Indian Defence Review

These heights had a history dating back to 1965, for they were captured for the first time on 17 May that year at the time of the Pakistani aggression in Kutch and were used as a bargaining lever in the subsequent peace negotiations.

Barchla and the Gangam complex of picquets dominated. Harka Bahadur Bridge from west of the Shingo river and Point 13620, as well as the Black Rock heights overlooking the stretch of road passing over the plateau. These heights had a history dating back to 1965, for they were captured for the first time on 17 May that year at the time of the Pakistani aggression in Kutch and were used as a bargaining lever in the subsequent peace negotiations. The posts were however returned in June 1965 after the Pakistanis vacated Indian territory in Kutch.2

Subsequently, in the Pakistani mass infiltration operations into the valley and the surrounding area in Operation Gibraltar, these heights were recaptured in August 1965 to block Pakistani infiltration routes. Once again, they were handed back to Pakistan in implementation of the Tashkent Agreement, much to the annoyance of our troops who had suffered considerable-casualties in both operations to capture these heights. They did not understand the logic of these exchanges of territory but accepted government policy in good faith. Realising the vulnerability of these posts, Pakistan had since then developed them with solid fortifications and the extensive use of minefields. Guns skilfully sited on the heights had been shelling Indian transport and administrative installations on the plateau for some time after the outbreak of hostilities.

Whig opened his offensive with a two-pronged thrust on either side of the Shingo, each independent of the other. These thrusts were supported by two Vampire aircraft, a regiment of 120-mm Tempella mortars and a field battery. Since the Pakistani Air Force was not operating in the area, the Vampires had a free run and proved very useful in close support of the ground operations. Considerable preparations to facilitate movement had gone before the operation in the way of developing essential tracks and administrative infrastructure.

Since the Pakistani Air Force was not operating in the area, the Vampires had a free run and proved very useful in close support of the ground operations.

The approach to Barchla and the Gangam posts was mostly frontal and was fiercely resisted by sweeping the likely spurs leading to the posts with machine gun and mortar fire. Despite this resistance, our troops systematically cleared post after post and headed towards Breilman, the base for their support. The advance was further slowed by heavy casualties because of frostbite caused by the subzero conditions prevailing on the windswept and inhospitable heights. And yet Whig trudged on slowly and surely in his characteristic deliberate manner.

In the eastern thrust to capture the critical heights of Point 13620 and Black Rock, he executed a clever manoeuvre with a small patrol of 9 J and K Militia in the saddle between them. This, coupled with the western thrust to cut off the enemy from the rear, as well as the roadblock established behind Point 13620, cut off the water supply to the post.These moves shattered the will of the post to fight. Our air strikes and heavy bombardment of the heights aggravated their disinclination to resist.

Soon, the Pakistani troops holding the posts were seen withdrawing in broad daylight on 9 December. 2/11 Gorkha Rifles, operating in the area, advanced and occupied the heights without a fight. The enemy left eight killed and three wounded. Thus these heights were captured for the third time, but this time for keeps.

India lost two officers and two JCOs killed, 12 officers and two JCOs wounded, one officer and one JCO missing, seven officers and six JCOs frostbitten, while the only leadership casualty on the Pakistani side was a solitary JCO.

The operation west of the Shingo proceeded slowly and steadily, clearing post after post by a frontal approach, and by the time the ceasefire became effective at 2000 hours on 17 December.3 Whig had managed to capture 36 Pakistani posts and secure about 110 square kilometres of territory at the cost of 55 killed, 195 wounded, 28 missing, and an inordinately high toll of 517 cases of frostbite, against claimed Pakistani casualties of 114 killed and 22 prisoners of war. It is significant that India lost two officers and two JCOs killed, 12 officers and two JCOs wounded, one officer and one JCO missing, seven officers and six JCOs frostbitten, while the only leadership casualty on the Pakistani side was a solitary JCO. This goes to show that the Pakistani leaders stayed in comfort in bases lower down the valley rather than risk their necks on the heights. The net achievement of the operations in Kargil was to provide an extra cushion of security for the Srinagar-Leh highway4 Indian retention of the heights as a sequel to the Simla Agreement5 and the delineation of the line of control on the basis of actual possession at the time of the ceasefire endows the Kargil sector with greater defence potential against military and infiltration operations from Pakistan. This is a significant achievement.