Indian Defence Review

This would not have happened had there been a CDS, who would quite routinely have ensured this compatibility. The reason for not creating a CDS position is historical, and it is unnecessary to go into this because it will amount to finger-pointing and detract from the seriousness of not having a CDS.

Thus the organizational shortcoming is a combination of three main issues, namely,

• No single-point source of military advice to NSC Chairman,
• Different locations of Service Command headquarters,
• Different theatres of operational responsibility, and
• Lack of secure communications at the higher levels of command, both inter-services and intra-service.

The combined effect of these shortcomings can result in

• Critical delay in reacting to threat or attack situations due to lack of communication between different Services,
• Lack of coordination in offensive or defensive operations both within and between the Services, and
• Problems in committing army, navy or air force reserves of troops, weapons and equipment or logistics to meet developing tactical or strategic situations.

In this organization-communications structure, the information reaching New Delhi may be delayed or inaccurate, and cause unacceptable delay for the three service headquarters, the cabinet, the PM and the NSC to understand and appreciate the real-time situation at the points of contact with the enemy, so as to arrive at rational decisions and issue directions.

Along our 3,380-km long northern border, the Chinese PLA forces are integrated into an operational whole under an unified command, while Indian forces have four sectors under four separate Commands. The Chinese forces are advantaged in terms of terrain, logistic supply chain and organizationally, over our three Services. Moreover, it is an accepted fact of military strategy that the attacker has the initial advantage over the defender, and added to the other advantages, the Chinese forces are perhaps overwhelmingly advantaged, especially at the commencement of open conflict. Combined with the certainty of Pakistan simultaneously opening a western front, inadequate inter-Services and intra-Service communication and coordination, delay in decision-making and lack of unified command under a CDS will cost us dearly in terms of loss of strategic and tactical positions especially if the conflict is short and intense, as it is likely to be.

As things stand today, the NSC may take decisions based on the advice of the NSA who has no military experience. As in 1962, a possible military debacle will end with the military taking the blame, besides suffering manpower and weapons-and-equipment casualties.

It is imperative that a CDS is immediately appointed with command authority over the three service chiefs, and additionally with the position of NSA (external security) reporting to the PM, in coordination with the present NSA who can be redesignated as NSA (internal security). This will be a necessary beginning but nowhere near sufficient, because the CDS will have the unenviable task of urgent re-organization and coordination staring him in the face.

Finally, the army needs to be taken off internal security duties unless absolutely necessary, and that too for a strictly limited period of, say, 60-days in a calendar year. The task of internal security needs to be borne squarely by state police and CAPFs, especially the latter, whose numerical strength is comparable to that of the army. 

Conclusion

At the bare minimum, military preparedness is a combination of adequacy of military hardware, the morale, training and fitness of the men who use that hardware, and the software which enables effective use of military hardware, all in the context of legacy problems and emerging threats.

Defence preparedness is the direct responsibility of the National Security Council (NSC) and the cabinet. It is the sum of military preparedness, diplomatic skills and capabilities, budgetary allocation of financial resources, and political vision. It calls for deployment and use of the nation’s hard and soft diplomacy (including intelligence) to complement basic military preparedness.

The military is government’s “instrument of last resort” both for internal and external security. The direct responsibility for overall military effectiveness at any point of time lies squarely on the shoulders of the three officers who occupy the position of Service chiefs at that point of time. Especially due to legacy problems, the onerous responsibility of the Service chiefs is unenviable.

The need for coordination and understanding between the three Service chiefs in dealing with the political-bureaucratic structure of governance cannot be over-emphasised. In this connection, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is organizationally and functionally inadequate to deal with government or to prosecute effective joint operations to meet emerging threats. This organizational structure cannot serve the need of the NSC Chairman to obtain adequate or timely military advice.

There is imperative and urgent need for creation of a post of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who is also a NSA, if our nation is to be effectively defended against immediate neighbourhood threats.

The current inadequacy of military and defence preparedness as outlined in the foregoing arguments is a bitter pill.  Perhaps the most important ingredient of this bitter pill is the need for the army to be taken off internal security duties, which should be assigned to CAPFs. Administration of this bitter pill is the bounden duty of the Service chiefs.

For the three Service chiefs to be individually and jointly unequivocal in pointing out inadequacies in military preparedness and higher defence management to government is not easy, but being in the “hot-seat” is never easy.

We must take all necessary, urgent and imperative measures to ensure that the 1962 situation is never repeated.

1. “B.C.Khanduri removed as defence panel chairman”; <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bc-khanduri-removed-as-defence-panel-chairman/article24980589.ece>; The Hindu, September 19, 2018.
2. “List of active Indian Military Aircraft”; Wikipedia; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_Indian_military_aircraft>; Accessed on 07.10.2018.
3. Vombatkere, S.G., “Cyber Security – Civil and Military Implications”; Indian Defence Review; Jan-Mar 2018; Vol 33(1), pp.38-42.
4. Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley; “The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies”; <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies>; Bloomberg Business Week, October 4, 2018.

Note

The article titled “The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies” dated 04.10.2018 [Ref.4], concerns server motherboards built in USA into which a microchip has been clandestinely inserted during the manufacturing process, allegedly by China. The microchip is designed to manipulate the core operating instructions and alter the server’s functioning including reporting code to anonymous computers elsewhere, without IT managers being any the wiser. It is reported that these motherboards are “found in Department of Defense data centers, the CIA’s drone operations, and the onboard networks of Navy warships”. Chinese telecom giants Huawei Corp and ZTE Corp are suspected to be involved, although these companies have expectedly denied involvement and China states that it too is a victim. Clearly, the focus would be high-priority targets, including advanced commercial technology and the computers of rival militaries.