“In former times Tibetans were a war-like nation whose influence spread far and wide. With the advent of Budhisim our military prowess declined…” Dalai Lama
23 October 1950: A Telegram from Lhasa – An interesting original document recently came to light1: a coded telegram from the Tibetan Kashag in Lhasa to the Tibetan representative in Delhi. The cable was sent through the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) which forwarded it to the head of the Tibetan mission with a covering letter stating “with compliments”.
A first remark: this telegram, routed through the MEA, shows to what extent the communications to and from Tibet were in fact a monopoly of the Government of India.
The telegram was an answer to a cable sent by the Delegation to Lhasa. Thubten Gyalpo2 and his colleagues had asked for directions in the talks with Yuan, the Chinese Ambassador who, on September 16, had proposed a three-point plan to solve the Tibetan issue. During this first meeting with the Tibetan delegates, Yuan had threatened that China would invade Tibet if the following points were not immediately accepted:
The delegates were bluntly told that if the answer was not favourable, the Chinese troops massed on the eastern bank of the Yangtze would attack Tibet, while if the Tibetans accepted the proposal, Tibet would be “˜liberated peacefully.
- Tibet must accept that it is a part of China.
- Tibet’s defence must be handled by China
- All political and trade matters concerning foreign countries must be conducted through China.
The delegates were bluntly told that if the answer was not favourable, the Chinese troops massed on the eastern bank of the Yangtze would attack Tibet, while if the Tibetans accepted the proposal, Tibet would be ‘liberated’ peacefully.3
The Tibetans tried to gain time and referred the matter to the government in Lhasa who took more than one month to answer.
By the time the reply from Lhasa came (23 October), the Chinese had already crossed the Yangtze, Chamdo had fallen and Ngabo, the Governor had been taken prisoner. Here is the answer from Lhasa:
“On the eleventh day of the ninth moon, we sent a telegram, instructing you to proceed immediately to Beijing with our response to the three points. The response — as decided through a discussion between the ruler and ministers and referred to the National Assembly — was cabled to you so that you would have no problem in carrying out your mission. Now that you have received the telegram, you must be preparing to leave. However, His Holiness the Dalai Lama suggested that we should consult the unfailing Gems4 through a dough-ball divination to decide whether or not to accept the first Communist demand for suzerainty over Tibet, this being an important issue relating to the well-being of our religious and political affairs, and needing a decision that would not harm our short and long-term interests. Seeing the important merit of this suggestion, a dough-ball divination was conducted in front of the statues of Mahakala and Palden Lhamo in the Mahakala shrine at Norbulingka. The divination predicted that out of the three demands of the Communist government, the first one for Chinese suzerainty over Tibet should not be accepted as this will harm our religious and political interests in the short- and long-term. Since the dough-ball divination is unfailing, you should proceed to Beijing without delay, as instructed in the earlier telegram.”
The instructions are very clear: the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet should not be accepted. The decision which took more than a month was taken in consultation with all the different parties involved in decision-making in Lhasa, including the young Dalai Lama, the Kashag, the National Assembly and the god-protectors. The telegram continues:
The following week, the delegates were told not to proceed to Beijing as the battle was shifted to the United Nations where an appeal was made.
“There, you should meet important leaders of the Communist Government and regularly report their statements to us. In order to make your work convenient, we will reply immediately to each point of your report. On the first point, concerning the demand for acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, you should not make the mistake of using any word that may suggest acceptance. The second and third points should be discussed without deviating from the instruction [given] in the earlier telegram.”
As this is the last document available regarding the policy to be followed for negotiations with the Chinese, we can assume that some of the modalities for the negotiations remained the same. It is very clearly stated here that the delegates should “regularly report their statements to us [Lhasa].” The procedure laid down here was not followed during the negotiations held in Beijing.5
The telegram went on to mention Mao’s letter quoted earlier claiming the ‘lost’ Tibetan territories west of the Yangtze river.6
“Your telegram of last night said that the National Assembly’s letter to Mao Tsetung would cause harm. But this letter was the product of a unanimous decision of the Tibetan National Assembly. Therefore, you should take this letter and hand it to the concerned person immediately on your arrival in Beijing. As a matter of fact, you are well aware that you were selected from the best ecclesiastical and lay officials. The dough-ball divination confirmed your selection, showing that your karma puts you in the position to undertake this mission. Now, as this is a matter of our national interest, you should not be faint-hearted and narrow-minded in your discussion with the Chinese. If you keep the instruction of your government, as spelled out in the earlier telegram, in your mind and develop courage and farsightedness, our polity will not suffer in the long run. Therefore, you should work with sincerity and diligence. You should not worry since we over here have been conducting a great deal of ritual prayers.
The instructions are very clear: the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet should not be accepted.
On the twelfth day of the ninth moon in the Iron Tiger year [23 October 1950]”
The last remarks refer to the reluctance of Shakabpa to go to Beijing due to the bad experience he had in 1948 during the Trade Mission’s visit to China and further because he did not agree with Lhasa intransigence. He felt, for example, that Tibet had no choice but to accept the first point.
This was the last instructions given to the Mission while in India. The following week, the delegates were told not to proceed to Beijing as the battle was shifted to the United Nations where an appeal was made.
Another unpublished document should be mentioned. It contains the instructions of K.P.S. Menon, the Indian Foreign Secretary to Shakabpa, then in Kalimpong. The cable was sent through Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Gangtok, Menon told Shakabpa: “In view of the Chinese invasion of Tibet we would advise that Tibetan delegation should not proceed to Peking for negotiations. We have conveyed this advice to the Tibetan Government through our representative in Lhasa. Your Government will doubtless issue necessary instructions to you. Kindly acknowledge receipt.”
Five days later, an appeal was sent to the UN by the same Shakabpa.
By the end of October 1950, things finally began to move in Lhasa. Though the young Dalai Lama had not yet taken over as the political and religious head of Tibet, the Kashag decided to emulate South Korea and appeal to the General Assembly of the UN against the Communist Chinese act of aggression.
Their best bet for support was the Government of India, since for the preceding months, the British had made it clear that they would follow whatever New Delhi decided.
“I have received a ‘suggestion’ from Tibetan sources that Tibet would like to appeal to the United Nations against the Chinese Army’s invasion. I have replied that India does not feel free to sponsor such a resolution in the United Nations, but Tibet is free to appeal directly, if it so chooses, through the Secretary-General. India has neither the resources nor the inclination to send armed assistance7 to Tibet.”8
Their best bet for support was the Government of India, since for the preceding months, the British had made it clear that they would follow whatever New Delhi decided.
The same day Nehru cabled B.N. Rau:9 “Chinese military operations against Tibet … do not affect our general policy or
even our policy regarding admission of new China in United Nations.”10
For the Tibetans, it was a terrible let down, but the Government of India felt that it could not do more without upsetting the Chinese. Shakabpa’s orders to go to Beijing were cancelled and he was directed by the Kashag to remain in Kalimpong to help in preparing and sending the appeal to the UN.
On November 3, the Tibetan Government informed the Indian Government that since India was not ready to sponsor the appeal, in other words lobby for it, they would request some Buddhist nations to do so.
The Tibetan Appeal
The appeal by the Government of Tibet was cabled to the UN on November 7. The well-drafted appeal stated that the problem was not of ‘Tibet’s own making’ and that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It compared their situation with Korea.
Indias reply was that it would certainly support an appeal from Tibet, but would not sponsor it.
“The attention of the world is riveted on Korea where aggression is being resisted by an international force. Similar happenings in remote Tibet are passing without notice.
… As you are aware the problem of Tibet has taken alarming proportions in the recent times. The problem is not of Tibet’s own making but is largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination.
As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance and for the defence of their country, relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations. There were times when Tibet sought but seldom received the protection of the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese, however, in their natural urge for expansion, have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and interdependence that existed between China and Tibet as between neighbours.
China’s conduct during the expedition of 1910 completed the rupture between the two countries. In 1911-12 Tibet, under the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, declared her complete independence, even as Nepal simultaneously broke away from allegiance to China. The Chinese Revolution in 1911, which dethroned the last Manchu Emperor, snapped the last of the sentimental and religious bonds between China and Tibet. Tibet thereafter depended entirely on her isolation, and occasionally on the support of the British in India for her protection.”
Then the Appeal clarifies the position of Tibet vis-à-vis China from the beginning of the century to date. The Appeal concluded with:
“˜Tibets own making and that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.”
“We, ministers, with the approval of His Holiness the Dalai Lama entrust the problem of Tibet in this emergency to the ultimate decision of the United Nations and hope that the conscience of the world would not allow the disruption of our state by methods reminiscent of the jungle.”11
The appeal was signed by the Kashag and the National Assembly on the 27th day of the ninth Tibetan month of the Iron-Tiger Year12 and was dispatched from the Shakabpa House in Kalimpong.
The Tibetans immediately ran into the heavy UN bureaucracy. The first objection was that Tibet was not a member of the UN. Worse, the UN wanted to refuse the message because it had originated from outside the country of the appellant.13 According to the UN rules, an appeal could not be received unless it originated from the country of the appellant. India, UK or the United States knew very well that for technical reasons,14 all official documents/communiqués from the Tibetan Government had always been issued from Kalimpong in the past. This time the big powers remained quiet.
On November 15, it was the tiny state of El Salvador which requested the UN Secretary General to list the Tibetan appeal on the Agenda of the General Assembly.
But very few states15 were ready to stand by their professed ideals and defend the rights of small peace-loving, oppressed nations. Worse was to follow.
The Chinese Revolution in 1911, which dethroned the last Manchu Emperor, snapped the last of the sentimental and religious bonds between China and Tibet. Tibet thereafter depended entirely on her isolation, and occasionally on the support of the British in India for her protection.
Meanwhile, on November 12, Shakabpa declared in an interview in Kalimpong: “I have received intimation from Lhasa about the Tibetan Government’s appeal to the UN.” And when asked, “Does Tibet seek independence?” he prudently answered that:
“Tibet is a peaceful and religious state. China attacked us from four or five directions while negotiations were going on regarding relations between Tibet and China. Our appeal to the UN is that the Chinese forces be made to withdraw to the Sino-Tibetan boundary demarcated by the river Drichu.16 The second question does not arise at present since we have to settle the first question of withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Tibetan territory.”17
One can often note the Tibetan reluctance to state their objectives in a direct manner. Did the Tibetan government dream that the Chinese, at that point in time, would withdraw and begin negotiations?
The Indian Reaction
On November 14, The Hindu stated:
“According to informed quarters here, India is expected to extend her general support to Tibet’s case before the Security Council.
The UK and the US, according to diplomatic quarters here, are also expected to support the Tibetan appeal.”18
Two days later in New Delhi, The Hindu announced: “Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyengar, India’s Railway Minister, said today that India would support before the UN, Tibet’s case against China.”19
In Lhasa on November 17, in the midst of preparations for the proposed discussion of the Tibetan issue in the UN, the Gods spoke through the Nechung State Oracle in Lhasa: “Make him King”. Thus Tenzin Gyatso was enthroned and became the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.
Our appeal to the UN is that the Chinese forces be made to withdraw to the Sino-Tibetan boundary demarcated by the river Drichu.
The Tibetan Foreign Office nominated a delegation including Surkhang, Ngawang Gyaltsen and Trunik Chhenpo Chhombay to plead the Tibetan cause at the UN. It is not clear what happened to the delegation, but they never reached the seat of the UN. If they had, it would have certainly made a difference, but no one was interested in helping the Tibetan delegates reach New York!20 Certainly not Nehru, nor His Majesty’s Government, for this might have brought an unwanted clarity into the convenient confusion.21
The British Position
The great powers, in particular the United Kingdom and India, were in a different dilemma. It had always been advantageous for the British to keep the legal position on Tibet as vague as possible, but times were changing.
With the UN becoming an important world body, new rules were framed and the old vague colonial definitions had to be fixed in black and white: either a state was independent or it was not. No state could claim to be simultaneously under the suzerainty or vassalage of another state and yet be fully autonomous.
According to the UN rules, only a ‘state’ could make an appeal to the General Assembly. Was Tibet a ‘state’ for the British Government?
Surprisingly, after consulting legal experts His Majesty’s Government accepted the fact that Tibet was a separate state. However, the Foreign Office wanted to further study the meaning of ‘suzerainty’. The legal cell of the Foreign Office finally concluded that two factors had to be taken into consideration:
- Whether the treaties concluded by a suzerain state were ipso facto concluded for the vassal; and
- Whether war of a suzerain was ipso facto war of the vassal.
On both counts, it was obvious to the British Foreign Office that Tibet was an independent state.
The British Representative in the UN was requested not to mention the legal position taken by the British Government. The Representative’s brief was that though they had to be prepared to accept that Tibet is a separate state in case the matter came to the General Assembly, the British strongly favoured a mild action. For London the question remained: what will India’s position be?
Till mid-November the position of the Government of India was clear: India would not sponsor the appeal but would support it if raised by any other nation. Then India’s position began to vacillate.
Here we should remember that Nehru must have had the Kashmir issue in his mind; he had become quite disillusioned about the effectiveness of the UN. He wrote:
Surprisingly, after consulting legal experts His Majestys Government accepted the fact that Tibet was a separate state.
“… when Chinese troops marched into Tibet proper, we told the Tibetan Government that if they so chose, they could prefer appeal to UN. We could not, however, sponsor such an appeal, though we might support it generally. We cannot go back on our assurance and have, therefore, to support inclusion of proposal for consideration by UN.
…We cannot, consistently with previous declarations, support Tibetan claim to independence, though we can and should favour recognition of Tibetan autonomy. We should support appeal on broad ground that problem of Sino-Tibetan relations should be solved peacefully and not by resort to arms.”22
Nehru added a small sentence which speaks for itself: “Chinese Government has repeatedly expressed themselves in favour of Tibetan autonomy, but of course we do not know what their idea of autonomy is.”
But the Prime Minister had begun to have doubts, for in the same telegram to B.N. Rau,23 he replied: “We doubt whether a discussion of Tibetan problem in General Assembly or in Security Council will yield any useful result.”
The change in policy seemed to be due mainly to B.N. Rau. According to a telegram sent by Henderson to Acheson:
“¦ when Chinese troops marched into Tibet proper, we told the Tibetan Government that if they so chose, they could prefer appeal to UN. We could not, however, sponsor such an appeal, though we might support it generally.
“Apparently Rau was under impression that by not criticizing Communist China in UN re: Tibet he might play more helpful role in mediating between Communist China and western powers following arrival Communist Chinese delegates in Lake Success.”24
However, opinion was divided in India, as Henderson explained:
“There had been some sentiment among various members in the Indian cabinet opposing GOI taking any action in the UN. However overwhelming majority sentiment was regardless effect on India-China relations GOI could not afford take uninterested position re Tibet.”25
In an internal note on November 18, Nehru had written down his position:
“I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard26 in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any other powers, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in, is embarrassing China. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail.”27
At that time, the Communist nations were lobbying for the inclusion of Beijing as a member of the UN and the Security Council.28 From New York Vijayalaksmi Pandit29 expressed “the Indian Government’s disquiet about the Communist military invasion of Tibet which might make it more difficult for the Peking Government to qualify as a ‘peace loving’ nation within the meaning of the Charter.”30
“I (Nehru) think that in no event should we sponsor Tibets appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly.”
Again and again, oblivious of India’s interests and security, the Indian diplomats worried about only one thing: the entry of Peking into the UN.
At Lake Success31 a procedural battle was going on: the Secretariat of the UN informed El Salvador that the Tibetan problem should first be brought to the General Committee which had to decide if the issue could or could not be referred to the General Assembly.
Castro, the Salvadorian representative proposed that the following Resolution should be passed by the General Assembly:
- To condemn this act of unprovoked aggression against Tibet;
- To establish a committee composed of (names of nations)… which will be entrusted with the study of the appropriate measures that could be taken.
- To instruct the committee to undertake that study with special reference to the appeal made to the United Nations by the Government of Tibet, and to render its report to the General Assembly, as early as possible, during the present session.32
In a cable to B.N. Rau, Nehru stated:
“Draft resolution of El Salvador completely ignores realities of situation and overlooks fact that only result of passing such a resolution will be to precipitate conquest of Tibet and destruction of Tibetan independence and perhaps even autonomy. We cannot possibly support it or even adopt merely negative attitude.”33
In the course of the negotiations in New York, most of the representatives indicated that India was the nation most concerned and that they would follow India’s lead.34
“ It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any other powers, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in, is embarrassing China.”
The logical outcome of the British Foreign Office legal cell’s opinion was that Tibet was a separate state and consequently an act of aggression had been committed. As a result pressures would have to be exerted by the community of nations to take an action in favour of Tibet. But, nobody wanted to act!
The telegram of the British Representative cabled to London concluded that: “I greatly hope therefore that I shall be instructed when and if the Indians raise this matter in the Security Council, to argue to the general effect that the legal situation is extremely obscure and that in any case Tibet cannot be considered as a fully independent country.”35
Because the British diplomats did not want to take action, the British Foreign office had to change its legal opinion on the status of Tibet!
At the same time, the American Government informed New Delhi that they were ready to help the Tibetans in ‘whatever means possible’, but in view of the geographical and historical factor, the main burden of the problem remained on India and India’s collaboration was more than necessary in any attempt to help the Tibetan Government.
While the British were struggling with legalities, Nehru was rejecting them: “We do not think that legal arguments will be helpful or that the Assembly should attempt more than appeal to the two parties to come to a peaceful settlement.”36
At the last moment, Nehru backed out of the understanding India had given Tibet. He requested Washington to refrain from publicly condemning China for its action in Tibet for fear that such condemnation might lend credence to Chinese charges that Western powers had an interest in Tibet and that the Americans were exerting an influence over Indian policy. Nehru decided:
“We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.”
Tibet was sacrificed!
At the last moment, Nehru backed out of the understanding India had given Tibet.
The main reason behind Nehru’s volte-face was that he was very involved in the Korean issue and did not want to yield his role as ‘neutral’ mediator.
This is also clear from the fact that in his Beijing office, Panikkar was spending most of his time on the Korean problem and was hardly concerned by the invasion of Tibet.
On the eve of the debate in the General Committee, Nehru cabled India’s Representative at the UN: “We are entirely in favour of deferring consideration of Tibet question because of various developments, more particularly arrival of Peking representatives.”37
“Any particular reference to an Article of the Charter of the UN might tie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later which may prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the UN might just be a dead letter, which also will be bad.”
It is clear the Korean affair was much more interesting to the Indian diplomats than the fate of this small nation.
On November 24, the request of El Salvador came up for discussion in the General Committee of the United Nations, India and Great Britain moved for postponing the matter: Jam Saheb of Navanagar, the Indian Representative, said that “the Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China.”
The matter was adjourned.
The poor Salvadorian Representative fought till the end, he wanted every member of the General Assembly to at least receive a copy of the Tibetan appeal.
“We (Nehru) cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it.”
Though the Office of the Secretary General promised to do this, it never did. The final conclusion of the meeting of the General Committee was that “the Chairman stated that he would have enquiries made and would ask that all documents of that type received by the Secretariat should be distributed.”
The fate of Tibet was sealed and the consequences followed one after another, the first being the signature in Beijing in May 1951 of the ‘Agreement on Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’.
Mao now had the green light for a free hand in Tibet. He knew that Nehru’s India was little more than a ‘paper tiger’. Not everyone in India agreed with this policy of appeasement of Nehru and Panikkar. Public opinion and many national leaders were outraged by the treatment meted out to Tibet and clearly saw its consequences for India.
One of these leaders, Jayaprakash Narayan, told The Hindu in Madras: “India is vitally interested in Tibetan affairs and she should do all that is possible to enable the Tibetan people to maintain her independence and their own way of life.”39
The socialist Dr. Lohia spoke in even stronger terms:
“To call the invasion of Tibet an effort to liberate three million Tibetans is to make language lose all meaning and stop all human communication and understanding. Freedom and slavery, bravery and cowardice, loyalty and treason, truth and lie, will become synonyms.
Our friendship and esteem for the people of China will never dim, but we must state our conviction that the present government of China will not be able to wash out the infamy of this invasion and baby murder.”
“¦Panikkar was spending most of his time on the Korean problem and was hardly concerned by the invasion of Tibet.
But the Indian Government had shown that when the time came, it was neither able nor willing to defend a small weak nation. This stigma would remain.
On November 20, in a cable to his Ambassador in China, Nehru stated his policy which would continue for the following years:
“I want to make it clear that I am convinced of the importance of Indo-Chinese friendship both from short-term and long-term points of view.”
He added: “But, of course, India has special feelings towards Tibet”.
Yet his priorities were clear: “…Even now we are anxious to continue friendly relations with China…Our present policy is primarily based on avoidance of world war, and secondly on maintenance of honourable and peaceful relations with China.”
Mao had indeed calculated well when he decided to open two fronts at the same time. Mao’s stroke in Korea helped to silence the world on the invasion of the Roof of the World.
The fate of Tibet was sealed and the consequences followed one after another, the first being the signature in Beijing in May 1951 of the “˜Agreement on Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.
“… In view of dangers of present situation and drift to war, any attempt which prevents war and safeguards interests of China should be welcomed by Chinese Government. … We suggest to you to clarify our position to the Chinese Government both in regard to Tibet and wider issues in as friendly a manner as possible.”
Tibet had been sacrificed for “wider issues”.
Efforts to revive the case in the UN continued for a few more weeks. On December 18, Bajpai told Henderson that the Government of India was still interested in Tibet’s case before the UN but “had delayed action pending outcome its efforts assist in achieving cease-fire in Korea.”
Bajpai assured the American Ambassador that the Indian Government “would probably re-examine whole problem of Tibet just as soon as it had done all it could in matter of cease-fire.”
However on December 30, Henderson cabled Acheson to inform him that:
“Representatives GOI had repeatedly assured us it intended do so [support Tibetan appeal]. Now appears views B.N. Rau and other Indian officials who do not wish India make any move in present world context which might offend Communist China have prevailed.”40
“Is it logical for UN which gave Indonesia which was under Dutch sovereignty hearing to ignore Tibet? Will India, for instance, have greater respect for UN if merely out of deference to it, UN gives Tibet no opportunity to present her case?”
Fifty eight years later, the case is still ‘pending’!
- Collection Jean Lassale, Paris (France).
- The co-leader of the Tibetan delegation.
- Fifty years later, it is still hard to grasp the difference.
- The Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha.
- When, a couple of months later, some members of the delegation left Yatung for Beijing, they were again told to keep in daily wireless contact with the Dalai Lama’s government in Chumbi valley.
- See page 138.
- He cited the case of the Dogra War when the Sikhs of Zorawar Singh were decimated during the winter in Tibet.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 335. Tibetans Free to Appeal to the United Nations.
- Sir Benagal N. Rau, the Indian Representative to the UN.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 339.
- For the text of the Appeal see The Dalai Lama, My Land and my People (New York: Potala, 1983), p. 249.
- November 7, 1950 of the roman calendar.
- Shakabpa, the Chief Negotiator, had cabled the appeal from Kalimpong.
- Mainly due to the poor transmission network in Tibet.
- Including India, UK and US.
- The Yangtse in Tibetan.
- The Hindu, Madras, 13 November 1950.
- The Hindu, Madras, 14 November 1950.
- The Hindu, Madras, 16 November 1950.
- Nobody was ready to issue visas on Tibetan passports at this point in time.
- It has to be noted that when Tibet sent delegations to the UN in 1959, 1961 and 1965, resolutions were passed in favour of Tibet, but it involved strong lobbying by the Tibetan delegates.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 347. Cable from Nehru to Rau dated 19 November 1950.
- Rau stated that no member of the Security Council appeared to be inclined to sponsor the Tibetan appeal mainly on grounds of the ‘doubtful’ status of Tibet and a general lack of knowledge about the problem, and asked for instructions in case the matter was brought up.
- USFR, Telegram, 793B.00/11-2050 dated November 20,1950. The Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State.
- USFR, Telegram, 793B.00/11-2050 dated November 20,1950.The Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State.
- Emphasis by the author.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2) p. 345. Policy Regarding Tibet, note dated 18 November 1950.
- Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in China, and some other Indian officials were pushing harder than anyone else.
- Sister of Jahawarlal Nehru and Indian Ambassador to the UN.
- The Hindu, Madras, November 21, 1950.
- Lake Success is the Headquarters of the UN in New York.
- Sen, Chanakya, Tibet Disappears (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 93.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 347. Cable from Nehru to B.N. Rau dated 20 November 1950.
- The same thing would happen in 1959, 1961 and 1965 when the Tibetan issue was again brought up in the UN.
- Quoted in Goldstein, op. cit., p. 718. Telegram from the UK delegation in New York to London dated 14 November 1950, (FO/371/84454).
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 347. Cable from Nehru to Rau dated 19 November 1950.
- SWJN, Series II, Vol. 15 (2), p. 351. Cable from Nehru to B.N. Rau dated 23 November 1950.
- It is interesting to note that a scholar has recently made a study of the Tibetan issue in the UN and has found out that the matter is still pending and could theoretically be taken up again from where it was left in November 1950.
- The Hindu, Madras 1 November 1950.
- USFR, Telegram 793B.00/12-3050 dated December 30, 1950. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State.