.

“¦India not only had to shatter the myth created by vested interests in the region about its expansionist naval development, but also contain adversarial developments in its immediate neighbourhood.

The independent India tried to revive and reinforce its engagement with the extended neighbours in the east; such as by helping Myanmar (then Burma) in 1947-48, fight its internal threats, Indonesia in getting independence by mobilising international support against the Dutch obduracy, and the former Indo-China countries (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) secure peace and stability through the implementation of Geneva Accords of 1954. Indian investments also moved towards its eastern neighbours, in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia during the late 1950s and 1960s.  However, these efforts did not take India far due to the Cold war divisions and Asian rivalries. There emerged a possibility of India becoming a dialogue partner of ASEAN in May 1980, but the Cambodian conflict vitiated that opportunity.

India’s ‘Look-East Policy’, initiated during the early 1990s as a part of India’s attempts to cope with the post-Cold War shifts in world and Asian politics, has picked up the threads, lost during the 1950s and 1960s, of seeking intensive engagement with the ASEAN region. The policy was initiated both for economic and strategic considerations. Economically, a liberalising India, in search of trade expansion and investments could not afford to keep away from dynamic ASEAN economies.

Strategically, India not only had to shatter the myth created by vested interests in the region about its expansionist naval development, but also contain adversarial developments in its immediate neighbourhood.

Myanmar immediately became an area of concern for India, partly due to the spill-over of internal instability in the form of support for its northeast insurgents and also because of the growing military presence of China and Pakistan. To address these concerns, radical shift in India’s stance towards Myanmar was introduced with its engagement with the military regime at the cost of its good-will and years of support for the democratic forces. The change in India’s Myanmar policy was the bold and concrete manifestation of its innovative and courageous ‘Look-East Policy’ that was primarily driven by security interests.

The change in Indias Myanmar policy was the bold and concrete manifestation of its innovative and courageous “˜Look-East Policy that was primarily driven by security interests.

Through this policy, India has sought to integrate itself, both economically and strategically with the Southeast Asian region. India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1994 and a full dialogue partner in 1995. That year India also became a member of the first regional security forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), setup in the region. Since then India has been deepening its integration with the region, both within ASEAN and out side.

The culmination of India’s integration with ASEAN can be seen in the establishment of ASEAN-India summit in 2002 and India’s participation in the EAS in 2005. Then there is Indian partnership in BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) established in 1997, and in Mekong – Ganga Cooperation Initiative launched in 2000. In all these forums security interests and concerns of the member countries are deliberated upon and appropriate actions are initiated.

All the member countries acknowledge India’s willingness and capabilities to undertake appropriate obligations to advance the cause of peace and security in the region. This is because India acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation during its second Summit with ASEAN (+1) in October 2003 at Bali, Indonesia. India also signed at Bali the joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

“¦a specific thrust in Indias approach to terrorism which may be useful for the overall ASEAN regional perspective. India does not over emphasise the Islamic extremist dimension of terrorism and the Indian experience shows that its own Muslim population has not joined the ranks of the Jihadi extremists.

At the Vientiane Summit in 2004, ASEAN – India Partnership of Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity was also concluded. After its 1998 nuclear explosions and declaration to have nuclear weapons, India has tried to alleviate concerns of the ASEAN members that its nuclear programme is aimed strictly to ensure India’s security interests and will not be used to advance any warlike or hegemonic objectives. In this respect, India also endorsed ASEAN’s proposal for regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This is a revised version of the earlier concept of Zone of Freedom, Peace and Neutrality (ZOFPAN). Through all these Treaties and Agreements, India has tried to establish its credentials as a dependable partner in ensuring regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

It may be pertinent to mention here that the upgrading of India’s naval facilities in its Andman and Nicobar Islands is of vital importance in enabling India to play a useful role in ASEAN regional security. India’s naval capabilities on these Islands are a part of its overall maritime security concerns where it has to protect its own 2mn Kms. of Extended Economic Zone (EEZ). These Islands are 1300 Kms away from the mainland but hold a nodel geo-strategic location with regard to Malacca Strait through which approximately more than $300 bn worth of oil and gas transits along with 40 Super Tankers and 300 ships daily. China and Japan, the two major players in Southeast Asia depend heavily on the Malacca Strait for their trade of $100 bn and $260 bn respectively.

In the two critical areas of countering terrorism and ensuring maritime security, India’s contribution has been active and constructive, both in building mutual confidence and implementing preventive measures. India’s cooperation with the US in escorting their ships through Malacca Strait during 2002 (April-September) under “Operation Sagittarius” considerably enhanced its standing with regard to maritime security. India has been willing to enter into bilateral or multilateral arrangements with any of the ASEAN countries to ensure maritime security, within or outside the ARF framework. Apart from Search and Rescue, the areas covered for such security cooperation include curbing – terrorism, piracy and trafficking of drugs, small arms and humans.

Many of the Indian terrorism experts have contributed to seminars and conferences in ASEAN countries on the question of dealing with the post-9/11 phenomenon of terrorism.

The speed and efficiency with which India could reach out to Tsunami affected areas in the region in December 2004, have also been appreciated. On terrorism, India needs extensive cooperation with the ASEAN countries because many of its terrorist and insurgent groups depend upon arms shipments and financial transactions passing through the ASEAN countries. India is also actively cooperating in intelligence sharing with the eastern neighbours in this regard and other arrangements such as Container Security Initiative.

There is, however, a specific thrust in India’s approach to terrorism which may be useful for the overall ASEAN regional perspective. India does not over emphasise the Islamic extremist dimension of terrorism and the Indian experience shows that its own Muslim population has not joined the ranks of the Jihadi extremists. Religious tolerance and pluralism is India’s strength that has constructive lessons for ASEAN to emulate.

For instance, Singapore’s Defence Minister acknowledged this positive aspect of India’s national experience in his interaction with Indian policy think tanks during his official visit to India. It was also impressed upon him that many persisting insurgencies in South Asia are not rooted into Islamic extremism. Many of the Indian terrorism experts have contributed to seminars and conferences in ASEAN countries on the question of dealing with the post-9/11 phenomenon of terrorism. Thus, India is gradually emerging as a positive and stabilising force in the region.

Building Dependable Bilateral Ties

The substance of India’s strategic engagement with the ASEAN region would be shaped and defined by the content of its relationship with the individual members of the region. Over more than a decade, there has evolved a regional approach in India’s policy that would nurse these bilateral ties. The main instruments of this regional approach has been high level political exchange visits, as well as visits by professional and defence delegations, arrangements like Free Trade Agreements and security dialogues, visits of naval ships and joint military exercises and agreements for defence supplies and training. The nature and extent of the use of these instruments or mechanisms depend upon the quality and strength of relationship with a given country.

India is now willing to supply military hardware to Myanmar. All this is done under a bilateral security dialogue instituted during the early Nineties.

In India’s perception, there exists two clearly identifiable clusters of ASEAN when it comes to building strong and dependable bilateral ties in the region namely; the old ASEAN (of six initial member countries namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines and Brunei) and the new ASEAN (of four countries that were given membership during the 1990s; i.e. Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). Both these clusters differ in their economic performances and strategic perspectives. India’s economic synergies with these two clusters also operate at two different levels. While India is capable and willing of offering support to the new ASEAN in the areas of human resource development, technical know-how and credit line on softer terms, it looks towards the old ASEAN for investments, trade and financial arrangements.

In defence terms, the new ASEAN borders China and forms a sort of security link for India since the Sixties, in particular. That was perhaps the reason why India went out of its way in endorsing the Vietnamese approach to the Cambodian question during the 1980s even at the cost of damaging the then available prospects of joining ASEAN (old) as a dialogue partner. This was mistaken at that time as a manifestation of India’s pro-Soviet slant in its foreign policy. Peace and stability in the new ASEAN region has always been of considerable significance to India because instability and disorder there, as and when precipitated, has been exploited by China and other vested interests.

Indias defence public sector companies are also not apt in clinching sale deeds on a competitive basis, particularly in the conformity with the culture of the Southeast Asian defence purchases.

We have mentioned earlier that in some important way, the shift in India’s approach to the Myanmar military regime marked the beginning of India’s look-east policy. India has had defence cooperation with Vietnam for a long time. This has been strengthened during the 1990s and in the new millennium, covering not only training and defence supplies but also transfer of peaceful nuclear technology under international safeguards. 1995 also saw the beginning of defence cooperation with Laos under which India has been providing teaching support at the Lao Military Academy. India has also now agreed to establish a Lao Air Force Academy for training purposes.

In 1997, India also agreed to upgrade Laotian fighting aircrafts (MIG-21s, initially supplied by the former Soviet Union), but the Agreement could not be executed owing to financial difficulties at the Lao end. India’s Security cooperation with Laos operates at various levels. Both the countries are sharing intelligence and coordinating their border management activities to ensure that the insurgents on either side do not take undue advantage. In 1995, Myanmar and India conducted joint operations to curb the activities of India’s insurgents in the Northeast region. India is also coming forward to help Myanmar strengthen its naval capabilities and ports. India is now willing to supply military hardware to Myanmar. All this is done under a bilateral security dialogue instituted during the early Nineties. This dialogue has had more than 13 meetings so far.

Among the old ASEAN countries, India is gradually stepping up its defence cooperation with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. All these countries, in particular Singapore, has played a very critical role in facilitating India’s integration with the ASEAN regional institutions. Strategic compatibility developed with Singapore by India is strongest in the region where India has offered critical training space and facilities to Singapore security forces (particularly air force). India has also started conducting anti-submarine warfare exercises with Singapore since March 2004. India’s experience in defence cooperation with Malaysia has not been free of disappointments to the either side.

India could not complete its obligations to repair and upgrade Malaysian fighter aircrafts (MIG-21) due to both, the financial arrangements and technological snags. Thailand has been seeking a military supply relationship with India which could not take shape due to various reasons including the shadow of the financial crisis in the ASEAN region during 1997-2000. It is, however, hoped that new momentum seen in Indo-Thai relationship will overcome many of the past hurdles.

Indias strategic engagement with the emerging Asia is on the right track and it is expected to gain momentum as India streamlines its economic and security capabilities.

In 2001, Thailand and India instituted an annual security dialogue to deal with the issues of their mutual concern in regional and bilateral security. India’s defence cooperation that existed at a modest level with Indonesia during the fifties and the sixties may hopefully be revived.

One of the problems in India pursuing its defence cooperation with the ASEAN region is its inaptitude and structural constraints in dealing with defence ties. India’s defence production, being in the public sector all these years, has not been geared to meet export obligations. India’s defence public sector companies are also not apt in clinching sale deeds on a competitive basis, particularly in the conformity with the culture of the Southeast Asian defence purchases.

In this respect, India may also learn to workout barter arrangements in payments for defence supplies and services. The Indian defence establishments are increasingly getting sensitized to their constraints and the region’s market demands and it is hoped that necessary lessons are learnt to harness the considerable potential of building defence cooperation in coming years. For instance, India’s defence sales to the ASEAN countries registered an increase of nearly 9% by 2003. India should, however, continue to be careful in avoiding entanglement, if any, with bilateral disharmonies and strategic divergences among its eastern neighbours resulting from its increasing bilateral defence cooperation.

On the whole, India’s strategic engagement with the emerging Asia is on the right track and it is expected to gain momentum as India streamlines its economic and security capabilities.