Indian Defence Review

Impediments to National Security

At present, the three Service Chiefs are placed below the Cabinet Secretary in precedence. Appointment of a CDS of five-star rank would make him above the Cabinet Secretary, and this is unacceptable to the bureaucracy on account of ‘civilian supremacy, something that causes general resentment within the military. The reason for the traditional stand-off between the bureaucracy and the military is that, while the military unreservedly accepts control by the elected executives in government and understands the role of the bureaucracy as the link between itself and the Defence Minister, it resents bureaucratic dominance. Whether this resentment is valid and has a basis, is source for a separate discussion, but it is necessary to mention here, that the bureaucrat-NSA has a retired senior Army officer as his military advisor! This is sufficient evidence of bureaucratic hubris, the readiness of some senior military officers to acquiesce to blandishments and the regrettable disinterest of the political hierarchy especially at the highest levels, all combining to adversely affect national security.

The fact is that bureaucrats enjoy easy and direct access to the Defence Minister and the PM because that access is institutionalised; whereas a Service Chief would only get heard based on his professional reputation or personal relationship or ‘equation’ with the country’s executives or when he is invited to render advice. Thus the bureaucracy resists creating the appointment of a CDS since it would effectively challenge the pre-eminence of the IAS and weaken its grip over the military. This is clearly an impediment to national security.

The second reason for no-CDS is internal to the three services and is as serious an impediment to national security as the first. Even though the military recognises the strategic need for a CDS, the three services are locked in an internecine conflict over which service should provide the CDS. The tacit (and less than honourable) assumption in this is that he would be partisan to his own service besides allowing one more promotion at the top level. This rivalry is based as much upon personal relations between Service Chiefs in-the-chair as upon traditional opinions of which service is pre-eminent among the three from a strategic or operational standpoint. There is also an innate fear that the importance of the other two services would be in some manner, downgraded. It would be unrealistic not to recognise that this is connected with rivalry for financial and budgetary allocations for military procurement. Perhaps a scheme of rotational appointment would solve this problem but inter-service rivalry is not in the best interest of national security and even goes against the best interests of the defence services. This rivalry is kept simmering by a devious and scheming bureaucracy playing on senior military officers and the Service Chiefs to thwart the appointment of a CDS.

In 2009, Rajat Pandit4 succinctly wrote, “Reforms have a way of coming in late. No wonder then that a decade after the Kargil conflict exposed deep fissures within the military top brass, some critical lessons, especially on the need for a single-point advice structure, and by extension a General Number One are yet to be learnt. It doesn’t help that the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force do not see eye-to-eye on this. Compounding matters is the smugness of a bureaucracy happy with the status quo even as it exercises a vice-like grip on the armed forces in the name of ‘civilian control’. The political leadership, in turn, remains apathetic about genuine reforms in the country’s higher defence management.”

Necessity for a CDS

There are some issues that demonstrate the necessity and urgency for creating the post of a CDS. The first and most important one is that, as discussed above, the PM and the NSC cannot obtain a full and true picture of the military dimensions of national security from the existing setup. This is vital in the emerging regional scenario of Chinese military build-up on India’s northern borders within easy missile-strike distance of Delhi, and India’s successful launch on April 19, 2012, of a 5,500-km range Agni V that can target Beijing. Noting that there are arguments that nuclear deterrence cannot work at all or that a nuclear deterrent can work only when it is backed by adequate conventional military force, the NSC strategising with nuclear second-strike capability (in view of India’s no-first-use policy) without well-considered military advice, is not merely dangerous but is potentially disastrous. A CDS answerable to the PM and NSC may well be the only competent person to manage India’s nuclear arsenal, which is currently in the hands of bureaucrats and technocrats who have little or no idea of military strategy and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) warfare.

Secondly, a CDS will be able to advise the PM and the NSC on the military aspects of border issues with neighbouring countries. For example, the advice of a CDS on how to handle Pakistani General Kayani’s recent suggestion that both Indian and Pakistani troops should withdraw from the icy heights of the Siachen glacier would be invaluable. Few outside the military know that Pakistan’s forces are not on the Siachen glacier at all, but have been kept well to its West by the Indian Army along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) North of point NJ9842. There is need for the NSC to take a call on the history of territorial disputes and conflicts with Pakistan in the whole of Jammu & Kashmir and particularly in the Ladakh region, by consulting the CDS to get a holistic view of the past situations leading up to the AGPL and possible future scenarios.Note 1

It is doubtful whether General Kayani’s suggestion has the sanction of the Pakistani government. Therefore, without the involvement of the Indian government, a detailed examination of his proposal and assessment of Pakistan’s hidden aims and agendas can be done most effectively by the CDS who would have on-the-ground knowledge of positions, operational and logistical problems as also the pros and cons.

Thirdly, to further strengthen Indo-US strategic ties5, the US Pacific Unified Combatant Command (PACOM) Chief, who commands combat forces of the US Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force, interacts separately with the three Service Chiefs in India. This does not allow the Indian military to get a holistic view of the interactions and plans, thus conceding strategic military advantage to the USA. A CDS who only can have a genuine tri-service perspective will be able to interact to India’s strategic and military advantage.

Finally, as a five-star rank military officer, the CDS will be in a position to advise and mentor the three Service Chiefs on inter-service operational doctrine, encourage tri-service synergy and implement reforms in higher defence management. This will enable India to play a greater strategic role in international affairs and secure for India the necessary resources for its developmental growth.

Need of the Hour

With regard to national security, the discerning observer inevitably comes to the conclusion that India’s national political executives have been without any mature concept of strategic vision, or that they have been too pre-occupied with politics of power to bother about national strategy (thus violating the people’s trust), or they do not trust the military. Or else, the machinations of the bureaucracy have ensured that India’s military is not a part of national security policy formulation. To be generous, perhaps it is a little of each, with a large dose of the last. The NSC, functioning with a bureaucrat NSA to advise the PM on national security over the past 13 years, has not even brought out a national security strategy document6 let alone defining the military’s role in national security, omitting to even consider it systemically compromises national security. And this is well understood by India’s political and military adversaries as well as allies and strategic partners.

The appointment of a CDS as NSA to the PM and with a position as a full member of the NSC with a senior bureaucrat as Member-Secretary, and with the three Service Chiefs remaining in the Strategic Policy Group of the NSC, is a vital necessity if national security is to be addressed rationally. With Chinese military build-up on our northern border along with the so-called ‘string of pearls’ and India’s response with the Agni-V, the appointment of a CDS is a critical strategic responsibility of the government of the day.

References

1. “House Panel Calls All Three Service Chiefs”, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/house-panel-calls-all-three-service-chiefs/934758/0>; Indian Express; New Delhi, Apr 10, 2012.
2. Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi; “Political Direction, Military Leadership And Morale”; Lecture delivered on the occasion of 112th Birthday Celebrations of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose; FICCI Auditorium, New Delhi; January 23, 2010.
3. “India Urgently Needs Chief Of Defence Staff”; <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-12-17/india/28078701_1_defence-staff-cds-post-perspective-plan>; Times of India; December 17, 2009.
4. Rajat Pandit; “Missing in Action: General No.1”; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-5060551,prtpage-1.cmshttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-5060551,prtpage-1.cms>; Times of India; 26 September 2009.
5. Vombatkere, S.G., “Deepening India-US Strategic Ties – Evidences and Repercussions”, Mainstream, New Delhi, Vol XLVIII No 40, September 25, 2010, p.13-15.
6. “IDSAComment”;<http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ANationalSecurityStrategy DocumentforIndia_arvindgupta_201011>; Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; October 20, 2011.

Notes

1. For example, in the military operations between India and Pakistan in 1965 and again in 1971, the Haji Pir pass in POK was captured by Indian troops at tremendous cost of loss of lives and limbs, but after the cease-fire, both times Haji Pir pass was “restored” to Pakistan by India’s political leadership without consulting the military, thereby losing important strategic and tactical advantages. Also, when India’s military forced Pakistani Lt Gen A A K Niazi to sign an instrument of surrender on December 16, 1971, at Dhaka, and took 93,000 Pakistani soldiers prisoner. The prisoners were returned to Pakistan without the political leadership extracting any tactical or strategic advantage, since the military was not consulted. Not consulting the military on national security issues goes against the country’s best security interests.