Indian Defence Review

There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots, but there are no old-bold pilots —- Anonymous

One of the most important lessons of the Gulf War II, even though not so easily visible on a casual look, concerns the men who fight wars. The battalion commanders in the rank of Lt Colonels, who led the American forces in battle, advancing rapidly across 500 km in two weeks- against stiff opposition and tactics demanding great flexibility, were in their mid-thirties; and the soldiers were in their early twenties. Compare this with the Indian Army’s battalion commanders in their early-forties in the infantry and higher in other arms, and Pakistan’s 35 years! The situation in other services is not very different. The Chinese military used to have commanders in the age brackets of 70s. But as part of the modernisation process they have managed to reduce the average age of senior commanders (equivalent to our three-star rank) to the 50s.

This is the age for “effect-based” military operations and forces. This in itself demands that the men who have to do the fighting must be young enough for greater effectiveness. Go back to the Kargil War, and you will notice that the hardest fighting was done mostly by the young. Few, if any, of the older officers and JCOs led from up front. The difference of a few years may appear small, but it is crucial in any fighting force. Every professional military tries to keep its age profile low because it infuses the force with greater fighting spirit and enhances its combat worthiness. Our problem is compounded even more by the reality that today the defence services are short by 16,000 officers, almost all of them in the lower ranks and younger ages.

Empirical studies over the years have proved that the optimum age for commanding officers of fighter squadrons, the highest level that actually leads in war, is 33-35 years. Interestingly, the pay scale for Wing Commanders / Lieutenant Colonels starts at 12 years of service corresponding to around 32 years of age! This was possibly one reason that gave credence to the old adage that there are old pilots, and there are bold pilots, but there are no old-bold pilots!

Of all the possible options for terms of engagement, the present system adopted by our defence establishment appears to be the least cost-effective with minimum flexibility available to the defence planners. Revising the engagement periods of active service in the defence forces, therefore, has become essential to optimisation of manpower. This is the standard method adopted by all Armed Forces across the world. Every country has evolved its own method of implementing shorter engagement periods which varies from conscript service, to voluntary national service, and shorter colour service with or without graded reserve liabilities. The US Army keeps the bulk of manpower on active duty for 3-6 years, while Russia has a compulsory conscript service of 2 years, and China for 3 years.

The central challenge for all military systems is to ensure a young fighting force. Simple arithmetic would tell us that early retirement in a military structure is inevitable. And yet the defence forces must attract the best material to serve in one of the most demanding careers anywhere. This contradiction is resolved in most professional militaries by ensuring that people serve for a short term of engagement and then move on to a second career, either formally organised by the government or by society accepting the early retirees into suitable jobs with dignity and adequate compensation. The military systems that rely on compulsory service (including draft and conscription) inevitably keep the length of service short and normally less than two years after which the individual is released into the civil system.

The. problem is that the overwhelming majority of military men in India retire at ages varying from 35-odd years (for jawans) to the early 50s for officers. There are few opportunities for a second career at these ages. The overall employment opportunities in a developing society like ours remain low. But at the ages at which our servicemen are retired, these opportunities are even lower. The pressure on man management has, therefore, led to the situation that over the years we have given up the principle of a younger fighting force in favour of seeking more and more vacancies at higher ranks, and raising the retiring age to create more employment within the defence services rather than seek a rational national solution.

As a result, we increased the colour service for men from the earlier 5-7 years to 17 years and more by the mid-1970s. The consequence a decade later was a massive increase in the pension bill (which now equals 17 per cent of the total defence budget) but which still does not provide the individual adequate compensation for a truncated career. The reported rejection of the proposal by persons below officer rank to accept the 2­year increase in retiring age introduced by the Fifth Pay Commission should have rung a warning bell. But we seem to be persisting in policies that will make the fighting forces even older in future.

Looking back, it is clear that even for pilots in the Air Force (where the training costs are high, and hence the desire to utilise trained manpower for longer periods also remains high) the basic rules stipulated that a maximum of 30 per cent of the officers would be awarded permanent commissions while the others would remain on short service engagement (of five years) which mayor may not be extended depending upon needs of the service and capabilities of the individual. But for decades, the Indian Air Force had to seek special sanction every two years for a more costly alternate special provision to grant 100­per cent permanent commissions on grounds of improving career prospects. Active flying duties for pilots normally end with the level of squadron commander’s rank which is the highest level at which active pilots actually lead the force into battle. This rank, which used to be a Squadron Leader till the early 1960s, now is held by Wing Commanders for fighter squadrons, although that of transport squadrons was raised to Group Captain in the “cadre review” of the early 1980s when fresh efforts were made to improve career prospects. That was also the time when the battalion commander’s rank was also raised to full Colonel – a rank that earlier used to be an administrative rank and the vast majority of officers moving up were promoted almost directly from Lieutenant Colonel (battalion commanders) rank to Brigadiers (to command Brigades).

The existing manpower policy of the services is based on the need for having efficient and well-trained manpower, which is motivated and dedicated to defend the security and integrity of the country. The present policy needs to be judged against the following parameters:

Manpower policies must not only cater for the operational needs of the Armed Forces and the requisite quality of manpower that constitutes these forces, but they also need to take into account the social and economic conditions prevalent in the country. Indian society continues to be heavily rooted in the family, family values, and social customs. Unlike many societies, Indian culture and society continues to value strong emotional and family ties with parents and children, and bread earners try to do their best to take care of what are seen as nearly sacrosanct responsibilities towards parents in their old age. Parents support children till employment and marriage stage. The need and commitment to greater care of parents increase substantively as they (the parents) age beyond 55 years.

The family and social obligations of the individual (toward parents and children), therefore, are the highest during the age bracket of 35-50 years. This is the age bracket during which our servicemen face the greatest uncertainties about their future and most of them retire before even reaching the stage where they would have settled their children, besides moving very frequently across the country on transfers and assignments in fulfilment of their duties.

Even more important, even for those who retire at 50 years age or more, the last 10-15 years are spent in great uncertainty, with promotion / extension boards dogging them and their future almost every year. This problem is really acute for officers. These officers constitute the higher leadership of the Armed Forces. To start with, the promotion system results in delayed promotions so that a Major General (and equivalent) would have spent nearly 30 years of commissioned service (besides four years under training, which unlike that in the civil services, is not counted for seniority) before reaching that rank compared to the 18 years for the civil services to become a Joint Secretary. To make matters worse, only the past few years’ record is used to decide promotions / extensions and retirements. The cumulative effect of the uncertainties has a fundamentally debilitating effect on the operational efficiency of the Armed Forces.

Thus, the existing terms of engagement in the three Services result in a service profile, which stretches mostly from 17 years to 35 years. This creates the following problems:

Increase in Average Age. The average age of Armed Forces personnel has increased substantially after engagement periods were extended. The Ministry of Defence, in its evidence to the Estimates Committee (1992-93) of the Tenth Lok Sabha, had confirmed this. The Army HQ had confirmed that the average age of commanding officers had gone up to 46 years, and this had been a cause for “concern.” The Army HQ, on the basis of analyses of operations undertaken by individual units in Sri Lanka, had concluded “wherever there was a younger age group in a unit, it did better than the other.” It is obvious that the increase in the average age profile of the Armed Forces has been detrimental to their fighting qualities. The Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha had recommended that, “Serious efforts should be made to bring down the average age profile of the unit commanders.” This also requires an overall reduction of age profile in the Armed Forces.

Increased Cost of Serving Manpower. The cost of maintaining active service manpower has increased significantly as a result of longer engagement periods instituted since 1976. By one estimate, nearly 80 per cent of the defence forces personnel are now married and eligible for entitlements as such. Compared to the reality that a mere 14 per cent of troops were expected to be married even as late as in the 1960s, this increase demands a much higher investment in infrastructure like accommodation, schools, medical facilities, etc. On the other hand, in spite of heavy outlays, the “satisfaction” levels of accommodation etc., remains low (less than 60 per cent by one estimate) resulting in adverse implications on morale in service and lowered motivation for people to join the Armed Forces.

Impact on Resettlement I Rehabilitation. The present engagement periods extending on an average to 17-35 years (corresponding on an average to 36­54 years age) result in the least conducive system for reasonable re-settlement and rehabilitation of ex­servicemen. At these ages of separation from service, there are few opportunities for employment and entry at midlevel of management in civil, government and private sectors. The marketable skills of retirees are low. On the other hand, the social and family commitments of the personnel separating from service are the highest in this age bracket when the children are yet to be settled and the parents are old and require care and attention. This generates a sense of insecurity, years before the individual actually retires, thereby leading to negative influences on juniors and those that might join the Armed Forces.

High Cost of Retirees. The pension bill of the retiring Armed Forces personnel has been rising rapidly since the effect of increased engagement periods started to be effective in early 1980s. Although the pensions are pegged at extremely low levels, where there is virtually no linkage with the cost of living, the Army pension commitment rapidly grew from less than 15 per cent of the pay and allowances in 1973-74 to 29.47 per cent of the pay and allowances in 1983-84. In absolute terms, the defence pensions bill rose from Rs. 60.05 crore in 1973-74 to Rs. 2,855.98 crore in 1995-96. In eight short years from 1981-82 to 1989­90, the pension bill (which is now shown separate from the Defence Services Estimates) went up by 300 per cent; and in the subsequent six years by another 220 per cent. Defence pensions now stand at Rs. 11,000 crore, a figure equivalent to 17 per cent of the defence budget, but which still leaves the pensioner with a grossly inadequate compensation to attend to his social and economic duties. The country had 380,000 military pensioners in 1950, and 600,000 in 1970. Compared to this, the total number of Army pensioners (including family and disability pensioners) alone as on December 31, 1983 were approximately 1,259,000. It has been estimated that, with the present engagement terms, the number of pensioners will soon be more than double the number of serving personnel at the present levels of strength. This is also adding significantly to the costs of providing other “non­effective” benefits to retired personnel (like medical aid etc.).

High Rate of In-service Wastage. The study carried out by Lieutenant General K Balaram in 1985 concluded that the “casual wastage rate”, that is, the pre-superannuation “in-service” separation due to variety of reasons, amounted to an annual figure of 2.1 per cent of the strength in the Army during the five-year period from 1980-1985. This represented a figure of 39.1 per cent of the total annual wastage rate for the period. If this trend has been more prevalent, then it indicates the fallacy of longer-term engagement since it would imply that only 60 per cent reach their age of superannuation. However, this would be unplanned wastage and a major cause of the recurring shortages of manpower with respect to authorised establishments.

Lack of Flexibility. The present manpower policies result in defence personnel being engaged for 17-35 years. This leaves very little flexibility in manpower planning since a social contract exists between the voluntary military manpower and the State.

Socio-economic Pressures. The current manpower policies impose heavy socio-economic pressures on the individuals without offering them a full career. Since this affects mostly the middle-to-senior persons, their morale suffers and acts as a de-motivating factor for new entrants to the services.

The problem is that we have sought a second career for our ex-servicemen who retire in their middle age by their absorption in other government departments. This naturally creates serious problems of inter-se seniority etc, blocking the promotions of people in those organisations. The answer to better defence manpower policy clearly lies in reducing the tenure of engagement in service rather than increasing it, since the latter simply cannot take 99 per cent of the servicemen to a career equivalent to what is available to the civilians in govemment service (leave alone those in the private sector).

The most feasible option would be to revise the colour service downwards to either the earlier (pre-1965) figures or even lower. The Estimates Committee (1992-93) in its Report to the Tenth Lok Sabha dated August 20, 1992, had made the following categorical recommendation:

“The terms of engagement in the three Services may be reviewed and the desirability of a reduced colour service considered after examining the recommendations of the Committee on Defence Expenditure. The Government should urgently prepare an appropriate scheme for gainful re-employment of ex-servicemen.”

This recommendation had been based on the statements of the Ministry of Defence, which confirmed that studies examining the concept had been going on, and a proposal for revision of terms of engagement had been made. At that time the Ministry of Defence had stated (to the Estimates Committee), “So far as the Army colour service is concerned, we are any time awaiting the recommendation of the Chief of Army Staff. We have done a great deal of work earlier. We referred it to the Chief of Army Staff. We are awaiting his recommendation any time now.” (emphasis added)..A decade later, the Group of Ministers, based on the report of Task Forces set up to introduce reform in defence management, came to the same conclusion. What is still missing is action.

Reducing the colour service to a 5-7 years engagement (for officers and men, except for the odd specialisb.tion) would separate the military men at around 24 years or less of age. This would still be half of the best of western militaries. There is no reason why this age cannot be further reduced by lowering the entry age (and academic qualifications) and providing the additional education in service. This would ensure that those willing to do so could be absorbed into paramilitary and other departments of the government at this age with a 5 year military service to their credit. This would naturally lead to the average age of the military being reduced to the early twenties, and that of battalion commanders to the early thirties. That was the system till the 1970s and which amply proved its efficacy in the lightning campaign and victory of 1971 that remains a landmark in military history.

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At this retiring age, the individual would be eligible even to appear in the central services examination and various other jobs in and outside government. His employability could be further enhanced by university education and rehabilitation training at government expense during the last two years when the individual can be held on active reserve. He would naturally, be entitled to a suitable financial compensation in the form of a one-time payment of gratuity. The changeover could be spaced over 5-7 years.

Overall, this would be far less costly to the exchequer than the present system. The requirement of infrastructure like married accommodation would come down substantively. Above all, the benefits of a younger fighting force would be immense in terms of combat capability. And infusion of disciplined trained manpower into civil society would be a far better option than chasing the mirage of compulsory military service that many talk of. Above all, the individual would be far better off with a dual career than the current uncertain half-career.

The problem is that though the defence establishment has committed itself to this course of action for years, little progress has been made in actually implementing it. Meanwhile, our defence forces remain on the older side while they could be much younger only if the planners could get their act together. As has happened so often in history, the fighting men then have to pay for the failures of the planners.

This article was first published in IDR Vol. 18 (1) Jan-Mar 2003.