Indian Defence Review

The armed forces of a country are a manifestation of the Government’s commitment to the people it represents of its concern for the pursuing the country’s national interests, for providing people security and creating a safe environment for the people to achieve individual success and growth. The armed forces require constant nurturing and involvement of the executive authority. Well-trained and modernised armed forces cannot be bought off the shelf. The issues enumerated here are not a vague notional wishlist but fundamentals that impact various facets of security and the related modernisation of the Army. It is the right of every citizen to demand of the Government to ensure the territorial integrity of the nation and a peaceful internal environment for the well being of the people. The armed forces pay back fully in sweat and blood.

Lately there has been a profusion of views, reviews, recommendations, suggestions and advice related to national security put forward for the express attention of the new Government in power. The issues highlighted range from weapon systems procurement to foreign policy. No doubt these are relevant and do need serious consideration. The people-oriented transformation to a more receptive political environment is likely to see these more favourably.

Anna Hazare’s ‘Anshan’ undoubtedly has brought Indian democracy to a point of inflection after which the role of public opinion and the will of civil society came to matter. Till then, the Indian Parliament functioned like an insulated oligarchy. No Member of Parliament thought it necessary to interact with the people of their respective constituencies on any matter of import or even those that had a direct bearing on the lives of the people. These elected members took it for granted that they knew what was best for these ‘dumb’ voters. Consultative participation was considered unnecessary and a waste of time. This was evident from the dismissive pontificating attitude adopted by some of the oligarchic spokespersons of the then Government in power who rubbished the idea of the protest.

There is a similar malady afflicting the Indian bureaucracy. There is no structured system in place for regular interaction between the generalist bureaucracy and the numerous ‘Experts Groups’ and ‘Think Tanks’. Mid and long term policy issues that can be hived to these groups to comprehensively debate these and suggest options or alternatives, are kept close to their chest as they equate information to power. It is a matter of fact that the bureaucrat is so heavily engaged in the routine day-to-day matters and errands that it is not feasible for him to address professional matters on security, economy, commerce or the other numerous specialised issues which, in the first place, are not his domain of expertise. The country’s bureaucracy needs to maturely accept such change. It is in this spirit that these views are put forth.

National Security Doctrine

During the previous NDA government’s tenure, expecting confidentiality, India had shared its threat perception with the USA clearly naming its primary adversary. India was rudely jarred into the arena of ‘real politik’ when USA shared this information with the adversary named therein. That particular incident of naivety notwithstanding, the Government should identify the threats it perceives impinging on its security on a wide canvas and clearly define the role it wishes to assign to the Armed Forces in securing the country’s national interests and safeguarding the nations’ core values and attributes. Such a clearly defined role will dictate the size, organisational framework and equipment profile for the Armed Forces.

Alliances and Regional Security Grouping

In 2013, the NSA’s Secretariat put forth a Policy Document titled “Non-Alignment 2.0”. The Document states, “India’s engagement in the construction of an international order will be through a variety of instruments: participation in regional and global institutions and possible participation with groups of countries.” It also mentions that though India is “sought after in great power competition” it has been “uneasy about formal alliances”. India needs to clearly indicate its preferred policy line and whether it is willing to go for any out of area contingency task beyond UN Peacekeeping assignments. Is it content with mere diplomatic support in the UN forum? The recent incident in the South China Sea involving China and Vietnam is the test case to the extent India is prepared to go and be a player in balance of power role in South East Asia. In India’s “Look East” Policy, Vietnam has been in special focus even in India’s military-to-military contacts.

Similarly, India’s strategic dialogue and partnership with USA as nurtured by the previous NDA dispensation, participation in BRICS and strong bonds with Russia need nurturing. A dialogue with China from a position of strength should be pursued, alongside stronger relations with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Australia. Therefore, the actions taken or not taken by the new Government in power will set the precedent for India’s ‘unique’ model as a global and or regional player in the future. It would also be a clear indicator for the limits, both diplomatic and military, to which India would like to be involved in bilateral disputes of two friendly countries. As a consequence, it will predicate India’s future military-to-military contacts with countries.

Nuclear Doctrine

Ironically, India was forced to go nuclear when it realised that a nuclear-free world is only possible by an outright proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Those countries possessing nuclear weapons have not been forthcoming in declaring, unambiguously, that these weapons would never be used first and also never be used against non-nuclear states. As a matter of fact, the USA used a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear Japan and later in the 1950s-1960s threatened to use it three times again against non-nuclear states, on the pretext of minimising US casualties. It reflects an attitude of pathological paranoia that has never been questioned.

India’s nuclear doctrine should be unambiguous in this regard. The recent inclusion in its doctrine, of the clause stating an overwhelming retaliation in response to the use of low-yield nuclear weapons (colloquially referred to as tactical nuclear weapons) against any force objective in the tactical battle area is in consonance with the basic idea of every nuclear weapon/device being a strategic weapon. Further, it is suggested that all reference to the so called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons in India’s doctrine should be amended to read as “low yield nuclear weapons/devices directed at force objectives or targets in the tactical battle zone”. Thereby, India’s response to such employment would draw an unrestricted overwhelming nuclear retaliation as retribution.

Institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

The debate on relevance of a CDS in India’s context has its ‘ayes’ balanced out with an equal number of ‘nay’ sayers. It would be prudent to first integrate the logistic element of the Services which is a more practical requirement with a financial bias and would accrue in curtailing the revenue head of the defence budget. Once the system has stabilised, relevance of the creation of post of CDS may be looked at once again. It is worth considering that the type of wars India is likely to fight in the future would invariably be ground forces centric. It is therefore, opined that if and when a CDS is ‘imposed’, it should be predicated with a clause that the CDS would always be from the Army.

Restructuring the Ministry of Defence(MoD)

The MoD is staffed by cadres of the Central Administrative Services who, in rotation, are posted to the MoD. Their expertise lies in merely interpreting existing Government Regulations; controlling, managing and auditing budgetary allocation; overseeing departments directly under the Ministry; advising the Defence Minister independently of the Services and interacting with other Ministries. Their dealings with the three Services generally relate to the above mentioned issues with no professional input. While the Service Headquarters routinely supply data on all matters, but when it comes to furnishing reports the onus of providing data and details is again the responsibility of the Service Headquarters. This disingenuous format of functioning is a deliberate ploy to keep the Services subordinated. A structural change is long overdue.

Existing Hollowness

Since the ‘leak’ in the recent past, of Chief of Army Staff’s secret letter to the then Prime Minister, it is now no secret that there is a seriously deep hollowness in the Army, to the tune of approximately Rs. 4,000 crore in weapons, ammunition, communication systems and equipment authorised. Such a state of affairs has been precipitated largely due to ineptness in the functioning of the Ordnance Factories (OF) and the lax monitoring and supervision by the concerned sections in the MoD.

The Ordnance Factories are generally overstaffed and plagued by exploitive trade unions. These factors have affected the automation and modernisation of the factories. By the manipulative exploitation of the ‘overtime’ clause by the work force, they virtually double the individual’s salary. This is a gross misdemeanour allowed to appease the workers unions and needs to be done away forthwith. The annual financial liability under the ‘revenue’ head coupled with the lack of accountability in strict adherence to production quantities and timelines have contributed to the current state of affairs. The Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) should be accountable to the Service Chiefs and not be protected or insulated by the MoD.

Modernisation Process

During a tenure in the Army Headquarters, one gathered an impression that a substantially large percentage of the staff posted in every directorate is deeply involved in processing cases for procurement of weapon systems and equipment. It is a direct consequence of the two principal maladies afflicting the modernisation effort – the failure of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to forge the modernisation drive through Research and Development (R&D) and the MoD’s cumbrous procurement procedure. Over the years, a timeline that has come to be accepted for the whole process and has come to stay right from the time of initiating a case for establishing the ‘acceptance of necessity’ to final induction of the first batch of a weapon system or equipment is roughly between ten to twelve years. Obviously due to this long gestation period many proposals die a natural death during the processing phases.

The inadequacy of the DRDO in absorbing modern weapons technology and failure to indigenously design and develop weapons, communication systems, night vision devices and equipment has been a serious drawback in modernisation of the armed forces. This perhaps is also the fallout of the unbridled autonomy that has been accorded to the Director General – DRDO, who is also the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and the Secretary DRDO as well. Such an all encompassing arrangement ostensibly confers sweeping powers to one individual over a range of aspects which includes the conduct of research, utilising funds allocated and administrative functioning with no accountability. There is an urgent requirement of a total revamp.

If the DRDO and OFs are revamped and made more accountable to the user, India can reach out to her neighbours for their military hardware requirements. Due to a misplaced prosaic moral stance on the issue of arms export, India lost out to China which has come forward to meet all such demands of Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and even Sri Lanka besides Pakistan. The presence of China in these countries has given rise to a ‘threat perception’ of strategic encirclement of India by China by way of bases constructed in these countries – “string of pearls” – which virtually arcs around peninsular India. Such a situation has come to pass more due to India’s denial of a realist outlook.

Infrastructure Development

Development of infrastructure in the border areas along India’s boundary with China, in particular, has been slow and lacking a sense of urgency considering its criticality. In the first instance, the number of agencies involved in independently assessing the viability of a project proposal makes a mockery of all the urgency accorded to these so called “strategic roads” projects. Secondly, taking the example of Arunachal Pradesh which needs these roads most urgently, the ground realties have been glossed over in the planning process. The Border Roads Organisation lacks the requisite modern equipment for speeding up the construction pace. There is a paucity of locally available skilled and unskilled labour.

The situation is further complicated by local resentment to importing such labour. Due to the unique geological structure of these hills and mountain ranges, even basic ingredients such as stone and aggregate are required to be transported from distant source sites thus raising the cost and time required for construction. The vicious monsoon has its impact too. Every year, the existing roads are subjected to extensive damages. Substantial resources have to be diverted to resurrecting these roads, which in turn reduces the working window and adds to the delay in construction of the new roads. Induction of modern equipment in sufficient numbers at an accelerated pace is essential and urgent.

The plethora of Ministries and agencies involved in just the road network projects in the North East Region is another reason for the uncoordinated slow and disjointed development. The Ministries of Defence, Road Transport and Highways, Home Affairs (for Border Area Development Projects, Hill Area Development Projects and Border Roads), Rural Development and Development of North East Region are all involved in this exercise. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has a major role in clearing these projects. There is a crying need to coordinate all this effort and resource and have the Environment Ministry onboard ab initio. As a matter of fact, the strategic roads must be accorded automatic Environment and Forest clearance when sanction for construction is approved in principle.

To make available an alternative mode of induction into the remote regions of along the Northern border, the disused Advanced Landing Grounds are being reactivated and additional ones planned for construction. Similarly, those areas not conducive to operations of fixed wing aircraft should have Forward Armament and Replenishment Points (FAARP) for rotary wing aircraft situated along the axis of maintenance. The unpredictable weather patterns and small time window suitable for flying will be optimally exploited when such a network of bases is in place. These projects must be given the necessary heave for early completion.

Logistic Warehousing

The geographical configuration of the Himalayas with a series of ranges running in depth and parallel to the boundary with China all along the Northern border areas has presented a major challenge in sustaining forces deployed forward. Due to the vulnerable and tenuous lines of communications, suitable logistic bases along the major axes are necessitated. In this regard, China has constructed a wide network of logistics bases and tunnels for logistic purposes in areas nearer the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The Indian Army has been slow in getting its act together due to various systemic constraints. In Arunachal Pradesh, land belongs to the local tribal community. Today acquiring land for such purposes is becoming more and more difficult. Intervention by the government would be required to see timely fruition of these projects.

Synergy of Resources

With effect from March 2011, a more nuanced and narrow definition of “paramilitary forces” has been adopted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) at the behest of the Army. The Assam Rifles, Special Frontier Force (SFF) and Indian Coast Guard are the only three that are in this category. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) have been listed as three of the eight Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) of the country.

Assam Rifles forces are officered, trained and operate with the Army but report to the MHA implying thereby that the lien of the Army on this Force is only for actual conduct of Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorist (IC/CT) operations – not a neat arrangement. The Assam Rifles should be wholly placed under the MoD.

The BSF operates under the operational command and control of the Army when deployed on the Line of Control (LC) with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). However, even in these areas the Sector Headquarters, under a Deputy Inspector General of the BSF, is not under command of the Army but remains answerable to the Inspector General of BSF in the upward hierarchical chain. The ITBP deployment along the LAC is independent of the Army, though the LAC is a ‘live’ border prone to military actions by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rather than activities related to policing requirement as is the mandate of the ITBP.

In POK, along the LC the Mujahids deployed alongside the Pak army are directly under the command and control of Pak Army. Similarly, China’s Border Guards deployed along the LAC in Tibet are operating directly under the PLA. It is an operational imperative that there is a single point of control of all forces deployed on the LC and LAC for a timely and coordinated response. Therefore, all these forces should be under the operational command and control of the Army – a measure that has been resisted to by the MHA for decades.

As a further measure for fullest synergy, it will be pragmatic on the part of the Government to adopt a policy wherein all personnel, including the officers selected for any CAPF, are mandated to initially serve in the Army for six years before reverting to their respective Force. Such an initiative would ensure uniformity of training, operational synchronism and would address Army’s persistent problem of shortage of junior leaders. The CAPFs have long resisted any such initiative as also a proposal of side stepping officers and soldiers to CAPFs on one pretext or another. Such a seamless bond with the CAPFs is a pragmatic and practical proposition sans any turf machinations or empire building.

Cyber Security

The ether medium has altered the security paradigm to a level of science fiction. A round-the-clock threat of a clandestine cyber attack is a reality. That India is subjected to continuous cyber intrusion is also a definite statement. India’s response is presently, defensive and limited. There is a concerted effort required to protect the cyberspace and guard our vulnerabilities. Both defensive and offensive measures have to be adopted. A robust response mechanism should be put in place for prompt action. Delay in getting our act together would have perilous consequences.

Maoist Insurrection

The Maoist insurrection has been brought down from the affected 180 districts in ten states in 2005 to 83 districts in nine states in 2010 and as of now is down to 60 districts in these nine states. The movement is directed against the policies for the Government relating to tribal autonomy to exploit the forest land and produce, non-receipt of benefits from mining and hydro-electric projects; the long-term goal being to create a Marxist Indian State. The insurrection has been galvanised by the failure of local administration reaching the people, political exploitation and deficiency of governance.

As has been acknowledged by the previous Government in power that, “Development is the master remedy to win over people. Strengthening development in these 60 districts is a must.” It, therefore, essentially remains a “law and order” problem. The new Government’s “development model” must be implemented here at the earliest.

Asymmetric warfare places a heavy demand on the quantum of force deployed. Lack of or weak intelligence network extracts a heavy price in terms of casualties. Poor administrative support increases the feeling of isolation of the men and effects their morale and fighting capacity leading to further casualties and fratricide. CRPF deployed in these areas have to reassess the leadership, revamp the intelligence, and reorient the modus operandi to deliver on the tasks entrusted to bring down the level of insurrection for the civil administration to begin the process of governance. This new Government should reopen talks with the Maoists leaders and accommodate their legitimate demands. On all counts, the Army should be kept out of this area as its inclusion will take the movement to a different level which is not desirable.

Military-to-Military Cooperation

The term ‘military diplomacy’ is anathema to the fraternity in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). That notwithstanding, the institution of combined training with foreign armies has been a monumental success. It has projected the Armed Forces professional capabilities and matches that of the best armies of the world. Imparting instruction to individuals and sub-unit groups from friendly countries should be provided more liberal financial packages for foreign army personnel so that India becomes the training hub for most of the developing countries. These countries should also be assisted with supply of military hardware. Often a recalcitrant bureaucrat in the MEA seems to know what is best for the country and who to engage with – senior military officers visiting other countries cannot even extend invitations for innocuous activities such as sports events. Shying away from such initiatives is a major draw-down on India’s aspiration of being a global player.

Conclusion

The armed forces of a country are a manifestation of the Government’s commitment to the people it represents of its concern for the pursuing the country’s national interests, for providing people security and creating a safe environment for the people to achieve individual success and growth. The armed forces require constant nurturing and involvement of the executive authority. Well-trained and modernised armed forces cannot be bought off the shelf.

The issues enumerated here are not a vague notional wishlist but fundamentals that impact various facets of security and the related modernisation of the Army. It is the right of every citizen to demand of the Government to ensure the territorial integrity of the nation and a peaceful internal environment for the well being of the people. The armed forces pay back fully in sweat and blood.