Indian Defence Review

Except for the debacle of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, India has managed to perform quite well in the various military conflicts. However, each of these did leave behind unmistakeable signs of inadequacy in the existing systems. Unlike any other developed country, the Indian forces are subjected to three tiers of control – secretarial, financial and ministerial. The existing system thus results in inordinate delays as superficially knowledgeable civil servants decide on military matters. To add to the woes of the men in uniform, the political leadership continues to be uninformed and indifferent towards their requirements and aspirations.

“Like beauty, understanding the strategy, lies in the strategic culture of the beholder” —Bernard Loo “Geography and Strategic Stability”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No 1, March 2003

In terms of area, India, the seventh largest nation in the world boasts of the second largest army, the fourth largest air force and the eighth largest navy. With the second largest population in the world, it is also considered a storehouse of human resource. The political noise about lack of reforms, inflation, poor governance and the current global economic trends notwithstanding, India has not been doing too badly. What India lacks, however, is strategic culture, especially in the management of its defence.

There are some in India who would like to see the Armed Forces away from playing a role in governance and decision-making. They ignore the fact that wars occur once every few years and that when they do, they tend to change the course of history. For example, the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the 1999 conflict in Kargil with Pakistan; while the former marked the beginning of British rule in India, the latter brought to the fore the need to overhaul defence management and modernise our Armed Forces. While some half-hearted attempts have been made in this regard, the issues have not been followed-up to logical conclusion and the Armed Forces remain marginalised. Despite five wars, continuing insurgencies, separatist movements, cross-border proxy war, Pakistan going nuclear, China’s emergence as a regonalpower, Revolution in Military Affairs, demise of the Cold War, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the structure of the Indian Defence Establishment and the National Security System, has more or less remained unaltered. It is time to review the security structure of the nation and take appropriate steps to prepare the nation to face the remaining years of the 21st century.

History

During the freedom struggle, leaders in India were focussed on gaining independence and had little time to devote to defence issues. Besides, in their collective wisdom, they were convinced that on attaining freedom, a non-violent India with no hegemonic ambitions, would be free of any external threat. Threat from Pakistan and China had evidently not been visualised. It was also argued that the major world powers, exhausted after World War II, would not engage India militarily. Thus India gained independence on August 15, 1947, without having given any serious thought to a defence policy. “A Tryst with Destiny,” as the first Prime Minister proclaimed, had actually begun for the Armed Forces.

The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) in pre- independent India was second only to the Viceroy. Being a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, he was the de facto Defence Minister. The role of the Defence Department was not to examine proposals or to sit in judgement over Army Headquarters but to issue orders on behalf of the Government of India. Soon after Independence, the War Department and Defence Department were merged to form the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It was also enlarged to take on additional roles of defence management that included threat assessment, force levels, budgeting and defence production. Independence necessitated the creation of structures different from those existing under the British rule to establish parliamentary control over the military. These structures were designed mainly to quell fears of possible political ambitions of the military amongst leaders.

In 1947, a committee of three senior Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers suggested a structure of the MoD. They aimed to lower the status of the military in relation to the ICS on the same lines as had been done for the police. Ironically, it was Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, who ensured that the Service Chiefs maintained their status over the Defence Secretary. Lord Ismay, the then Chief of Staff, was asked to draw up a Higher Defence Organisation for India. Prevailing conditions did not permit large-scale changes but a number of committees were recommended for coordinated decision-making for national defence. In essence, independent inputs were to be forwarded by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), the Defence Minister’s Committee (DMC), of which the Service Chiefs were members and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). These signified the representation of the Services, as also the bureaucracy and political control and were conceived with a vision to reduce red tape, provide collective professional advice to the political leadership and most significantly, retain the military leadership in the decision-making chain.

Over a period of time, the latter two committees degenerated into ad hoc procedures, in the process marginalising the Service Chiefs. Their repeated reduction in precedence further reduced their role in the decision-making process with reliance on individuals rather than the system. When Nehru assumed the portfolio of the Defence Minister in November 1962, he instituted weekly meetings with the Service Chiefs and Secretaries reflecting his belief in the wisdom of collective decision-making. However, this arrangement was short-lived.

In 1971, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) replaced the Emergency Committee set up in 1962, which in turn had been set up to replace the DCC. While the DCC was entrusted to deal with defence related matters, the CCPA had a broader charter. This further reduced the role of the Service Chiefs in security-related decision-making. Transfer of the Military Wing from the Cabinet Secretariat to the MoD further widened the break. The Military Wing previously provided secretarial support to the DCC and COSC. With the transfer, the Defence Secretary started considering all COSC matters also under its purview.

The MoD had taken control of all defence related matters — be they plans, promotions or placements of senior officers! Service Headquarters has continued to remain out of favour in the defence decision-making machinery, even as it remains responsible for ensuring the territorial integrity of the country.

The Aftermath of Kargil

A direction in higher defence policy formulation is strictly the prerogative of the political leadership, as it should be in any democratic nation. This fundamental principle has been scrupulously followed by our apolitical armed forces unlike in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The unwritten interpretation of ‘civilian control’ has been taken to mean control by the ‘bureaucracy’ rather than by the political leadership. To keep the Services on the back foot, the bureaucracy has perfected the art of ‘divide and rule’. The Service Headquarters has been kept outside the framework of higher defence decision-making for as long as my generation can recollect, leading a prominent journalist Shekhar Gupta of the ‘C’ word fame, to once state, “In no other major democracy are the armed forces given so insignificant a role in policy making as in India. In no other country do they accept it with the docility they do in India.”1 While too little control over the Armed Forces can lead to serious problems, too much control can also smother the military and render it ineffective in the long run.

Fortunately, except for the debacle of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, India has managed to perform quite well in the various military conflicts. However, each of these did leave behind unmistakeable signs of inadequacy in the existing systems. Unlike any other developed country, the Indian forces are subjected to three tiers of control – secretarial, financial and ministerial. The existing system thus results in inordinate delays as superficially knowledgeable civil servants decide on military matters. To add to the woes of the men in uniform, the political leadership continues to be uninformed and indifferent towards their requirements and aspirations.

Every country formulates its comprehensive objectives based on the regional and global geopolitics. The UK, USA and France have evolved their respective defence decision-making organisations as per their strategic perspective and may not necessarily be suitable for India. Studies were carried out between the sixties and the eighties in various countries to formulate a template for an effective higher defence organisation. The situation in India was, however, one of complacency after the victory against Pakistan in 1971. The War was quoted as a classic example of inter-services cooperation and competent higher defence coordination, with no further need to tinker with the system conforming with the American philosophy, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”.

In effect, it was not till 1999, post-Kargil, that a comprehensive study was ordered to focus on the lessons of the conflict to improve higher defence management. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), set up under K Subrahmanyam, was mandated to examine the sequence of events and make recommendations for the future. The KRC was not an enquiry commission. The KRC studied the events leading to and during the conflict and flagged some glaring inadequacies in the country’s defence management primarily in the fields of intelligence gathering and sharing, border management and the structure of the defence establishment itself. The KRC recommended a complete review of the national security system not by the bureaucracy but by a group of experts. Consequent to the recommendations, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was formed under the leadership of L K Advani, with Arun Singh heading the Task Force on Management of Defence. The findings of the Task Force listed the following areas that called for immediate attention:

• The requirement of synchronisation between the departments of MoD and the Service Headquarters and clarification on their respective roles and functions.
• The concept of Service Headquarters as ‘attached offices’ of the MoD.
• The working of COSC and its perceived failure to provide a single point military advice to the Government.
• Coordination of defence acquisitions.
• A link between plans and budgets through Long Term Integrated Planning.
• Synergy between the various departments.
• Military – media relations.
• Jointness with the Ministry of External Affairs.
• Synergy with the academia.
• Lack of information of the working, ethos and culture, and requirements of the Armed Forces in the civil, academic and industrial environment.

At this stage, it may be relevant to study some of the existing models of National Security structure working in the world today. Due to the differences in the political set-up in Russia and China, these models are not workable in the Indian context. The British, French and German models endeavour to achieve similar goals in a parliamentary system. The British and the French have a Cabinet Committee headed by the Prime Minister or President, with a composition akin to that in India. They have however, a dedicated staff. The German model too is similar, their Federal Chancellery or Bundeskanzleramt (BKA) is akin to India’s Cabinet Secretariat. Responsible to the Chancellor, the head of the BKA is normally of the status of a Cabinet Minister but can be otherwise.

The British established the COSC as early as 1923 to ensure inter-service balance and coordination. When it was formed in 1946, the British MoD was essentially a coordinating office for the three single Service Ministries. A single agency in a unified MoD incorporating the three Service Ministries was formed in 1964. The lessons learned from the Falklands War inspired further reforms in Britain. The process was set in motion in 1985 under the direction of then Defence Minister, Michael Heseltine, leading to the evolution of a fully integrated structure.

The experience gained by US and the path it adopted may hold some valuable lessons for India, though their methods and policies would have to be suitably modified to suit Indian requirements and objectives. The concept of ‘jointness’ in the US Armed Forces, though replete with examples in many campaigns of World War II, really took shape after the War ended, with the passing of the National Security Act in 1947. Prior to 1947, the separation of the three Services was embodied in a cabinet structure with separate war and navy departments. Some of the worst inter-service wrangling took place after 1945, mainly due to diminishing budgets and a lack of a focused threat. However, the legacies of joint victories of World War II led the US Armed Forces to continue with the concept of unified commands. The establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) further reinforced the concept.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986, passed to further unify the Armed Forces, has the following main objectives2:-

• To reorganise the Department of Defence (DOD) and further strengthen civilian authority within the Department.
• To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defence.
• To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of the missions entrusted to them.
• To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.
• To provide for more efficient use of military resources.
• To improve joint officer management policies.
• To enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of DOD.

Prior to suggesting changes, it would be pertinent at this stage to examine the objectives in the context of Indian higher defence management.

The first objective is to strengthen the ‘Civil Authority’, which in India’s case, refers to the Defence Minister. The US organisation is quite clear that civil control does not necessarily mean control by civil servants. The Secretary of Defence exercises control by a ‘Defence Planning Guidance’ (DPG) document that includes national security objectives, policies, priorities of military missions and the resources that are likely to be available for the projected period. The DPG is prepared in consultation with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and is instrumental in initiating the DOD Planning Program and Budgeting System. The document is lucid in detail, displays expertise and is not the handiwork of half-informed bureaucrats.

In India, the national security objectives have not been stated clearly because the National Security Environment, spelt out in the annual MoD Report, is itself outlined in general terms. The planning and budgeting has been an annual exercise without the benefit of any central guidance.

The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) is another form of a guidance document that the Secretary of Defence uses to spell out the general and strategic areas of interest to the Administration. Based on the CPG, which is also prepared in consultation with the CJCS, contingency plans are drawn up by the military that are then vetted by the NSC, before final approval by the President. The DPG and CPG, therefore, ensure that overall civil control is maintained in the entire planning process. In India’s case, one can only wonder if any such mechanisms exist. This is in spite of having being involved in two major contingent operations, Sri Lanka and Maldives.

The second objective of the GNA, and of importance to India, is to improve the quality of military advice offered to the President from a single point (Prime Minister in the Indian context). This is precisely what the GoM Report on restructuring of the Indian higher defence organisation, i.e. the appointment of a CDS, has recommended and which has been shelved after perusal, pending wider consultations with all political parties for a broad consensus. The existing COSC needs consensus in order to make any recommendations and has the drawback of the Service Chiefs advocating their ‘Service’ viewpoint while also attempting to sacrifice for the common good of joint considerations. What is required is to follow the American example where the Service Chiefs are subordinate to the CJCS and yet have the right of access to the President, should there be any dissent. Such a system has worked well in the US and provides adequate checks and balances. In India, there is a nagging fear in the minds of the Civil Services and fed by them to the political leadership, that a CDS with powers of centralised advice, may become too powerful and subvert the democratic process. The idea has been rooted ever since independence and reinforced by events in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The CJCS in USA has tools available at his disposal to ensure efficient use of resources for instance, Integrated Priority Lists, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, authority to evaluate the preparedness of combat commands, responsibility to develop joint doctrines for the Armed Forces, role appraisal, missions and functions of Services and a regular review of the force structure. In performing these tasks he is assisted by the VCJCS, the Chiefs and a dedicated staff. The American experience and system needs to be studied in depth and suitably modified to the Indian environment before embarking on any changes.

Getting back to the topic of Indian defence management, a notification was issued by the Government on May 23, 2002, ‘designating’ the Service Headquarters as ‘integrated’ departments of MoD with a view to dispel any misconceptions that they do not participate in policy formulation. A major flaw in the GoM Report that it merely designated the changeover but did not provide for any mechanism for the transformation, was much to the chagrin of the Armed Forces and to the satisfaction of those manning the desks at MoD.

Conclusion

K Subrahmanyam, Chairman KRC was disappointed and said so in an interview published in the ‘CLAWS Journal’ (Summer 2009), that neither the KRC nor the GoM Reports were tabled or discussed in Parliament. The reasons are too obvious to be stated. Whatever little has been implemented has yielded results, though not to the desired levels but a beginning has been made and today, the three Services are better harmonised. However, measures for integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD and the appointment of a CDS have not been initiated. The former would be strongly contested by the bureaucracy, who maintains that “there is nothing wrong with the present system”.

In the prevailing security scenario, there is a need to make the Chairman COSC, if not all members of the Committee, a permanent invitee to the Cabinet Committee of Security. Can it be done? Yes. Will it be done? No. But the answer to the question should be in the affirmative because it is required for the efficient working of the system and is not just a demand for another four-star appointment in the Armed Forces. As of now, the mechanism and working relations between the MoD and the Service Headquarters have remained unchanged over the years, though necessity-driven arrangements have been made whenever required. In UK, the MoD is not just the Department of Defence but also the Headquarters of the three Services. In the US, the DoD is composed of the office of the Secretary of Defence, JCS, Joint Staff, Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force besides the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. In the Indian context, regrettably, such an arrangement has not been acceptable to the politico-bureaucratic establishment class, there by sidestepping the required level of integration between the MoD and the Service HQs.

Given the apprehensions associated with the type of integration recommended by the Task Force on Defence, it was expected that the least would be a beginning towards a partial integration, possibly at the functional level with the lateral exchange of appointments at the Joint Secretary/Deputy Secretary level. This would have assisted the senior bureaucrats with professional advice from the military officers and vice versa. Alas! Nothing happened. Leave alone transfers, Joint Secretaries, as members of some of the long-standing Committees do not even attend scheduled meetings, citing non-availability due to pressure of work. The reasons are, of course, well understood! Cosmetic changes were initiated and the Service Headquarters was renamed as ‘Integrated Headquarters. Initially, as an after-effect of the GoM Report, a bureaucrat from the IAS/IFS was posted to Headquarters IDS but was withdrawn soon thereafter, never to be again posted.

The Standing Committee on Defence, in its Annual Report of 2008-2009, has adversely commented upon the non-integration of the Service Headquarters and MoD, and not for the first time! The MoD claims adequate involvement of the Service Chiefs in the decision-making process by citing the example of the Defence Minister’s weekly meeting with them and interaction at lower levels. The bureaucracy believes that further integration would obfuscate the independent analysis and re-evaluation of policy before implementation. There is obvious reluctance towards integration due to mistrust and unfounded fears. Despite repeated demand from the strategic community and critical remarks in the Reports of successive Standing Committees on Defence, mere lip-service continues to be done towards the integration of MoD and the Service Headquarters.

As an emerging power, nuclear India is in the midst of important happenings in the world, all of which demand replacement of the antiquated higher defence management system with a new structure responsive to the dynamics of geopolitical realities. The four pillars of a modern regional and a world power are political stability, economic strength, scientific and technological development and military capability. In India, all the pillars are weak. The problem of lack of foresight in the politico-bureaucratic establishment in so far as military matters are concerned, is compounded with the latent fear of a military coup as was manifest in the recent case reported in a prominent national daily. Movement of two military formations towards Delhi was misconstrued as a takeover plan. Besides exploiting inter-service rivalry the bureaucracy has conveniently delayed the process of reforms.

Ongoing trends in conflicts clearly indicate the changing nature of war. Real time intelligence, seamless communications, accuracy and lethality of weapons systems and an increasingly automated battlefield demand that the Services need to be structured, trained, equipped and brought to bear in an integrated manner. These complexities demand well-deliberated decisions and sound advice to the Government on the full range of military issues through reforms in higher defence management, one of which is the integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD.

Corrective measures have been long overdue. The changes must be viewed in totality; a restructured MoD with clearly defined roles and accountability for the political leadership, bureaucracy and the Armed Forces. The need of the hour is not mere statements but a sense of urgency and a sincerity of purpose on the part of the government to set the entire process in motion.

Notes

1. Jaswant Singh, ‘Defending India’, (Bangalore: Macmillan India, 1999), p 109.
2. C Lovelace Jr, Series of ten essays on “Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986, Department of Defence Reorganisation Act”, available on the Internet.

References

1. Wg Cdr R Venkataraman, “India’s Higher Defence Organisation and Management,” KW Publishers, 2011.
2. Air Mshl BD Jayal (Retd), “Higher Defence Management for India in the 21st Century:Challenges and Prospects – Pt I & II”, Defence Watch, June and July 2005.
3. Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd), “Integrated Theatre Commands for Jointness & Integration of the Military”, SP’s Military Yearbook, 2011-12.
4. Brig Vinod Anand (Retd), “Integrated Defence Staff for Jointness in the Armed Forces”, SP’s Military Yearbook, 2011-12.
5. Gp Capt Rajiv Mata (Retd), “National Security and Strategy – Getting the Basics Right”, Defence and Security Alert, November 2009.
6. RSN Singh, “A Sordid Tale of India’s Strategic Culture”, Defence and Security Alert, November 2009.
7. Adm Arun Prakash (Retd), “The Three Invisible Men”, Defence Watch, February 2012.
8. Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd), “Marginalising the Defence Services”, Defence Watch, January 2012.
9. Air Mshl BD Jayal (Retd), “Inter-Service Turf Wars- Time for Professionalism to Prevail over Parochialism”, Defence Watch, December 2011.
10. Shitanshu Mishra, “Higher Defence Management in India”, Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 2004.
11. “Direction or Drift in India’s Higher Defence Management”, A Paper written by the Author, as a Group Captain, while attending a post-Graduate Course in National Security Strategy at National Defence University, USA, 2000-01.