Indian Defence Review

It is widely presumed that sixth generation fighters would be optionally manned. The decision to put a pilot in the cockpit would be determined by the nature of the mission. Many missions would not require a pilot. Some missions may conceivably require a mix of unmanned and manned fighters. Clearly, the concept of a manned fighter flying unmanned missions is not exactly bizarre. The QF-16 and the J-6 and J-7 drones are really optionally manned fighters albeit fourth and third generation respectively. The question that now arises is – could second and third generation unmanned Chinese fighters such as the J-6 and J-7 be used to overwhelm Indian air defenses during a conflict?

In September 2013, an F-16 fighter took to the skies at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida without a pilot in the cockpit. The mission, remotely piloted by two US Air Force test pilots in a ground control station at Tyndall, marked the first flight of the aircraft officially dubbed the QF-16 Full Scale Aerial Target. (The ‘Q’ designation is used for unmanned fighter aircraft earmarked for realistic combat training. The US military earlier used a QF-4 aircraft, a remotely piloted F-4 Phantom of the Vietnam-era.) During the flight, the QF-16 performed a series of simulated manoeuvers reaching supersonic speeds before returning to base and landing.

To realise the QF-16, Boeing retrieved a retired F-16 from Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, restored it for flight and equipped it to be remotely piloted. Boeing had modified six F-16s into the QF-16 configuration. What is interesting about the QF-16 is that it can perform 9G manoeuvers, flying to its structural limits instead of being constrained to human (6G) limits. The QF-16 is being tested for weapons delivery and will ultimately be used for weapons testing and other aerial training. Could the QF-16 be fielded in combat? Let us go to the other end of the world, the end that concerns us more.

J-7 Drone

In February 2010, it was reported that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has converted some of its retired J-7 (Chinese version of MiG-21) fighters into unmanned target drone for realistic air-to-air and surface-to-air weapon testing. The pilot seat has been replaced with electronics to facilitate remote piloting. The J-7 target drone can fly at supersonic speed and simulate typical manoeuvres of modern combat aircraft.

J-6 Drone

In June 2010, The Taipei Times reported that China had converted a large number of recently decommissioned fighter aircraft into pilotless drone planes. They would be used together with Israel-developed Harpy anti-radar Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense systems and destroy key targets. In January 2013, a section of the press reported that the PLAAF had converted a large number of J-6 fighter jets into unmanned attack aircraft at the Liancheng Air Base in Fujian province. According to a report attributed to Kanwa Defense Review, the J-6, which was retired from PLAAF in the late 1990s, was picked for an unmanned attack fighter role because of its light weight and Within Visual Range (WVR) combat capability. A ‘YouTube’ clip posted in December 2013 shows ground crew preparing a Shenyang J-6 target drone for take-off during a PLAAF training exercise. The J-6 is the Chinese version of the MiG-19.

Optionally Manned Fighters

It is widely presumed that sixth generation fighters would be optionally manned. The decision to put a pilot in the cockpit would be determined by the nature of the mission. Many missions would not require a pilot. Some missions may conceivably require a mix of unmanned and manned fighters. Clearly, the concept of a manned fighter flying unmanned missions is not exactly bizarre. The QF-16 and the J-6 and J-7 drones are really optionally manned fighters albeit fourth and third generation respectively. The question that now arises is – could second and third generation unmanned Chinese fighters such as the J-6 and J-7 be used to overwhelm Indian air defenses during a conflict?

The Nature of Conflict?

Most analysts would counter that question by asking – what kind of a conflict are you talking about? An all-out war or a limited PLA action to seize territory and humiliate India, a 1962 radix? Actually, it doesn’t matter what kind of a war the two nations are fighting. A limited war is always fought in the context of an all out conflagration. This is especially true of the adversary that could lose an all out war! The consequences of an all out war weigh more heavily on the weaker adversary. Remember how in 1962 India’s political leadership opted to lose Aksai Chin and a lot of Arunachal Pradesh, rather than commit the IAF and risk a wider conflagration? The Pakistani Army did not withdraw from Kargil because they were about to be dislodged from captured heights by the Indian Army. Arguably, they could have held ground indefinitely forcing a redrawing of the Line of Control (LC)! They withdrew in order to avoid a wider conflagration, which they would have lost!

A full scale conventional war between India and China would make no sense for either. A limited war would make some sense for China, but only if it was driven into it by a serious challenge to its great power ambition.

Rationale for a Limited War

From the Indian point of view, the imperative to limit the scope of a military conflict with China is simple and very compelling – we would, in all likelihood, lose an all-out conventional war! End up sans Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir, economically crippled, and relegated to a second rate Asian power status in the decades to come. There is also the risk of a full scale war turning nuclear. Finally, a full scale war would serve no  military aim.

Although China in all likelihood, would trump India in an all-out conventional war, its victory would not be without consequences. Such a war would destabilise the region; it could lead to unrest in Tibet and the isolation of China. Besides, the PLA would not be assured of victory; it could well face reverses fighting a more determined and better equipped Indian Army. There are many good reasons for the PLA to limit the conflict in scope – its doctrine and mindset!

Careful calibration has been the recurring theme in PLA military operations since the Korean War. The PLA has fought and won limited conflicts in India (1962) and Vietnam (1979). The concept of limited conflicts with assured victory is now doctrinally ingrained into the PLA mindset. Military action must be resorted to with very specific aims. That is something the Chinese know only too well – they wrote the book on war-fighting! China’s aim is to become the dominant regional power and eventually to match or exceed the US as a global power. Fighting a full scale war with India would not advance the aim. Coercive dominance, not wars, is what China uses to ensure its rise is inexorable because it involves fewer risks.

Coercive dominance is what the Depsang incursion in April 2013 was all about. Coercive dominance is what China is resorting to in its territorial disputes with Japan and China. A limited conflict could be viewed as an extreme form of coercive dominance. Getting back to what this article is about. Could China use its improvised drones against India? Should these drones be a part of IAF war gaming studies?

Understanding the PLAAF Threat

We will come to it, but first let us quickly recap relevant PLA doctrinal concepts – Active Defense and Local War under Conditions of Informatization – and recent changes in the PLAAF force structure.

Active Defense

The concept of Active Defense states that the PLA will engage in strategic defense and strike militarily only if struck. That sounds benign till you come to the elaboration which states that a strategic defense posture must necessarily be based on an offensive operational posture. Political or strategic action against the PLA could be construed as a strike against it!

PLAAF Modernisation and Changing Force Structure

Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has downsized and reoriented itself into a modern force, the modernisation facilitated by sustained high rate of economic growth. The imperative for reorientation has come from an ever increasing dependence on energy imports (China was earlier energy independent) and the need to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). China is now heavily dependent on oil and gas imports from the Middle East and will continue to remain so despite its increasing energy imports from Russia.

Till the 1980s, the PLAAF was predominantly a homeland defense force that used a large number of second and third generation fighter interceptors. What the PLAAF now needs is the ability to project force and secure SLOC in coordination with the PLA Navy (PLAN). It needs the ability to venture beyond its borders and make precision attacks. It needs long range swing role fighters with multi-mode radars carrying a mix of air-to-ground and air-to-air PGMs. It needs air refuellers, AWACS, ISR UAVs and heavy long range transport aircraft.

According to a 2014 US Department of Defence (DoD) report on Military and Security Developments, China now has approximately 1,900 combat aircraft (fighters, bombers, fighter-attack and attack aircraft), 600 of which are modern. PLAAF fourth generation fighters now include Su-27, FJ-7, J-10 and J-11. The PLAAF is likely to become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. The above mentioned US report also says, “The PLAAF is pursuing modernisation on a scale unprecedented in its history and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities including aircraft, Command and Control (C2), jammers, Electronic Warfare (EW) and data links.”

China’s military modernisation goes beyond its immediate needs and is aimed at countering US power projection in the region through the US Pacific Command (USPACOM). This is easy to understand. As long as the US remains the dominant power in the region, smaller countries allied to the US could disrupt China’s energy imports.

I would like to make an important point here before we move on. PLAAF modernisation is not aimed at India, so China would be reluctant to pit premium PLAAF assets against the IAF in any local war with India. It would prefer to minimise PLAAF involvement and limit it to third generation fighters, perhaps even improvised fighter drones? But make no mistake, the PLAAF has demonstrated its ability to rapidly relocate assets across the country in exercises and has made infrastructural investments in Tibet – airbases, radars, communication, roads and railway lines – that would facilitate such relocation.

Limited War with Improvised Drones

China has the technical ability to configure its unmanned fighters for air-to-air as well as air-to-ground combat using precision guided stand-off missiles. The country has developed a multi-layered national Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) comprising weapon systems, radars, and C4ISR platforms to counter air threats at varying ranges and altitudes to defend its key installation, borders and territorial claims. As such, China could employ drones in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) roles.

Air-to-Air Combat

PLAAF J-7Is avionics feature a data link that can facilitate “hands off” interception using ground and airborne radar targeting data fed directly to the autopilot for vectoring the aircraft. The PLAAF has a growing inventory of force multipliers such as AWACS and Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA). Using mid-air refuelling, PLAAF AWACS could remain on station 24/7 to control such interceptions.

Air-to-Ground Combat

In order to effectively attack moving ground targets in a heavily contested battle zone, a drone needs to be stealthy, fast, and small presenting a difficult to shoot down target. Such drones – the UCLASS of the US, the UK’s Taranis and France’s Neuron – are still under development. But consider a battlefield along the LAC and factor in the terrain. Target mobility would be low enough for stand-off attacking using PGMs and targeting data supplied by ISR drones. Such stand-off PGMs could well be launched by second generation fighter drones.

The PLAAF already has stand-off weapons with impressive accuracy. It also has its own constellation of navigational satellite that can provide positional updates to the stand-off weapons. It has been operating a large fleet of slow speed reconnaissance drones along the LAC to identify and accurately geo-locate targets. Any positional inaccuracy at the point of launch of the PGM by a second generation fighter drone would be corrected through mid-course satellite updates.

Economics of Operating Drone Fighters

The acquisition costs of a drone squadron raised by fitting electronic kits on retired fighters would be almost negligible. The operating costs would be more significant, but much lesser than those for a manned fighter squadron of the same aircraft type. While technology makes conversion of a manned fighter into a drone relatively simple, there would be a penalty on account of improvisation – higher operating costs! Because manned fighters are much heavier and more complex than a drone needs to be. Heavy not just on account of the weight of a fully geared up pilot, but also because of the increased structural volume to fit a cockpit, ejection seat, canopy, cockpit controls and displays, air conditioning, oxygen systems and radio set.

Also, a manned aircraft mandates better defensive sensor suite, back-up hydraulic and electrical systems. Weight addition has a domino effect and so does weight reduction! So typically a UCAV with the same weapon load and performance as a manned fighter would be around ten tonnes lighter than a manned fighter. The complexity of a manned system requires higher level of maintenance support. In other words, maintaining a squadron of improvised drones would require almost the same level of technical manpower as a squadron of manned fighters.

For the IAF, which has never been able to raise squadron strength to government authorised levels because of budgetary constraints, infrastructure and manpower costs of operating drone fighter squadrons may appear daunting. But for the PLAAF, which has dramatically cut its active fighter interceptor inventory from around 4,000 to around 900, would have a different view.

Pilot Requirements

For a pilot, operating a drone fighter as a launch platform for Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) would be far less stressful and challenging than actually flying a fighter. As mentioned earlier, interception could be automated. So would take-off and landing. A ground-based pilot would just manage the sortie, not fly it, taking decisions in case of system or sensor failures. Training of drone pilots would be largely simulator based. Piloting a drone is something that retired PLAAF pilots could do on an honorarium! The cost of operating improvised fighter drone squadron would be non-prohibitive for the PLAAF.

Employment of Improvised Drones in Limited Conflicts

So far we have established that:-

• The PLAAF has improvised drones in the form of unmanned J-6 and J-7 aircraft.
• The PLAAF also has the technological ability to employ them for stand-off precision strikes and interceptions.
• A limited war with China, though not in Indian or Chinese interest, is a distinct possibility.
• If war does break out, it will be in both India and China’s interest to keep it contained.

So, if push does come to shove, would the IAF see PLAAF improvised drones in action?

Limited War Implies Minimal Use of Air Power

One way of containing any military confrontation along the LAC would be to avoid cross-border use of airpower, as was done during the Kargil conflict. While such restraint would suit India, it would prove too limiting for the PLA whose endeavour would be to seize Indian territory without heavy losses. Any PLA ingression would definitely be accompanied by the use of helicopters and UAVs over Indian territory.

However, it is conceivable that China would avoid escalation by not committing the PLAAF to offensive operations across the border, such as striking IAF bases and Army formations across the LAC. China’s aim would be to seize Indian territory with minimum use of force so as not to alarm its other neighbours and the rest of the world. However, such restraint on the part of the PLAAF would expose its troops within Indian territory to IAF attacks and this is where PLAAF drone fighters could come in.

The PLAAF could attempt to foil an IAF fighter attack on advancing PLA troops by fielding improvised drones with BVR missile, controlled and guided by AWACs. The combination of PLAAF fighter drones, PLA MANPADS and mobile surface-to-air missiles, and the terrain could disrupt IAF operations to an extent where they become ineffective and result in high attrition. Drone-launched BVR missiles would force IAF fighter to jettison their offensive weapons load and take evasive action. Some IAF aircraft would inevitably be shot down.

If the IAF did manage to avoid heavy losses, China would have the option to up the ante through stand-off missile attacks on IAF bases, as well as Army supply routes and camps. The PLAAF would be able to unleash punishing blows without violating Indian airspace. Its own helicopter operations would be within its claimed territory. Any attempt by the IAF to go after the drones within Chinese territory would be escalatory. Besides, it would achieve almost nothing. Shooting down a Chinese drone fighter would hardly alter the course of the battle.

Chinese and Indian drones routinely patrolling the LAC during peacetime and intrusions are commonplace. PLAAF use of drones in a limited war would not be considered escalatory by China or by the rest of the world. US drones routinely violate Pakistan airspace and in the past have routinely violated Chinese airspace. Airspace violations or even attacks by drones are no big deal. Certainly not big enough for India to start a full scale war with China,  a war that India is unlikely to win!

For the use of drone fighters to be effective, the drones would have to be deployed in large numbers to ensure some are always airborne to disrupt IAF fighter operations. Guiding and controlling the drones would require 24/7 deployment of AWACs and their mid-air refueling. Currently, PLAAF AWACs and FRA assets are limited but in the near future augmentation is likely.

Conclusion

China has the technical capability to employ its J-6 and J-7 fighter drones in any future conflict. It is conceivable that such drones could be employed to deter IAF intervention in any PLA operation within Indian territory. However, there is no open source evidence that China plans to employ second and third generation fighter drones in any future conflict with India. The PLAAF is not known to have trained in such drone operations, but then the world would not necessarily know if it had.

One reason why China’s drone fighters may not be much talked about in US government think-tank reports is because they are not earmarked to counter US forces. They are likely to be Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and India specific. The existence of drone fighter capability and a credible rationale for its employability should be factored into the IAF’s planning unless intelligence reports suggest otherwise. The IAF is not known for careful planning or out-of-the box thinking, something that was evident during the conflict in Kargil in 1999.