Military & Aerospace

Lessons from the 1962 Sino-Indian War in Ladakh
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Issue Book Excerpts: The Crimson Chinar | Date : 19 Nov , 2016

This is the third and concluding part of the Sino-Indian war, and although, it covers the wider canvas of the war, it focuses on Ladakh. The previous parts of the extracts from the book: The Crimson Chinar – The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico-Military Perspective that form this series, posted on this site before this: The Overview of the War and Occuparion of Tibet and the American Secret War are recommended to be read prior to reading this part.  

…these are as relevant in the current strategic Sino-India strategic discourse, as they were in the bleak autumn of 1962.

Before coming to the lessons of the war, since, there remains a major controversy on why did India not employ Air Power in 1962, the extract of the relevant part is being covered prior to highlighting the macro lessons from the war – these are as relevant in the current strategic Sino-India strategic discourse, as they were in the bleak autumn of 1962.

The Employment of the Air Force

The Indian Air Force in 1962

After the experience of the first Kashmir War and threats emanating from China, the Government of India (GOI) approved the IAF force structure for a 45 Squadron Force by the end of 1961; composed as 35 Squadrons of Combat Aircraft and 10 of Transport Aircraft.  However, by the end of 1962, the actual strength remained at 36 Squadrons, which included 10 of the Auxiliary Air Force. The delay for raising the additional 9 Squadrons was due to bureaucratic delays in making the choice. The Air Force wanted the F-104 Star fighter from the US, but this was not forthcoming due to objections from Pakistan and the only alternative was the MIG -21 from the Soviet Union. This had been contracted for, but were still not available when the war broke out. With a total of 559 fighter/bomber aircraft, the IAF of 1962 was a formidable force, especially in terms of quality as compared to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).[1] There was also the factor of appreciating what the PLAAF could possibly throw against India and this depended on the capabilities of her aircraft and the Air Bases she had from where operations could be mounted as also the threat she anticipated from her own eastern coast. Qualitatively, the IAF had an edge as the MIG 15 and 17’s of the PLAAF were obsolete aircraft and only the MIG 19’s were comparable to the Hunters. A quantitative tabulation of fighter assets is given in Table 3-1 below.

Table 3 – 1  :  Comparison of the Fighter & Bomber Assets[2]

MIG 15 & 17              –   1350 Oragans (Toofani)           –   57
MIG 19                      –    150 Vampires                       –   224
Illusion 28                  –    500-600 Gnats                              –   33
  Hunters                          –   140
  Mysteres                        –   105
Total- 1500-1600  Total    –    559

Deployment of Fighter/Bomber Assets

…it seems no intelligence assessment of what the PLAAF could/would deploy against India was undertaken in any professional manner.

Eastern Sector.  Though the bulk of the Indian assets continued to be deployed against Pakistan, by 1960, the IAF had also deployed two Squadrons of Toofanis and Vampires each at Tezpur, Chabua, Jorhat and the Bagdogra Air Bases and in addition, two Squadrons of Hunters were also deployed nearby at Kalaikunda. The infrastructure was considered adequate to meet any threat in the east, and if the requirement came, additional assets could be made available from the aircraft deployed against Pakistan. On the other side, it was assessed that China would use her three airfields at Jeykundu (12,467 feet), Chamdo (10,597 feet) and Nachu (14,763 feet) in the east, though the utility of Nachu was limited due to its height. Lanchou, Zinning and Kunming were too far away from the front, hence they could not contribute directly but their use as feeder bases and for bomber and air transport roles remained significant. It can be seen from the heights of these airfields that the carrying capacity of aircraft would get affected. On the other side, the IAF had the distinct advantage of having bases at lower altitudes.

Western Sector.   The Western sector had an edge over the eastern, since relocation of aircraft by the IAF for meeting the threats was easier. The airfields that China could use were Khotan and Kashgar and both were located at heights between 4000 to 5000 feet; hence the payload factor was favourable compared to her airfields in the east. The Western Command assessment of 9 April, 1960 was that the Chinese could interfere with our own Air support operations as also carry out offensive air raids against our forward posts.[3] On the other hand, airbases like Leh, Thoise and Kargil, which were closer to Eastern Ladakh, could not support fighter operations. As a result, support had to come from the plains, restricting loiter time over the area and the striking range.

India grossly overestimated the capabilities of the PLAAF.

Threat Assessment

As tensions escalated, the Indians carried out an analysis on the capability of the PLAAF against India but unfortunately, this was based on imprecise intelligence and based on western inputs.  In the words of Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “As regards the balance of air power, it seems no intelligence assessment of what the PLAAF could/would deploy against India was undertaken in any professional manner.”[4]He goes on to say that the assessment made was based on the aggregate ‘bean count’ without assessing the doctrine, strategy or calculation of the deployable air effort and useful payloads. It may be pertinent to point out that in 1962, the bulk of the PLAAF was deployed to meet the threat across the Taiwan Straits and therefore little effort and that too of dubious quality could have been brought to bear on India. However, to be fair, in 1962, the IAF, like the Army, had no institution where the employment of air power could be systematically analysed. The Intelligence Directorate of the Air HQ had no capabilities to assess the IB data, let alone make independent assessments. As a result, the assessment was alarmist and became one of the factors for the Indian decision to keep her fighter/bomber fleet grounded. This was to prove another monumental blunder for which India suffered.

Air Maintenance

India had failed to build up adequate ground infrastructure to counter the Chinese threat; hence, the Army was forced to depend upon Air maintenance. However, the air effort possible could only meet only half of the requirement of the Army. The Indian transport aircraft holdings[5]are given in the table, and due to the paucity, requirements of the eastern theatre were outsourced to the ‘Kalinga Airlines.’

Table 3-2 : Transport Aircraft of the IAF in 1962

Type of aircraft Quantity
AN-12 1 Squadron (7x aircraft)
Dakota 2Squadrons* (8 x aircraft each)
Fairchild Packet 2 Squadrons*
IL -14 1 Squadron*
Otter/Caribou (Light Transport) 2 Squadrons

 …the final decision not to use the Air Force offensively was taken after the Chinese had started their offensive and it was a decision ‘taken under the counsel of fears.

Helicopters. The first of the Helicopter Units had been set up in 1960 and by the time of war, India had three units. The Unit for Ladakh was equipped with the versatile MI-4 transport helicopter which proved invaluable for the movement of men and supplies. In fact, the first operational move of a company in helicopters in the Indian context was carried out by this unit. The other two units were deployed in the east and the third was being raised in Tezpur as late as September 1962 and had a mix of Bell G-3 and Alouette helicopters. These helicopters proved their weight in gold not only in the war but even after it.

Ground Support.The biggest problem the Air Force faced was the absence of ground support at the various ALGs used in the Ladakh sector and absence of radars and radio links were major limiting factors. That the Air Force managed so well in Chushul, Fuchke and later in DBO was indeed commendable. The Air Force was also short of Supply Dropping Equipment which restricted forward delivery.

Application of Offensive Air Power

The controversial Indian decision not to employ the Fighter/Bomber assets of the IAF has been analysed at some length by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh.[6]The underlying reasons as given by him that contributed to the decision of not using offensive air power are summarised:

It united the country in her darkest moments and gave birth to an India who at least temporarily, developed the will and the resilience for introspection.

  1. Lack of Intelligence of the Enemy Air Capability.  India grossly overestimated the capabilities of the PLAAF. In that, quality of the air power and a realistic assessment of what China could deploy were not adequately considered.
  2. Desire to Prevent Escalation.  The fear of avoiding a PLAAF backlash seems to have played heavily on the Indian leadership. The apprehension seems to have been fear of bombing of Indian cities and shooting down of transport aircraft. There was mixed counsel on the utility and effectiveness of close air support in jungle and mountainous terrain. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has quoted Major General Palit, the DMO that as late as 2 May, 1962, the advice was that the Army should only ask for close air support when faced with the ‘distinct’possibility of a post being overrun. Militarily, this makes little sense as one can never wait for the situation to get out of hand and for exposed posts like those in Aksai Chin and Sumdo (Sugur Sector, adjacent to Ladakh), this was a recipe for disaster. Even the Director of Air Operations, Air Marshal H C Dewan, seems to have advised the Chief of Air Staff on the same lines. 
  3. Lack of Jointness between the Army and the Air Force.   The British had left behind a rich legacy of jointness between the Army and the Air Force and this had proved to be a major battle winning factor in the first Kashmir war. After the departure of Lord Auchinlek, the appointment of Supreme Military Cdr had lapsed by default. Thus the onus for joint planning for the higher direction of war fell on the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and by default, the Committee, became the de-facto advisors to the DCC. Unfortunately, after the first Kashmir war, the system of the DCC itself was never revived, hence, even the COSC had not even met since 1959 and her two sub committees, including the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had become non-effective.

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The apprehension that the use of offensive air power would escalate the war seems to have been the major consideration. It appears that there always remained the hope that despite the skirmishes, the conflict would still not escalate to a full blown war. As per Palit, the final decision not to use the Air Force offensively was taken after the Chinese had started their offensive and it was a decision ‘taken under the counsel of fears.[7]Since no one was willing to predict an all-out offensive, use of offensive air support was not considered seriously. The underlying consideration being that India should not precipitate the situation under all circumstances. Once the offensive started, it seems that no one had time to review/reconsider this option.[8]Even the pacing out of the offensive as two distinct phases must have added to the dilemma for the proponents wanting to avoid further escalation.

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2 thoughts on “Lessons from the 1962 Sino-Indian War in Ladakh

  1. The General has missed many crucial points in his analysis, e.g. the then finance minister Morarji Desai blocked release of funds for purchase of automatic weapons (rifles?) for the army etc although these were sanctioned by the Indian cabinet prior to 1962 debacle. There is also no reference, not to mention an in depth analysis, of the resignation by the army chief Thimayaa in 1959 supported by other higher echelons in the military service which Nehru as the PM succeeded to reverse by his “diplomatic” charm, or better said hoodwinking tactics. In my books, the army commanders, in particular Thimayaa, failed to rise to the occasion to stand up to their political masters to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty in territorial terms by challenging their directives. This stands in stark contrast to what Napoleon had laid out in European context for the military as its foundation for the nation..

  2. Outstanding analysis. I would add one component regarding “fatal flaw”. What was the nature of the Indian polity before & throughout this conflict? What was insufficient about it? What were the social, political components of Indian national identity that were fatal.
    Outstanding historical analysis, but I would have liked to read more about India’s civil-military relations & its consequent political institutions as requisites for prosecuting a war.

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