Indian Defence Review

In the areas of insurgency, where national borders exist, external support also provides sanctuaries across the border or within a state to serve as strategic depth. When under pressure, the insurgents can retreat to these sanctuaries for rest, refit and rejuvenation. For successful counter-insurgency, neutralisation of sanctuaries, whether within or outside, is a must.

Domination of Information Spectrum

Since the aim of insurgents and counter-insurgents is to bring about a change of thinking/behaviour, information dissemination and propaganda play a major role. Perceptions are as important as facts. At the level of basic human understanding. David Hume, as well as Emanuel Kant, subsumes all learning under the process of perception. We sense the reality of the external world through our audio, visual, nasal and touch senses. In this sense, there is no reality but only perception of reality. The sensation once it reaches the brain is recorded and decoded or interpreted in reference to the existing images. All reality is thus an image and previously existing images form a very important part of the process of perception. A tribal who sees an aircraft for the first time naturally enough relates it to the image of a bird that he knows and the aircraft is perceived as a huge bird. When no prior image exists to explain or compare the transmitted image, the human reaction is ‘irrational’. Thus, it may not be unusual to see a tiny toddler play with a cobra!

Fear is, in a fundamental sense, an ‘acquired’ attribute, so are fearlessness or bravery. The masses facing coercive threats need an ideological prop. The human thinking process is understood as primarily an image comparison exercise; something akin to an analogue computer. Thus, the sharper image has the tendency to be evoked more often. In turn, this makes it even sharper and we have formation of stereotypes, mindsets and fixed notions. Since these are universal and affect thinking, perception and ultimately behaviour, they cannot be ignored. This brings in the importance of context, cultural, racial, geographical and psychological, that must be considered in any information policy.

Public media thus plays a very important role in the ultimate outcome of the struggle between insurgents and counter-insurgents. The Communists understand this extremely well and have special propaganda units along with the guerrilla units. The counter-insurgents face a dilemma as the freedom of media is a sacrosanct principle but the media itself is keen on circulation and profits. Thus, an insurgent enjoys an advantage since there is the lure of ‘exclusive’ stories in meeting an insurgent clandestinely! Media management and control of information flow can be thus critical for the success of counter-insurgency.

It has been mentioned right at the outset that the aim of use of force in a insurgency situation is to change the thinking inside the head and not breaking heads. This further underscores the importance of information management. Even a liberal democracy like Britain had imposed limited censorship in 1988 to ban the public airing of views on IRA. In 2006, a similar law has been passed to prevent ‘glorification of terrorism’. While distasteful, some form of control over information flow may well become necessary in an area facing insurgency. But it is a double-edged sword because in such a scenario rumour thrives and the adversary may well make use of this tool. The decision on limited censorship could be avoided if the media accepts self restraint.

The information policy in insurgency situation has several objectives. It is meant to raise the morale of own forces and lower that of the adversary. Information management also aims at winning over the sympathy and support of the general population in the conflict zone and outside it so as to avoid the situation faced by the Americans during the Vietnam War where domestic support evaporated. With greater resources, the counter-insurgents can use the electronic media both the radio and television, to great effect which specially, when packaged as entertainment, is difficult to counter.

Furthermore, in counter-insurgency there is no clear cut division between tactical, strategic and policy levels. The conflict process is diffused, with crucial decision-making often devolving to the lower echelons of command. Both these factors make it desirable or even mandatory that there is ‘understanding’ at all levels of the chain of government. A well-informed subordinate is less likely to take an action that may well end up having adverse strategic or policy implications. Thus, even the lowest level functionary must be aware of the general situation and basic objectives. This is unlike the principle followed by all militaries ‘need-to-know’ as the basis for information sharing. In counter-insurgency, virtually everyone needs to know everything.

Review and Conclusion

Counter-insurgency is a complex phenomenon demanding an equally complex solution. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Although it is very much a form of warfare fitting into the description given by Jomini as ‘wars of opinion’ or Clausewitzian ‘wars of resistance’, these are inadequate definitions and it is better to treat insurgency as armed politics and a distinct form of warfare that needs a separate set of principles of war as summarised below:

The case studies referred to in the work can be divided into two clear categories, the ones that have come to a conclusion and others that await closure. The South African insurgency against apartheid and the Mizo insurgency fall into the first category. The Sri Lankan case is ambiguous, while the LTTE has indeed been defeated militarily; it would be hazardous to believe that the Tamil revolt has ended since the grievances that led to it in first place are yet to be addressed. In the case of Nagaland, tragically, while the insurgency has indeed ended but peace remains illusive as vested interests had developed around maintaining low-level violence. Proud Nagas are still in search of an honourable end such as the one the Mizos attained, when an Accord was signed with all the fanfare. A little imaginative effort by the Indian government to concede ‘victory’ to the Nagas would end it, but imaginative policies are not a strong point with most governments. The two other conflicts, in Kashmir and the Naxalite movement are ongoing; there appears to be no easy end to either.

Also read: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Peace – I

In the case of Kashmir, ever since the failure of armed uprising, domestic elements as well as Pakistan seem to have embarked upon a strategy to make the Kashmir valley ungovernable. Despite sporadic attempts, India appears to have failed in creating a perception of ‘no win’ in the minds of citizens of Kashmir valley and their supporters in Pakistan. Recent surveys have shown that Kashmiris have no desire to merge with Pakistan; an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir is their goal. Judging from Kashmiri separatist literature and propaganda, there seems to be no clear vision or acknowledgement of the problems of the viability of a land-locked state and the difficulties of gaining independence from two countries – a problem shared with many other ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Chechens and Baluchis. The demand for autonomy also ignores the economic price that Kashmir may well have to pay for distancing itself from India which provides the tourists and the markets for Kashmiri products. There appears to be no effective leadership in Kashmir that can see this and convince the people.

The Naxal movement seems to be passing through an extremely violent phase at the moment and the state is yet to drive home the truth that force will not win any concessions. At the same time, welfare measures including economic development and grant of forest rights to tribals is still a work in progress. But the twin strategy of development and dominating force should produce results sooner or later. The new Forest Rights Act of 2006 has rectified the past injustice to some extent. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 was passed in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, on December 13, 2006. The President of India assented to the Bill on December 29, 2006 and the Act came into force.

But the real problem for the tribals is fear of modernisation. While contact with the outside world has given rise to aspirations for modern goods and comforts, the tribals, who are emerging from the ‘hunter-gatherer civilisation’, lack the skills to compete in the modern world. The Naxals are skilfully exploiting these primordial emotions. Inept media management has led to lack of trust between the government and the forest dwellers. The geographical fact that the Naxal affected areas do not share an international border (unlike Kashmir) means that external influence should be absent. In the end, that may well prove to be decisive. But it appears that as in a Greek tragedy, unless the tribals find enlightened leadership soon, they may well continue on the violent path and bring untold misery upon themselves.

The terrorism threat faced by the global community could well be classed as an insurgency against the world. Terrorist violence is its manifestation and a tactic. The roots of this threat lie in ethno/religious ideology that has a global aim. Conflicts and revolts from Central Asia, Chechnya, Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Kashmir, southern Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia have a common element, if not a degree of co-ordination and co-operation, amongst the insurgents. If the world is to succeed in this war against terrorism, it has no choice but to face up to this insurgency. It is in this respect that the comparative study of insurgency can be of great help in understanding the process, the cause-effect chain and the success and failures of policies, strategies and tactics.

Counter-insurgency studies are often dominated by a ‘reductionist’ thinking and approach. But insurgencies are not simple military problems yielding to ‘yes-no’ logic and solutions. It is a long existing controversy whether warfare is a science or an art; insurgencies certainly are closer to art than science. It is a long-held belief that guerrillas without popular support are like fish out of water. A logical answer to insurgency, therefore, is to drain the water and let the fish die. Yet the focus is usually on catching the fish! There is also an almost religious belief on using carrots for the general population (the supporters/sympathisers) and stick for the armed fighters. This approach negates the complexity of the situation and seldom works. What succeeds is a dexterous use of both carrot and stick against the water as well as the fish. Counter-insurgency is, therefore, akin to delicate brain surgery in conception and implementation.

It is hoped that this work would promote ‘understanding’ of insurgency at the level of policy makers and implementers in order to help the evolution of policy, doctrines, strategy and tactics.

Notes:

1. It is however possible that the Americans had never really given up on the Domino theory. The American withdrawal from Vietnam could also be attributed to the détente with China that took place in 1972. A Communist dominated South East Asia, that was under Chinese influence was perfectly acceptable now that China was an ally (Cambodians faced the brunt of this policy with the US-China supporting the murderous Pol Pot regime). The American calculations went haywire and Vietnam steered itself away from China. Shanghai Communiqué 28 February 1972. Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. New China News Agency, Beijing. With the signing of this by Chinese Premier Chou En Lie and President Nixon of the US, a virtual alliance between the US and China came into existence. This was to have a major consequence on the course of war in Vietnam.
2. Mail & Guardian on line, 11 July 2007, article on the occasion of 20th anniversary of the Battle.
3. Griffith Brigadier General Samuel B. (Trans.), ‘Guerrilla Warfare By Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara’, Cassel & Co. Ltd, London, 1962. p.132.
4. British High Commission New Delhi, ‘Northern Ireland Peace Process’, 1993. The British government established an independent commission of police complaints to ensure that citizens have a forum to vent their grievances. ‘Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland’, Tienial Review, HMSO, London 1991. Grew James, Chairman of Commission on Police Complaints, Interview and discussions. 15 July 1993.
5. Sharma Sk & Sharma Usha, ‘Documents on NortheEastern India, Vol 9 Nagaland’, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2006. p.380. Pandit Lt. Gen BT, Interview with on 24 April 2011. General Pandit, then a Major and Staff Officer in the 8th Mountain division recounted an interesting story. It was in winter of 1965, the General Officer commanding the division Maj. Gen. Kalyan Singh was going from Kohima to Mockokchung. Near Okha, his small entourage passed through a company of rebels. The similarity of uniforms fooled the General and unsuspectingly he halted and as is the practice, enquired about the welfare of the soldiers. Pandit realised that these were not Indian army soldiers but rebels. He asked one of the rebel officers whether he knew who the General was, the answer was, and ‘of course he did’. The point of the story is that between the rebels and army, there existed a bond of mutual admiration, harking back to old times of chivalry in wars.
6. Insurgency is an armed conflict and the doctrine of minimum force is not applicable, though for the sake of appearances, the term is often used rhetorically by the counter-insurgent leadership.