Indian Defence Review

Kudankulam Nuclear Plant

China cleverly masked its real reasons for opposition to the Indian membership by insisting on the plea that India was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This opposition was merely a technical cover up for some deeper strategic calculations which China was unwilling to spell out, but were quite apparent right from the beginning. In fact, China could barely hide these concerns, when its official media stated that India’s membership of the NSG would “jeopardise” China’s national interests, besides touching a “raw nerve” in Pakistan.

Hectic diplomatic outreach by India preceded the plenary session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in Seoul where India’s membership of this elite club was to come up for discussions 24 Jun 2016.

The NSG consists of 48 nations which can legitimately trade in nuclear material. As per the existing rules governing its various provisions, entry of any new member into NSG can only be permitted if there is complete consensus among its 48 members on such entry. Therefore, if even one country were to oppose the new entry, there will be no accretion to the club’s strength.

During PM Modi’s recent visit to the U.S., India’s membership of MTCR was announced with big fanfare. Thereafter, our MEA made its intensions clear about its next target, i.e., to seek membership of the NSG. Right from the time when India submitted its application for grant of full membership of NSG on May 12, 2016, China through its various channels, made it abundantly clear that it was going to oppose India‘s entry into the NSG. Within days of making such announcement, China stated that its best friend, Pakistan, too will have to be accommodated. Immediately thereafter, Pakistan too formally applied for the membership of the Group.

Knowing well that without China’s acquiescence, India will not be granted the membership of NSG, India launched a diplomatic offensive in a big way, culminating into a meeting between Chinese President, Xi Jinping and PM Modi in Tashkent on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting on 22 June 2016. It will be futile to deny that by personally appealing to the Chinese President on the issue, PM Modi put his own reputation at stake.

In retrospect, it can safely be said that India miscalculated on three fronts; first, its over-confidence in its ability to persuade China to accept India’s entry; second, under-assessing Pakistan’s ability to rope in its long term ally, Turkey; and lastly, India’s inability to allay the genuine reservation of countries like South Africa, Ireland , New Zealand and Switzerland, etc., about setting a precedent for other countries by letting India enter NSG without having signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Besides, India seemed to have suddenly woken up to the necessity of seeking membership of this elite club after many years of having put the matter into a cold storage. After the signing of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear deal in 2008, the whole process of proceeding ahead with the consequential, procedures, memoranda, agreements, etc., remained in limbo due to various reasons; the primary among these being the reluctance of the Indian Government to kick-start its various provisions due to internal political dynamics.

China cleverly masked its real reasons for opposition to the Indian membership by insisting on the plea that India was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This opposition was merely a technical cover up for some deeper strategic calculations which China was unwilling to spell out, but were quite apparent right from the beginning. In fact, China could barely hide these concerns, when its official media stated that India’s membership of the NSG would “jeopardise” China’s national interests, besides touching a “raw nerve” in Pakistan.

China clearly forgot that India had been given a waiver in 2008; paragraph 1 (A) of NSG deliberations of September 2008, state, “India contributes to the widest-possible implementation of the provisions and objectives of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. Consequently, there appears no contradiction between NPT and India’s becoming member of the NSG. This waiver allows Westinghouse, and its competitors in France or South Korea, to bid for setting up civilian reactors in India It may also be added that China was party to the decision of NSG to give this waiver to India. In 2008, the US-China relations were riding the crest of surging trade and a common vision of how the international order needed to be restructured. The waiver came only after some prodding by President Bush when he rang up President Hu Jintao. Today, the situation is different; what with U.S. – China relations experiencing a turbulence over Chinese muscle-flexing in the South China Sea.

China on many occasions has played the Pakistani card whenever India tried to overcome its decades- old prejudice in western world, which measured India’s interests and capabilities in a hyphenated equation with Pakistan. Though most of those countries, including the U.S, France, Britain, Germany and others have largely overcome these reservations, there are still some countries which have not reconciled to the existing realities in South Asia in the post cold war world. It is in keeping with this thinking that in order to offset any advantage accruing to India by becoming a member of the NSG, China pushed for Pakistan too being granted the NSG membership. It is a different matter that China has not been able to garner much support from within the NSG in favour of Pakistan due to the latter’s horrid track record of nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, India’s track record on the issue of nuclear proliferation has been commendable; even its worst enemies have never pointed a finger at it on this score.

By insisting on the precondition of signing the NPT as the basis for any country wanting to become a member of NSG, China calculates that such Norm-based entry would help Pakistan too to gain entry. China is forgetting that many in the NSG are certain to resist such a move because of Pakistan’s record as a proliferator of nuclear-weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

It is pertinent to mention that for an energy-deficient country like India, it needs nuclear power to push its much heralded development agenda. That alone will enable it to bring its millions out of the poverty in which they continue to live even after nearly seven decades of independence. Besides, India is committed to reduce the consumption of its fossil fuels to 40 %. India is woefully deficient of nuclear material and has to import it from other countries to fuel its nuclear reactors for power generation. It is here that India’s membership of the NSG becomes very crucial as the latter alone regulates the global trade of nuclear technology. Its membership will open up the international market for India’s domestic nuclear energy programme and help India to realize its dream of becoming a developed country by 2050.

The NSG was established by the United States after India carried out its nuclear test in 1974, with the aim of regulating the trading in nuclear equipment and material. The aim was to control the spread of nuclear equipment as also the fissile material and thus strengthen the global Non-proliferation regime, whose centre piece is the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty or the NPT. According to the provisions of the NPT, only those countries are recognized as the ‘nuclear weapon states’ that tested the nuclear weapons before January 1,1967.Therefore, India cannot be declared a nuclear weapon state.

As is well known, India, Pakistan and Israel, refused to sign the NPT. In the meanwhile, following the end of cold war, Indo-U.S. relations started warming up and during President George W Bush’s Presidency, the U.S. sought ways to deepen its strategic cooperation with India. Both countries realized that nuclear energy would be the most important element of that cooperation. But since India was not a member of the NPT, the U.S. and its allies could not share nuclear technology with India. Therefore, a way forward had to be found; the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement provided that option.

According to this treaty, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, and put the civilian part under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. As a follow-up, India changed its export laws to come in line with the four key nuclear control regimes, i.e., the NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group. The US helped India gain entry into these regimes. This meant that India would for all practical purposes, be treated like an NPT member, even though it wasn’t one. China knows all this but sticking to technicality, it succeeded in stalling our membership.

Pakistan’s opposition to India becoming a member of the NSG revolves around its argument that giving India easy access to fissile material and technology for its civilian nuclear programme would enable ‘it to have that much more material for its military nuclear programme’. Further, it asserts that bestowing such membership on India will fuel a nuclear arms race. But this argument carries little weight as Pakistan has been persistently opposing the key international agreement called the ‘Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which would cap the military nuclear stockpiles of all countries. The FMCT is an agreement that would specifically address Pakistan’s apprehensions, but Islamabad has refused to sign it.

India may have been denied entry into the NSG for the time being, but with most countries supporting it, India says that the efforts in this direction will continue. We can only wait and watch.