Homeland Security

Spilling Own Blood on Own Land is Absence of Strategy
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 07 Jan , 2016

Air Force Station - Pathankot

After having signed the Indus Water Treaty, Nehru made a forceful assertion in the Lok Sabha on 30 November 1960 that “we purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries”. The outcome of such a huge compromise was that Pakistan imposed three conventional wars and an inexorable proxy war on India. Yet India neither responded in kind nor abrogated the largesse handed over to Pakistan in the form of Indus Water treaty. We as a nation seems to forget that “those who do not respect sense of history and sense of geography do not have even the time to regret”. In spite of reversal after reversal Indian policy makers have been committing same mistake of extending olive branch to Pakistan in a hope that this time Pak will display sincerity.

…why India has chosen to fight enemy in its own territory? If it is part of strategy then I am afraid it is a fatigued and tired ideology.

Is it that we have become insensitive of allowing perpetrators to spill our blood on our soil? I am also baffled, why India has chosen to fight enemy in its own territory? If it is part of strategy then I am afraid it is a fatigued and tired ideology. In other words it is absence of strategy and lack of politico- military will to hit the enemy where it hurts most. Meek response and inability of the nation’s long arm to impose cost has made Pakistan bolder by the day because there is no fear of retribution. If India does not respond and impose cost at this stage, the attacks will intensify and re-acting under duress will have dangerous consequences.

It beats my imaginations why political hierarchy believe that Pakistan has changed? Talking to political leadership in Pakistan is something like talking to a messenger who has no voice and control over the actions of his master. It is mandatory to talk, but talk from the position of strength. The question is how do you create strength? The answer is that strength does not come from inaction or standing on a high moral ground. Strength comes only with strong response, credible capability, politico military will and ability to leverage the tools of national power. Except Mrs Gandhi no other Indian leader has ever leveraged the tools of national power to achieve larger strategic objectives. One may call it an art or ability to take calculated risk or “spirit of Leonidas” to put everything at stake for national pride. It is now time for the national leadership to take calculated risks and reverse the threat than to suffer periodically from the wounds of terrorism.

Big Questions Need Answers

Drugs, ISI And Terrorism. There seems to be certain similarities between pre 1984 era and post 2010. The Khalistan movement in 80s was preceded by an organised drug trafficking network in Punjab. Amritsar, Khem Karan and Gurdaspur were the hub centres of drug trafficking. Drugs had brought money and weapons to Punjab and thus laid down the foundation of insurgency and terrorism that shook the nation and entire North India. Same events are being re-enacted and Punjab is slipping into turmoil and drug mafia are running their business with impunity.

Some where the drugs, ISI and terrorist organisations are connected and it will be a mistake to believe that drug cartels will remain neutral.

The flow of drugs from Pakistan to Punjab has allowed ISI of Pakistan to spread its tentacles and now it seems that weapons, terroristsand the modules if not checked will set the stage to re-start the era of terror and violence in Punjab once again.

Some where the drugs, ISI and terrorist organisations are connected and it will be a mistake to believe that drug cartels will remain neutral. They have played a role in the past and their active complicity can’t be ruled out even now. Therefore, the first question is that why the nexus between ISI, local drug mafia, even the politicians and some of the law enforcing agencies have been allowed to flourish. Will the Government rein in the drug traffickers and their masters to dismantle the network to prevent another potential turbulence?

What is the Role of Police?  No matter what the Punjab police say, the fact is that it has failed to do their job in a professional manner. As per the information in public domain, it was clear that intelligence agencies had done their job very well. The information can’t be more specific than this. If that be so why Punjab police that claims to have a very good intelligence network did not react to the information and allowed the terrorists to reach the Air Force base Pathankot. This lapse could have embarrassed the nation no end. Will the Government make Punjab Police accountable in for this lapse?

Why NSG was Employed When Local Military Authorities Were Better Suited to Conduct Operations. This was an operation that certainly would have been better executed by the local military authorities. Because it involved isolation of strategic assets, securing of vast areas and elimination of terrorists. If the reports are true, all terrorists were eliminated by the local troops and use of BMPs. What it needed was a single commander who is in control of situation.

Will the government now nominate the local military commander responsible for handling a security challenge in his area of jurisdiction and additional resources including police will be placed under his command for the duration of the operations.

No other agency including NSG can defend military installation as well as the local military authorities. Such operations are routine for Infantry battalion and Rashtriya Rifles in J&K.

If there was any additional requirement, SF from Udhampur could have been requisitioned who are involved in such operations on daily bases in J&K. Will the Defence Minister issue guidelines that hence forth, local military commanders will be made responsible and accountable to execute counter terror operations in their areas of jurisdiction? The discretion should be with the Theatre commander to either superimposed or nominate any other officer as the commander depending upon the gravity of situation.

What is the Role of DG NSG? Robert Greene said, that a commander must elevate himself above the battlefield and his acumen as a military leader lies in his art and ability to command full range of military operations. Ironically a police officer who has never been exposed to military manoeuvres and military engagements is elevated to head a special force, not because he is qualified or most suitable but because he is a senior police officer and has to be given an appointment as DG.  DG and head of the arms are supposed to provide the conceptual and doctrinal leadership to the force they command by virtue of having practiced tactical and operational aspects in war like situations. Thus globally the military formations are headed by those who have risen in the ranks through the organisations they ultimately command. Question comes can a nation afford to have a ceremonial head with no experience and conceptual insight to supervise or direct such operations? The mere fact that he is parachuted from top to head a specialist force with no experience as a Special Forces officer, itself is a proof of bankruptcy of vision at national level. He has not even gone through the mandatory commando course or other courses that qualify an officer to be a Special Forces commander. It is indeed a mockery of the system, as a result he is not in a position to advice/ give vision to develop or train troops for future threats.Are we seeing degeneration of an elite force? Can the policy makers set this anomaly right?

Disjointed Front.The tactical commanders knew what is to be done on ground and had no doubt about the actions to be taken to handle this situation, but what was disconcerting was the strategic level leadership which spoke in different voices and created confusion by failing to nominate single lead agency and commander. The right step would have been that the local military commander should have been nominated as the commander, and all resources should have been placed under his command since he knew the geography and ground situation better than others. To some extent it sent out a message that Indian senior leadership has not learnt the art of handling crisis. Will the government now nominate the local military commander responsible for handling a security challenge in his area of jurisdiction and additional resources including police will be placed under his command for the duration of the operations.

What are the Options to Bridge Operational Gaps?

As it appears Pakistan Army and ISI is unlikely to concede breathing space to India. Pathankot and Mazar e Sharif attack on Indian assets (one in India and another in third country) concurrently is a sign of aggressive Pakistan that is willing to take risk. Will India resort to restrain or will India build capabilities to hit back with equal force?

Why defence installations have become vulnerable is because the cantonments and garrisons have become porous, land has been encroached upon and mandatory distance from the civil inhabitation has been reduced.

Strengthen The High Value Installations. In an emerging security paradigm high value strategic targets will remain lucrative objectives. A military force can look outward only if it is in a position to create secure environment internally. Divided focus will always create scepticism and doubt in the minds of security forces. One can’t say with utmost confidence that all assets are secured as per the recommended system, however it is essential that a system approach is adopted to secure installations.Essential components of a holistic security are as recommended below:-

  • Structural Security. Structural security should be in layers so that it is able to deny access, delay access, disrupt the plan of adversary and divide their reaction. Layers must consist of impregnable concrete outer perimeter wall, electric fence to stop ingress, electronic fence to detect/ identify the breach and inner perimeter fence to pose additional delay.
  • Human Security. It must be understood that the human security is not a replacement of structural security; rather human security is an offensive tool to eliminate the threat. Human security needs to be placed at vantage point in the form of static posts but linkages between the static posts is to be provided by a mobile quick reaction teams capable of acting with speed.
  • Situational Awareness. Intelligence gives situational awareness and act as bridge between various components of the security structure. It enhances the capabilities, sharpens the reaction and reduces the response time. Most significance is that it gives a transparent environment to the security forces to thwart any attempt to breach the perimeter fence. 
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Brig Narender Kumar (Retd.)

Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

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13 thoughts on “Spilling Own Blood on Own Land is Absence of Strategy

  1. Turf protection has been the biggest bane in a security situation. While it is always taught in all the training institutions that the troops available closest to the point of conflict should be used as first responders, nobody thought it prudent to use the army personnel available within less than 10 kms of the airfield to respond. The IAF wanted to take all the credit and therefore flew in its GARUDAS from Delhi rather than asking for help from the Army. The Army Chief, while flanking the Def Minister during his address to the media, never suggested to him that the Army was in a better position to handle the situation as it had fully trained and equipped troops in the near vicinity. The NSA thought he can handle the situation himself and therefore, take the credit for the success of the operation. In the bargain he botched up the operation. And as regards Punjab Police, less said the better.

  2. Dear Narender.
    Excellent eye opener article.
    There is no substitute to honest and hard working political and social system of the nation.
    Our problems are basically due to lack of determined and effective leadership which has not been able to guide and lead nation to become self reliant in arms and equipment, besides inculcating patriotic ethos in some of our people.
    We are open to influences for consideration from all sorts of external and internal vested interests.
    We require energetic citizenry and above all a strong Armed Forces like the major powers of the world, which at present we are not.
    We can not fight the relentless enemy with primitive weaponry that too the obsolete and discarded stocks from advanced nations. Our men require more training and competence besides patriotic feelings which we have in plenty.
    Thanks for great insight and knowledgeable article.

  3. This foolish strategy or the lack of strategy in countering Pakistan will cost India very heavily in the foreseeable future. Pakistani Army has changed gears by regularly getting the fidayeen squads to attack targets in Punjab. Thus geographically they have widened the ambit or scope of jihadi operations from Kashmir to Punjab. India, on the other hand continues to fight terror within Indian territory. This is bound to embolden Pakistan to expand further into the hinterland. India in principle must consider Pak interests globally as legitimate targets and reprisal attacks far and wide on Pak commercial and diplomatic interests will bring Pak to its knees.

  4. the map which the tsts so desperately needed and would have loved to have! after their point of entry, they would have walked on to tarmac rather than across. is it not a security leak.. why blame media over a minute to minute commentary. this map can be used for a subsequent ops down in the years ahead..!

    please remove.. or is such information already in public domain and avail to all and sundry ?? makes me wonder ,.. if so.. why so much hulla gulla on security..

    • Sir,
      This is only a pictorial representation. Kindly go to Google earth that shows the one meter resolution of each hanger, actual alignment of the fence, adm block and all smaller or larger structure. yes it would have been considered a classified probably 20 years back, today you can see everything including the location of security post. Kindly go to google earth. Sir we are living in 21 century.

      • I am sorry I could not agree with you. I “googled” the Pathankot IAF base and found surely some map of it. In my eyes it is like a silhouette where arguably the runway could be identified. One sees also other “structures” , but whether they are admin buildings or barracks or canteens or military installations is subject to interpretation or guess work. And there lies the crux of the problem raised by col ratti. The map published by you clearly identifies those “structures” for what they are in reality, which is the crucial information for the enemy to strike where. I would have thought such information is classified in the hand of the IAF not to be brought out in the open. I am surprised that is not to be the case in the India’s military intelligence circle. I would add that 21 century has not made human intelligence bearing on information irrelevant. All radar maps are based on digital technology for image processing. Once the data is collected by instruments it is an enormously difficult task without human intelligence input to reconstruct the true picture (i.e. analog) from it which the human brain perceives. In fact, on the ground it is possible to set up false structures which radar imagery could interpret as true things such as runway or hangar. Radar image processing is always supplanted by human intelligence for the image to stand for the true picture. The enemy could not generate that ground reality without access to vital information from human sources. Hats off to col hs rotti to hit the nail here.

  5. Yes you are right DG NSG should be a comando himself. What about the security officer of Air Force Station Pathankot why is he a admin officer why not make a separate selection for security officers in IAF rather than draw them from administration cadre. Its very easy to point out mistakes with others rather than improving yourself. Also in army there is a ethos of leading from the front where was the security officer was he leading the garuds all those who got injured were airmen where was the officer

  6. Very appropriately written sir, its a very simple case of security of the country being handled by inapt hands, who in their one-man up ship want to earn accolades. The military commanders at all levels have been sidelined due to their own follies, aspirations etc.

    There cannot be piecemeal solutions to all this, there is a need to comprehensively overhaul the complete Security system, supported by the so called three estates of democracy, who should recognize and support the Defense forces as the fifth estate, media being the fourth.

    It should be made to realize to the four estates that if this fifth estate is demeaned and not heard, the four pillars of democracy will not survive.

    This episode depicts the character of the country, where me, mine and myself comes first.

  7. An excellent piece of article, very well thought out and timely.
    The people responsible must take note of this…….in ‘an advise proof country’.
    We are more people – centric than Nation-centric…..All will suffer if we do not take care of ourselves better. Tools of power are meant to be used. The power equation says…power used will grow, unused will diminish and misused will disappear.
    Once again my compliments to the author.

  8. A well written article. However, some thoughts of mine:-
    1. The DG NSG should be questioned regarding the training being imparted under his command for bomb/IED disposal. He should also be queried as to why he did not put his foot down against an operation which was essentially an Army one. One may consider relieving him from his post. Suggestion to have an Army officer head it will obviously fall on deaf ears(political/IPS)
    2. Facts highlighted not withstanding, does the NSG in Bombay know about each and every vulnerable spot in the city thoroughly. If not, should it be deployed in cases like 26/11? If not, why have the force? If the area outside the perimeter of the air force station has been encroached with colonies coming up right up to the fence, then it was an operation in built up area for which NSG IS trained. Why the objection to its deployment?
    4. Instead of trying to enforce Works of Defence Act ( which one has not been able to till date in many cases, primarily due to political reasons), we may settle the MPs and MLAs just outside the perimeter of the military installations. The perimeter would automatically receive security of the highest order(‘Z class security!!!).
    5. What authority does a local Brigade/sub area commander have over co-located air force installations? Doubtful if any. Is he responsible for the security of such installations? Again doubtful!
    6. DSC’s role needs a serious re-think. Vulnerable locations especially military ones should have a more effective force guarding them.

  9. Thankyou for this detailed analysis, you zeroed in all the problems and shortcomings of this operation very Wel. . It seems we haven’t learned much from Mumbai atacks. There was same chaos , and lack of inter service coordination.
    The concept of DSC is good only if it is proper, y trained and équiped for protection ops. It looked out of shape highly unprofessional unit.

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