Our Foreign Secretary in a recent talk has stated that “India’s efforts to bridge the trust deficit and pave the way for a serious and comprehensive dialogue were thwarted by a level of overreach by Pakistan”. The overreach is just one ploy of scuttling progress.
When our Home and Foreign Ministers visited Pakistan they encountered insults instead of overreach. The next time around it will be some new tactic. The real problem is that while both nations want to keep the dialogue process going, the motives are strikingly different.
Kayani openly states that his security obsession is India”¦ Since Kayani is the Army Chief it would be fair to assume that he represents the mania of the Pakistani Army. Therefore the problem for India and the world is not Kayani alone but the Pakistani Army.
Our Prime Minister is committed to talks with Pakistan so that we can settle our differences and live in peace and harmony. His sincerity is unquestionable. The Pakistani establishment is equally committed to talks but its intentions appear suspect.
On evidence there is reason to believe that Pakistan driven by its Army- uses the dialogue process to buy time for the next strike, the next cut to keep us bleeding till we disintegrate or till they discover what their Nation is all about and come to terms with their identity as Bangla Desh appears to have done.
Kayani openly states that his security obsession is India. Some who have interacted with him believe that his fixation is so deep that he is unable to fully comprehend the gravity of the incessant reports and comments on the stability and survivability of his country. Since Kayani is the Army Chief it would be fair to assume that he represents the mania of the Pakistani Army. Therefore the problem for India and the world is not Kayani alone but the Pakistani Army; the Army that has virtually ruled the Country for the last fifty years or so, ever since General Ayub Khan first seized power through a military coup.
Now what is the Pakistan Army’s strategic philosophy? Though generally known it merits repetition. After Dec 1971 when the country was split into two, the shell shocked Pakistani Army began a reappraisal of its capabilities in the context of its arch enemy- India. The review was not driven by considerations of securing national interests. Instead the principle driver of the exercise was revenge. And it is this pathological obsession with revenge that remains deeply embedded in the psyche of the Pakistani Army. So hurting India became the paramount mission.
Kashmir and other bilateral issues provide the fig leaves for the international community and maybe for the liberal, tolerant and enlightened population within.
In terms of conventional military forces the equation after 1971, had begun to alter significantly in India’s favor. It was also evident that with the passage of time the capability gap would become unbridgeable. So to neutralize India’s conventional force advantage it gave the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the greatest priority.
The nuclear brinkmanship that we have witnessed since the latter half of the eighties was clearly to be expected as the next logical step in the unraveling of its new strategy. China’s support was understandable but that the West facilitated and acquiesced in this game plan till the turn of this century points to the failure of our diplomacy. As a matter of fact some mindsets still persist. Otherwise how do we explain the continued pressure on us to make concessions on Kashmir?
Given our experience of the past decade wherein we have generally remained on the back foot it is time we took some bold steps”¦To launch the process we invite the Pakistani Army Chief to Delhi to be followed by a visit by the Indian Army Chief to Pakistan. It is time we opened a new chapter in our bilateral relations where we shift from a reactive phase to a proactive posture.
Throwing responsibility to the winds Pakistan began to brandish its nuclear weapons capability in a manner similar to the revolver in the holster of the Wild West. So while nuclear weapons were expected to keep us militarily paralyzed, the offensives into India were to be executed by the Jihadists, the Mujahedeen, the terrorists, the militants or the insurgents. Give them whatever name you will. It is through these groups that Pakistan has been waging a relentless war against us for the past twenty years.
We should not forget that the idea of using irregulars is not new to Pakistan. Within months of gaining independence the Pakistani military launched its first offensive into Kashmir which was spearheaded by the tribal people. In 1965, the plot was almost identical. But it is only after the success against the Russians in Afghanistan that the Pakistani Army came to the conclusion (howsoever flawed) that the basic methods used in Afghanistan could be used effectively to bleed India. In Afghanistan it took ten years against India they obviously are committed to carry on for longer.
How have we responded against this protracted offensive of a thousand cuts? Perhaps the Army’s Exercise Brass Tacks conducted in the eighties when we sensed the new game plan of Pakistan was our first military move on the chess board. Whatever we tried to accomplish- misfired. The second was Operation Parakrama. There isn’t any consensus on what this massive mobilization achieved. Politically the Agra Summit was path breaking. Its failure was perhaps ordained.
Clearly our problem is the Pakistani Army. And the answer is in either changing its mindset or in transforming Pakistan into a more effective democracy where the Army ceases to call the shots. These two alternatives have to be concurrently addressed by us, as well as the international community. On both counts we require sophisticated strategies and equally sophisticated implementation mechanisms.
In this context a small first step could be to explore the option of military to military interaction. I believe the idea had been tossed around tentatively and somewhat discretely in the past and dropped for reasons that may have now lost their relevance.
Given our experience of the past decade wherein we have generally remained on the back foot it is time we took some bold steps. Let the Government announce that to build confidence and address the prevailing trust deficit it proposes that the two militaries engage in discussions and have delegations visit each other. To launch the process we invite the Pakistani Army Chief to Delhi to be followed by a visit by the Indian Army Chief to Pakistan. It is time we opened a new chapter in our bilateral relations where we shift from a reactive phase to a proactive posture. Maybe the Pakistani Army will spurn our offer. If they do, I am sure, we can come up with another box to be opened.
Finally a view on dialogue: the solutions we seek should not be limited to the disputes as we see them but importantly it should also address mutual sense of ill-will and wrong-doing. In that an effort should be made, by both sides to bury the unpalatable parts of history and accept the geographical reality as it exists.
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