Intelligence
When considering intelligence, it should not be viewed at from the narrow angle of Military Intelligence only, but should be looked at from the overall National angle. At the time the developments leading to the 1962 War with China took place, the intelligence organization of the country had not yet matured. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) was responsible for both external and internal intelligence; and the responsibility for external intelligence was only later transferred to the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). However, it has to be admitted, that even around this period, the intelligence organization has had a reasonable amount of time after Independence, to properly organize themselves and be able to obtain essential intelligence affecting the Nation’s security. While the Communist Chinese themselves publicly announced that they would march into Tibet and actually implemented their plan in October 1950, and no efforts were required by intelligence organization to confirm this aspect, since the Chinese forces had come right up to the Indian borders, a very careful track should have been kept on the subsequent build-up and deployment of their forces. When the Forward Policy was being planned and executed, the information of large Chinese concentrations was not available. Of course, subsequently, the information of such concentrations came to light through local formations or External Affairs Ministry. For instance, the fact that the Chinese had a strength of a Division or more in the Ladakh area was not known till a late stage. Similarly, the concentration of a division or more opposite Khinzemane, only came to light at a very late stage, after 7 Brigade was concentrated forward to attack the Chinese at Thag La. Again, the considerable build-up of forces in the Bum La area, for the advance to Se La and Bomdi La came to light quite late. All these concentrations, in such a difficult area, could not have taken place in a short period. The planning, movement and deployment of such large forces in difficult terrain, takes considerable time. As such, the intelligence organization should have been able to obtain information of Chinese moves, in reasonable time in advance. A careful analysis of such information, would have revealed the likely intentions of the Chinese.
The fact that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin, linking Sinkiang with Tibet, only came to light almost three years after the construction commenced. In fact, it was Military patrols which confirmed the existence of this road. The information more or less came to light, only after the road was completed. It might be stated that the Indians never suspected the Chinese to indulge in such latent violations of Indian territory. However, a major occurrence of this nature, should have been known much earlier.
From a Military point of view, intelligence does not come of its own accord, on a platter. It has to be sought and many a time, fought for. If Army Headquarters was not receiving the intelligence which it needed for planning, it should have prodded the agency responsible for it, before it committed its troops on any venture on the ground. At this time, Military intelligence also was in its infancy and was dependent on the Intelligence Bureau to a large extent. Lower formations had the capability to obtain intelligence of only the area of deployment of forces, up to a very limited depth on the enemy’s side. It was much later after the War, that this capability was somewhat improved.
At the local formation level, it was necessary that commanders organized their intelligence effectively, in order to plan their operations properly. In the case of 4 Division for instance, no proper assessment was made of the approaches from the flanks and the capabilities of the enemy on these approaches, nor adequate surveillance of these approaches organized. Thus, when the Chinese appeared in much larger strengths than what was initially appreciated, the information was not initially believed; and when it was confirmed, forces were committed piecemeal, and that too very late, to deal with the enemy. It is needless to reiterate that for planning and conduct of operations effectively, accurate intelligence is vital; and no efforts should be spared to obtain this.
Principles of War
Experience of warfare has brought out that there are certain principles of war, which if followed properly would help in achieving success, and which if violated, could well result in defeat. A Military officer is taught these, right from the outset of his career. Broadly, these principles are Maintenance of Aim, Offensive Action, Concentration of Forces, Economy of Effort, Cooperation, Security, Surprise, Flexibility, Administration and Morale. In this War, it could be said that the Indians violated most of these principles, while the Chinese adhered to many of them and thus were able to achieve success. It is not proposed to go into details of these principles, but a brief review would be useful.
It would appear that the Aim itself was not clear, as far as India was concerned. If the aim was to ensure the integrity of the Northern border, the actions required for the purpose commenced much later, after the Chinese had already violated Indian territory, and occupied large chunks, particularly in the Western Sector. If the aim was to prevent further intrusions, the plan followed, namely, the Forward Policy, was incapable of achieving it. If the aim was to throw the Chinese out from the areas occupied by them, again, the plan made and the forces employed for the purpose were incapable of achieving it. No doubt, there was considerable confusion in the aim, owing perhaps to the belief that the Chinese would not seriously react to any of the moves by India. It is felt that if there was a clear aim, which could have been to ensure the integrity of the Indian territory in the Northern border area, and if this was relentlessly pursued from the outset, by first understanding the requirements to implement the aim and next following it up progressively but vigorously, perhaps better results would have been achieved. From the Chinese point of view, it would appear that the aim was quite clear to them. They had regained control over Tibet after a gap of forty years or so, and never again should Tibet be allowed to go out of their control or be seriously threatened from India. As such, the areas strategic to the defence of Tibet must be effectively secured. They had constructed a road through Aksai Chin, which was vital for them and its security had to be ensured by all possible means. Further, as the predominant power in Asia, as perceived by themselves, India had to be put in its place and there was no question of tolerating any nonsense from that quarter. If necessary, India should be taught a lesson, so that the border question would be settled to the advantage of China, even if force had to be used. It was perhaps not their aim to remain in occupied territory in the North-East, at any stage. Keeping these issues in mind, there is no doubt that the Chinese pursued their aim, without any major deviation.
As for Offensive Action and Concentration of Forces, one could say that when India got tired of Chinese intrusions, and China even extended these to the North-Eastern Sector, a decision was taken to evict the Chinese, by offensive action. However, as brought out, the task was beyond the capability of the forces employed. Unless the requisite forces were made available and concentrated, it was not possible to undertake the mission. On the other hand, the Chinese were able to plan for offensive action right from the outset. Wherever they intruded or occupied large tracts of Indian territory, or wherever they expected a reaction from the Indian side, the Chinese had concentrated sufficient forces as a back up and to undertake offensive actions as required. Even for effective defence, the Indian side had not concentrated adequate forces or deployed them in a militarily sound manner. With regard to Surprise, there was too much publicity of Indian actions, so much so that the Chinese got to know of contemplated actions well before hand, and prepared to counter these. On the other hand, Chinese reactions almost always came as a surprise to India. As for Security, the Indian side had not taken adequate measures in many cases. For example, when 4 Division were deployed in the Se La, Dirang, Bomdi La area to prevent further advance by the Chinese, little heed was paid to the security of the flanks. Earlier on, 7 Brigade was concentrated in the Namka Chu Valley, right under the observation of the Chinese. With regard to Flexibility, as has been brought out, as operations were not earlier visualized in the Northern border area, the Army was not adequately prepared for it. While it had the requisite mobility for warfare in the plains, it did not have the wherewithal for affording it the necessary mobility in the mountains. Air transport was also extremely limited. On the other hand, the Chinese, who were already in Tibet for some considerable time, had developed the requisite mobility for their forces. As for Cooperation, while cooperation between Arms and Services within the Army worked all right, offensive air support was not available to the Army. This was of course deliberately kept out, to preclude escalation of the war. The question of Economy did not really arise for the Indians under the circumstances, but it must be said that the Chinese, while observing economy of effort over all, concentrated superior strengths at the places of action. With regard to Administration and Morale, the less said about these, the better. Thus, it will be seen that in this war, many of the principles were violated by India. The consequences were obvious.
High Command
The functioning of the High Command left much to be desired. For success in war, it is vital that the Political Set-up in a country and its Military High Command work in close cooperation and coordination with each other. In the normal course, the protection and promotion of National Vital Interests is carried out by political means, which primarily consists of diplomacy. When diplomacy fails, the Armed Forces may have to be employed. While considering the employment of Armed Forces, it is necessary for the political masters to understand their capabilities and limitations. Indeed, it is the job of the Military Chiefs to advise the political masters, without fear or favour, in the National interest. However, it is also the duty of the Military to understand political compulsions, and carry out tasks given to them even if they go counter to their views, so long as they are within their capability. On the other hand, if the Service Heads feel strongly that the interests of the country would be seriously jeopardised by acceeding to political demands or by submitting to political pressures, the only course open to them in a democracy is to resign from their job. A Military officer is taught and motivated right from the outset of his career that no sacrifice is too great for the protection of the integrity and honour of the country.
In the case of the 1962 War against the Chinese, while Thimayya and his Army Commanders generally ensured that the interests of the country were not jeopardised by succumbing to political pressures, once there was a change in the High Command, regrettably the top commanders could not stand up to these pressures. They allowed themselves to be completely dominated by the Defence Minister (Krishna Menon) and his close advisors. Unfortunately, there was a crisis of confidence within the Military command itself right up the chain. This naturally had an extremely adverse effect on the functioning of the Military, viz, acceptance by it of militarily unsound courses of action, with the consequent disastrous results.
It is clear from the above that selection of Higher Commanders must be carried out carefully and great responsibility rests on the Government in this regard. An officer being considered for High Command or as a Principal Staff Officer, must be professionally competent, highly dedicated, possess character, inspire confidence particularly in subordinates, be calm under adversity and above all, be highly patriotic. Anyone who does not meet these requirements, and who may compromise National interests at any stage, cannot be considered to be fit to fill such posts. After the 1962 War, greater care has been exercised in this regard, but this is an aspect on which the Government has to be always circumspect. Any temptation to allow other factors to influence, particularly in the selection of higher commanders in the Services, must be resisted.
Force Levels and Equipment
It has been brought out that owing to the declared policy of non-violence, non-alignment and pursuit of peace and concentration on development the Army was somewhat neglected in the years following Independence. There was considerable opposition to any increase in the Military Budget. Strangely, some of the politicians who thus opposed any increase in the forces or improvement in the equipment, later took the Government to task for not giving an adequate response to the Chinese actions! Further, as no threat from China was envisaged by the Government, there was no expansion of the Armed Forces. As brought out, at the time of the Chinese Conflict, the Indian Army had only about 7 divisions or so. These were more oriented towards fighting in the plains. Further, the equipment of these formations was of Second World War vintage. In every respect, the Chinese had superior equipment. Once it became clear that the Army had to be utilized against the Chinese, new formations and units were raised in haste. These raisings were not based on a thorough analysis of the threat and force requirements. Further, the units and formations were not properly integrated. In the case of 4 Corps, which was the formation responsible for the conduct of operations in NEFA when the crunch came, the raising of this Headquarters started more or less when the battle had already commenced. Headquarters 33 Corps, which itself was a new formation, but which had been in control at least for some time, was side-stepped, perhaps for reasons other than Military. The consequences of all these were, that the Army went into battle unprepared, ill-equipped and in inferior strength.
After the 1962 War, for the first time after Independence, an analysis was made, though somewhat hastily, of the needs of the Indian Armed Forces in general and those of the Army in particular. Raisings of some new formations and equipping them with some new equipment for mountain warfare, but not in terms of heavier equipment required for plains warfare, was carried out with the assistance of friendly countries. However, subsequently, better planning and build up was carried out. The lesson that comes out from this is that, although the country may believe and follow policies of a peaceful nature, others and particularly the adversaries, may not oblige or reciprocate, as would be evident from the course of events that took place subsequently. Hence, in the National Interests, it is essential to ensure that at no stage is the country ever found wanting as far as its defence preparedness is concerned.
Civilian Understanding of Defence
It is abundantly clear from this War, that there was inadequate understanding, or for that matter, little understanding, of Defence among the civilians in general. National security is not merely the responsibility of the Armed Forces alone, but that of the whole Nation. In particular, the Government and the Parliament have the major responsibility in understanding the vital interests of the Nation, the threats to these, and in taking necessary measures to meet these. The civil servants and the Intelligence organization are responsible to provide the necessary staff support to the Government. The industry has the responsibility to ensure that the needs of the Armed Forces are fully met, apart from ensuring that the civilian needs to strengthen the economy are also met. The farmers have to ensure that the Nation is self- contained for its needs of food and allied requirements. Equally, doctors, engineers, scientists, technologists and so on, have all got their responsibilities in strengthening the Nation. The public at large must ensure that nothing is done which could weaken the Nation, but should do everything possible to contribute their might towards strengthening the Nation. In this connection, the duties and responsibilities enjoined upon the people in our Constitution (Article 51 A) are very relevant. The Media must play a positive and constructive role in contributing their own mite towards strengthening the country. Thus, it will be noticed that every segment of society has its share of responsibilities, towards ensuring the security of the Nation. Only when the Armed Forces know that they have the full backing of the Nation, will they be able to give of their best. The fact that they will only be launched into a war after a thorough consideration of all aspects involved and after they are properly geared in terms of leadership, equipment, training and so on, has a great impact on the morale of the Armed Forces.
In this War, it was apparent throughout that there was not adequate understanding of defence among the civil. To a trained military mind, it was obvious that the Chinese threat was being under-estimated, that the measures taken for border protection, namely, the Forward Policy was tactically unsound, that the orders given for the eviction of the Chinese were incapable of being successfully executed, that the plans for countering a major invasion by the Chinese were not sound, that the manner in which fighting was conducted did not inspire confidence and that over all, the Army was expected to achieve the impossible and was being let down. As brought out, far too much influence was exerted by the Defence Minister (Krishna Menon) and his close advisors and little heed was paid to professional advice, when sound advice was given in the early stages. Unfortunately, after the changes in the Military High Command, even suitable Service advice was not forthcoming to the civil.
In some of the more advanced countries of the world, generally there were some politicians and civil servants, who have had experience of service in armed forces. Churchill, the great war time Prime Minister of Great Britain, De Gaulle of France, Eisenhower of United States of America and so on are some of the examples, of even the highest leadership having had such experience. Further, these nations have a set up that is able to provide better advice and expertise to the Government, concerning National security. In many countries, National Service has helped in generally educating the people, and particularly the future politicians, civil servants etc., in defence matters to some extent. Further, a systematic study is made of defence matters in these countries. Whatever be the case, it has to be ensured that the right type of leadership is provided to the Armed Forces and that professional advice that comes up from such leadership, is taken due cognizance of; and rejected if at all, only after thorough consideration of all aspects involved. Equally, Honourable Members of Parliament must make a thorough study of defence and contribute their might towards formulation of correct policies, build up of Armed Forces, and in ensuring that the country is at all times well prepared to meet any threats to its security.
Concept of Battle/War
The manner in which the Chinese rolled up the Indian forces in the Kameng Sector showed that there was no clear concept of battle among the commanders at different levels. Every time, it so happened that the Indian commanders allowed themselves to be surprised, and reacted to Chinese moves without proper prior planning. Naturally, these reactions, hastily carried out, were unsound. At no stage did the Indian commanders regain the initiative or make the enemy react to their own moves, if any.
At the higher level, it was evident that the commanders did not have a clear perception of the war, which could take place. Although the civilian leadership did not envisage Chinese reaction in the form of war, there was no excuse for the military leadership not having foreseen it and not having prepared for it. As a result of various actions taken by both sides before the situation escalated into a war, the higher military leadership should have thought of contingency plans in case war had broken out. These would include likely moves by the enemy, own counter-moves, reaction by the enemy to these, and own further reaction and so on. In other words, the war should have been seen through in their minds, to its successful conclusion. The civilian leadership cannot be blamed, for not doing so.
From the above, it would be obvious that both at the strategic level and the tactical level, it is essential to visualize, how the war or the battle as applicable, is likely to develop and how the commanders concerned would react at different stages. It is only when a commander has a clear concept of the war or the battle as the case may be, that he will have a chance of success.
Training
The vital need for adequate training, before an army is launched into battle, can never be over emphasised. An undertrained or inadequately trained force being launched into battle is as bad as, or even worse than, an undertrained doctor carrying out surgery, an undertrained engineer constructing a building or an undertrained worker handling a machine. The Army comprises different Arms and Services, each having its own responsibilities, towards the successful accomplishment of a mission. For instance, while the Infantry may carry out the final attack on an enemy position, the Artillery has to provide accurate fire support to neutralize the enemy’s positions, the Engineers may have to clear mines, the Signals will have to provide communications, and the Administrative Services have to provide the logistic backing. In the plains, the Armoured and Mechanized Forces, play a vital role. Further, the Army is required to operate against different adversaries, in different types of terrain and climatic conditions and under varying circumstances. All these, require a great deal of training, both at the individual level and at the unit and formation level collectively. Apart from this, training is also required in working with the other two Services, namely the Air Force and where applicable, the Navy.
In this War, as has been brought out, the Army units and formations concerned did not receive the requisite training, for the type of fighting they were required to undertake. Yet, because of intrinsic pride and elan of the units of the Indian Army built up over a long period, units which were led properly, gave a creditable account of themselves. However, nothing can substitute hard and realistic training as such. It is necessary that all facilities are provided and opportunities made available, for the Army to carry out its training for war constantly and to always remain in a state of absolute fitness for war.
Strategic Communications
As no threat was visualized from the Chinese, no strategic communications such as roads into the likely areas of fighting, railways to suitable bases, forward airfields and so on were developed prior to the fighting. As the threat became evident, action was initiated to develop these, but the time available was very limited. For instance, the Srinagar-Leh road, though started after the first Jammu and Kashmir Operations, was only completed in October 1961; and the Leh – Chushul road could only be completed by October 1962. The general state of communications has been brought out in the earlier part of this Chapter and it is not necessary to repeat those details here. However, the fact remains that there was no strategic network of communications available; and this made the induction of the requisite forces and their subsequent maintenance, extremely difficult.
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This war has brought out the lesson that keeping in view the threats to the Nation, strategic communications must be planned and developed well in advance. The Border Roads Organization created at the time of this war, was given increasing responsibilities and subsequently developed a large network of roads, airfields and so on in all strategic areas along the border. In fact, they continue to work on these and their tasks extend into the future also.
Tactical Lessons
Many useful tactical lessons emerged from this war such as need for holding dominating ground, holding firm irrespective of any outflanking moves by the enemy, judicious employment of reserves to deal with such moves, security of line of communications, study of enemy’s tactics and evolution of proper countermeasures, planning operations thoroughly, orientation to fighting at high altitudes, toughening, battle inoculation, building up mutual trust and confidence between commanders at different levels, efficient administration and building of morale. Even now, these are very much relevant and should be carefully studied.
The Navy and Air Force
In this War, obviously the Navy had no role. As far as the Air Force was concerned, it was not employed in a combat role, apparently to avoid escalation, as also because of the superiority that China had. However, the Air Force continued to provide transport support and communication facility to the Army and undertook evacuation of casualties from the difficult areas on the borders.
Impact of War
The overall impact of this war proved to be a blessing in disguise for the Army and the Country. For the Army, the vital need for according top priority to the profession over everything else, stood out like a beacon light. Subsequent performance, particularly in the 1971 War, proved that it had learnt its lesion. For the Country, the realization dawned that for safeguarding national interests, realistic policies had to be followed. Again this was well reflected in 1971 and thereafter. However, neither side can afford to be complacent. The valuable lessons learnt in 1962 must be constantly kept in view by everyone.
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