Indian Defence Review

Ladakh and Kargil Operations

Maj Gen SP Malhotra, General Officer Commanding 3 Infantry Division, was operationally responsible for the defence of Ladakh and Kargil tehsil of Leh district. He faced two hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan. The area of responsibility so far as Pakistan was concerned extended along the erstwhile ceasefire line from Biegdangdo in the Shyok river valley to north of Zojila. The routes of ingress from Pakistan follow the valley opposite our Partapur sector, comprising the Karakoram and Ladakh mountain ranges, the Indus and the Yamo Laru ridge and the Shingo river valley.

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The land is extremely broken and rugged. It is cut by deep, narrow gorges and ravines. Because the river valleys are narrow, the gradients are steep. Vegetation is confined to the river banks in summer. Rainfall is negligible, and the climate is dry and very cold. The temperature at the heights where operations were conducted was as low as minus 25° Centigrade.

The temperature at the heights where operations were conducted was as low as minus 25° Centigrade.

Our military base in the north was located in the Nubera valley, which came to be known as the Partapur sector. This sector was connected with Leh by a precipitous and indifferent pony track across Khardungla. The Partapur garrison, which consisted of about four companies of Ladakh Scouts, was maintained by airlift up to Thoise. A jeep track ran along the Shyok river from Thoise to within a few miles of Biegdangdo village.

Pakistan encountered similar difficulties. Its forward posts close to the ceasefire line near Biegdangdo were connected with the military base at Skardu by about 135 kilometres of indifferent jeepable road up to Turtok and from there by foot or animal transport. The constraints of hazardous and lengthy lowclassification communications forbade either side from launching a major thrust into the area. The terrain is among the most difficult in the world. Steep, rocky mountainous features ranging in height from 18,000 to 23,000 feet span the area on either side of the Nubera valley. A small force could hold up a frontal offensive as any local outflanking move would require a major mountaineering effort and hence could be possible only on a limited scale.

The constraints of hazardous and lengthy lowclassification communications forbade either side from launching a major thrust into the area. The terrain is among the most difficult in the world.

The main Srinagar-Leh highway, the lifeline of the troops employed in Ladakh, ran through Kargil. This road passed through Zojila, which was snowbound about seven months a year. The open season from May to October was fully utilised by military traffic. But this highway ran close to the Pakistan picquet line and was overlooked from Point 13620 and the Black Rock complex immediately north of the plateau area.

Movement in the Harka Bahadur Bridge area, near the confiuence of the Shingo and Sura rivers, was also dominated by the Barchla Pass and the neighbouring posts of the Gangam area. It was therefore imperative that the contingency plan should ensure our securing such territory as would deny domination of the Srinagar-Leh highway by the enemy by fire and observation.

The Pakistani-occupied territory opposite the Kargil sector is served mainly by a Class 5 fairweather road from Gilgit via Skardu to Gangam, a distance of 200 and 85 miles respectively. This ruled out any significant threat to the area from the Pakistan side, but the better communications in the sector gave greater offensive potential to the Indian side. The Shingo loops into Indian territory, entering from the Gultari side west of Gangam near Dalunang, and flows back into Pakistani-occupied Kashmir at Gangam. The area between the Indus and the Shingo where it enters Indian territory is accessible from the Gangam track, while the area west of the Shingo is supported from Gultari, which in turn is connected to Minimarg by a tortuous jeep track. The approach from Gultari is by animal transport over 48 miles of difficult country and could thus support only marginal forces. Terrainwise the going is less difficult than in the Partapur sector and again, as elsewhere, major outflanking movements are restricted.

Most of these weapons were deployed singly for snap shooting. The Pakistani posts were held in varying strengths from a section upwards.

Malhotra was allotted the task firstly to defend his area of operational responsibility against aggression by Pakistan or China separately or simultaneously. Secondly, to ensure the security of the Srinagar-Leh road, and thirdly to exploit fully all suitable opportunities for local counteroffensive actions against Pakistan, concurrently ensuring that the balanced defence posture was not prejudiced at any time.

The area opposite the Partapur sector was held by Pakistan with one company of Karakoram Scouts, who were later reinforced by one or two companies of mixed Karakoram and Gilgit Scouts. Pakistan had one wing of Karakoram Scouts reinforced by two additional companies in the Kargil sector. It later transpired that Pakistan had hastily mustered some reservists and pensioners to make up the manpower of some posts. The entire sector had about three 75-mm guns, a section of 3.7-inch howitzers and six three-inch mortars. Most of these weapons were deployed singly for snap shooting. The Pakistani posts were held in varying strengths from a section upwards. The defences were however well prepared and likely approaches mined. These posts, located on inhospitable heights, were vacated in winter except for the minimum presence required for security. The Karakoram Scouts, a paramilitary organisation, had a low defence potential, especially when they were not so well equipped in snow clothing to brave subzero temperatures.

Malhotra had about four companies of Ladakh Scouts in the Nubera valley, one of which faced the Pakistanis and two the Chinese, with one company in reserve. These companies were supported by an ad hoc battery of 4.2-inch mortars. The personnel of the Ladakh Scouts are recruited locally, and by virtue of their hardy upbringing are used to subzero winter conditions. Their knowledge of the land and the people is of great advantage.

Malhotra backed him up by providing relief and additional troops, thereby accepting justifiable risks against the Chinese.

On the initiative of Maj Rinchen, commander of the Ladakh Scouts, whose home was in the Nubera valley, the Biegdangdo company captured the Karakoram Scouts’ posts blocking the entrance to the Shyok valley under Pakistani occupation. He followed this up by advancing towards Turtok. This officer, who had won the Maha Vir Chakra in the Pakistani invasion of Ladakh in 1947-48, was known for his boldness and unorthodox approach to military problems. Emboldened by his initial success, he collected resources and porters to rout the hastily retreating adversary in the style of Zorawar Singh. Malhotra backed him up by providing relief and additional troops, thereby accepting justifiable risks against the Chinese. The advance along the Shyok valley was soon underway.

But as Rinchen’s columns moved steadily forward, as if sucked into a vacuum, its maintenance became a problem, especially so because the track right up to Turtok could be negotiated only on foot or by animals. Thoise, the base for these operations, was itself fed by a precarious airlift by aging Fairchild Packets as the airstrip in the narrow valley could not take bigger planes. The farther Rinchen advanced the more difficult it became for the already overstretched administration to support the column. The helicopter fleet of larger load-carrying capacity was not available at that time. Out of fear that the column would be starved of food and ammunition, Rinchen was halted at Turtok.

This offensive was not planned but was one of those operations which exploited an opportunity war offered.

Meanwhile, Pakistan managed to reinforce its troops and organise defence in the general area of Siari against the frontal Indian advance. After the capture of Turtok, problems of administration and manpower brought operations in the Shyok valley to a halt. Although the companies of Ladakh Scouts in the Nubera valley were relieved by raising a local militia known as the Nubera Guards to reinforce Rinchen, no solution could be found for the problem of providing adequate administrative support. Rinchen advanced about 12 miles in all and occupied several square miles of barren and rugged mountainous country which had no economic or political value to Pakistan.

This offensive was not planned but was one of those operations which exploited an opportunity war offered. Rinchen’s initiative was commendable. At this point, I might mention that I looked after the Ladakh Scouts as Station Commander Leh from 1967 to 1969. In this period Rinchen was in constant trouble because he found military discipline irksome and clashed with authority on many occasions. I had to protect him from the Spartan and holier than thou attitude of my GOC. I always saw some soldierly potential in Rinchen’s apparently rebellious outlook, and I am proud to say that the war amply proved my confidence in him.As a planned operation, it would however have been better to develop the thrust from the Indus Valley across Chrobatla straight towards Siari. This had a great advantage compared with the way the operation was conducted. Firstly, a secure administrative base on the Class 5 road from Khalsi in the area of Hamethang would have eased the maintenance problem as the base could fed from Leh by motor transport. Secondly, securing Siari would have cut off the Karakoram Scouts deployed east of it. The entire Shyok valley eastwards up to Biegdangdo could then have been swept from the rear. And this would have yielded a good crop of prisoners. But the frontal Indian advance was resisted by a systematic withdrawal without many casualties.

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In the Kargil sector, Brig ML Whig commanded 121 Infantry Brigade Group and was operationally responsible for the area. He had some six battalions, of which four were holding the picquet line and two were available as reserve for immediately launching offensive tasks.1 The obvious task was to deny the Pakistanis observation and domination of the Srinagar- Leh road.

These heights had a history dating back to 1965, for they were captured for the first time on 17 May that year at the time of the Pakistani aggression in Kutch and were used as a bargaining lever in the subsequent peace negotiations.

Barchla and the Gangam complex of picquets dominated. Harka Bahadur Bridge from west of the Shingo river and Point 13620, as well as the Black Rock heights overlooking the stretch of road passing over the plateau. These heights had a history dating back to 1965, for they were captured for the first time on 17 May that year at the time of the Pakistani aggression in Kutch and were used as a bargaining lever in the subsequent peace negotiations. The posts were however returned in June 1965 after the Pakistanis vacated Indian territory in Kutch.2

Subsequently, in the Pakistani mass infiltration operations into the valley and the surrounding area in Operation Gibraltar, these heights were recaptured in August 1965 to block Pakistani infiltration routes. Once again, they were handed back to Pakistan in implementation of the Tashkent Agreement, much to the annoyance of our troops who had suffered considerable-casualties in both operations to capture these heights. They did not understand the logic of these exchanges of territory but accepted government policy in good faith. Realising the vulnerability of these posts, Pakistan had since then developed them with solid fortifications and the extensive use of minefields. Guns skilfully sited on the heights had been shelling Indian transport and administrative installations on the plateau for some time after the outbreak of hostilities.

Whig opened his offensive with a two-pronged thrust on either side of the Shingo, each independent of the other. These thrusts were supported by two Vampire aircraft, a regiment of 120-mm Tempella mortars and a field battery. Since the Pakistani Air Force was not operating in the area, the Vampires had a free run and proved very useful in close support of the ground operations. Considerable preparations to facilitate movement had gone before the operation in the way of developing essential tracks and administrative infrastructure.

Since the Pakistani Air Force was not operating in the area, the Vampires had a free run and proved very useful in close support of the ground operations.

The approach to Barchla and the Gangam posts was mostly frontal and was fiercely resisted by sweeping the likely spurs leading to the posts with machine gun and mortar fire. Despite this resistance, our troops systematically cleared post after post and headed towards Breilman, the base for their support. The advance was further slowed by heavy casualties because of frostbite caused by the subzero conditions prevailing on the windswept and inhospitable heights. And yet Whig trudged on slowly and surely in his characteristic deliberate manner.

In the eastern thrust to capture the critical heights of Point 13620 and Black Rock, he executed a clever manoeuvre with a small patrol of 9 J and K Militia in the saddle between them. This, coupled with the western thrust to cut off the enemy from the rear, as well as the roadblock established behind Point 13620, cut off the water supply to the post.These moves shattered the will of the post to fight. Our air strikes and heavy bombardment of the heights aggravated their disinclination to resist.

Soon, the Pakistani troops holding the posts were seen withdrawing in broad daylight on 9 December. 2/11 Gorkha Rifles, operating in the area, advanced and occupied the heights without a fight. The enemy left eight killed and three wounded. Thus these heights were captured for the third time, but this time for keeps.

India lost two officers and two JCOs killed, 12 officers and two JCOs wounded, one officer and one JCO missing, seven officers and six JCOs frostbitten, while the only leadership casualty on the Pakistani side was a solitary JCO.

The operation west of the Shingo proceeded slowly and steadily, clearing post after post by a frontal approach, and by the time the ceasefire became effective at 2000 hours on 17 December.3 Whig had managed to capture 36 Pakistani posts and secure about 110 square kilometres of territory at the cost of 55 killed, 195 wounded, 28 missing, and an inordinately high toll of 517 cases of frostbite, against claimed Pakistani casualties of 114 killed and 22 prisoners of war. It is significant that India lost two officers and two JCOs killed, 12 officers and two JCOs wounded, one officer and one JCO missing, seven officers and six JCOs frostbitten, while the only leadership casualty on the Pakistani side was a solitary JCO. This goes to show that the Pakistani leaders stayed in comfort in bases lower down the valley rather than risk their necks on the heights. The net achievement of the operations in Kargil was to provide an extra cushion of security for the Srinagar-Leh highway4 Indian retention of the heights as a sequel to the Simla Agreement5 and the delineation of the line of control on the basis of actual possession at the time of the ceasefire endows the Kargil sector with greater defence potential against military and infiltration operations from Pakistan. This is a significant achievement.

The aim could however have been better achieved by establishing a roadblock on the track from Gultari to Gangam complex at a suitable place to block the axis of maintenance and withdrawal as a preliminary operation near Ghahumadu and then develop a sizable thrust of about two battalions towards Ollhingthan, the Pakistani base, either along the Indus Valley or along the Junkar feature. This was by no means an ambitious undertaking. Once Ollhingthan was in Indian hands, the posts east and west of the Shingo could have been rolled, working from both sides.

Both Malhotra and Whig went through the costly operations of attrition rather than use manoeuvre. As a result, they maimed more manpower with frostbite than gunshot wounds. As for the opposition met, about 80 odd rifles, eight automatics and three artillery pieces were captured in the operation. Considering the strength that got away, it appears that 121 Infantry Brigade Group encountered an opposition of only about two to three companies of Scouts. All the same, the territory gained in the Kargil sector gave us a significant tactical advantage.

Notes:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 24, “Indo-Pakistan Clashes Across Kashmir Cease Fire Line,” p 6500.
2. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 25, “Indo-Pakistan Fight in Rann of Kutch–A Narrative,” p. 6509.
3. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 3, “Diary of Events,” pp. 10570-10571.
4. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 3, “India’s Gains and Losses.” p. 10569.
5. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 29 “Summit Talks in Simla-Agreement signed,” p. 10874.