Indian Defence Review

Under pressure from his frightened officers, the Pakistani naval chief accepted the withdrawal of the flotilla inside the harbor. Accordingly, on 8 December, all warships except the fleet oil tanker Dacca, which was fully loaded, were brought in. Fear of fire, and the deep draught restricting the entry of the tanker, forced its anchorage along with merchant ships outside the harbor. This concentration of Pakistani warships gave the Indian Navy freedom to repeat their raid at will in Pakistani waters. The Indian Navy repeated the attack on the night of 8 December. According to the by then accepted concept, IAF attacked the harbor at 2200 hours and continued to press the attacked till our missile boats were within eight kilometres of their target. The missiles further damaged what was left of the oil installations.

Enjoying the freedom of the seas, on the return journey the Indian fleet passed along the Makran coast and attacked the oil storages at Jiwani and Gwadar. Three merchant ships anchored along with the oil tanker outside the harbor were also hit and set ablaze. There were fires all along the coast as well as at sea, so much so that passing ships and airliners reported a glow in the skies over the city for miles around for some days. Reportedly, Pakistan lost about half its fuel reserves, and this would have certainly told on the battle front had the war been prolonged. The rout of the Pakistani Navy was complete and thereafter the Indian Navy’s mastery over Pakistan waters went unchallenged. After this conflict, the Indian Navy came of age.Note:

1. Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 1, p. 10541.

The Navy performed its role with rare verve and energy, and despite the fact that most of the vessels on its muster were obsolescent it exploited its resources to the best effect. In fact, the Soviet naval chief, who visited India after the conflict, was surprised at the use of missile boats for a purpose for which they were not originally designed and was full of praise for our ingenuity. Fazal Muqeem’s accusation that we employed Russians to service these boats is absolutely baseless. The Indian crews were well trained to handle sophisticated weaponry from any source. In this case, it happened to be Russian.

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At the very beginning of the war, the Indian Navy had imposed a total blockade on traffic between the two wings of of Pakistan and effective control on traffic between them and the rest of the world. It captured the first Pakistani ship plying under an assumed name within 24 hours of the opening of hostilities, and thereafter no ship could ply in Pakistani waters unless the Indian Navy permitted.

The missile boats created such a scare among the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy that all seagoing commanders pleaded absolute vulnerability of their craft against their attacks without the possibility of retaliation.

While patrolling the Kathiawar coast, the Indian frigate Khukri was struck by a salvo of three torpedoes, from a Pakistani submarine and sank on the night of 9 December as a result of the damage caused. This was perhaps due to the efficiency gap between the Indian surveillance system fitted on our ships and the evasive tactics the submarine adopted. Eighteen officers and 176 crew went down with the ship while six officers and 61 crew were rescued. It was said that Capt Mulla, the ship’s commanding officer, was last seen on the bridge directing rescue operations and preferred to go down with his ship in the highest traditions of the Navy.

It is however felt that in the context of modern warfare this tradition is outmoded. So long as all the necessary steps have been taken to repair the damage and after having ascertained that no more can be done to retrieve a ship, and that all is done to save lives and retrievable equipment, all able bodied officers and ratings, including the captain, should try to get away to fight another day. For instance, if Lord Mountbatten had insisted in going down with the Kelly in World War II he would not have lived to be theatre commander in the Far East, including Burma, and to play such a significant part in negotiating India’s independence. Glory can be overdone.

The overall naval gains and losses in terms of attrition were: Pakistan lost one destroyer and one minesweeper in the west, three gunboats by naval action and one submarine because of an accident in the east against the loss of one Indian frigate and one shore based Alize aircraft of the fleet air arm. Overall, the count went in favor of the Indian Navy.’ The credit for this success rightfully goes to Admiral Nanda, who forged the Navy into a potent weapon and wielded it well. This should not however lull us into complacency, as in the context of modern warfare one can ill afford to rest on old laurels alone. A review of potential threats to maintain the Indian Navy’s battle-worthiness is constantly needed.

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As part of Bhutto’s drive to build Pakistan’s military strength after the humiliation suffered in 1971, the navy has received special attention. Its poor showing must have impelled a revision of priorities, and efforts have been made to provide it with the equipment necessary to redeem its honor in the event of another war with India. Pakistan has never concealed the fact that its arms buildup is primarily aimed at India, and in this regard there is a definite effort on its part to match our armed strength.

Under pressure from his frightened officers, the Pakistani naval chief accepted the withdrawal of the flotilla inside the harbor.

Intelligence reports reveal that by moving the naval headquarters from Karachi to Islamabad alongside the army and air force headquarters Pakistan has to a large extent overcome the difficulties of coordinating the efforts of the three services in planning as well as execution in the higher direction of war.

According to reports, Pakistan has more than made up the losses it suffered in 1971. Its present naval strength comprises 17 major surface warships and nine underwater craft besides a large number of support vessels like coastal patrol boats, minesweepers, tanks and tugs. There is no immediate proposal to have a separate fleet air arm to provide much-needed air cover, but it may be safely assumed that in the next conflict there will be better integration between its navy and air force. The Pakistan Air Force has long-range bombers like the Ilyushin28 and medium-range fighters like the Mirage Ill which will adequately fill the gap as and when required.

Pakistan’s underwater fleet has three Daphne-class modern patrol submarines which may have been augmented with fresh acquisitions. These craft, with a displacement of about 1,000 tons each, are equipped with 12 torpedo tubes and have a speed under water of about 15.5 knots. In addition, Pakistan has acquired eight midget submarines of the S x 404 class from Italy. They displace 40 tons, and can carry about 12 men for commando raids or frogmen for undersea sabotage in harbor areas. They are not very fast, having a submerged speed of only 6.5 knots. Because of their size and ability to operate in shallow water, they are suited for clandestine operations and attacks on offshore oil platforms. They have a limited range on their own, but their carriage on mother ships to achieve strategic range can increase their area of operation a great deal. They were used for such operations with advantage in the Second World War.

In fact, the Soviet naval chief, who visited India after the conflict, was surprised at the use of missile boats for a purpose for which they were not originally designed and was full of praise for our ingenuity.

The Pakistani surface fleet consists of one cruiser, four destroyers and two frigates, to be shortly augmented by two more of the Whitby class. Most of these vessels are aged. Although they possess quite formidable conventional firepower for shore bombardment and have also been equipped for antisubmarine roles, they can be neutralized by missile boats. Following the Indian line of acquisition, Pakistan recently went in for eight large patrol craft of the Shanghai II class from China. Although not armed with missiles at present, they are likely to be provided with the Chinese version of Styx surface-to-surface missiles.

These are very similar to those on the Russian missile boats in service with the Indian Navy. The Chinese are currently fitting their Hola and Hoku missile boats and Luta-class destroyers with them. It is probable that some might go to Pakistan. Once fitted with these missiles, Pakistan’s Shanghai II boats will be a match for the Indian boats and will beef up the offensive/defensive capability of the Pakistan Navy greatly. Much has been said lately in responsible quarters about the threat to India from the Indian Ocean in view of the great power rivalries in the region. The US decision to acquire Diego, Garcia and establish naval and communication facilities there triggered a controversy when India, along with some other littoral countries, appealed to the international community to keep the ocean free from these rivalries. This was a protest in. particular against the establishment of an American naval base in the region. Both US and the Soviet Union are geopolitically so distant from the Indian Ocean that it is difficult to sustain naval operations in the area, at least for long, without the backing of a suitable local infrastructure.