The malady of breaking up coherent units and sub-units is a fallout of interference from higher HQ in the tactical operations arena. In any Infantry battalion today no Commander can confidently claim to deploy a coherent section which has trained together and has a well-identified leadership. A similar situation exists with regard to platoons too. Trying to implement a ‘buddy’ system remains an exercise on paper only. Colonial practices such as residential guards for Commanders aggravate the problem. This form must change and the task of providing guards for non-combat functions must be entrusted to Defence Security Corps.
The malady of breaking up coherent units and sub-units is a fall out of interference from higher HQ in the tactical operations arena…
Similarly, the Corps of Military Police (CMP) has been created for a specific role. However, ad hoc Garrison Military Police (GMP) is mustered as a local arrangement to augment the strength of the CMP. However, this results in CMP becoming the managers of the GMP who are doing their task. The GMP is mustered by pooling in manpower from garrison units which is highly detrimental to the structured cohesion of the sub-units of the battalion/regiment from where the manpower is mustered. The practice in the Army has always been to deploy coherent sub-units for any task unlike the police or para-military forces where employment is specified by physical numbers. The system followed by the Army is basically to retain the cohesiveness of a sub-unit built around a clearly identified command and control hierarchy catering for a leadership element, communications, equipment and administrative support.
Execution of Operational Plans
Plans were made off large-scale inch maps. Remoteness of the areas and the level of cartography existing in the 1930s-1940s when the maps were prepared made them inherently inaccurate. Adequate time was not made available to battalions and formations to familiarise themselves with the ground where they were to undertake defensive operations. Interestingly, the Report has, at a number of places, mentioned of action by Chinese outflanking the defences held by Indian troops. It is indeed an indication of the familiarity with the terrain in the area of operations, level of training, cohesion of the units and the level of communications available with the PLA that enabled them to operate cross-country deep inside enemy territory with alacrity and ease. How did they get such detailed inputs of the terrain? Had they been carrying out physical reconnaissance all the while that India was complacently insisting that the “Chinese will not react”? This is intriguing and noteworthy.
Since there were no roads the field, artillery and mortars which had very limited range per force had to be deployed well forward to be in a position to provide defensive fire support. Mules and air drop of mortars and Howitzers were resorted to. As a matter of interest, a Howitzer of one of the units dropped at Hathungla was retrieved recently a few years ago after a detailed search. Dropping a weapon with crew is only the beginning of the problem. Mortar/Howitzer tubes without ammunition are mere worthless junk of metal. For meaningful fire support, ammunition for any operations requires a constant stream flowing forward. The limited range of these mortars/Howitzers made the concentration of fire from a number of fire units, as is the practice, non-existent. Similarly, due to these limitations, the weapons could not undertake any counter bombardment to neutralise enemy artillery. Thus, the PLA artillery was targeting Indian troops in their hastily prepared defences without interference.
Adequate time was not made available to battalions and formations to familiarise with the ground where they were to undertake defensive operations…
Of late, there has been much hype on the possible induction of Ultra Light Howitzers (ULH) of 155mm calibre from USA. To exploit the light weight of this weapon which gives it the ability of being carried under slung a medium-lift helicopter; deployment areas for the guns need to be prepared in peacetime. Arrangements have to be made to stock ammunition in secure, hardened bunkers/caves dug into mountain sides, particularly, in areas where the road is not likely to reach in the next half decade/decade. Gun positions can be prepared at additional locations with ammunition dumped ab initio to cater for contingencies of side-stepping the ULH to areas so prepared without being handicapped for want of ammunition and need to divert utility helicopter resources during the battle. To do so would entail purchase of larger quantities of ammunition than in normal circumstances.
In every operation, the Report highlights the paucity of availability of reserves. Mountains are suited for defensive operations due to the attackers’ express need for opening an axis for maintenance to progress operations in depth. Well-prepared, stocked and defended localities can hold out numerous enemy attacks that will severely constrain the momentum and progress of any attacker’s plans. The enemy, in his preparation for an attack will seek maximum information of the defender’s deployment and location of his automatic and support weapons. The layout of a defended locality can be obtained by patrols and military appreciation, though actual position on ground of sub-units, his automatic weapons and support weapons may be concealed and measures for limited deception undertaken. Uncommitted reserves, however, can create a decision dilemma for the enemy, since he will not know the strength and location of the force. Considering the nature of the terrain and the high altitude of the tactical battle areas, pre-locating reserves well forward, duly acclimatised, was an essential aspect of the operational planning but was not done by the formations. Knowing the difficulties imposed along our Northern borders, in a future war, allocating uncommitted reserves to Brigades, Divisions and Corps as reserves, ab initio, maybe a more pragmatic option that will be need to be actively considered vis-a-vis holding a strategic reserve in the form of the Mountain Strike Corps (refer to IDR Oct-Dec 2013).
Air Support
From the Report, it appears that in meetings at the Government level, where the Chief of the Army Staff was invited to attend, the Air Chief and Naval Chief were not invited. This reflects the level of strategic thinking and planning at the highest echelons of the Government. The potential of the three services to further the interest of the country was not comprehended. The coordination of effort between the Army and the Air Force at the Eastern Command HQ level also seems to be just marginal. In the high level meetings, of the Command HQ, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was represented by ‘an officer’ whose rank or appointment has not been specified. Consequently, his contribution could only be limited to indicating availability of serviceable assets and the ‘meteorological’ forecast of the next 24 hours. The incident where the Eastern Army Commander was left stranded at Tawang by IAF pilots when the helicopters took off without him is militarily ridiculous. The pilots acted as though they were the staff of a commercial airline and not a combat force in a live battle situation.
In every operation, the Report highlights the paucity of availability of reserves…
Close air support, communication flight support and casualty evacuation are essential ingredients of tactical operational planning. To base a plan on such support which is available based on priorities dictated by another service compels the Army to make plans from within its own resources. As a result air assets are not fully exploited. Dedicated air resources for operations can only be planned for when assets such as attack helicopters, armed helicopters, utility helicopters are under the command of the Army. It is a moot point as to why the Air Force needs to control all flying assets in the air space from the ‘nap-of-the-earth to outer space’. Army Aviation ought to control all air assets over the Tactical Battle Area.
Comprehensive National Power
As the scope of the Report did not include commenting on the planning process at the higher levels, future conflicts and wars will require all elements of national power to be employed at appropriate stages. At the political level, the CCS and at the bureaucratic level, the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretary will need to be organised so as to orchestrate the deployment of various elements of power to synergise their potential with the sole aim to secure national interests.
The act of the then Government in not maintaining any minutes of meetings was to escape accountability. The decision making process in the Government is as it is because it is an elaborate enactment choreographed to defuse accountability and responsibility. The Opposition in Parliament, too, failed abysmally in forcing the issue of augmenting the strength of the Armed Forces and ensuring that they were suitably equipped in order to be prepared for a military conflict. As a result, the PM had to shoulder all responsibility for errors of commission and omission of others.
The Report, unwittingly, has given the Nation an opportunity to introspect. No scapegoats at this juncture will redeem what, we as a Nation, collectively lost. Simply drawing lessons from these failures without rancour or recrimination will enable us to emerge wiser and stronger.
Please wait...
The writer has noted “The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war” .
Aren’t similar incidents happening at present as reported very recently? Here is a link: indiandefencereview.com/news/lessons-from-the-henderson-brooks-report/0/
To quote: “Two Chinese helicopters entered Indian territory in Uttarakhand on two occasions in April and June after which the Army launched protests with the Chinese Army, the Rajya Sabha was informed on Tuesday.
“Due to differing perception of the Line of Actual Control by both India and China, transgressions do occur. Two Chinese helicopters transgressed the LAC on April 30 and June 13 in Uttarakhand,” Defence Minister Arun Jaitley said in written reply to a query.”Protests were lodged regarding the above transgressions with the Chinese side in flag meetings on May 5 and June 23 respectively,” he said.
The minister said the incidents of transgressions are taken up with the “Chinese side through established mechanisms such as flag meetings, Border Personnel Meetings and normal diplomatic channels like working mechanism for consultation and coordination on India-China border affairs etc.”
There have been many incidents related to transgression and face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops along the LAC in last few years.”
Hari your observation on PS Bhagat is correct. He was a Brigadier then. Incidentally coming from an Infantry Regiment of hill troopsof the Kumaon region, seem to have picked up from them this penchant for suffixing ‘Singh’ after every name. Sen became Sen Singh Sahib, Aiyappa became Aiyappa Singh Sahib. So truly Regimented.
It is true that the options were not wargamed at the tactical level. Every action taken was adhoc, whether it was induction of forces, selection of defences, and preparation for contingencies. A Corps Headquarter being raised when operations are imminent was ludicrous. Intelligence of the enemy was nix. Own patrolling to gain information was too limited and shallow. All these stemmed from the fact that we were not in the frame of mind for a war. So the lesson that to be prepared for war at all times is paramount. Armies are raised to fight wars and enforce peace violently. Forces are not deployed in border areas for ‘diplomacy’. If that is clear to all Commanders then upping the ante should be suitably calibrated.
The author of “Report” was Lt. Gen. Premindra Singh Bhagat, not Bhagat Singh as mentioned in this opinion paper.
A more critical analysis is needed that Indian army failed to defend other approaches to SELA Pass like trails which bypassed SELA and allowed the Chinese to appear behind indian lines, including Bomdila and farther beyond. That is military failure, not a civilian issue.
Writer after writer discuss at length the political failures of Nehru and Menon. There is very little time devoted to military matters which lead to haphazard withdrawal from SELA Pass. Chinese had appeared in strength behind Indian lines using trails etc. of which they had a complete knowledge, but carried very little supplies to sustain their troops for any length of time. Had SELA pass defences held and unnecessary withdrawal not ordered then, hungry and cold Chinese would be surrendering to Indian troops.
The issue of command failure is the worst in this debacle. Army lines of communications were bypassed. The command structure was ignored and soldier forced into a bad and open position, ultimately to be ambushed by the Chinese. Henderson-Brooks and PS Bhagat report (whatever is published) highlights this failure in a cursory way, blaming Gen Kaul for bypassing all command structure. It does not deal with complete brigade level failures in guarding the backdoor. There must also be failures at the Intelligence level that nobody thought that so many trails are still usable during october and November months which would give access to the Chinese behind Indian lines.
These type of issues which need to be thoroughly understood before we stand up to the Chinese next time. One lesson and foremost of all is that if you are not prepared then go for a fight. (Nehru did not understand that).
I am in full agreement with you. The failure in 1962 was not only at the highest political levels, but was also at the Army command structure. It has been noted that Gen Chaudhury, the Army Chief in the aftermath of the India-China war, spent most of his time and energy to cut out the dead wood to cleanse the Indian Army – to give an example, to retire Lt Gen Pathnia and his coterie in the Army. In my view something very ominous is happening at the Army at present which brings back in mind the pre-1962 mindset of the Army and the political masters (Modi as I write). I read again and again statements of Army Generals past and present, that 1962 will not be repeated. These are just hollow statements. Of course, 1962 cannot happen since we are in 2014 ! But something else is happening at the India-China border. The Chinese PLA is year by year nibbling away Indian territory by their aggressive posture and patrolling. Since year 2000, India has retreated from the boundary held, or better said lost, more than 800 sq km in Ladakh and the East. The Army hoodwinks the public, that the line of control is just a perception and hence as if the Chinese are entitled to encroach on the Indian side. Once I tried to take it up with a Maj Gen who served at the Chinese border, but I failed to extract from him that the Indian forces have also advanced their LAC in any sector. This is so poignant that at the time of 1962, Indian Army had posts right at the northern shore of the Pangong Lake. All these Indian posts fell one by one in Chinese hands in October 1962 ! At present only the southern section of the lake, at most one-third, is under India’s control. I was taken by surprise by a statement by Gen JJ Singh, Governor of Arunachal, that to settle the boundary India will have to trade in some areas in her possession. In the history of the world, boundaries between nation states have often been determined by fighting wars, but the Indian nation is coward to go to that length.