Homeland Security

Airfield Security: Lessons for the IAF
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Issue Vol. 31.2 Apr-Jun 2016 | Date : 15 Aug , 2016

Lessons from Civil Aviation

Civil aviation went through some major disasters before they woke up to serious airport security. The single deadliest airline catastrophe resulting from the failure of airport security to detect an onboard bomb was Air India Flight 182 “Emperor Kanishka” from Montreal to London in 1985 that crashed over the Atlantic killing all 329 onboard. Another onboard bomb that slipped through airport security was on the Pan Am flight in 1988, which killed 270 people.

The IAF has also asked the Central Government to remove encroachments around the airbases…

The September 11 episode in 2001 is the most widely recognised terrorist attack in recent times involving air travel. Airport access has since been tightened. Passengers and baggage are screened using ever improving metal and explosive detector machines. More recently, backscatter X-rays machines are being used. India stepped up its airport security after the 1999 Kandahar hijacking. The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), a paramilitary organisation, was given the charge and put under the regulatory framework of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (Ministry of Civil Aviation). They created especially trained group for Airport Security Units. Things did improve thereafter. Another problem that some airports face is the proliferation of slums around the boundary walls and in the approach zone.

IAF Airfield Security

Access to any base is through two or three main entry gates which are well-manned and have drive-in barriers. However, a large number of other personnel such as airfield maintenance and construction contractor labour also pass through these gates to work inside. While there are CCTV cameras on the gates, the time has perhaps come to introduce inspection and examination devices such as the ones at airports for humans and materials.

The boundary walls sometimes have drains passing under them and are secured by iron-rod grills. These have sometimes been breached. Thick forest/vegetation near the boundary wall/fence often hampers security. More night-vision devices should help. Effectiveness of the outfacing and swivelling searchlights atop the watch towers depends on the external foliage clearance. Many airbases have unauthorised structures nearly touching the boundary walls in spite of clear laws against such construction.

Local Commanders have to use innovative base-specific ways and local liaison to strengthen security…

A typical IAF base is secured during peacetime by DSC personnel manning the peripheral watch towers and the important operational assets augmented with air warrior guards comprising non-technical staff who are not engaged in active operational activities. DSC numbers need serious augmenting and forward bases should have a relatively younger lot. The limited Garud Commandos act as Quick-Reaction Force and take on larger real-time threats. While the Garud are better armed and better trained, they have other tasks and roles such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) through Radar-bursting and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Garud units need to be increased to two from present one in forward bases.

The Vital Assets (VA) at an airfield include the Runway, Air Traffic Control building, Base Operations Centre, the Communication Hub, Bulk Petroleum Storage, Bomb and Weapon Storage, Specialist Vehicles, and high-technology laboratories among others. The Air Warriors and their families also have to be kept safe. In war, Territorial Army units are supposed to take over airfield security but they are unlikely to reach in time for an ‘incident-trigger’ led war.

A good local commander would have to be proactive and make the best of his assets and environment. Airfield-wise Counter-Terrorism Contingency Plan (CTCP) has to be evolved and rehearsed. It was heartening to note the use of day and night airborne surveillance very effectively at least in tracking the terrorist if not neutralising them. If the terrorists were seen in the thick vegetation, could we have used the helicopter gunship to prevent them moving towards the DSC Mess? After the Pathankot attack, the IAF has planned to strengthen security at 54 airbases of the country by installing “smart fences”, electronic surveillance systems, thermal imagers, Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras and drones at a cost of Rs 8,000 crore, at Rs 100 to Rs 150 crore per airbase.

Kill ratios are often in favour of the terrorists especially when attacking soft targets of their own choosing…

The IAF has also asked the Central Government to remove encroachments around the airbases. The rule stipulates that no construction can take place 100 metres from the airbase and no structure can come up to 900 metres around the ordnance depots. However, these rules are not followed in many cases. The Garud Commando Force was formed in September 2004, after attempted terror attacks on the two major airbases in Jammu and Kashmir. Their current strength is approximately 1,080 personnel.

The IAF has also sought Government sanction to recruit more Garud commandos. Ten additional units would mean 700 additional personnel. The IAF has also issued shoot-at-sight orders at all its bases under the Western Air Command after sounding a high alert. Given the threat perception, more than 15 air stations are directed to adhere to shoot-at-sight if anyone tries to enter the premises in an unauthorised manner. The IAF has prominently displayed this warning at vantage positions. The civil administration, including the police, has been informed about the latest directive.

Lessons and Way Forward

The physical casualties might have been less than 26/11 Mumbai attacks but success against a major military target has no less implications. Due to advance warning, some of the high value assets were flown out. However, many others had to be secured in situ. More heavy-duty equipment is needed to clear the foliage in a few densely vegetated stations. As walls can be scaled, a surveillance system with CCTV cameras is required along the perimeter.

Google pictures make it possible to study the layout of possible targets. Social media is being used to honey-trap and blackmail unsuspecting youngsters and use them as possible moles. This needs restrictions and monitoring. It is a common practice for people to enter the air force bases with their cattle for grazing as they find the grass inside the campus plentiful and of high quality. There are shopping centres inside the airbases that local civilians visit. All these need review.

The enemy is at our gates. It is time to talk less and act more…

Local Commanders have to use innovative base-specific ways and local liaison to strengthen security. A significant cache of arms and ammunition was later accidently found by boys bathing in the Upper Bari Doab canal in Pathankot. This must have been dumped in advance. This indicates that our borders are still porous.

Kill ratios are often in favour of the terrorists especially when attacking soft targets of their own choosing. Often that is unfairly used as a success matrix. Meanwhile, could India have responded with a barrage of firing across LoC and captured a few posts to teach Pakistan a lesson and show resolve? When will India stop being perceived as a soft state? Have we failed in command and control due multiple agencies with different political bosses? India has still to implement the high-level Kargil Committee report. Will India ever learn the lessons from this attack?

Maulana Masood Azhar has been identified as the mastermind of the attack. Pakistan has lodged an FIR under its Anti-terrorism Act. The FIR also shows the telephone numbers contacted by the terrorists during the attack. About a dozen suspects have reportedly been arrested in Pakistan with very little outcome. Defence Minister Parrikar said, “We have lost patience now and want action against the terrorists. Those who have harmed India will not be spared and they will be given an apt reply in their own language. Have taken plenty of measures and results will reflect soon.”

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The enemy is at our gates. It is time to talk less and act more. It is time to raise special airfield defence units and train them on the lines of army to secure vulnerable installations and replace the DSC. There is a need to revive the four-decade old proposal to have an Air Force Regiment. There is a need to tailor the entire Armed Forces force structure to address terrorist threats. The martyrs have done us proud. It is time to wake up and get the act right!

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Air Marshal Anil Chopra

Commanded a Mirage Squadron, two operational air bases and the IAF’s Flight Test Centre ASTE

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4 thoughts on “Airfield Security: Lessons for the IAF

  1. Old DSC Jawans only had prevented 04 terrorist s and killed them outside the gate at अवंतिपुर अफ स्टेशन इं 2001. अत पठानकोट also, only DSC had engaged the terrorist s at first , else scene would have been different there। So we can very well rely upon them।

  2. Pathankot episode (thank God it came about so that we wake up) is a glaring example of how everything can go wrong. The basic to secure an Air base is the Perimeter Wall. On the outside of the wall there should be 10 m of low wire entanglement (LWE), with metal panji stakes. This then should be covered by a Double Apron fence. Beyond the fence there should be a pucca track for patrolling the Perimeter. We need to procure 4×4 armoured cars patrolling the perimeter. All towers should have swivel mounted search light and manned with machine guns. They should also have Radio and Line communication. Every base located next to or near Army units should have contingency plans with the Army to cater for such emergencies. These were terrorists and we sent to just create mayhem. If it was a proper planned operation to destroy assets then they would have sought entry to the “Technical Area”. That’s was not done because destruction of military assets would have upped the ante and a particular threshold would have been crossed. Then the country would have had to respond differently and could have led to an escalation. Pakistan’s aim is to keep us occupied and demoralize us. After 14 May 2002 attack they know what we did to them.

  3. Perimeter security, then comes operational area security. What was worrisome to the knowledgeable was it took 6 days to neutralize the 5 terrorists. This was the same case during 9/11 when MARCOS COMMANDOES OF Navy 200 of them could not neutralise 4 terrorists at Taj and Oberoi hotels and only NSG commandoes could do this. I expect the same type of response from QRT who should be on par with NSG along with weapons. When we compare it with the recent karachi atttack, where Pakistani commanodes took only 6 hours to neutralise and open the airport shows something radically wrong in our training.Overwhelming troops deployment ot neutralise small namd of terrorists brings down the morale of our troops. soon we will become like americans troops who want coke and airsupport for everything.

  4. instead of increasing manpower why does the airforce not remploy special forces exservicemen from army to train the kadu airman and officers to infantry standards. from airmen to master warrant officers each one be phsically mentally trained for one month every year like the commando school at belgaum. having 70000to 90000 officers trained in small arms nighvision lmgs mmgs heavy machine guns rocket launchers will make iaf bases formidable instead of relying on old dsc jawans.Atleast 100 special forces majs and ltcols be taken on deputation every year and 1000 ncos jcos inducted to build up a combat mass within next 10 years

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