Indian Defence Review

AWACS

What is Information Warfare? : Information Warfare (IW) in its most fundamental sense is the emerging “theater” in which future nation-against-nation conflict at the strategic level is most likely to occur. IW is also changing the way the theater or operational – level combat and military activities are conducted, specifically aerospace operations. Interestingly, IW may result in “operations other than war” being conducted, especially as it may permit a country to achieve important national security objectives without the need of forward deployment of military forces. IW then may define future warfare and be the central focus in any conflict in the future.

Information systems were previously second in importance to “real” weapons such as aircraft, tanks, ships and missiles, but today, they are so critical to military operations in general and aerospace operations in particular that it may be more effective to attack an opponent’s information systems than to concentrate on destroying his military forces.

Information Warfare may result in “operations other than war” being conducted, especially as it may permit a country to achieve important national security objectives without the need of forward deployment of military forces.

Information warfare consists of activities that deny, exploit, corrupt, destroy or protect information. Information Operations (IO) include psychological operations, electronic warfare, military deception, physical attack and security measures.

Historical Background

Air Power theorist Colonel John Warden understood the evolving nature of information operations. While he did not specifically define IO, he stated, “information will become a prominent, if not predominant part of war to the extent that whole wars may revolve around seizing or manipulating the enemy’s data sphere”.1

From an aerospace perspective, it would be proper to examine the air campaigns in the recent past such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq which will not only present the historical context for understanding the lessons learnt, but will also reinforce the fact that IO has become an integral part of US air superiority. In the Asian context, two countries of interest to India are China and Russia because of their potential to influence Indian actions by the capabilities of their air force, the maturity of their aerospace industry and their interactions with the Indian forces.

Kosovo and Operation Allied Force

NATO’s dominant air strategy hinged on the need to maintain the unity of the coalition. At the strategic level, IO was effectively conducted in the form of psychological operations, public affairs and counter- propaganda to maintain the unity of the coalition.

The efficacy of air power, especially PGMs along with IT, made the Chinese switch the focus of their air force from the defence of their national territory to both offense and defence.

At the operational level however, restrictions imposed on “need to know” basis created dissension among the allies primarily on account of inability to access information on the specifics of US F-117 and B-2 sorties, perhaps because operational security violations were discovered concerning NATO air tasking order sorties. Tactically, the alliance results were diluted by the coalition targeting process which resulted in striking many false targets thus prolonging the air war and delaying attainment of goals.2

Despite the vast quantities of ordnance expended, the air campaign was unable to stop Milosevic from continuing the ethnic cleansing, partly because air strikes against dispersed or hidden targets were largely ineffective. The other reason was that without a ground invasion or a deception plan to draw out the Serbian forces, the Serbs could use the terrain to protect key elements of information, such as force location and high value assets such as Air Defence (AD) Systems. While the Air Component Commander wanted to strike strategic targets, the Combined Force Commander wanted to hit the Serbian military.

Aerostats (India's first indigeneously developed balloon mounted radar)

Unfortunately, in the absence of a ground invasion by the allied forces, Milosevic was able to maximise the use of terrain, making it difficult for NATO aircraft to strike his forces in the field as well as his mobile AD systems. The Serbian AD command and control systems were however blanked out rendering ineffective any air opposition. On the other hand, the Serbs made effective use of decoys such as heated steel plates which confused IR guided weapons and these combined with the effects of weather and terrain on airborne sensors, delayed allied air dominance.

Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

Air power, combined with Special Operations Forces (SOF) and local irregular forces, subdued the Taliban regime in the initial phase. Precision targeting by SOF as well as Air Force Combat Controllers along with Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), were able to locate, target and destroy Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda forces.

The Taliban possessed few serviceable Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and AD Arty guns to effectively counter allied air strikes. Without conventional ground forces and minimal organic firepower, the SOFs and USAF controllers relied heavily on air strikes. The challenge to Air Power was to minimise collateral damage to Afghan non-combatants through IO, precision navigation and strike. This resulted in the Taliban occupation being reduced to one third of the country. However, Osama bin Laden was still at large and the Taliban quickly dispersed into safe havens in the caves and mountains.

Embraer

Targeting the Taliban in dispersed conditions was difficult as even the most advanced US ISR capabilities could not locate, target and destroy them. Hence, influencing the tribal leaders and other human intelligence assets became critical to locating the Taliban strongholds. These sources however, were often subverted by corruption or conflicting loyalties and hence became a risky proposition. These challenges, as well as dispersion of enemy forces and the use of surrogate forces, would extend the duration of the struggle for supremacy in Afghanistan. Coordinating of non-lethal actions, such as reconstruction efforts, along with the combat operations were necessary for the country for some semblance of normalcy.

Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

The 12 years of US experience of air operations over Iraq helped the allied forces accumulate detailed information on Iraqi Air Defence operations as well as the orbat of key Iraqi ground forces. It was Air Power that enhanced the lethality of the relatively small allied ground force. Along with air superiority, US planners integrated security measures, deception and other elements of IO to conceal the size and location of the coalition forces. Information Superiority was a political dimension as the US declared that hostilities were against the regime and not the people of Iraq. By most accounts, the Iraqi Air Force was totally defeated by in the coalition forces.

It can be seen that IW had played an increasingly decisive role in these conflicts, but for the campaign to be a success, the non-lethal aspects needed to be integrated into the overall plan.

China

Jiang Zemin, former President of the People’s Republic of China, noted before the start of the Iraq War that the PLA must use IT to increase the lethality of weapons and streamline Command and Control. The efficacy of air power, especially PGMs along with IT, made the Chinese switch the focus of their air force from the defence of their national territory to both offense and defence. The Chinese analysed that PGMs hit 69 per cent of targets in Desert Storm, but only 20 per cent in Kosovo. The lower rate of success in Kosovo was not due to inaccuracy, but a result of an ingenious deception campaign. Chinese analysts also attributed the success of coalition forces in Afghanistan to the small but elite units that effectively executed IW and leveraged Air Power to deny the Taliban command and control as well as freedom of movement. Furthermore, the Special Forces organised the resistance in the North and created a Southern Alliance.

Information Superiority was a political dimension as the US declared that hostilities were against the regime and not the people of Iraq. By most accounts, the Iraqi Air Force was totally defeated by in the coalition forces.The Chinese Military Commission (CMC), after analysing the recent campaigns recommended the downsizing of the PLA by around 200,000 men, alongside decentralising as well as giving more responsibility to their military districts and then addressed similar changes to the PLAAF. They downsized their combat aircraft fleet by 20-25 per cent, though their strike power increased by 50-70 per cent, with the induction of Su-30MKK, and F-10 aircraft. Their integrated information-based air defence network and growing culture of decentralised execution will allow them a significant advantage over an opponent operating on a centralised model of execution.3

US defence analysts reported to the Congress that the PLA’s IW units could not only attack enemy computer systems and networks, but also had anti-satellite capabilities. The IT specialists would also come from civilian institutions throughout China leveraging its population of 1.3 billion.4

Russia

Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s Minister of Defence drafted a white paper which viewed modern warfare as highly asymmetric where, instead of using traditional military force against military targets, it now engages military as well as a nation’s economic infrastructure with IO. Russia’s current military doctrine identifies IO as a means of countering military and non-military threats and also uses IT to bridge its short term military modernisation with long term systemic changes.5

In Kosovo, the Russians agreed with the Air Component Commander’s targeting priority by striking strategic targets that would compel Milosevic to yield and thus create the psychological impact necessary to win. This along with the help they gave to the Serbs to target stealth aircraft, were the IW aspects that Russia believes it can use to counter US air dominance.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, the information-technical element was demonstrated by precision air strikes against Taliban’s air defence systems and the role of Air Power in the ground offensive. The use of SOF demonstrated the information-psychological element by uniting the Northern Alliance and building the Southern Alliance from scratch.

IT can streamline command and control; provide greater collection and rapid analyses of data in real time and depth to counter- information operations.

A report by the Russian Academy of Military Sciences on the lessons of the Iraq War concluded that it was not the state of air force or air defence weaponry or the army’s state of low morale, but it was IO directed against Iraqi command structure that made it impossible for the Iraqi forces to achieve even minor successes.

Currently, Russia’s National Security Concept identifies their national interests and highlights foreign IO as one of the key threats to their national security. It identifies IT as a key enabler for transforming the military. It deduces that defensive IO, by securing information networks and using camouflage, concealment, deception and secrecy, can protect Russia’s IO and thus deny air superiority to the enemy.

President Putin placed military organisational reform as one of his top priority national goals. This called for a reduction of troops and streamlining of the services as well as military districts. IT can streamline command and control; provide greater collection and rapid analyses of data in real time and depth to counter- information operations.

India’s Approach

In India, there is imperative need to appreciate that IO is both a peacetime as well as wartime activity. A synergy amongst the services is a vital consideration. While the Indian Army, the Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF) will each have their own understanding of IO, they need to formulate a Joint Doctrine as well as individual service doctrine. The next step is to link up with each other, share information and commence planning and training for peacetime as well as wartime contingencies.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, the information-technical element was demonstrated by precision air strikes against Talibans air defence systems and the role of Air Power in the ground offensive.

The third step is organisational. Each service operates on a hierarchical model which will be most vulnerable to IW. Hence the need for a model, perhaps a hybrid model of centralised planning and decentralised execution. The services also need to set up computer networks with the help of IT professionals from the civilian domain for defensive and offensive IO. And last, but not the least is to consider that IW will be the synergising force to bring all operational and support elements together to achieve the common goal.

Conclusion

Information has changed from being an “asset” to a “weapon in and of itself”. It is vital then that one does not focus narrowly on the technologies to fit familiar, defined models of aerospace operations like speed, precision, range and lethality. In the process, one might miss the vision and opportunity for a genuine military revolution. Information warfare is real warfare; it is about using information to create such a mismatch between own and enemy forces.

As Sun Tzu would argue “the opponent’s strategy is defeated before his first forces can be deployed or his first shots fired”. And this is what is required to be done to face the challenges of Information Warfare.

Notes

1. Colonel John A. Warden III,” Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”, Aerospace Power Chronicles,” Battlefield of the Future: 21st century Warfare Issues”, 1995.
2. Benjamin Lambeth (2001). NATO’s Air War for KOSOVO; A Strategic and Operational Assessments.
3. AF Climenko, The Evolution of China’s Military Policy and Military Doctrine” Military Thought, Apr-Jun 2005.
4. Josh Rosin “China a Major Cyber Threat, Commission Warns”. Federal Computer Week, 1 Dec 2006.
5. Mary Fitzgerald (2001).” Russian Military Policy and International Objectives: Interim Strategies and Plans for Long-Term Systemic Change”