Indian Defence Review

Encouraged by the speedy progress of operations, D’Souza was tempted to induct another battalion, 3 Maratha, into the Kaiyan bowl. It arrived there on 16 December, and by the time of the ceasefire had secured the southern flank by capturing the Pathari heights. The operations in the Lipa valley were undertaken throughout under the command of Headquarters 104 Infantry Brigade located in the Tangdhar valley on an entirely different axis and across another pass at Nasta Chun.

After the ceasefire, it was found that the Pakistanis had suffered 18 killed, with a possible 24 more whose bodies could not be found, and ten prisoners, their losses thus totalling about 50. Only 12 rifles and two automatics were captured along with a radio set. All the dead and the prisoners belonged to the Tochi Scouts. From these statistics and information available from Fazal Muqeem’s accounts, it appears that the Lipa valley was held by no more than a couple of Scout companies. Akbar Khan had taken the justifiable risk of denuding the Lipa area to muster strength for his illfated attack in the Poonch sector. Knowing the constraints on sustaining sizable Indian operations there over precarious routes of maintenance across Tutmari Gali, it was unlikely that D’Souza could achieve worthwhile results.

Five months later, unknown to the higher command, a little Pakistani pocket near Kaiyan village surfaced. This pocket, within D’Souza’s knowledge and with the tacit consent of the Indian troops in the area, continued to be maintained through a track along Jinjar Nala which the Indians held on both sides. D’Souza withheld this information as he felt it might invite criticism of his conduct of operations, and he was anyhow confident that the pocket existed only at his pleasure as he had the capacity to eliminate it if it turned troublesome.

On the face of it, D’Souza’s performance appeared impressive on maps, but his difficulties were progressively mounting on the ground, especially with the snowfall and the increasing operational demands of the troops manning the fresh conquests. Ground-based maintenance could not cope with administrative requirements and increased reliance had to be placed on the Indian helicopter fleet, which was diverted from other important tasks to meet their pressing needs.

Along with the Lipa valley operations, an attack was launched on the Shisha-Ladi feature, part of the extension of the Tithwal bulge, on the night of 7/8 December. A post stands on the summit of this rocky feature, jutting out of Ghasla Top. It was at first reported to be held by a company of Tochi Scouts, and it was only after the assault on it had begun that it was found to be held by regulars, one company of 2 FF inducted after the capture of Ghasla Top and Ring Contour. The post was discovered to have concrete fortifications, but information about the location of bunkers and automatics was scanty. Supported by about five fire units, 8 Rajputana Rifles assaulted the position from the west, a very steep approach, with two companies and with two stops established south and southwest of the objective. The Pakistani troops displayed good fire discipline in that they did not open up till the assaulting troops were within 75 yards.

Our shelling set alight the dry grass which grew profusely on the feature, and the flames leaping skyward and smoke caused much confusion. The artillery fire had by then lifted. The defending Pakistanis turned the concentrated fire of automatic and other weapons on the attackers. This hail of fire held up the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the troops exposed on the bare rocky hill. All efforts to get it going again failed. Thereupon, the commanding officer launched his two reserve companies from the north. Pressing home the attack with grim determination, they gained a small lodgment in the enemy defences, but like their predecessors could do no more. They were subjected to defensive fire over our localities with a high-explosive air burst. As day dawned, the troops in the open suffered more casualties. The attack was called off very reluctantly at 1000 hours on 8 December. Losses amounted to two JCOs and 35 other ranks killed, two officers, two JCOs and 65 other ranks wounded, and one officer and three other ranks missing or believed killed.

The next attack was on the Wanjal complex, east of Ghasla Top, and the Shisha Ladi feature. Wanjal, an oblong 1,096 metres long, was known to be held in four different localities in depth by about a platoom strength each. 3 Bihar was relieved from the picquet line by 8 Rajputana Rifles after the abortive attempt to capture Shisha Ladi and was given the task of capturing the Wanjal complex. The battalion set about its tasks methodically. Destruction of enemy bunkers was undertaken by the direct fire of a section of mountain guns and by the precision shooting of two medium guns, commencing in the first light of 14 December. In addition, two fighter bombers carried out sorties against Brith Wari Gali and Pakistani gun positions in the general area of Tilwara. Most of the bunkers had been damaged before the attack went in on the night of 14/15 December.

The assault proceeded along the spur from the north over a narrow frontage because of restricted space for development. Meanwhile, the commando platoon had infiltrated, and finding one of the depth localities on the complex vacant occupied it. That scaled the fate of the Pakistanis holding the complex. The assaulting troops closed in soon and captured the forward localities after a brief hand-to-hand fight. The whole complex fell into the hands of 3 Bihar soon after and they were well entrenched on the feature by first light on 15 December. The Pakistani casualties were 18 dead, five wounded and one prisoner who belonged to 16 POK, against four of our men killed and 29 wounded. The complex was held by no more than a platoon plus of PoK troops. In this attack, commando platoons from two other battalions played a significant part in establishing roadblocks along the Pakistani routes of maintenance and by raiding gun positions. This success to some extent compensated for D’Souza’s earlier failure at Shisha Ladi.

But unknown to D’Souza the Pakistanis had made considerable encroachments between the Wankal complex and the Lipa valley in the general area of Katran Ki Gali. The pluses and minuses of the extension of the Tithwal bulge in the south were evening out concurrently. Meanwhile, reports continued of BSF advances in the frozen lakes area of Minimarg throughout the operations, and by the end of hostilities this force claimed to dominate the line of the Kishanganga and the road and track communications running along it.

When stock was taken of the territory lost and gained in the conflict at the end of December 1971, 19 Infantry Division showed a spectacullar gain of approximately 150 square kilometres of Pakistani-occupied territory. Heavy snow covered the mountain heights, froze the lakes in the Minimarg area, obliterated the memory of setbacks in battle, and brought to the fore the showy sense of achievement. So impressed was the hierarchy with D’Souza’s performance that he was one of the first divisional commanders to be awarded a Param Vashist Seva Medal.But the veil of illusion started gradually lifting with the melting snows and the realities buried underneath began to emerge.the D’Souza became conscious of the little Pakistani pocket in the Kaiyan bowl. He tried to negotiate with the Pakistanis on vacating the pocket, but without result. He decided to eliminate it in early May, 1972, using force. For this, he initially inducted one company of 2 Guards and attacked the pocket, but without adequate artillery support. The attack failed as a logical outcome of an ill-conceived plan.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani reserves transferred from opposite the Lipa valley had returned and Tikka Khan, now at the helm of affairs and seeking an opportunity to rehabilitate the image of the Pakistani Army after the Bangladesh debacle, was prepared to hit back at the slightest provocation. Jumping at the opportunity D’Souza’s move offered, he hit the Indian forward positions in the Lipa valley and threw 9 Sikh back at one blow.

Because of the precarious and restricted flow of materials by man and animal pack across Tutmari Gali, defended localities could not be fully developed with minefield, wire, bunkers with overhead cover and so on, and as such they had little defence potential against determined attacks supported by a preponde rance of artillery which the Indians tried to match with two medium guns, the only artillery which could be brought to bear in the Lipa valley. The headlines in Indian newspapers the next day announcing the reverses and the loud propaganda of Radio. Pakistan embarrassed the Indian Government in general and the Army in particular.

The command and control of the Lipa valley operations, particularly at the time of this reverse, was very peculiar. The brigade commander from the Tithwal sector was moved in to conduct the operations. He was still on the home side of Tutmari Gali when the Pakistanis attacked and could do no more than get the reports of the reverse on the radio. His headquarters in turn were handed over to D’Souza’s Colonel General Staff as a temporary measure, while the brigadier in charge of the reserve brigade, now without troops, was cooling his heels somewhere in the Gulmarg sector. To stall further Pakistani advances, the remainder of 2 Guards was hurriedly inducted into the Kaiyan bowl and Headquarters Reserve Brigade brought into command the sector.

As the snow melted and negotiations to delineate the line of control proceeded between the Indian and Pakistani military teams the original claims of physical domination in respect of 19 Infantry Division started shrinking, especially in the Minimarg lake area. Proportionately, the military reputation of D’Souza started waning in the eyes of the hierarchy. About the direction and the conduct of operations in the 19 Infantry Divisional sector it can now be said that there did not appear to be any purpose behind them which could enhance the Indian offensive or defensive capability in the future. The extension of the Tithwal bulge and the annexation of a portion of the Lipa valley had not brought any tactical advantage. Contrarily, both had proved an administrative headache and a tactical embarrassment.

If the two tactical areas of Haji Pir Pass and the Bugina bulge had been secured, this would have greatly enhanced the defence potential of Kashmir Valley. As described earlier, Haji Pir connects the Kahuta bulge with the Uri bulge and acted as a gateway for infiltrators into the valley in the period preceding the 1965 conflict. Any Pakistani thrust along the Haji Pir-Uri road also outflanks defences sited ahead of Uri. To secure this flank, and also to block routes of infiltration, it was imperative to secure the pass at the first opportunity. The Bugina bulge provided Pakistan with a readymade bridgehead across the turbulent Kishanganga to develop operations either to eliminate the Indian-held Keran bulge or to outflank the Tithwal bulge by developing a thrust towards the Lolab valley. On the other hand, its capture by the Indians would have prevented the maintenance of Pakistani posts opposite the northern gullies, as it would have take considerable time for Pakistan to build an alternative route of maintenance.

These were two worthwhile objectives within D’Souza’s sector, and he had one brigade group in reserve, the major portion of which (about two battalions) remained unused right up to the ceasefire. D’Souza’s excuse for this was that he was waiting for definite indications that Pakistan 7 Infantry Division had been committed elsewere before he drew on his reserves. This was not a valid argument, especially after Pakistan had shown its hand in the Poonch and Chhamb sectors. The reserve brigade group could have been employed after 7 December to secure either of the above objectives, but preferably the Bugina bulge, as Akbar Khan had committed his reserves in the Poonch sector and could not switch them to Bugina in a hurry. But he had the capability to do so towards Haji Pir after recoiling from Poonch and working from interior lines.

Both objectives had reasonably good road systems, and it would have been possible to support the operation administratively as well as from the angle of fire support. One or two additional battalions could be mustered from the holding force in dormant sectors to bolster the invasion force. The tidy conduct of operations under integral headquarters with adequate fire support would have yielded tactically more profitable results. It would also have fulfilled the Chief’s overall strategic plan for the coming war.

But this was not to be. D’Souza was a typical infantry soldier whose vision never travelled beyond the foresight of his rifle. Displaying little or no imagination, he fumbled from one situation to another like a trigger-happy cowboy with utter disregard of the war aims or security of his command. Despite the successes obtained by the audacious manoeuvre of tackling the prepared defencss from an unexpected direction by infiltration or wide outflanking moves, D’Souza launched frontal attacks with disastrous results and erosion of morale. As a result, he not only humbled himself eventually but embarrassed the nation. Despite his pressing commitments in Poonch and Chhamb, the Corps Commander should have directed D’Souza’s actions firmly as D’Souza was obviously incapable of thinking for himself.