Indian Defence Review

The contours of India’s relationship with China have been tumultuous over the last six decades. From periods of great bonhomie in the mid fifties – the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ years to hitting rock bottom in 1962 when both nations went to war over the boundary dispute, the relationship has seen great turbulence marked by venomous animosity over the ongoing boundary dispute. Besides the boundary dispute, India’s concerns are related to China’s role in supporting insurgent groups in India’s Northeast, and in its active support to Pakistan, particularly in the nuclear field. Chinese concerns are related to the activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC).

China also appears to be concerned over the reported presence, of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), in Indian territory a US non government organisation but funded by the US Government. From time to time the US Congress has provided special appropriations to the Endowment to carry out specific democratic initiatives in countries of special interest, and China blames the NED for part of their troubles in Xinjiang and Tibet. The positives in the relationship have been increasing trade flows, cooperation in the WTO, commonality of interests over contentious world issues such as the recent ‘UN Climate Change Conference 2009′ held at Copenhagen, and a relatively peaceful border since the Wangdung incident in 1986.

China has already started conditioning the international political and military environment in its favour with respect to the border dispute. Chinese claims over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh are a pointer in this direction.

But we are living in dangerous times. With 24 hour news channels all eager to ‘break news’, a relatively minor incident has the potential of being hyped into one demanding a response for the sake of national honour. Recent reports of Chinese incursions in parts of Indian territory led to public opinion being inflamed in India and a dangerous hysteria being created with both countries accusing each other of intruding into their territory. While the two governments exercised restraint, such incidents have the potential of leading to conflagration.

In the instant case, the bilateral agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility on the border till a final solution to the border dispute is reached between the two countries stood the test and the situation was diffused. However, the issues which bedevil the two countries remain a source of concern and have the potential to lead the two countries to war.

While the possibility of armed conflict erupting as of now appears remote, our ability to repulse an attack on our eastern and northern borders with China needs to be analysed and understood in context. Paradoxically, the greater our ability to protect our frontiers, the less will be the likelihood of hostilities breaking out. The question to be asked is are we prepared and what more needs to be done?

One of China’s significant aspects is the continuity of its civilisation which has endured without interruption over several millenniums. The Chinese are remarkably conscious of their uniqueness and have expressed this in the name they give to their country – Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) and Zhonghua (Central Civilisation). In Chinese conception, every phenomenon whether natural or social has two opposite, complimentary aspects – the Yin and the Yang. The dialectic of Yin and Yang gives rise to the concept of ‘wu wei’ – a process of refraining from distorting the natural course of events by clumsy or premature intervention. Allied with this is the ‘Sûn ZÐ Bîng FÎ’ (The Art of War), a Chinese military treatise written by Sun Tzu in the 6th century BC.

According to Sun Tzu, a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. This idea of shaping the battlefield to achieve success finds continuance resonance in the Treatise – ‘Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win’, and gives rise to the concept of winning without fighting – ‘For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill’.

In the current context, while a great deal more needs to be done in improving defence preparedness, the Indian Armed Forces are totally capable and competent to repulse any Chinese misadventure across the high Himalayas.

China’s strategic traditions and domestic influences will thus have a great bearing on their military thinking and policy towards India. The practical manifestation of that policy would devolve around the following:

China has already started conditioning the international political and military environment in its favour with respect to the border dispute. Chinese claims over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh are a pointer in this direction. Google, which earlier used to show the state as part of Indian territory in its maps now gives out both Indian and Chinese claim lines. The intent of the Chinese is clear. In case of an India-China conflict, Beijing would like to mould international opinion in its favour and minimise support for India, by convincing the world that China has acted in ’self-defence’ and that India is the ‘aggressor’, in illegal occupation of Chinese territory.

Chinese attempts to constrain India are exemplified in their support for Pakistan. This forces India to also look westwards while engaging with China and ties up valuable resources in anticipation of a two front war. China’s extensive development of multimodal connectivity all along its borders and inside the neighbouring countries for facilitating trade flows, energy supplies and movement of arms and armada is another aspect of containment and psychological dislocation of the adversary. This attempt at creating a ring of anti-Indian influences could rightly be inferred as strategic encirclement and containment of India, to sub-serve its strategic global ambitions.

In the event of a conflict we could expect China to choose the time and place of initiating hostilities in accordance with the earlier mentioned concept of ‘wu wei’. They would aim to limit, mislead and control India both through the military and political realm. As an element of surprise, a crucial pre-war element could be a highly capable cyber attack as part of its strategy to carry out psychological paralysis of the adversary and manage conflict. This would be followed by managing the flow of information to the extent that if India still wants to persist continuing with the conflict, it would invite a risk of war, potentially involving the nuclear element as well. A high level political strategy of prevention would likely be put in place to convince India of the futility and high risk of going to war.

China thinks strategically and acts decisively; the Chinese military modernisation programme is the biggest manifestation of this “¦

Should India not be deterred, China is likely to begin the conflict with a heavy ballistic and cruise missile attack as the next step in conflict management to destroy command and control centres and inflict damage on communication and logistic nodes. The political commissars and the Central Military Commission (CMC) could be expected to play a vital role in the conflict as also in formulating the nature of operations.

Is India prepared to meet a Chinese military threat is the question that obviously comes to mind. There have been misgivings in certain quarters of India’s ability to withstand a Chinese attack. Of late, New Delhi has shown concern over China’s increased defence spending and has stated that China’s armed forces modernisation needs to be “monitored carefully” for implications on India’s defence and security. While it would be imprudent to underestimate Chinese capability, a lack of understanding of one’s own strength is also fraught with grave consequences. In the current context, while a great deal more needs to be done in improving defence preparedness, the Indian Armed Forces are totally capable and competent to repulse any Chinese misadventure across the high Himalayas.

There can be no two opinions on how deadly cyber warfare can be in terms of crippling or destroying an adversary’s economic, communication and strategic networks and infrastructure. The Chinese have exceptional capabilities in this regard which they will put to good use in a conflict situation with India. But Indian capacity too is not insignificant and the application of this capability over the Tibetan plateau would degrade Chinese offensive capability to a considerable extent. It must be noted that the Indian Army is geared up for operating in a digitised battlefield and its information systems are quite secure from hostile strikes. As per the statement of Lt-General P Mohapatra, the Indian Army’s Signal Officer in Chief, the army has put a very secure network in place which cannot be tampered with. The General also stated that various cryptographic controls have been put in place and there are training activities to ensure that no loss of information takes place.

While overall Chinese air power has a tremendous edge over India, what needs to be considered is how much of the PLAAF can be applied in a conflict across the Indo-Tibetan border. China has many security related concerns of greater import than its concerns with India which would necessitate the deployment of adequate quantity of PLAAF for its Mainland security. Also, the quantum of air effort which can actually be employed from the air bases existing in Tibet will give out the net quantum of force which is available for application against India. It must however be noted that the payload of aircraft get reduced while taking off from high altitude bases. PLAAF operations from Tibet would hence get degraded to that extent. As Indian aircraft take off from bases at sea level, India should be able to maintain a reasonable air deterrent against any invading force.

Could we have a National Security Advisor from the defence services rather than from the civil bureaucracy or the police services? These issues need to be debated.

A major component of Chinese offensive forces has to be built up largely from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions in the mainland. The terrain in the Tibetan plateau with its concomitant communication network will play an important role in this build up. The time taken to induct such a large sized force robs the operation of any element of surprise. The lines of communication being limited are also extremely vulnerable to interdiction by air and missile attack. Indian capability in ensuring a high degree of battlefield transparency over the Tibetan Plateau will make it impossible to hide large troop concentrations and logistic nodes further adding to the attacker’s vulnerability from aerial and missile attack. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give us a glimpse of how devastating, economical, and precise they can be, if they are supported by airpower. Airpower tackling the depth formations and strategic reserves will ultimately deliver the highest dividends. Considering the improvements in endurance and weapon carrying capability, the aircraft will also be capable of multi-tasking.

To support their ground offensive, China would have to deploy a vast quantity of artillery within 15 to 30 km of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The lie of the ground in the mountainous terrain as existing along the LAC is such that the artillery would have to deploy near existing roads and tracks, making use of reentrants and folds in the ground. It would be well nigh impossible to conceal these gun locations making them viable targets for own aerial attacks. Destruction of a large part of the adversary’s artillery would seriously jeopardise his ground offensive, which could then be defeated in detail.

Finally, mountains give tremendous strength to the defensive. For troops that are well dug in, an extraordinary amount of combat superiority would be required to overrun the defences. India has adequate holding forces to stave off even determined Chinese assaults and with the addition of two extra mountain divisions in the region, this capability will only get enhanced. In the Tawang Sector, which perhaps would have the greatest importance for China, the battle will be waged in a narrow 40 km corridor between the tri-junction of India-Bhutan-Tibet and the glaciers which lie further east. While the conflict will be bloody, there will be no repeat of 1962. At best, China can hope for a pyrrhic victory with marginal gains and at worst a humiliating defeat. But the probable end result would lie somewhere in between.

On the naval front, the previous Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta had stated that China was shaping the maritime battlefield in the region and had cautioned that the Chinese are looking 20 years ahead. As per an official from the Indian Navy, China has increased its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. These reports while a source of concern are not something which cannot be dealt with, given the time frames involved.

As per an official from the Indian Navy, China has increased its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.

While India has the present capability to address its security concerns across the LAC, much needs to be done to maintain a conventional military deterrent in pursuit of its genuine security concerns. A war in the high Himalayas will be a costly proposition for both India and China and should best be avoided. The Chinese are however further increasing the conventional gap between the two forces through a rapid process of modernisation and improving infrastructure in Tibet. China thinks strategically and acts decisively; the Chinese military modernisation programme is the biggest manifestation of this since it is the largest in the history of the world. While this issue needs to be addressed with the utmost concern, there appears to be no real movement towards this end. The defence budget has remained stagnant as a percentage of GDP and available trends do not suggest a change in this aspect.

From the army point of view, a much greater push is required in improving infrastructure especially with respect to logistics and communications. Procurement of guns for the artillery needs to be expedited and thought needs to be given to match Chinese missile capability so as to achieve effective deterrence. The Air force needs to ensure it has a combat edge over PLAAF in Tibet for which appropriations in the defence budget may need to be readjusted. India should also focus on developing its naval capability with a power projectionist role giving greater emphasis on the ‘anti-access’ strategy. While the biggest Chinese vulnerability in the political sphere is present in the form of Tibet, with a possibility of serious domestic fallout for the Chinese, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is also a serious Chinese concern as nearly 60 percent of their oil passes through the Indian Ocean.

But what really needs to be done to improve the state of defence preparedness in India is higher defence reform. We have an antiquated civil – military relationship which has failed to grow and mature in step with the needs of modern day security challenges. Thus, while the Service Chiefs are responsible and accountable for their respective services, they lack real authority which rests with Indian bureaucracy without the attendant accountability. Perhaps the time has come to question the role of the defence secretary and other civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence. Could we think of making the post of Defence Secretary redundant once the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff is created? Could we think in terms of four ‘4 star’ ranked officers in theatre commands to look after India’s security concerns against China, Pakistan, the Indian Ocean Region and our nuclear assets? Could we have a National Security Advisor from the defence services rather than from the civil bureaucracy or the police services? These issues need to be debated, and hopefully, some will be implemented.