The current US troop surge in Afghanistan has seen an induction of 17,000 additional combat troops and 4,000 trainers. The US 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade (over 130 helicopters), the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (8,000 troops) and the 5th Stryker Brigade have commenced heavy fighting in the Helmand province, the key opium growing belt. The British troops in particular have taken fairly heavy casualties. Is the surge too little too late? Proper CI operations would require a far higher committal of American troops. The US Commanding General in Afghanistan (Lt Gen McChrystal) has specifically asked for more forces and a doubling of the envisaged size of the Afghan Army and Police. Will he get these?
Pakistan is keen to see the US and its allies exit from Afghanistan. It has been stridently advising against further US troops build-up in Afghanistan.
As per media reports there is considerable debate and skepticism in Washington against these militarily sound and common sense recommendations. Vice President Joe Biden has reportedly proposed an alternative strategy that focuses more on Al Qaida and less on the Taliban. It seeks to actually reduce troops and rely more upon air power and precision strikes by Predator UAVs. In purely military terms there could not be a more surefire prescription for disaster. Predator operations have met with some success in Pakistan only because the Pakistani Army has launched large scale ground operations which have increased the pressure on the Taliban and its allies. Leaving the moderate Taliban in charge would be a short order prescription for a return of the Taliban and a needless cause for Jihadi Triumphalism.
Popular Support. The key issue, as in Vietnam however, would be public opinion. This seems to have been shaken by the initial casualties suffered in the surge. On this factor primarily hinges the success of the US surge in Afghanistan. Ultimately the war in Afghanistan would be won or lost in the opinion polls back home. Political sensitivity to casualties will be the key factor that moulds the American will to fight and stay the course. CI operations are manpower intensive and the Afghan campaign has been drastically under resourced for far too long. If the Americans are serious about pacifying the region and want to protect the population, they will need to commit enhanced resources and stay the course for at least one to two decades. Anything short of that will lead to a regional disaster with grave security implications for India.
Curtailing Ammunition Re-supply. Curtailment of ammunition re-supply to the insurgents is the key component of the defeat mechanism. Construction of effective border fencing helps to achieve this effect. It had drastically curtailed terrorism in the Punjab and later J&K. The money that the US is throwing at Pakistan could be better spent by constructing a fence on the Durand Line. At the very least it will stop large scale and brazen re-supply of the Taliban via truck convoys from Pakistan!
Probable End States
Near Term Future. The situation in Afghanistan is highly fluid and volatile and it is difficult to make viable forecasts beyond a three to five year time frame. A major scenario driving driver would be the military outcome of the US surge in Afghanistan and the level of casualties sustained by the US/ISAF. Based on this there could be three Alternative Military Futures:
- Hold the Course Scenario. This would be an optimistic scenario premised upon a success of the US surge (and committal of additional US troops asked for by Lt Gen McChrystal) with minimal casualties. This could encourage the US and NATO to stay the course for armed nation state building for the next one to two decades.
- Thin Out Scenario. The US surge is partially successful, but entails heavy casualties that raise political costs. Accordingly in 2011, President Obama declares victory and begins to thin out ground troops. However, US would retain Air bases and Special Forces in Afghanistan in an over watch role. Vice President Joe Biden’s Strategy would actualize this scenario in a much earlier time frame.
- Precipitate Withdrawal Scenario. This would largely flow out from the Thin Out Scenario. It would be premised upon heavy casualties inflicted on US Air bases by suicide attacks/Rockets/Standoff Fire by the Taliban and a failure of Pakistan Army offensives in NWFP/FATA. This could raise political costs to a level where the US/NATO withdraw all forces and confine support to Naval Aviation from the Gulf. The apparent weakness of the ANA could thereafter result in a swift collapse of the Afghan state with Pakistan sending in its Pashtun troops in Mufti to assist the Taliban in switching to regular warfare for the re-conquest of Afghanistan.
Long Term Strategic Futures: Probable Scenarios. All long term futures that span a time horizon of 10–15 years would be a logical outgrowth of what happens in the near term future, i.e. the success or otherwise of the US surge. Results of this would be evident by 2011–2012. Based upon these probable end states/outcomes, a range of long term future probabilities can be outlined. These however would be purely hypothetical scenarios based upon probability. These hypothetical end states can be listed as follows:
The situation in Afghanistan is highly fluid and volatile and it is difficult to make viable forecasts beyond a three to five year time frame. A major scenario driving driver would be the military outcome of the US surge in Afghanistan and the level of casualties sustained by the US/ISAF.
- Stabilization of a nation-state in Afghanistan.
- Fragmentation along ethnic fault lines.
- This could take two forms:
- Taliban’s Pashtun Consolidation.
- Emergence of Pakhtunkhwa that leads to a splintering of Pakistan.
These long term futures merit elaboration.
- Stabilization of a nation-state in Afghanistan. The long term success of armed nation state-building could lead to the positive outcome of the stabilization of a relatively modernist and inclusive state in Afghanistan that is self-sustaining and resists external penetration/control.
- Fragmentation along Ethnic Faultlines. The Taliban had practiced politics of ethnic exclusion and even the ethnic cleansing of Hazara and Uzbek minorities from the 1990s to 2001. This has deepened ethnic polarization in Afghanistan. A Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan is likely to lead to the fragmentation of that state along ethnic faultlines. Such fragmentation could assume two forms.
- Taliban’s Pashtun Consolidation. The ISI has consciously tried to subsume Afghan nationalism by promoting the Salafi ideology of Jihad via the Taliban, to make national frontiers irrelevant. It has been its constant endeavor to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency has made the Durand Line irrelevant. If the Taliban insurgency triumphs, Pakistan could gain control of the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and expand territorially to gain the notional strategic depth.
- Emergence of Pashtunkhwa. However, given the degree of alienation that could be caused by the Pakistan Army operations in NWFP and FATA, the reverse could equally happen. A new Pashtun national entity that straddles the Durand Line could come into being. If Afghanistan survives, its capital would remain in Kabul. Should Afghanistan fragment on ethnic faultlines, the new Pakhtunkhwa could emerge as a result of the splintering of Pakistan along the Indus faultline. The new entity may seek its capital in Peshawar. The Pashtuns therefore could create a state at the expense of Pakistan.
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Maj Gen Bakshi , I was surprised to read in your article that as per your analysis, Afghanistan was a launching pad for 9/11. I do not blame you since the subject of your Phd is Limited wars in South Asia and whatever happened in 9/11 was neither a limited war Nor was in South Asia. None of the people involved in 9/11 had any connection with Afghanistan and so far no definite connection has been established between the hijackers and Al Qaida. You have been teaching Psy Ops and it seems that this is a deliberate attempt of a psy op. In fact this is a repeat of the Indian habit of putting it’s finger in every wrong place even beyond its neighborhood. What has India got to do militarily in Afghanistan? You have been directly involved in the murder of millions of innocent muslims of Kashmir during your stint in the Indian Army then do you think the Afghans would appreciate what you profess?
Please do not distort history because that would be tantamount to poor integrity and as an ex soldier You should prefer death rather than being known as a person with poor integrity,