Counter-insurgency is a complex phenomenon demanding a complex solution. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Although it is very much a form of warfare fitting into the description given by Jomini as ‘wars of opinion’ or Clausewitzian ‘wars of resistance’, these are inadequate definitions and it is better to treat insurgency as armed politics and a distinct form of warfare that needs a separate set of principles of war.
Principle of Adequate Force
In a state based on the rule of law, there is a well-defined doctrine of using force against unarmed but violent mobs. The principle is to use ‘minimum force’. This is defined as a short-term antidote to bring the mobs to their senses. In case of war or open conflict, the doctrine of ‘concentration’ or maximum force is in operation. In the case of insurgency, as the aim is not ‘destruction’ but persuasion; the counter insurgents are expected to use ‘adequate force’6 i.e. adequate to defend themselves but ensuring minimum collateral damage or casualties. The other consideration is that the force used must be ‘qualitatively’ superior, morally due to it being used under a strict legal regime or superior precision technology.
The overall aim is to achieve psychological domination over the insurgents. Learning from the American experience in Vietnam where the former ended up in a quagmire, the South African armed forces deliberately chose a model of creating high-tech, hard-hitting helicopter-borne teams to hit at the guerrilla bases and headquarters in lightening raids. These forces never held ground and avoided prolonged engagements. The tactics were akin to the ones followed by the Israelis. But the South Africans never even attempted to win the hearts and minds of the people (neither did the Israelis). The end result was that while the apartheid regime was militarily strong right till the end, it lost all legitimacy and international support. A balance has to be struck between what is militarily desirable and politically acceptable. Successful use of force has to be accompanied by political, social and economic measures. The stark ideological illegitimacy of the apartheid cause was the ultimate undoing of the South African regime, not resistance by the ANC.
It is due to this consideration that counter-insurgency has no place for heavy weapons like the artillery or air power. Adequate force is not an easy concept to define especially when the opponent may well take recourse to modern weapons. Matching the insurgents would be entirely justified in such situations. This is of particular relevance when the insurgents act as a ‘proxy’ of some other nation. But if the counter-insurgents desire to create a psychology of ‘no win’ in the opponents then qualitative or quantitative superiority has to be created. During the Vietnam counter-guerrilla operations, many American analysts came to a conclusion that 30:1 superiority is necessary for countering guerrillas and achieve success. A complex question that military commanders are confronted with is the adequacy of force which depends on many other factors including tactics of both and the state of morale.
Accurate intelligence, or lack of it, plays a crucial role in both the counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla operations. Most of the times, the armed forces are tactically blind and act more like a bull in a China shop. One solution that has been found, by what one can call lazy Generalship, is to induct large number of troops in the area and hope that by their sheer presence chance encounters will take place and armed forces with their superior skills, better weaponry and unlimited supply of ammunition, will get the better of the guerrilla/insurgent. To some extent, this did work in Kashmir in the early 1990s as well as in Iraq during the so called ‘surge’ phase. However, the same strategy failed miserably in Sri Lanka when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) tried it as well as in Afghanistan since 2010. Difficult terrain and skilled guerrilla fighters were the possible reasons for this apparent failure though the jury is still out as far as Afghanistan is concerned. But even more importantly, the political leadership that lays down the deadline for withdrawal/completion of operations is responsible for forces to get demotivated to give their lives for a lost cause. This degrades the force employed in terms of quality and effectiveness. One has already seen earlier that adequate force concept is related to both the quantity and quality.
In the last several decades the world has not seen a large-scale conflict like the two world wars of the twentieth century and hence most of the political leadership has very little or no experience of war. There is a tendency to treat a soldier like a robot. As an infantry soldier with some experience of live fighting under his belt, the author wishes to debunk this notion. At a crucial stage during a fire fight a soldier is lonely and advances only if he is convinced of the righteousness of his conduct and the influence of his immediate leadership. Else, most of the patrols and ambushes, bread and butter operations in counter-insurgency, are carried out only on paper! The morale aspect is crucial when we consider whether a force is adequate.
Multi-Pronged Approach
In the art of war, ‘Selection and Maintenance of Aim’, ‘Concentration of Force and Flexibility’ are some important principles. In the insurgency warfare however, a multi-pronged approach is not just desirable but also necessary since it is a multi-dimensional conflict. The multi-pronged approach automatically gives a degree of flexibility to switch the effort from one objective to another or switch the emphasis from one field to another.
It has already been mentioned earlier that an insurgency may well have its roots in social, economic, political or psychological problems. Many a time, a revolt may start due to economic distress, as in the case of Mizoram in 1966, but later become a struggle for identity. It is well nigh impossible to accurately assess the root cause of trouble. Thus, peace-enforcing and peace-making by addressing the root problem cannot be treated sequentially but must run parallel. This is akin to a ‘broad front’ strategy of conventional war. Any attempt to concentrate excessively on the military aspect, as was the case in Vietnam, can only lead to assured failure.
At any given time, in case of long drawn out insurgency, the dominant cause may well be entirely different than what it was in the initial stage. A counter-insurgent has to be mindful of these subtle shifts and be sensitive to it. Accordingly, the emphasis has to shift from economic to political or psychological, as the case may be. It is this dynamic relationship between the cause and effect that makes insurgency a much more difficult proposition than conventional conflict, where the military element predominates.
Another dimension of the broad front approach is multi-agency operations. In all endeavours, whether military or civil, multiple agencies or departments have to work towards a common goal as for instance, intelligence agencies whose work is integral to any military operation. But in case of counter-insurgency, this has an added reason and that is that often the state has to simultaneously pursue contradictory policies or strategies. For instance, while the armed forces may well be engaged in military action against the insurgents, the intelligence agencies may well be in contact with the same organisation and carrying on secret negotiations. This has been particularly the case in North East India where the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) was in constant touch with the rebels even as the military operations were in full swing.
Similarly, while the political talks were going on at government level, the economic and other developmental work was sought to be delinked from success or failure of negotiations. Multiplicity of agencies is thus a norm in counter-insurgency and a certain degree of autonomy is granted to each. This permits the counter-insurgents to carry on contradictory strategies and lends flexibility.
There is a major debate as to what agency/organisation must be used and for what task. There is a marked reluctance on the part of the armed forces to get involved in a domestic quarrel where there is no clear external element. The Para Military forces are expected to carry the major burden of fighting such wars. But there is a major problem here. At the section or platoon level, where the guerrilla war is fought, these operations are in no way different from similar operations in conventional wars. The Para Military forces are neither trained nor equipped to fight a war and are often found wanting in this respect. The ‘Principle of Adequate Force’ also implies that the armed forces cannot use their full range of equipment, a sort of fighting with one hand tied behind one’s back. A way out of this dilemma is a middle path wherein the armed forces act in support of the police or the Para Military. For instance, the searches and neutralisation may be carried out by the Police, while the armed forces lay the outer cordon to prevent escape. The South Africans faced a similar problem when they faced the ANC-led sabotage and subversion operations inside the country while a full-blown guerrilla war was going on in South West Africa and Angola.
This worked since the ANC was unable to launch guerrilla war inside South Africa. But the South Africans created special police units, which were organised and trained on the lines of Special Forces of the army to do this task. South Africa also consciously took a decision to not occupy territory and instead organised mobile, high-tech company groups to hit at the rebel bases and keep them off balance. This was a lesson from the Vietnam War where the Americans entered the swamps and fought the guerrillas on their own terms. It is very difficult to make any definitive judgement on this issue but suffice it to say that counter-insurgency must be fought as a multi-agency operation and with a suitable mix of military, police, intelligence and high-tech Special Forces.
Readers may have noticed that the oft used cliché ‘winning the hearts and minds of people’ has not been used anywhere in this work. This phrase conjures up the insurgency and counter-insurgency as akin to two lovers vying for one maiden! Yes, it is true that both the parties to conflict do try to win the people over to their side but the process at least for counter-insurgents is also a struggle between heart and mind. Since the insurgents paint a romantic picture of a utopia of paradise on earth, it is futile for the counter-insurgents to compete with them on this. What the counter-insurgents can achieve is to convince the minds of general people that the goal of the insurgents is unattainable, and that the available alternative is not bad. When privations brought upon by long periods of fighting begin to bite, while the heart may still be swayed by the romantic notions propagated by the insurgents, the mind overcomes the heart and accepts the reasonable compromise. Insurgency versus counter-insurgency is, therefore, not only like a competition between two lovers but also a struggle between romanticism and realism. In most cases, where counter-insurgency has succeeded, it has been a triumph of realism over idealism.
External Influence and Sanctuaries
Insurgencies all over the world have an element of foreign support with varying degrees in each case. It was less in the case of revolts in the North East, while it is a dominant factor in Kashmir and South Africa. Without Pakistan’s support, the Kashmir insurgency would not survive. The initial steady support by the Soviet Union to the ANC did much to sustain it through difficult times. This external support can be military, diplomatic, economic or moral. In Kashmir, besides the Pakistani support, the US consistently gave its moral backing to the Islamists right up to 2001. At a particularly important stage in the 1990s, when the insurgent morale was low after the surrender at Hajrat Bal shrine, the US Secretary of State, Ms Albright, came out in support of the separatists. In a frequent occurrence in Kashmir valley, separatists would demonstrate shouting slogans praising the then American President Bill Clinton.
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In such circumstances, it is impossible to achieve the perception of a ‘no win’ situation. Loss of external support can quickly lead to the collapse of insurgency, as witnessed in both Nagaland and Mizoram after the 1971 War destroyed East Pakistan. It is axiomatic that for any remedial measures to be successful, violence has to be reduced to an acceptable level. This becomes a virtual impossibility if the inimical external power continues to pump in arms and also offers sanctuary. As the aim of counter-insurgency is to bring about a behavioural change and not destruction, rebel morale is of critical importance. In order to achieve the aim, counter-insurgency has to ensure that the external support is cut off from the rebels.
Even in the Irish insurgency, it was the ultimate denial of continued support by the Irish Republic to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that paved the way for the truce in early 1998. The proactive role of the US during that period also closed the tap of support from American Irish community. The relative peace in Northern Ireland would have been impossible without these two measures.
The ending of external support is also important to create a psychological ‘no win’ situation. For so long as external support exists and the state that gives support is perceived as strong, no amount of countermeasures would weaken the morale. The psychological dimension of the external support to insurgents is as important as the supply of arms, ammunition and finances. Interestingly, one of the reasons for the collapse, or near-collapse of the insurgency in North East India was the 1971 Indo-Pak War that saw the emergence of Bangladesh. The Mizo as well as Naga insurgents never recovered from this blow. Within a few years, the major Naga groups gave up the struggle and signed the Shillong Accord of November 11, 1975.
The Mizos began serious negotiations in 1979 and finally signed the Mizo Accord in 1986. After the loss of East Pakistan support, the insurgents turned to China. But the Chinese, while willing to supply arms and equipment, were not ready to openly champion the rebels’ cause. Thus, the morale downslide of insurgents could not be checked. On the other hand, the open Pakistani support to the insurgency in Kashmir has ensured that despite the successful operations against the insurgents, their morale remains high and insurgency continues. In the case of South Africa, the universal support to the anti-apartheid movement played a major role in bringing home the fact that South African government was on the losing side. In addition, steadfast military support by the Soviet Union and many other countries such as India to the ANC also played a role. Thus for counter-insurgency to succeed and the creation of a ‘no win’ mind-set, external influence has to be ended.
In the areas of insurgency, where national borders exist, external support also provides sanctuaries across the border or within a state to serve as strategic depth. When under pressure, the insurgents can retreat to these sanctuaries for rest, refit and rejuvenation. For successful counter-insurgency, neutralisation of sanctuaries, whether within or outside, is a must.
Domination of Information Spectrum
Since the aim of insurgents and counter-insurgents is to bring about a change of thinking/behaviour, information dissemination and propaganda play a major role. Perceptions are as important as facts. At the level of basic human understanding. David Hume, as well as Emanuel Kant, subsumes all learning under the process of perception. We sense the reality of the external world through our audio, visual, nasal and touch senses. In this sense, there is no reality but only perception of reality. The sensation once it reaches the brain is recorded and decoded or interpreted in reference to the existing images. All reality is thus an image and previously existing images form a very important part of the process of perception. A tribal who sees an aircraft for the first time naturally enough relates it to the image of a bird that he knows and the aircraft is perceived as a huge bird. When no prior image exists to explain or compare the transmitted image, the human reaction is ‘irrational’. Thus, it may not be unusual to see a tiny toddler play with a cobra!
Fear is, in a fundamental sense, an ‘acquired’ attribute, so are fearlessness or bravery. The masses facing coercive threats need an ideological prop. The human thinking process is understood as primarily an image comparison exercise; something akin to an analogue computer. Thus, the sharper image has the tendency to be evoked more often. In turn, this makes it even sharper and we have formation of stereotypes, mindsets and fixed notions. Since these are universal and affect thinking, perception and ultimately behaviour, they cannot be ignored. This brings in the importance of context, cultural, racial, geographical and psychological, that must be considered in any information policy.
Public media thus plays a very important role in the ultimate outcome of the struggle between insurgents and counter-insurgents. The Communists understand this extremely well and have special propaganda units along with the guerrilla units. The counter-insurgents face a dilemma as the freedom of media is a sacrosanct principle but the media itself is keen on circulation and profits. Thus, an insurgent enjoys an advantage since there is the lure of ‘exclusive’ stories in meeting an insurgent clandestinely! Media management and control of information flow can be thus critical for the success of counter-insurgency.
It has been mentioned right at the outset that the aim of use of force in a insurgency situation is to change the thinking inside the head and not breaking heads. This further underscores the importance of information management. Even a liberal democracy like Britain had imposed limited censorship in 1988 to ban the public airing of views on IRA. In 2006, a similar law has been passed to prevent ‘glorification of terrorism’. While distasteful, some form of control over information flow may well become necessary in an area facing insurgency. But it is a double-edged sword because in such a scenario rumour thrives and the adversary may well make use of this tool. The decision on limited censorship could be avoided if the media accepts self restraint.
The information policy in insurgency situation has several objectives. It is meant to raise the morale of own forces and lower that of the adversary. Information management also aims at winning over the sympathy and support of the general population in the conflict zone and outside it so as to avoid the situation faced by the Americans during the Vietnam War where domestic support evaporated. With greater resources, the counter-insurgents can use the electronic media both the radio and television, to great effect which specially, when packaged as entertainment, is difficult to counter.
Furthermore, in counter-insurgency there is no clear cut division between tactical, strategic and policy levels. The conflict process is diffused, with crucial decision-making often devolving to the lower echelons of command. Both these factors make it desirable or even mandatory that there is ‘understanding’ at all levels of the chain of government. A well-informed subordinate is less likely to take an action that may well end up having adverse strategic or policy implications. Thus, even the lowest level functionary must be aware of the general situation and basic objectives. This is unlike the principle followed by all militaries ‘need-to-know’ as the basis for information sharing. In counter-insurgency, virtually everyone needs to know everything.
Review and Conclusion
Counter-insurgency is a complex phenomenon demanding an equally complex solution. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Although it is very much a form of warfare fitting into the description given by Jomini as ‘wars of opinion’ or Clausewitzian ‘wars of resistance’, these are inadequate definitions and it is better to treat insurgency as armed politics and a distinct form of warfare that needs a separate set of principles of war as summarised below:
- The aim of insurgency is ‘regime change’ while that of counter-insurgency is ‘behaviour change’ from conflict to co-operation and co-existence. Thus, the peace process is an inherent part of counter-insurgency and not a separate act.
- The aim of insurgents or counter-insurgents is to create a perception of a ‘no win’ situation using military force, economic pressure or psychological domination.
- The force used by the counter-insurgents must be adequate and legitimate. Legitimacy is concerned with both the means and the ends.
- Multi-pronged and multi-agency approach by the counter-insurgents has greater chances of success.
- External support, influence and sanctuaries for the insurgents must be neutralised.
- Information management is the key to the ultimate success of any counter-insurgency.
The case studies referred to in the work can be divided into two clear categories, the ones that have come to a conclusion and others that await closure. The South African insurgency against apartheid and the Mizo insurgency fall into the first category. The Sri Lankan case is ambiguous, while the LTTE has indeed been defeated militarily; it would be hazardous to believe that the Tamil revolt has ended since the grievances that led to it in first place are yet to be addressed. In the case of Nagaland, tragically, while the insurgency has indeed ended but peace remains illusive as vested interests had developed around maintaining low-level violence. Proud Nagas are still in search of an honourable end such as the one the Mizos attained, when an Accord was signed with all the fanfare. A little imaginative effort by the Indian government to concede ‘victory’ to the Nagas would end it, but imaginative policies are not a strong point with most governments. The two other conflicts, in Kashmir and the Naxalite movement are ongoing; there appears to be no easy end to either.
Also read: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Peace – I
In the case of Kashmir, ever since the failure of armed uprising, domestic elements as well as Pakistan seem to have embarked upon a strategy to make the Kashmir valley ungovernable. Despite sporadic attempts, India appears to have failed in creating a perception of ‘no win’ in the minds of citizens of Kashmir valley and their supporters in Pakistan. Recent surveys have shown that Kashmiris have no desire to merge with Pakistan; an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir is their goal. Judging from Kashmiri separatist literature and propaganda, there seems to be no clear vision or acknowledgement of the problems of the viability of a land-locked state and the difficulties of gaining independence from two countries – a problem shared with many other ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Chechens and Baluchis. The demand for autonomy also ignores the economic price that Kashmir may well have to pay for distancing itself from India which provides the tourists and the markets for Kashmiri products. There appears to be no effective leadership in Kashmir that can see this and convince the people.
The Naxal movement seems to be passing through an extremely violent phase at the moment and the state is yet to drive home the truth that force will not win any concessions. At the same time, welfare measures including economic development and grant of forest rights to tribals is still a work in progress. But the twin strategy of development and dominating force should produce results sooner or later. The new Forest Rights Act of 2006 has rectified the past injustice to some extent. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 was passed in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, on December 13, 2006. The President of India assented to the Bill on December 29, 2006 and the Act came into force.
But the real problem for the tribals is fear of modernisation. While contact with the outside world has given rise to aspirations for modern goods and comforts, the tribals, who are emerging from the ‘hunter-gatherer civilisation’, lack the skills to compete in the modern world. The Naxals are skilfully exploiting these primordial emotions. Inept media management has led to lack of trust between the government and the forest dwellers. The geographical fact that the Naxal affected areas do not share an international border (unlike Kashmir) means that external influence should be absent. In the end, that may well prove to be decisive. But it appears that as in a Greek tragedy, unless the tribals find enlightened leadership soon, they may well continue on the violent path and bring untold misery upon themselves.
The terrorism threat faced by the global community could well be classed as an insurgency against the world. Terrorist violence is its manifestation and a tactic. The roots of this threat lie in ethno/religious ideology that has a global aim. Conflicts and revolts from Central Asia, Chechnya, Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Kashmir, southern Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia have a common element, if not a degree of co-ordination and co-operation, amongst the insurgents. If the world is to succeed in this war against terrorism, it has no choice but to face up to this insurgency. It is in this respect that the comparative study of insurgency can be of great help in understanding the process, the cause-effect chain and the success and failures of policies, strategies and tactics.
Counter-insurgency studies are often dominated by a ‘reductionist’ thinking and approach. But insurgencies are not simple military problems yielding to ‘yes-no’ logic and solutions. It is a long existing controversy whether warfare is a science or an art; insurgencies certainly are closer to art than science. It is a long-held belief that guerrillas without popular support are like fish out of water. A logical answer to insurgency, therefore, is to drain the water and let the fish die. Yet the focus is usually on catching the fish! There is also an almost religious belief on using carrots for the general population (the supporters/sympathisers) and stick for the armed fighters. This approach negates the complexity of the situation and seldom works. What succeeds is a dexterous use of both carrot and stick against the water as well as the fish. Counter-insurgency is, therefore, akin to delicate brain surgery in conception and implementation.
It is hoped that this work would promote ‘understanding’ of insurgency at the level of policy makers and implementers in order to help the evolution of policy, doctrines, strategy and tactics.
Notes:
- It is however possible that the Americans had never really given up on the Domino theory. The American withdrawal from Vietnam could also be attributed to the détente with China that took place in 1972. A Communist dominated South East Asia, that was under Chinese influence was perfectly acceptable now that China was an ally (Cambodians faced the brunt of this policy with the US-China supporting the murderous Pol Pot regime). The American calculations went haywire and Vietnam steered itself away from China. Shanghai Communiqué 28 February 1972. Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. New China News Agency, Beijing. With the signing of this by Chinese Premier Chou En Lie and President Nixon of the US, a virtual alliance between the US and China came into existence. This was to have a major consequence on the course of war in Vietnam.
- Mail & Guardian on line, 11 July 2007, article on the occasion of 20th anniversary of the Battle.
- Griffith Brigadier General Samuel B. (Trans.), ‘Guerrilla Warfare By Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara’, Cassel & Co. Ltd, London, 1962. p.132.
- British High Commission New Delhi, ‘Northern Ireland Peace Process’, 1993. The British government established an independent commission of police complaints to ensure that citizens have a forum to vent their grievances. ‘Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland’, Tienial Review, HMSO, London 1991. Grew James, Chairman of Commission on Police Complaints, Interview and discussions. 15 July 1993.
- Sharma Sk & Sharma Usha, ‘Documents on NortheEastern India, Vol 9 Nagaland’, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2006. p.380. Pandit Lt. Gen BT, Interview with on 24 April 2011. General Pandit, then a Major and Staff Officer in the 8th Mountain division recounted an interesting story. It was in winter of 1965, the General Officer commanding the division Maj. Gen. Kalyan Singh was going from Kohima to Mockokchung. Near Okha, his small entourage passed through a company of rebels. The similarity of uniforms fooled the General and unsuspectingly he halted and as is the practice, enquired about the welfare of the soldiers. Pandit realised that these were not Indian army soldiers but rebels. He asked one of the rebel officers whether he knew who the General was, the answer was, and ‘of course he did’. The point of the story is that between the rebels and army, there existed a bond of mutual admiration, harking back to old times of chivalry in wars.
- Insurgency is an armed conflict and the doctrine of minimum force is not applicable, though for the sake of appearances, the term is often used rhetorically by the counter-insurgent leadership.
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