Indian Defence Review

A general review of media reportage on India’s southern security, relating to Sri Lanka in recent months reveals following salient aspects:-

• Sri Lankan Govt’s (SLG) argument of finding convincing reasons to push military strategy to the logical conclusion of giving top priority to the “annihilation of LTTE’s military assets”, while many others are trying to impress on the SLG the need for an “imaginative formula to isolate the Tigers”.
• The LTTE and the Tamils yet again rejecting Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s (SLFP) latest package of May 1, 07.
• The LTTE being under “tremendous pressure” from the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) at its gates; threatening (India) yet another SL Tamil and LTTE migration to Tamilnadu (TN), once again disrupting India’s security situation.

• India’s “benign neglect” of policy prescription towards SL since its withdrawal in 1990; its preoccupation with Indo-Pakistan problem and Indo-US developments; its reluctance to get involved again with SL, though it is India’s “moral responsibility” to help solve that problem.
• India being edged out from SL in preference to the USA and China, as India is unwilling to shoulder its responsibility as a regional power. India must bring the SLG and the LTTE to negotiating table.
• LTTE trying to graduate from guerilla to a regular, conventional force, as it has had a functional shallow water naval capability and, now, added a fledgling air component sending enough shock-waves in the region.

It is a basketful of ideas and approaches : annihilation of LTTE; imaginative formula to isolate it; repeated rejection of SLG offers by LTTE; LTTE being under tremendous pressure; India’s unwillingness to shoulder its responsibility as a regional power, and therefore losing out to China and the USA; addition of air power to LTTE armed strength; threat of another LTTE-Tamil exodus to TN.

It is time an assessment of realities and determining factors in the SL-LTTE case is made.

LTTE

It is a thoroughbred, hard-boiled militant organisation – strong, disciplined, highly motivated, dedicated, daring, innovative and fiercely focused on Eelam, to the exclusion of any other arrange-ment. Its guerilla warfare capability may give some quarter to SLAF conventionally, but will not give up and will not let the SLG/Sinhalas live in peace.

It is ruthless in maintaining its sole supremacy among the SL Tamils as their only protector and representative, and has brutally eliminated all other competitors, leaving no alternative body to speak for the people.

“Eelam as an idea and LTTE as a sentiment” have mesmerised the people, impressed the Indian Tamils, galvanising them to abide by the dictates of the LTTE and face even harshest sacrifices.

LTTE is convinced of its justification of waging war to the very bitter end, using all stratagems including nego- tiations, ceasefires, even some co- operation with the SLG if it suits its interests to recuperate, rebuild, regain strength-thus keeping alive even remote hope of a solution in the international community, but only to dash it at its convenience. It has remained enigmatic, unpredictable, vicious, unreliable, obdurate, ruthless and inflexible in the pursuit of its aim and methods adopted.

It has cultivated a good backing of and networking with many an insurgent group of neighbouring countries ; its varied ties with South and Southeast Asian neighbours to evoke their sympathy for its struggle for independence against Sinhala chauvinistic intransigence and coercion.

Though monolithic in its visage, it has suffered a fracture in the eastern wing with Karuna’s break-away, and a major disadvantage as it is added to the US-EU’s terrorist list.

SL Tamils and the LTTE need and exploit India’s help to the hilt against their Sinhala-fellowmen, but do not want Indian compromise-formula or its intervention to bring about a give-and-take with the Sinhalas.

SLG

The Sinhalas are as proud, unyielding and inflexible as the Tamils led by the LTTE. Their idea of Sinhala dominance is absolute. They have deep distaste for the Tamils for the latter’s privileges enjoyed while under the British.

Sinhala Buddhism has a strong hold on the majority and is equally uncompromising and ruthless.

SL has a functional democracy, friendly relations with India and an equally visible inclination to strike its own furrow in South Asian conflicts as witnessed in its permitting Pakistan its over flight facilities during Indo-Pak conflicts of 1965 and 1971, as well as its pro-China bias in the 1962 Sino-Indian confrontation. Yet, surprisingly the same SLG sought, and got, India’s armed assistance in 1971 and 1987 to tackle its internal security problem. In a continuing turnabout the SLG with tacit suport of the LTTE tried to throw out the IPKF in 1989 even as the Indo-SriLanka Accord (ISLA) was operative! So the SLG is also unpredictable, unreliable, crafty and adamant, caught as it is between its democratic liberality, ethno-linguistic pride, intolerance of the LTTE’s secessionism and dependency on outside, particularly India’s help.

India

India has to contend with two indispensable entities – SLG and LTTE. Both have a warm and permanent place in its calculations. One cannot be jettisoned for the other ; a dilemma which stops India from forcing either of them beyond a point. No military solution, as envisaged in the ISLA can satisfy the SLG or the LTTE. The ISLA, in Barbara Tuchman’s definition qualifies to be called a folly “asserting a power you know you cannot exert”. Both are ineradicable parts of India’s quest for peace and security in South Asia, as both have close ethnic, religious, historical, cultural and social ties with India.

India’s Tamils and Tamilnadu become politically, socially and strategically highly sensitive and vulnerable depending upon the condition in SL.

Palk Strait’s mythological Rama Setu being dredged to create a canal big enough to allow passage of blue water naval ships, while solving Indian Navy’s strategic problem of circum-navigating the whole island of SL has simulta-neously created another problem of security of ships while negotiating narrow canal surrounded by shallow waters of Palk Straits, which are within the LTTE’s shallow water naval beat.

Any conflict in SL Tamil areas will result in Tamil refugee exodus to neighbouring Tamilnadu. The LTTE has always benefited by this, while the migration has established a virtual homeland in TN, with opening created in Madurai, Ramnad, Chennai, Trichi, Coimbatore, Bangalore, Vedaranyam etc. It is this bunch of India’s social, political, strategic and security problems that the Indian government has to deal with, which, Gunnar Myrdal’s “soft state” that India is, will find difficult to measure up to.

India’s plurality, diversity, complexities of continental dimensions, its critical sensitivity and its bitter ISLA-IPKF experience have generated great confusion, diffidence, uncertainty, loss of credibility, and even pique of a once-bitten-twice shy-variety in its attitude to the SL imbroglio. At the same time India has displayed adequate sagacity in deferring to the dictum of “thus-far-and-no further” wisdom, as against the background of US, USSR and European arrogance and persistence witnessed in Afghanistan, West Asia and Balkan States, which have had disastrous fallouts.

Witnessed here is a pertinent transformation of Indian philosophy of its military power. In late 1980s Indian military power came to be shaping up for its wider role of regional power, and projecting it outside national confines, under a youthful Prime Minister, his dynamic Defence Minister and a pushing, ebullient Army Chief. The army was on the march to modernisation with its RAPIDs, mechanised forces, airborne and amphibious formations, aerial tanks, science and technology knocking into the conventional baggage and so on. It was heady wine, breezy, elevating. It was in this environment that the SL episode of ISLA was grabbed for the experiment on power projection. The idea subjectively worked to provide a mine of experience and awareness of capabilities, but failed to achieve the objective. The failure too brought out a bundle of lessons, experience and weaknesses. Military power projection has myriad implications ; and rests on certain conditions, limits and preparations. A good example was intervention in Bangladesh –then East Pakistan -. And a bad example was in SL, 15 years later. 1971 was efficient and neat use of force abroad. 1987-90 was ill-conceived, ill-prepared power projection, with only its technical capability to commend it.

It is worth remembering that India has historically, psychologically and culturally not attempted military power projection outside its geographical confines ; no conquests or foreign interventions for it. But in the modern world self-abnegation and non-involvement are no guarantees of national security. They demand readiness to use military power to obtain, and maintain, national security.

International

Sri Lankan Tamil agitation in the 1980s saw a turn from Tamil United Liberation Front’s (TULF) peaceful dharnas, hunger strikes etc. to guns and violence under the younger generation’s militants led later by the LTTE. This violence was seen by the then Indian Govt under Indira Gandhi as a threat to India’s security, what with its Tamil segment seething under DMK-AIADMK alternates, with the apprehensions of Islamic (Pak and Saudi Arabian) angling in the disturbed waters, and with the Soviet-US finger extending to the SL pie, thereby boosting secessionist scourge to Tamils astride the Palk straits. India feared meddling in the Sri Lankan cauldron by countries inimical to Indian interests. Proximity to Diego Garcia was an added concern. Thus pre-emption of foreign influence and India’s regional eminence became crucial.

It is difficult to discern any enthusiastic motivation in the international community to get into the SL domestic ferment though. Strategically the world consigned it to its backyard. There was little by way of natural resources in the island to exploit. Diego Garcia had substantially reduced SL importance. Islamic urges met with cool contentment of SL Muslims – be it among its Tamil segment or Sinhala majority. It was, and continues to be, predominantly a South Asian, an Indian sub continental concern. It is this international disinterest that has prolonged the conflict and allowed extended bloodletting among the hapless inhabitants, including those on the Indian soil. Human life and misery are cheap in the sub continental region.

International community has very little to do with the SL imbroglio, and even lesser interest. It is clearly and solely within the orbits of India and SL. Suffering visits only the Tamils, Sinhalas and Indians, none else. It is strange that people from the outskirts of North Pole have to come down to the serendipity island to solve the problem, while the Sri Lankans and the Indians wallow amidst expendable human lives! Stranger still is that India which has put spacecraft in orbit without the cooperation of international community, and exploded nuclear bombs in the teeth of world opposition, (it has that high level of persuasive and industrious skills), has chosen to benignly neglect the SL problem that so adversely affects it.

So What Next?

The foremost and the very first disturbing factor in even commencing consideration of the question is the typical Indian historical, cultural, psychological characterisitic of waiting and wallowing and wishing away till the situation becomes hopeless and sets our own house on fire. Time and human suffering in the prolonging adverse security situation are begging for hard decisions, particularly by the major actor, India. That hard decision is to pressurise the SLG and the SL Tamils (LTTE) by every possible means, including socio-economic, regional and international action to force them to come to terms, terminate confrontation by accepting adjustments and assisted by certain guaranteeing mechanism including regional or international elements if need be. As the major actor India may have to choose, on one side, between the antagonists, and, on the other, compensate the other. In the process it will be essential to isolate the obdurate LTTE from the SL Tamil as well as Indian Tamil peoples. Indian govt, its politics, its democratic and ruling alliances, its electoral greed and diversity of opinion and interests will have to suborn themselves to the common cause of putting an end to the suffering of the subject peoples and bringing about elements of security and peace in the region.

Pressurising the antagonists wholly depends on persuasion – peacefully or by other means; by building up necessary national, regional and international opinion; manipulating social, political, economic activities, restrictions, sanctions, compensations etc; bringing into play international attention and contribution by world bodies; explaining to the public at large the stakes, interests and dangers involved, including the need for peace and security for the development, progress and prosperity of the people. In short an action package on the lines of what India undertook as a diplomatic effort in the international field in 1971 Indo-Pak confrontation. A special effort will be needed to exert more firmly on the SLG to devolve necessary powers to the Sri Lankan Tamils and ensure guarantee mechanism. For this to take effect it is essential to bring major world powers and organisations to play their role. And India must make all efforts to garner that international pressure.

Too long have the politics and political parties in Tamil Nadu kept the Eelam pot of Sri Lanka boiling on their soil. The LTTE had a field day, all these years and played a prominent part in the Tamil Nadu elections with the cutouts of LTTE leaders adorning vehicles and lamp posts and buildings right up to the Legislative building in the fort at Chennai. Senior govt officials in the southern districts had to have strong security guards for their residences, offices and school going children for their safety. LTTE have threatened, killed, murdered, blown up, massacred our Tamils, their Tamils, our leaders, their leaders and kidnapped and killed our fishermen, apart from smuggling in explosives, weapons, oil fuels and war material all in Tamil Nadu. It is time the LTTE was pushed out of Indian soil and denied entry and assistance. Similarly all migration of Sri Lankan Tamils needs to be stopped, and help in any form denied to them, since the LTTE will clandestinely use this facility. When we continue to protest against Pak ultras and intruders carrying out disruptive activities from bases in our land, why should we allow such facilities and activities to the SL Tamils and their protégés the LTTE? Why this duplicity? Will it not hinder our effort to garner international opinion against the LTTE? In any case the LTTE is a banned terrorist organisation ! What business do the Tamils –and the Indians- have howling against Kashmiris sheltering Pak or Taliban terrorists or militants when we are doing the same to the LTTE ?

“India is probably the only country in the world that –has given official recognition to its expatriates, (who) have been granted an extraordinary range of special concessions” says Shashi Tharoor in his book “India”, Penguin Millennium edition, for their (NRI’s) financial contribution to their motherland. And what do the SL Tamil migrants and their LTTE bring to their shelter-land except violence, murder, insecurity and socio-political upheaval, adding to our own nascent struggle to manage indigenous variety ? Our Tamils and their regional leaders must realise, and made to realise in no uncertain terms, that Tamil identity, LTTE and their problems are not the be-all and end-all, and that they have to defer to the larger demands of national opinion, national security and management of national diversity. Too close a drift towards the issue of identity – Tamil identity in this instance – will lead to “solitary identity” a recipe for violence and self righteousness. This exclusive drift in identity in Amartya Sen’s words “can also kill – and kill with abandon”.

There is a need to raise a strong enough shallow-water naval capability to ensure security in the Palk Straits and coastal waters to nullify LTTE as well as SL depredations. The traditional seafaring smuggling clandestine activities of the SL Tamils with their counterparts in TN should be stopped. During IPKF operations the open sea of shallow water remained a big headache. With the proposed dredging for a sea canal through the Palk Straits its security gains added importance. For a country of continental complexity, its nuclear capability, space launch capability, missile capability, and its burgeoning technological, economic, democratic and human strength, the ensuring responsibility of arranging, bringing about and maintaining regional and national security is inescapable, if it is to serve humanity, save devaluation of human life, and ensure peace and security to its people, to the neighbours and in the region. Nuclear and missile wars are least likely to take place as they act as their own deterrents. But regional, national and communitarian violence is quotidian.

We have to change our mindset, review our ongoing dissociation with the Sri Lanka – LTTE problem, choose hard decisions, take tough stand, hone our persuasive skills, use our power and pressure without hesitation but justly and bring about an international opinion to facilitate the successful use of that force. And all this to save human lives, avoid destruction, facilitate welfare and development in the region, to establish and maintain peace and security.