The Pakistani strike force, comprising 6 Armoured Division, 8 Independent Armoured Brigade and 17 Infantry Division, was located in the Kharian-Gujranwala complex so as to be effectively utilized both in the hilly and plains sectors within seven to ten days. 17 Infantry Division had been raised to replace 9 Infantry Division which had been moved to Bangladesh, and its fighting potential was rated a little lower than that of the older formations. Pakistan 7 Infantry Division was located in Peshawar and other Northwest Frontier cantonments and was known to have been trained in mountain warfare.Since its transfer or future employment was not discernible from available intelligence, its potential threat to the valley and to the Poonch sector loomed large in Indian military planning and the subsequent conduct of operations. The Pakistani strike force was essentially heavy in armour, and it was obvious that to exploit this potential Pakistan would commit the force in the plains in the dry season, when the going is good for thanks. To make a serious dent, it was imperative that Pakistan should use both 7 and 17 Infantry Divisions in support of the armoured thrust wherever it chose to strike.
Any armoured thrust in the hilly sector, except to a limited degree in the Jhangar-Naushera bulge, was totally discounted. So on balance there were greater chances of a Pakistani offensive in the plains. But a limited offensive with two to three brigades with a capability of developing one major and one subsidiary thrust in the hills was not discounted. The Pakistani threat had to be evaluated in relation to the sensitivity of each sector and the Pakistani capability of achieving its local aim fitting into the overall strategic plans. Thus no more than a temporary disruption of the Srinagar-Leh highway near Kargil was expected, especially in the coming winter when the Pakistani capability of inducting regular troops over the tenuous road communications in the northern sector was minimal. On this consideration alone a justifiable risk was accepted in moving one Indian brigade group from there to the Punjab sector before Zojila closed.
The Pakistani threat had to be evaluated in relation to the sensitivity of each sector and the Pakistani capability of achieving its local aim fitting into the overall strategic plans.
The approaches to Kashmir Valley are mountainous and snowbound in winter. Mountain warfare at the best of times is troop-consuming. In view of the weakness of the Pakistanis in infantry and because the concentration of about two divisions worth of strike element opposite the valley, far from the Kharian complex, would upset their overall military balance, it was unlikely that apart from a subsidiary threat worth one or two brigades they would venture into the valley in any significant strength.
But the threat of infiltration was potent and had to be guarded against. The Poonch bulge was politically attractive to Pakistan because of ethnic affiliations and the fact that repeated attempts to capture it in the past had proved abortive. Its capture had therefore become a prestige issue. Besides, militarily its capture would not only enlarge the Haji Pir bulge right up to the Poonch river but also gives access to numerous passes over the Pir Panjal range and thereby extend the scope of infiltration activities in Kashmir Valley.
An offensive in this sector would also give Pakistan the advantage of removing threats to its own sensitive areas in and around Mangla Dam and to Bhimber behind the Chhamb sector defences.
The Pakistani strike force was concentrated in Punjab near the Jhangar-Naushera bulge. Launching an attack by them in the bulge would not only be convenient in terms of time and space but also to switch troops around to meet other contingencies developing in the Sialkot sector between the Chenab and the Ravi. An offensive in this sector would also give Pakistan the advantage of removing threats to its own sensitive areas in and around Mangla Dam and to Bhimber behind the Chhamb sector defences.
A successful offensive by Pakistan in the Chhamb sector would provide the easiest access to the Akhnur bridge. Although opening an alternative route to Rajauri upstream had reduced the importance of the bridge, its capture would have been a great psychological gain for Pakistan in view of its political importance. Besides, the capture of the Chhamb-Jaurian area would provide depth to the sensitive Pakistani areas of Gujrat, Alexandra Bridge over the Chenab and the Marala headworks in the region. Militarily, its capture would help Pakistan develop operations towards Jammu from the west. So the defence of the Chhamb sector was considered significant and accordingly given higher priority.
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