Indian Defence Review

The Doklam stand-off between India and China, which lasted for 72 days, and which took place in a remote area of the forbidden heights of eastern Himalayas, is symbolic of the continued lack of trust that exists between India and China, ever since the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ slogan was turned on its head by Chinese aggression in 1962.

The humiliating reverses suffered by India in the 1962 war was a direct consequence of Nehru’s haughty moralizing on the conduct of diplomacy at various international fora, without backing it up with the required degree of military preparedness. On the other hand, averting a conflict in Doklam, without compromising our stand (our objection to China constructing a road till the tri-junction, as they define it), has been a welcome diplomatic victory, even though it may prove to be a short-lived one.

In all previous violations of the McMahon line by Chinese troops, the confrontation would be directly between the two belligerents, India and China; but not this time. This time it was not a routine violation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by the Chinese troops that needed an Indian response. Militarily and diplomatically, there was much in the Doklam stand-off that was different.

Doklam plateau falls in the Bhutanese territory. There is a pre-existing territorial dispute between Bhutan and China in this region. Therefore, to start with, this time there was a third (sovereign) country whose territory was violated. India got involved for various reasons; the most important being the fact that India and Bhutan have a defence treaty (Mutual Defence Agreement) which stipulates a specific role for India in Bhutan’s defence and external policies. But more importantly, the issue involved much more than merely standing by the ‘Treaty’.

As the summer of 2017 turned the valleys within the cold plateau into pleasant grazing grounds, the Chinese graziers began to bring their live stock for grazing into the lush green valleys and meadows. But shortly thereafter the India troops stationed in the Chumbi Valley noticed heavy road-construction equipment being parked by the Chinese on the tracks which led to their posts. It was not long before the middle of June 2017, that Chinese started constructing a road towards the Tri-junction. It is at this point that Indian troops physically intervened to prevent the construction activity, resulting in the stand-off.

The Chinese had planned to construct a road through Bhutan to a disputed Tri-junction point involving India, China and Bhutan. When completed it would link Lhasa-Shingatse to Yadong in the heart of Chhumbi valley. The dispute arose because this would seriously change the status quo. As a matter of fact, it was only in 1960 that Chinese graziers for the first time started bringing their live stock into the area; whereas the Bhutanese graziers have been using this area for centuries. In 2012, it had been mutually decided to determine the tri-junction points between the three affected countries, China, India and Bhutan and it was further agreed that none of the affected parties will take any unilateral action on the issue.

In the Treaties of 1988 and 1998 it was agreed by China and Bhutan to maintain peace in the area, pending a final settlement. It may be mentioned that the exact location of the Tri-Junction point between India, Bhutan and Tibet had not been agreed upon. According to the watershed theory, which India is wedded to, the Tri-junction is at Batangla, which is nearly 8 km north of where Chinese claim it to be, i.e., Gyemochen. As a matter of fact, a joint survey of the area was also carried out. After holding 24 rounds of talks with China, the Royal Government of Bhutan said, “On June 16, 2017, China started constructing road from Dokla to Dhoklam area towards the Bhutan Army Camp at Zomplri without informing Bhutan…”

It is not that the area has suddenly come to the notice of the Chinese as theirs, and which needed immediate occupation. Letters about the area were exchanged between the two big neighbours, India and China, as far back as 1966 (Vol 13 & 14 of the correspondence of Ministry of External Affairs, 1966- White Paper on China). In 2005,India and China had agreed to a formulation on a ‘ settled population’ as one of the ‘Guiding Principles’ for a boundary settlement, but within a year, the Chinese envoy claimed all of Arunachal Pradesh, while at the same time, claiming 496 Sq Km in eastern Bhutan and 286 Km in the western sector, which included Doklam area.

Clearly this created apprehension in the minds of Bhutan Government which saw a threat building up to Phuntsling, the entry point for Bhutan from India. If China were to occupy the disputed area, they would control the high mountain ridges, putting Haa, Paro and Thimpu, Bhutan’s three most important cities, within Chinese artillery range.

The implication of the construction of the Chinese road to the Tri-junction that it determined unilaterally, would lead to the annexation of the Doklam sector, permitting the PLA to widen the western shoulder of the Chhumbi Valley which would facilitate its military strike through Chhumbi Valley towards Siliguri Corridor, posing a grave threat to India’s security of its entire northeast region. The Chinese intended to take the whole of western shoulder of Chumbi Valley, permitting them to take the road to their version of Tri-junction, i.e., Mount Gyemochen, which is 10 km south of India’s interpretation, i.e., east of Batangla Pass. This would point the Chinese dagger at India’s north-eastern states.

Actually the Chinese objective was to come on to the Zomperi Ridge, 7.5 Km south of Batangla with the aim of buttressing its claims on Doklam. It is pertinent to mention that Indian troops here are at an advantage, as they were in Sumdrong Chu in 1986. This grave threat to India’s north-eastern states led to the Indian local formations in the region getting specific instructions. These were:-

•  Hold the line on ground and prepare for Chinese military retaliation.

•  Maintain Bhutan’s interests, particularly its territorial integrity.

•  Brave Chinese pressure.

Once it became clear to the Chinese that Indian Army was determined to prevent any construction of road in this area, the war of words started in earnest. The threatening statements issued by the authorised Chinese spokesmen raised serious concerns in India. Coupled with fact that China had moved 3 divisions, an artillery, an AD and armoured brigade in south Tibet, forced India to initiate a matching military response; it activated 3 divisions and its AF assets already permanently stationed at bases close to the LoAC in Assam and West Bengal.

Indian Army Chief’s visit to Gangtok during the stand-off did much to reassure the nation that China will not be allowed to dictate its terms as far as the military confrontation on ground was concerned.

As the stand-off turned into a stalemate, the war of words between the two neighbours became frequent and heated. However, it must be said to the credit of India that the Indian Government sources were extremely careful in issuing statements which could be considered even remotely provocative.

Defence Minister, Arun Jaitley’s statement that ‘ India of 2017 was not the India of 1962’ and the Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s detailed and articulate statement in the Parliament was seen as a matured response to the breast beating and threatening statements issued by the State-controlled Chinese media and spokesmen /women of its External Affairs ministry and PLA. Such war of words and threatening posturing by China did not create any panic in India. The latter, by its stead fast military stand and diplomatic mature- handling convinced China that India, this time around, was determined to prevent China from having its way.

The first signs of thaw appeared when the Indian National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, visited China for a scheduled multilateral meeting, during which he also met the Chinese President, Li Xing Ping. Though no statements were issued concerning the Doklam standoff, it was apparent that the ice had been broken. As the press reports subsequently said, Sh. Ajit Doval had made it clear to his Chinese counterpart that ‘Chinese could not claim every disputed piece of land in the Tibet-India border region as its own, as a fait accompli’.

A very categorical statement issued later by the Indian Home Minister, Sh. Rajnath Singh, clearly hinted that the standoff was nearing a resolution. On Aug 21, 2017, while speaking at an ITBP event, the HM said, “I want to assure the nation that Doklam issue will soon be resolved.” A couple of days later, the Chinese withdrew their road- constructing heavy equipment to the pre-June 16, 2017, locations, thereby restoring the status quo ante. Thus ended the Doklam- standoff, which nearly brought the two mighty nuclear-powered nations, to the brink of war.

Major Chinese incursions into the Indian Territory, across the 4000 km McMohan Line, are not new. Sometimes these have been in the form of small patrols getting across, and at other places, company- strength troops have intruded into the Indian side and left after constructing some bunkers or destroying ours. On some occasions they have even tried to change the status quo, as in Depsang (2013), Chumar( 2014) and Doklam (2017). Doklam incursion, however, was a case apart; the incursion did not take place in the Indian Territory, but in Bhutan. Therefore, India, for the first time, had to deploy its troops in a third country.

There has been much debate on the choice of Doklam as the Chinese incursion point this time round, its belligerent posturing during the entire imbroglio and finally, ending the whole imbroglio with a whimper. It is impossible to go into the Chinese mind and improbable to decipher what their inscrutable faces say. At best, there can only be conjectures about the motives of Chinese bid to change the status quo of the LoAC in Chumbi Valley.

For long, China has been trying to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan, but without much success. Its aim is to get a foot-hold in Bhutan and then, like Nepal, expand its base for further influencing Bhutan’s policies, particularly vis-a-vis India, with the aim of driving a permanent wedge between India and its closest ally, Bhutan.