Indian Defence Review

George Friedman once said that the first line of defence against Islamic radicals would be the Muslim states themselves. It could be believed that Pakistan quite accurately represents this fault line. As the second largest Muslim state, it is difficult to imagine how an acutely divisive and terror afflicted state can sustain itself in the long term. Given the continuing instability, internal unrest and political turmoil, it is imperative to determine as to where the state of Pakistan is headed in the foreseeable future.

While it may not be possible to precisely predict the future, but one can surely visualize the uncertainties and strategic discontinuities emerging in Pakistan. An exercise of this nature could be fraught with risk, especially when there are doubts already expressed on the viability of state. This chapter attempts to analyse some of the key uncertainties faced by Pakistan and the likely scenarios that may unfold over the next two decades or so.

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In the current strategic discourse, the state of Pakistan is often referred to as the pendulum state, where the political reins of the country consistently change hands between the powerful army generals and the well heeled politicians. In recent times and especially ever since dismissal of General Mushraf’s regime, the domestic politics seems to have become even more fragile and unpredictable. The assassination of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto particularly plunged the country into one of the worst political crises in recent decades. Consequently, the federal elections which had raised high hopes of a vibrant democracy were soon belied by the irreconcilable differences between mainstream political parties. The balance of power it seems is again tilting in favour of the Pakistan military and their leadership.

The balance of power it seems is again tilting in favour of the Pakistan military and their leadership.

The future of Pakistan hinges on several critical questions. Where is the state of domestic politics in Pakistan headed? Would religion and radicalism continue to dominate the future of Pakistan? What are the key strategic uncertainties that lie ahead? Can the Pakistani establishment hold out against these fears and uncertainties in the long term? Is the revival of a viable democratic culture ever feasible in Pakistan?

In this context, one can arrive at a purposeful appreciation of the country’s future by constructing alternate scenarios based on a socio-politico and military understanding of the Pakistani state.

The Strategic Drivers

The key drivers which could play an important role in shaping the future of Pakistan are discussed at six broad levels:

Political Turbulence: In the post Musharaf period, there has been some revival of political activity in Pakistan. Though much was expected from the Zardari-Sharif duo, the strong mutual antagonism has led to a drift in domestic affairs of the state. It comes as no surprise that Pakistan’s polity and politics continue to be fragile. Some even apprehend that if the political establishment fails to deliver the mandate, the Pakistan army could soon step in. It therefore becomes important to examine if there are any indications that the pendulum may swing again. If yes, then how would the new dispensation contain the raging radicalism and fissiparous tendencies in the state. And what if it fails? The key issue here is that how long will these power swings between the political and military establishment continue. In the ensuing political and dissonance could the disparate radical groups emerge as new power centres, and in turn lead to greater radicalisation of the polity and political institutions in the country.

An array of radical groups rules the roost and their ability to strike at will clearly threatens the very foundation of the Pakistani state.

Religion and Radicalism: It is a matter of concern that religious fundamentalism rages unabatedly across the length and breadth of the country. Unprecedented acts of terror signal a sharp rise in radicalisation of the civil society. An array of radical groups rules the roost and their ability to strike at will clearly threatens the very foundation of the Pakistani state. The state’s political institutions seem to have corroded irreversibly and are under severe stress. And lately, its adverse impact has become a matter of concern for the Pakistani armed forces as well. The key aspect being that religious fundamentalism is impacting the pillars of the state – the political leadership, the civil society and the armed forces. It would have to be carefully watched if the Pakistani state ever succeeds in containing the tribulations of rampant religious radicalism within the country.

Cracks in Federalism: Ever since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been characterised by a weak federal structure. The turbulent peripheries i.e. the NWFP, FATA, Balochistan and Balawaristan today pose a serious challenge to the unity of the state. Sindh suffers from serious ethnic divide with Karachi being the hotbed of sectarian strife. In the west, the Durand line conundrum could intensify the demand for an independent Pashtun homeland. The Afghans in any case disregard the sanctity of any international boundary and have for several years demanded the right for free access and trade in the frontier provinces. Punjab too seems to be an emerging hotbed of radical Islam. The Seraiki influence in the South Punjab, and the demand to trifurcate the province into North, Central and South Punjab has been gradually gaining salience. Is the Pakistani state capable of holding out against these divisive tendencies will have to be carefully analysed. Is it possible for the Pakistani establishment to satisfy demands of greater federal autonomy in the provinces of Balochistan and Balawaristan. Some experts even argue that the instability and chaos prevailing among the peripheral provinces could lead to the fragmentation of the Pakistani state.

Economic Revival: The current economic situation within the country looks grim. High dependence on foreign aid, a burgeoning fiscal deficit, sluggish economic activity and increased military spending seem to be exacerbating the economic distress. The social indices seem to be under severe stress with education and health being the prime areas of concern. Unemployment is rising, inflation is soaring, and lower agricultural production is creating food shortages – the fall out of which is being seen at several levels. The mushrooming of local madrassas as a consequence of poor social indices in Pakistan is a fact well known. How will these economic imbalances be corrected and can the economy simply sustain itself on foreign aid. Is radicalism impinging upon the country’s economic health and would an equitable management of resources lead to a favourable business environment are questions that need to be addressed.

Relations with Neighbours: India, Iran and Afghanistan make up the immediate neighbourhood. And the antagonism between neighbours seems to have been cast in stone. The long standing dispute in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the deep sectarian animosity with Shiite Iran, and the search for strategic depth in Afghanistan show hardly any signs of improvement or reconciliation. The caustic relationship with India surfaces every now and then and, in fact has adversely affected its ability to concentrate on the counterinsurgency campaign in the frontier provinces. Its inimitable obsession of strategic competition with India for influence in Afghanistan affects the probability of improved relations in the neighbourhood. How does Pakistan reconcile its differences with its neighbours will be an important driver for lasting peace in the region.

The caustic relationship with India surfaces every now and then and, in fact has adversely affected its ability to concentrate on the counterinsurgency campaign in the frontier provinces

Extra-regional Interests: Global strategic focus is gradually shifting from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Leading nations of the world are worried about the evolving internal security situation in the country. United States and China, its key allies are earnestly looking to contain the situation lest it implodes and affects their geo-strategic interests. Pakistan is crucial to the United States, for securing its energy interests in the Middle East. Also Iran’s intransigence and unpredictable behaviour can partly be countervailed by United States’ continued presence and relationship with Pakistan. China too seeks to secure its interests in Pakistan through strategic infrastructure development ventures, military cooperation and commercial investments. Both countries could be expected to play a key role, if the situation deteriorates beyond the control of the state in Pakistan. At yet another level, Saudi Arabia’s interference in the political and religious context could become an area of serious concern. Japan and France too have long term developmental and commercial interests within the country and therefore could be expected to play an important role in times of crisis.

The Key Uncertainties

Some of the aforementioned drivers carry a high element of embedded uncertainty. These factors consequentially can cause the future to be much different from today. The trajectories could even go off course and thus be highly uncertain. Four drivers which would make the most crucial difference are discussed:

Radicalism: The key issue is to ascertain whether or not religious radicalism is the most dominant threat to Pakistani state. Would Pakistan be able to contain the spread of religious fundamentalism within the state? If not, then how far could the political and social landscape of the country worsen? Could it lead to conception of a theocratic state or could it end up in some form of Islamic socialism in Pakistan? Would the state be able to sustain this extremely charged religious environment or do we see the emergence of a revolutionary situation – a la Iran – in Pakistan? The resulting environment shall surely carry severe consequences for countries in the neighbourhood.

Provincialism: Whether or not the growing demand for provincial autonomy is a threat to Pakistan’s unity and cohesion? Can the Pakistani establishment fulfil the compelling aspirations of the individual provinces within constitutional confines of the federal structure? If not, then could it lead to further turbulence and instability within the Pakistani society? Can these fissiparous tendencies over time lead to ‘Balkan-isation’ or ‘Lebanon-isation’ of Pakistani state? The issue is gathering import and could be expected to carry serious consequences in the future. The promulgation of the 18th Constitutional amendment is perhaps an important step towards partial mitigation of the federal differences. It however remains to be seen whether this amendment would produce sound political dividends in the future.

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Democracy and Politics: Whether or not the current political dispensation in Pakistan be able to weather the gathering storms of ‘radicalism’ and ‘provincialism’? Would the political climate deteriorate to hasten the return of military rule? If yes, then when could the Pakistani state swing in favour of the military rule? Would the country witness yet another two to three bouts of civil-military rule before it fully reconciles to merits of a constitutional democracy? However, the continued importance being accorded to the military hierarchy by extra-regional powers does not seem to suggest so. General Ashfaq Kayani’s silent rise and lately the accorded of three year long extension in service and so for pointers in this direction.

Would the country witness yet another two to three bouts of civil-military rule before it fully reconciles to merits of a constitutional democracy?

Current Economic Crises: Whether or not one would see the revival of the country’s economy? The Pakistani economy is sustained largely by foreign aid and loans. The social sector indicators such as health and education too paint a not so good picture. As long as the West shows interest in Pakistan, it may be in a position to finance its failing economy. But their disengagement from the region could surely spell doom for Pakistan’s economy. The unprecedented floods in Pakistan that have caused much damage and devastation further aggravate the economic health of the country.

The foregoing uncertainties could be the prime drivers in shaping the future scenarios in Pakistan. In the following section, these have been inter-woven to evolve the generic trend lines in conjunction with other less consequential drivers. The conceptualisation of trend lines has been confined to the discussion of key uncertainties.

The Decadal Trend Lines

Each strategic uncertainty has been analysed to outline the trajectories i.e. the current situation and decades till 2020 and 2030. These trend lines then form the basis of postulating plausible scenarios for 2030.

Plausible Scenarios 2030

Four broad visualisations denoted as the `4F Scenarios` emerge – functional, fragile, failing and fragmented Pakistan. Each scenario is based on a mix of trend lines drawn from the key uncertainties discussed above. There could be a few intermediate scenarios; however these are not discussed. Notwithstanding the negativities observed in the trend lines, the probability of the Pakistani state pulling itself out from the current mess cannot be ruled out.

Scenario I:

Functional Pakistan. It is quite possible that state of Pakistan is able to drive itself out of its current internal problems. The Pakistan army sensing the security implications comes down heavily against the radical elements. The Taliban momentum is eventually rolled back and the al-Qaida is denied safe havens. The success of allied operations in Afghanistan facilitates in calming down the frontier provinces. The rival political groups and parties begin to cooperate with the military in order to bring some sense of order within the country. The civil administration recognises the criticality of the situation and begins to perform. The social sector indicators such as health, education and law and order start looking up as a result of sound economic policies.

The Pakistan civil society could be expected to rally behind these power centres, but if there is no change, it could well become despondent. The politics of ‘power swings’ is likely to be the norm for a generation or more, till the people of Pakistan realise the futility of this brand of politics, or a charismatic figure emerges, whose vision and aura over shadows the current crop of politicians and generals.

Pushed around for strategic and ideological gains, Pakistans capacity to influence its future is reduced or simply non-existent. At best, it can rent out its territory for others games or power play.

Scenario III:

Failing Pakistan. Growing radicalism and demand for provincial autonomy would be the key uncertainties driving this condition. A civil war may possibly erupt in the state of Pakistan wherein the peripheral provinces go their own way, radicalism rules and al-Qaida operatives come close to laying their hands on some nukes. The internal fault lines are accentuated by issues of food shortages, climate change and water security, and the sharing of natural resources and minerals. And even if, the existential threat from the Pakistani Taliban is somewhat reduced, this protracted conflict with the Taliban would eventually weaken the state. The Pakistani populace becomes increasingly vulnerable to the battle between the religious forces and secularists, capital investment flees, economic development slows down and Pakistan becomes a nation of conflicting interests. In the process, chaos and anarchy sets in. Pakistan looks to be headed for ‘Lebanon-isation’ and even possible ‘Balkan-isation’.

Scenario IV:

Fragmented Pakistan. Pakistan’s several power centres such as the military, political and religious parties and radical elements become pawns to extra-regional players – with the US, Russia and China being the lead contenders. Pushed around for strategic and ideological gains, Pakistan’s capacity to influence its future is reduced or simply non-existent. At best, it can rent out its territory for others’ games or power play. This would affect the state’s cohesion and development, and enrich only those actors, who conspire to be part of this great game. The resulting power politics would focus on simply getting a piece of the cake – legitimately or illegitimately. Certainly the Pakistanis can be expected to favour their trusted ally China – because of its strategic importance, economic clout and geographical proximity. China could easily outsmart others in furthering their strategic and commercial interests. China successfully creates several trans-national corporations to check mate the western powers in Pakistan. Giligit-Baltistan shows signs of amalgamating with China. The United States may retain some control over certain political constituencies in Pakistan. India too may vie for re-claiming some of its territory in Jammu and Kashmir. A resurgent Russia and the Shiite Iran would also not like to be left out of the resulting imbroglio.

Wild Card Scenarios

Several wild card situations are possible and those remotely likely are discussed. First, the take over of the Pakistani state by a radical Taliban regime could portend grave challenges. Taliban led by a messianic leader and supported by a few political parties initially assume power at the provincial level and gradually emerges as a powerful political force in the centre. An Afghanistan like situation of mid 1990s emerges which blatantly tramples all democratic values and institutions across the length and breadth of the country.

Second, the country’s nuclear assets despite best attempts of the military leadership and the United States pass in part or whole into the hands of radical elements. Such a situation engineered by the al-Qaida could force the United States to launch a counter strike to wrest back the nuclear assets. This could generate an intense internal backlash eventually resulting in a civil war. And thirdly, increased attempts by the United States to unilaterally strike at some of the al-Qaida strongholds within the frontier provinces leads to a political backlash within the country, and the radical elements seize the opportunity and rise to force a regime change.

The massive floods in Pakistan surely proved to be a disastrous wild card. With more than 20 million people displaced; 1.8 million houses damaged; 1.2 million cattle heads lost; a fifth of the cotton crop wiped out; and vast tracts of the most fertile arable land along the Indus River deluged, this tragedy surpasses any other disaster witnessed recently. The magnitude of the devastation and damage caused has been colossal and some experts argue that Pakistan may take years before its fully recovers.

Conclusion

In absence of clear alternative futures, the pendulum of power will continue to swing, with the possibility of a collapse always looming in the background. But then a weak Pakistan threatens everyone in the region. Pakistan’s future scenarios are linked to the regional future which all must work to transform. Given the current political and religious drift, it is unlikely that these ideal conditions can ever be achieved. This process will have to be multi-faceted and anticipatory rather than reactive. And if it does not happen, then like all else it will be subsumed in due course. And then there would be far too much at stake for all stakeholders, and especially the lead countries to allow the current downward trajectory to continue.

Could Pakistan draw itself out from the scenarios – fragile, failed and fragmented – and become a functional state is the big question. No wonder betting on plausible politico-military alternatives in Pakistan by 2030 can be inherently risky and fickle.