Indian Defence Review

India’s riposte was directed at Pakistan’s principal city of Lahore opposite Amritsar across the International Boundary, thus expanding the scope of the war which Pakistan initiated as a limited one in J&K. This offensive would also drive a wedge between the Pakistani forces deployed in Lahore and Sialkot. The offensive blunted the Pakistani armour thrust in Khem Karan, had successes in Dograi and Barki but failed to capture Pakistani territory up to Ichhogil Canal as planned. The operations in the Jammu-Sialkot sector captured about 500 sq. km. of Pakistani territory and took a heavy toll of Pakistani armour but it did not achieve the stated war aim to destroy the Pakistani war machine.

Pakistani operations in J&K which were aimed to wrest Kashmir from the clutches of India failed miserably. It was the locals who gave away the locations of the infiltrators, there was no insurrection as was trumpeted, and the offensive in Chambb was halted in its tracks as the Indian forces were poised to cut them off by the offensive from Jammu. Pakistan had to recoil its forces that had ingressed beyond Chambb towards Akhnoor to save Sialkot.

The Indo-Pak War of 1965 was essentially a limited war as East Pakistan remained uninvolved in any ground operations. At that time there was only one Pakistani infantry division in East Pakistan. It is claimed by some that the Army Chief, General J.N Chaudhuri, who was also the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, did not inform the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh of the ground operations. This is not possibly true as records in Defence Minister Y.B Chavan’s diary dated September 07, 1965 indicate, “I told the CAS to hold his hand in East Pakistan. We do not want any wasteful escalation there.”

It is evident that there was adequate interaction between the three Chiefs and the Defence Minister. Due to the limited resources available with the Indian Air Force (IAF) and given the superiority of the aircraft with Pakistan, the IAF could only spare limited effort in support of ground operations. It is surprising that despite the reasonably prolonged Kutch affair and subsequent unfolding of the infiltration in J&K inter-service planning and preparation for possible contingencies was not undertaken. The IAF appeared on the scene only on September 01. Also, even as the Defence Minister cautioned not to activate the Eastern front, the same day the IAF raided the Chittagong and Dacca airfields.

The misunderstanding proved costly as in retaliation the Pakistani Air Force destroyed many aircraft on the ground at Kalaikunda, Bagdogra and Kolkata airfields. Airfields at Agartala and Barrackpore too were targeted. As regards the Indian Navy (IN), during the Kutch skirmishes, INS Vikrant had been moved to the Saurashtra Coast and this had a sobering effect on Pakistan.

After the Kutch operations, the Western Fleet sailed to the Bay of Bengal as per the existing SOP for relocating the fleet during monsoons. However, to give it a strategic facade it has been recorded that “keeping in view the political developments in the region, the Fleet was despatched there.” It may be true that some Indonesian leaders had even begun calling the Indian Ocean, the Indonesian Ocean. The Indonesian Naval Chief made statements that the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago was a natural extension of Sumatra. Indonesian President Sukarno stated that an attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and offered to provide whatever was needed by Pakistan. He despatched a submarine and missile boats to assist Pakistan and began to patrol around the islands. However, these developments notwithstanding, on persistent pleading by the Western Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Samson, the Fleet was given orders to return to the West Coast.

Defence Minister Y.B Chavan summed up the IN’s contribution as, “I greatly appreciated the silent but efficient role which the Navy played in defence of the country. The IN protected islands, which were vital to our security, guarded our ports and the long coast-line………and achieved all that the Government desired of it within bounds and compass allotted to it.” Should India have opened a front of the Eastern flank too? It was a decision that required immense strategic foresight and strong political will. Bangladesh could have been an independent country in September 1965!

In the final balance, the outcome of a war should be whether the political aim set was achieved. Pakistan started the war with the explicit aim to wrest J&K from India by force. In that it failed miserably. Minor tactical gains and territorial gains are not sufficient to claim victory. Since India was in a reactive mode in a war that was thrust upon it, denying the belligerent achieving any of his stated objectives was, therefore, a victory by all accounts.

Physical casualties, tanks destroyed or captured, artillery pieces destroyed, enemy posts captured and counter-attacks launched, aircraft shot down or destroyed on ground, ships sunk or square kilometres of territory captured will merely be “accounting for” figures if the political objective remains out of the grasp. In the aftermath of the war the situation was back to square one.

There are lessons to be learnt relevant even now. We need to debate these issues:

• Though India proclaimed Non-Alignment as its strategic stance, it was compelled to seek the assistance of US, UK and USSR for weapons and equipment. Is India shy of an alliance? In a power equation alliances give a boost to national power.
• In a reactive scenario with a nuclear backdrop what are realistic political objectives?
• In a limited regional war scenario, which will predominantly be a ground war, to achieve any political objective is a CDS the panacea that remedies all? The fact is that the IN and the IAF in any sub-continental context will be subordinate to the Indian Army.
• Who will decide military objectives which will enable the defence forces to achieve the stated political aim – the Defence Minister or the Chairman Chiefs of Staff or the Army Chief or a most ridiculous option the Defence Secratary?
• Who plans the campaigns of the war commensurate to the military aim and allocation of resources for its execution?
• As per the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961, the defence of the country entrusted to the Defence Secretary. In the Ministry of External Affairs, the Secretary is a professional diplomat who has risen in the stream and experienced the nuances of diplomacy to thus render professional advice and direction to the Minister. How can the Defence Secretary be expected to do justice the requirement placed on him when he is only serving in the MoD for a limited duration with no background on affairs of military security and strategy?
• After the Kutch incident, how is it that the situation was misread and Pakistani action in J&K not anticipated? 1962, 1965 and 1999 were operations when India was taken by surprise. This seems to be a recurring pattern.
• Despite the induction of more lethal weapons and technology, there has been no change in the organisation structures of the Army. Are we only replacing old weapons and equipment with new and continuing to prepare to fight as in the last war?

Is India shy of an alliance? Alliances give a boost to national power…

• Rigid tactical doctrines continue to be applicable. Manoeuvre and fire and move (skirmish order) are only given lip service. Young Platoon/Troop and Company/Squadron Commanders feel more comfortable in dwelling on the ‘higher direction of war’ rather than grapple with the myriad imponderables of leading sub-units in tactical combat situations.
• The US put pressure on forcing Pakistan not to initiate any action in J&K in 1962. China’s collusive support to Pakistan existed in 1965, 1971 and in a subtle way, in 1999 as well. It is a reality that will have to be factored in. A two front war in the classical sense may not be on the cards but strategic redeployment of forces will surely be curtailed.
• Pakistan had employed irregulars in its war with India in 1947, 1965 and 1999. Now it is mass producing more sophisticated well armed and trained ‘mujahedeen’. India has to prepare for a complicated hybrid war contingency in any future conflict with Pakistan. For this, there must be synergy between the CAPFs and the Armed Forces. Who will coordinate this planning, preparation and equipping of these forces that fall under MHA and MoD??

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B.H Liddell Hart observed that – “Non-aggressive states were likely to fight to extremes compared to aggressive nations. The latter viewed war more or less as business and would back off if an opponent proved too strong. By contrast, the former, motivated by ideals, tend to press a conflict to the bitter end.” This ideal was so evident when the Indian Prime Minister said “Ab to kuchchh karna hi hoga.”