The Americans also worry about a possible pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan in the subcontinent and have on a number of occasions given expression to their apprehensions in fora such as the US Congressional hearings. Such fears are not of recent origin. In May 1990 a special emissary of US Presideft, the then Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates/had been sent to Pakistan to warn its leadership against a nuclear adventure against India. The American assessment was based on what the CIA had believed to be definitive indicators of Pakistani intentions.
Kargil represents joint Pak Mujahideen action in what official circles describe as Jehad in Kashmir. Neither is in a mood to accept any solution on Kashmir short of accession to Pakistan.
This American assessment has for long been disbelieved in India but it seems now a fresh look at the evidence5 is called for as it has come to light that Pakistan was able to make components for a nuclear bomb by 1983 and was ready for a nuclear blast in 1984. The joint article captioned ‘Securing Nuclear Peace’, published in the News of 5 October 1999, by two former Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan, Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar (the latter is now the Foreign Minister) and former Air Chief Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, had made the point that the value of nuclear capability for Pakistan had been under consideration on at least three occasions as given below:
- Use of nuclear weapons to counter an anticipated Indian attack on Kahuta in mid 1980s was neither specifically mentioned nor excluded.
- Use of nuclear weapons in the event of Brasstacks (a massive Indian military exercise in 1986 along the Indo-Pak borders) converting into an operation, which was more thana mere speculation.
- Gates visit in May 1990 was to prevent an escalation into war with nuclear undertones following deterioration of the Kashmir situation in early 1990 when Indians were considering bombing of training camps in POK.
It is, thus, clear that the thought of use of nuclear weapons against India has crossed the minds of Pakistani leadership several times in the past. Military control over these weapons and an inherent instability in the political and economic situation in the country together constitute a potent combination that can cause Pakistan to lurch into a desperate decision on launch of nuclear weapons against India. Kashmir does provide a backdrop to such a possibility.
Kargil represents joint Pak Mujahideen action in what official circles describe as Jehad in Kashmir. Neither is in a mood to accept any solution on Kashmir short of accession to Pakistan. Anything else would create a rebellion.6 Such is the belief in some quarters in Pakistan.What has creation of Pakistan meant to the people who live in its territory? Has it been a boon or a handicap? In the words of a scholar, since its inception Pakistan has faced intensively “crisis of political development”, i.e. the crisis of identity, legitimacy, integration, penetration, participation and distribution? This description provides ail answer to the question.
Another scholar Myron Weiner observes that national integration comprises five tasks, the creation of a sense of territorial nationality, the establishing of a central national authority, the bridging of the elite-mass gap, the creation of a minimum value consensus, and devising of integrative institutions and behaviour. The objective is to bring about a national identity among people who are divided by ethnicity, religion, language, culture and history8. Going by these criteria, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the “crisis of political development” continues in Pakistan and complete national integration is yet to be accomplished. The split in 1971, leading to Bangladesh, was an eloquent commentary on the state of affairs there. Continuing social, regional and ethnic tensions may suggest that the final chapter is perhaps yet to be written.
With a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, a new form of fundamentalism has started stalking Pakistan, which is vocal about its preference for a Taliban like state in Pakistan.
Instead of being the basis for a common identity and nationalism, Islam in Pakistan has proved to be quite divisive. It discriminates against minorities, reduces them to the status of lesser citizens and makes a mockery of their political rights by creating a climate for fostering separate electorates. While Islam became a tool for seeking legitimacy in the hands of usurpers, Islamisation was seen to be an opportunity by Islamic groups to transfer political power into the hands of the believers through occupation of as many positions of authority as possible in order to pave the way for the establishment of a doctrinaire Islamic state. The influence of this brand of Islam has continued to grow in the corridors of power resulting in step-by-step increase in religio-political mobilisation. The electoral results prove that such groups have not caught the fancy of the general masses of the people but the objective of seizing ultimate political power in the country continues to guide their programmes.
This politicised and activised form of Islam has little to do with piety or religiosity. It also practically contributed nothing to the promotion of cardinal Islamic values of social justice, equality, brotherhood, freedom, tolerance and democracy. On the other hand, its narrow interpretations by sectarian groups have spawned heavy sectarian violence. Shias and Sunnis now maintain their own militant forces ‘that often engage in murderous attacks against each other. With a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, a new form of fundamentalism has started stalking Pakistan, which is vocal about its preference for a Taliban like state in Pakistan.
Portents point to a repetition of Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt in Pakistan, where government and religious forces are battling it out on the streets and elsewhere, making the ordinary citizen insecure about life and property.
Supporters of this fundamentalism are engaged in a Jehad in Kashmir but they want to carry out a Jehad within Pakistan also. The military rulers are unable to control the hardliner extremists and are on the defensive. They have had to roll back measures aimed at controlling the fundamentalist outfits such as placing restrictions on collection of funds in the name of Jehad and a display of weapons at meetings and congregations. The balance of forces between the fundamentalists and the military regime seems to be tilting against the latter since the Maulavis and the Mullahs are gaining in strength each year through the addition of about 40,000 graduates from Madrassa schools.
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