Indian Defence Review

As things stand today, the LCA is a long way off from being what it was touted to be when first conceptualised. At present, there is a problem with the multimode radar and the Kaveri engine, thereby adversely affecting the induction schedule. ELTA radars and GE 404 IN 20 engines are sought to be their replacements to inject some urgency into the project. A further delay in the LCA induction would mean that we would not even be getting a ‘current generation’ aircraft leave alone a ‘next generation’ one at the time of induction. In light of these delays, it would be catastrophic if at the end of the enormous time and cost expended on the LCA programme all we get is a limited series induction.

Lack of Clear Vision

The armed forces are accused of lacking a clear vision of what they want; that they lack a research temper and simply demand what they see or read about in brochures. This is what DRDO calls BBC or simply put means ‘best of brochure claims’.

“¦the fact remains that the Navy has been more successful in indigenisation than its sister services.

There is an element of truth in this accusation. The flip side, however, is that the armed forces have yet to see in Indian scientific journals or in PSU development work any original work on the design of futuristic weapon systems. Nor do they get to see any indigenous work on new equipment that would revolutionise warfare or have a force multiplier affect. What one sees is imitation work on equipment that is already under production in the West. In the absence of such original work, it is but natural for those responsible for honing a fighting force, to look elsewhere. DRDO too must introspect because every time the Services want a new system, DRDO offers to make the equipment available indigenously, at low cost and attractive timeframes. Experience would suggest that such self-assurance is usually misplaced. Just because the Armed Forces are required to first turn to DRDO to check on availability of new systems it need not ‘accept’ all challenges. They could be honest and say that a particular system would be beyond their capability or capacity or that it would take much too long for the system to fructify. Such honesty would enhance mutual trust and encourage a healthier relationship between the Service HQ and DRDO.

Let us look at another facet of the ALH collaboration in terms of vision. At the time of the finalisation of the collaborative agreement, Air HQ had forecast a requirement for a Cheetah helicopter replacement. It was decided to take advantage of the collaboration for the ALH to design a completely indigenous light helicopter.

When the ASR for the ALH was being finalised, Ministry of Defence (MOD) had specified that the helicopter built in India would be a de-novo design and not a copy of any existing model. Technologies employed would need to be futuristic. As HAL did not have the necessary wherewithal to design and develop the ALH by its self, it was necessary to go to renowned helicopter manufactures for a tie up. After many deliberations/presentations/visits, German manufacturer MBB was preferred over Aerospatiale of France. The high level committee comprising the MoD, Dept of Defence Production, SA to RM, FADS, HAL and Air HQ that was to select the collaborative partner, felt that the French proposal was very close to the SA 365 Dauphin that was then coming into production, and hence there would not be too great a learning curve for HAL’s design personnel. The committee decided to select the MBB proposal, which was a completely new design.

When new officers takeover they bring new ideas, and over a period of some years, coupled with advances in technology, these ideas become mandatory requirements.

Ministry of Defence decided that once HAL’s design personnel had gained adequate experience working on new technologies with MBB, a core group of designers would be detached from the ALH project to design separately a small helicopter for the Indian Armed Forces. This helicopter would be a lightweight reconnaissance helicopter or a Cheetah replacement. It has been nearly 25 years since HAL started work on the ALH. Not only has the ALH not entered service in large enough numbers, but also there has been no report on the light helicopter that was to be designed separately.

So what are the Armed Forces to do now for their requirement of small helicopters? These helicopters, besides carrying out numerous and multifarious tasks, are the eyes in the battlefield. There is no option but to import another helicopter. Current reports say that the government has invited Eurocopter to negotiate for 197 AS 550 Fennec helicopters for the Army in a deal worth $600 million. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited will make 137 of these helicopters under licence. It would appear that everyone will come away pleased, especially HAL as it will get more work load, but no one is asking as to what happened to the small helicopter that HAL was to start designing independently way back in the late 1980s. Most in the Armed Forces would not even be aware that such a stipulation existed.

IAF Killed DRDO Programmes

At present, there is a big gap between the image that DRDO projects and the reality as it exists on the ground.

Recently an eminent DRDO personality was quoted as being critical of the censure being focused on DRDO by a spate of articles in the Indian Express, and by retired Service Officers. Predictably, this person has tried to turn the criticism back on the Services. While there may be a measure of truth in what he had to say, his insinuation that the IAF killed some DRDO projects is misplaced. He has talked about the IAF not wanting the HF 24, which all agree was an excellent design by Kurt Tank. The aircraft, however, was grossly underpowered and while the IAF with a sense of pride in indigenous design utilised the aircraft in squadron service for some years, they could not continue for long with an aircraft that was not technically advanced, especially when there was no alternative power plant replacement in sight. As its induction was delayed, it was only a matter of time before the aircraft would have to be phased out, a similar situation now obtaining with the LCA. The trainer version of the aircraft was better than the fighter, but to suggest that the aircraft would have made a good advanced jet trainer (AJT) is perhaps asking too much of one’s imagination.