In Pakistan’s higher direction of war there did not seem to be any coordination between political diplomacy and military means. When this surrender drama was being staged in Dacca, Bhutto was addressing the Security Council thus: “Perhaps this will be my last speech in the Security Council. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalising of abject surrender, then I say that under no circumstances shall I be. I will not take back a document of surrender from the Security Council. I will not be a party to the legalisation of aggression. For four days the Security Council had procrastinated. Why? Because the object was for Dacca to fall… Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are, I am going.” With that, he walked out of the chamber. This defiant political stance was not matched by Niazi’s armed resistance.
“¦the amount of stockpiled material available and the defence potential endowed by mighty rivers and marshy ground proved that if Niazi had the heart to fight he could have prolonged the war long enough to enable Pakistans foreign friends to push through a resolution in the Security Council to safeguard its territorial integrity and compel Indian acceptance of it.
In the early hours of 16 December, Niazi passed orders for a ceasefire to his formations. He lauded their stout and heroic stand against heavy odds and explained that a stage had been reached when further resistance was futile and would end only in unnecessary loss of life. He ordered their withdrawal to specified areas of assembly and gave directions for preparations for surrender. It appeared that either his message did not reach all concerned or some commanders deliberately ignored it for at the time of surrender the defenders at Khulna, Rajshahi, Nator, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jaydebpur, Sylhet, Maynamati and Chittagong were still putting up a stiff resistance. After the formal surrender, most of the commanders blamed Niazi for the collapse and felt they had been unnecessarily disgraced.
In all 1,606 officers, 2,345 JCOs, 64,109 other ranks, 1,022 non-combatants enrolled in the regular army, 79 officers, 448 JCOs and 11,665 other ranks of the paramilitary forces (not including those paramilitary forces of Bangladesh origin who were handed over to the Bangladesh Government), 91 officers, 30 petty officers and 1,292 ratings of the Pakistani Navy, 61 officers, 31 warrant officers and 1,049 airmen of the Pakistani Air Force, 166 all ranks of the West Pakistan Police and 7,555 civilians surrendered in various garrisons all over East Pakistan. The Indian losses were 1,421 killed, comprising 68 officers, 60 JCOs and 1,293 other ranks, and 4,061 wounded, comprising 211 officers, 160 JCOs and 3,690 other ranks, and 56 missing.
In the excitement and confusion of the surrender drama, the Pakistani Army Aviation Squadron, consisting of some eight heli-copters (four MI-8s and four Alouettes) under the command of Lieut Col Liaqat Bokhari and carrying important wounded personnel, including Gen Rahim Khan, and their families, flew on 15 December night to Akyab, in Burma, and thence to West Pakistan.
Please wait...
