Military & Aerospace

Higher Defence Management through Effective Civil-Military Relations
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Issue Vol. 27.4 Oct-Dec 2012 | Date : 10 Dec , 2012

The Soothing Touch

Efforts to correct the imbalance and bring about reforms in the establishment in the face of well-entrenched positions of the bureaucracy and the reluctance of the political class to transform the system against the indifferent advice of the bureaucrats, have continued to remain unenthusiastic and subdued. The post-Kargil War review was expected to remove the disparities but the recommendations of Subrahmanyam Committee of 1999 and the Group of Ministers (GoM) Report of 2001, with veteran parliamentarian, LK Advani at the helm, were effectively scuttled by an uninterested ‘civilian-authority’, with some cosmetic changes, citing differences amongst the Services to implement the other major recommendations.

Will the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee and that of the Committee of Secretaries, ever see the light of day?

The Sixth Pay Commission, once again, brought to the fore the divergence of thought between the bureaucracy and the Armed Forces. There was no member from the Armed Forces in the Pay Commission. Anomalies in the recommendations of the Commission running in triple figures were set to be resolved by a Commission of Secretaries, once again with no representation from the Armed Forces! These are yet to be resolved and the country has seen some angry scenes of ex-Servicemen returning their medals to the President of India.

A Task Force on National Security was set up by the present Government under the stewardship of Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and Indian Ambassador to USA till 2001. Members of the Task Force included former Chiefs of the three Services, former heads of various Government Departments, retired bureaucrats and police officers. It is considered as the first serious review of national security after the Kargil Review Committee and had a few sub-committees to focus on internal security, defence and intelligence issues. The Task Force submitted its report to the Government on May 23, 2012. As per last information, it is yet to be perused by the Cabinet. It needs to be seen whether the Government has the sense of urgency and the political will to accept the recommendations and implement them, no matter how unsavoury they may be to certain segments of the establishment.

As late as July 2012, the Honourable Raksha Mantri (RM) wrote to the Prime Minister (PM) on the ‘growing discontent’ amongst the serving and retired members of the Armed Forces. On July 12, 2012, a high-level Committee was set up headed by the Cabinet Secretary and with five other senior Secretaries as members. The Committee, once again, had no member from the Armed Forces despite the three Service Chiefs writing separate letters to the RM to include representation from the Services. Unconvincing reasons have been put forward to not include any, citing that it would delay the submission of the report scheduled for August 08, 2012. It is not known whether the report has been submitted. At least there is no report in the media yet to indicate that the report has indeed been submitted. It was also expected that the PM would declare the recommendations of this Committee from the ramparts of the Red Fort of August 15, 2012, during his address to the Nation.

The Ministry of Defence needs an expert cadre and not a generalist cadre…

The Way Ahead

No other professional has shed so much blood for the nation. For members of the military, the shedding of blood whether that of others or their own, is not a strictly incidental part of their work. Historically, the protection of lives and territories has been the fundamental purpose of militaries. So has been the historical purpose of the Indian political and bureaucratic class in setting up Committees and Commissions to ‘look into’ the grievances of the Armed Forces. Will the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee and that of the Committee of Secretaries, ever see the light of day or would they be consigned to the archives to surface after another war or another national crisis?

For one thing, our nation, like some many others, arose from mayhem and has faced war at regular intervals. War has profoundly shaped our history and for this reason, the military is deeply linked to our sense of national identity in a way that is true for no other profession. The bureaucrats do not retire at 35 years of age or for that matter at 54. They retire at 60 or 62 years after having served in the Capital for a major portion of their service and are immediately re-employed for another twenty years or so as a member or the head of a Commission/Committee. If they cannot relate to the difficulties faced by the men in uniform both during and after their service, how then can they be expected to do justice in redressing the disparities that exist between the ‘civil authority’ and the military?

Change, if it comes, will be strongly resisted not just by the bureaucracy but also by the Armed Forces…

While the author is not against the establishment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as has been recommended by many, the appointment is also not going to be the panacea for all ills. The Air Force has been blamed for the delay of the appointment of a CDS. What the Air Force has been asking for is that a host of other recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and the GoM report of 2001 be implemented before a CDS is appointed. What the many Committees have recommended in some form or the other, and the author is in full agreement with them, is that the marginalising of the military in higher defence decision making has to end.

There is a need to have civil servants in the higher defence organisation along the lines as in UK, suitably adapted to Indian conditions. The Ministry of Defence needs an expert cadre and not a generalist cadre. Alongside, there is also the need to have diplomats in the ministry to provide useful inputs, keeping in mind that defence and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin. The civil servant and the military officer must work together at each level of the organisation, from the lowest to the highest, avoiding the ‘us and them’ attitude.

Change, if it comes, will be strongly resisted not just by the bureaucracy but also by the Armed Forces. The experiences of 1948, 1962, 1965, 1971, Kargil, Op PARAKRAM and 26/11 have revealed the shortfalls in our higher defence decision-making process, and the lackadaisical attempts to put right the system. Do we need another major crisis for a wake-up call?

References

  1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Soldier_and_the_State:_The_Theory_and_Politics_of_Civil-Military_Relations
  2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington
  3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morris_Janowitz
  4. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Antonys-note-on-unrest-in-Army-led-to-panel-on-pay/articleshow/15284824.cms
  5. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-13/india/32662870_1_family-pension-military-personnel-full-orop-implementation
  6. http://www.rediff.com/news/report/naresh-chandra-task-force-to-recommend-permanent-head-chiefs-of-staff-committee/20120523.htm
  7. Rosa Brooks, “Generals are Mars, Their Bosses are from Venus”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/25/generals_are_from_mars_their_bosses_are_from_venus
  8. Anit Mukherjee, “The Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India”, IDSA Fellows Seminar, May 2011.
  9. Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd), “Marginalising the Defence Services”, Defence Watch, January 2012.
  10. C Uday Bhaskar, “Tenor of Civil Military Relationship in India”, Salute, Feb 2012.
  11. SG Vombatkere, “Rational National Security”, Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 2012.
  12. Dhiraj Kukreja, “Integration of Service Headquarters with Ministry of Defence”, Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 2012.
  13. VR Raghavan, “Strategic Culture: A Military Perspective”, in “Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives”, ed N S Sisodia and C Uday Bhaskar, IDSA New Delhi.

Notes

  1. Sun Tzu. 1971. The Art of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  2. Carl von Clausewitz. 1989. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press
  3. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1508
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja

former Air Officer Commanding in Chief of Training Command.

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