Indian Defence Review

The National Democratic Front of Bodoland has resurfaced with gusto in the North East. On Saturday the separatists (NDFB) massacred two persons and left more than four injured. Earlier on Friday the separatists Bodos killed five Hindi speaking people after stopping a bus on National Highway-31 in Kokrajhar district of Assam. The Bodo Security Force or National Democratic Front of Assam has been making all attempts   to create a separate Bodoland for the Bodo people of Assam. The Bodo militants have been posing a serious threat to the security apparatus. Although violence in itself is condemnable, very rarely, terrorist violence is a nihilistic act bereft of any deeper undercurrents. And the structure of violence is more often than not, located in society and social conditions which not only create them but also nourish and reinforce them. Recurrence of violence is symptomatic of a society’s body politic, torn asunder by varied threats and tensions.  Very often, the social conditions that generate conflict (and the cause for violence) have external coordinates.

In a globalised world, the matrices of power turn on the highly visible, in-egalitarian structure of international economy and as such inter-relations between socio-economic conditions in different parts of the world are becoming more and more obvious day by day. Secessionist activities in the NE are a result of various issues that plague the region: lack of economic development and industrialisation, local incompetence and outside support. International borders ring this area and this has added another dimension to the ongoing problem of insurgency. The Bodo militants have used Bhutan, Bangladesh and Naga insurgents Myanmar, for procuring arms and training .To a large extent, militancy provides livelihood to the rebels.  Recurring conflicts between the tribal population and sundry separatist groups in the NE have added a deadly dimension to the vulnerable situation.

In the past, attempts have been made by the rebels to put pressure on the government to meet their demands. Due to the need for deployment of paramilitary forces in the region, the government, too, has incurred heavy losses, both in terms of public property and lives.The Indian Army’s Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino were successful in driving the rebels underground but could not destroy their potency. Although the central government has made efforts to find a solution to the political problems plaguing the region by initiating the Tripura accord, the Assam accord and the Mizo accord, the grievances of various factions within the militant organisations still remain unaddressed. Consequently, insurgent activities against the government and clashes among the factions have continued unabated.

We should be extremely cautious in handling the present crisis. The region’s thick forest-cover provides an excellent base for the rebels to carry out guerrilla activities. Several security officials have died on the National Highway 53 and 39, which connect Manipur to the rest of country. These days, rebels seem to be reasonably confident of their access to vantage points. Moreover, their strategies have become more sophisticated and they are successful in acquiring more lethal weapons from across the border.

The criticism of the government’s policies by the insurgents has also got support from the locals. The lack of sufficient resources has also created a problem of force deployment in the region over the years. Consequently, training and ground force exercise have been affected. In addition, the geographical location of the NE has made it difficult for the Army to gain reliable intelligence. Moreover, the mobile members of the rebel organisations are trained in guerrilla warfare and get help from the border areas of Myanmar and Bangladesh.

The disturbing issue is that neither the withdrawal of the Army from the NE nor the occupation of the entire region seems tenable anymore. The military operations will get unsustainable. But the role of the military and the security forces is crucial because their operations in insurgency-affected areas require a combined approach of local support and excellent intelligence information network.

In a changing environment, intelligence agencies, the police and paramilitary forces need to diversify their methods by bringing together their technical and professional expertise. In this regard, the following suggestions may be worth considering:

• Carefully examining the incidents and preparing detailed action-oriented reports on the insurgency-affected areas
• Building a sophisticated communication network
• Better management of local contacts
• Developing new techniques of security and maintenance of secrecy
• Talented specialists must be deployed in  the affected areas
• Sensitisation of personnel to issues relating to human rights, civil liberties, prisoners rights, etc.
• Developing capability to anticipate security needs. This can be done by conducting specialised courses for monitoring security situations.

On the other hand, there is a need for the sophisticated security procedures which can go all the way from village  screening to the border area in north east .  Some kind of positive programmes which can replace the frustration of terrorists can prove effective.  There is also a need to promote open institutions, including political institution to absorb the ethnic, religious and political pressure and allow them (the terrorists) to vent their feelings in a proper way. This will change their mind and thus encourage them to settle their differences in some peaceful way.