Indian Defence Review

At the outbreak of hostilities, India declared a blockade of Pakistani ports, but later changed this to contraband control. A blockade might have induced some powers friendly to Pakistan to try to run it just to humble India’s naval power. India could ill afford to get embroiled in such awkward skirmishes at that time. Contraband control, which allowed the freedom to search a particular ship, was more flexible in application and, under the circumstances, fitted the bill better.

An extensive publicity campaign was organized along the west coast to educate fishermen, sailors on coasters and air crew flying over the vulnerable area in recognizing Pakistani submarines in various profiles.

Nanda’s offensive plan was indeed simple. Leaving aside antisubmarine craft to protect the west coast from the Pakistani submarine menace of the Midget and Chariot type in its armoury, the Indian fleet was to be divided into two task forces. One, comprising the bigger, and comparatively slower, ships was to demonstrate off the Makran coast to guard the Gulf sea lanes. The aim was to draw the Pakistan fleet employed in protecting the harbor away from Karachi westward, inviting an engagement and the full attention of the Pakistani naval authorities. Then, exploiting the fact that the naval protection for the harbor had been denuded, the second task force of faster ships, towing missile boats collected in Kathiawar ports, was to rush from the south, get close to the Karachi dockyards and strike the harbor shipping and facilities, especially oil storage tanks, with all the force at its command.

There was considerable lethal power packed in each missile boat, and this was required to cause the maximum destruction in the area. The plan envisaged a very favorable air situation over the area of engagement, for otherwise the whole operation could be scuttled by interference in executing the naval manoeuvres. Towards this end, it was arranged that to cover the approach of the missile boats IAF would neutralize the airfields near Karachi, and after completion of the raid it was to support the withdrawal of the missile task force. This delicate synchronization and dovetailing of air effort was perfected with pains-taking care.

The idea of using the missile boats, essentially a defensive weapon, in this offensive role emanated from Nanda himself. To prove their effectiveness in this role several trials were carried out with the weaponry at Cochin for months till the desired standard of accuracy was achieved. There followed intensive training of crew and commanders. Mock battles to rehearse the task were carried out in early November off the coast of Bombay with complete success.

Various configurations and approaches were tested, and the most suitable accepted. Having fully satisfied himself regarding the soundness and efficacy of his operational plans, Nanda set about sharing his confidence with the officers and ratings participating in the venture. In an address before the expected war, he offered to remove without recrimination those who had no faith in the boldness and novelty of his concepts. None accepted the offer, and it was clear that the Navy was wholeheartedly behind the plan.As war clouds started gathering, both participating task forces put out to sea and were at their respective war stations about the end of November. The stage was now set for enactment of the drama, so painstakingly planned and rehearsed beforehand. A task force comprising five large ships was put on patrol duty in the northern sector of the Arabian Sea with the ostensible task of protecting Indian shipping in the Persian Gulf. They were to make their way slowly towards Karachi, keeping themselves about 150 kilometres south of the Makran coast and southwest of Karachi. The second task force, consisting of a similar number of smaller but faster warships, was formed off Kathiawar approximately 500 kilometres southwest of Karachi. The strike force of missile boats was towed to various hideouts along the Kathiawar coast and concealed from air detection.

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Commenting on the glaring gaps in Pakistan’s direction of war, Fazal Muqeem says the Pakistani naval chief was not even informed of Yahya Khan’s intention of starting hostilities in the western wing till as late as 29 November. The army chief, who was close to the President and presumably in his inner councils, sang up the naval chief and informed him of the President’s decision, saying that hostilities might start in a few days. He was not given the exact date and time, which he was told would be conveyed to him by the air chief in due course disguised in a codeword. The codeword was conveyed to him about 1515 hours on 3 December, a couple of hours before the pre-emptive.

Commenting on the glaring gaps in Pakistans direction of war, Fazal Muqeem says the Pakistani naval chief was not even informed of Yahya Khans intention of starting hostilities in the western wing till as late as 29 November.

At that time, the Pakistan flotilla warships were already deployed in their war stations. All commanders and ship companies were informed of the impending operations by about 1700 hours. The deployment, as appreciated by Indian intelligence, was in a semicircular arc, with Karachi harbor as the centre, within about 70 to 80 miles of the port. Brisk patrolling and watch was operative to monitor suspected craft on all the approaches to Karachi. Three Daphne class submarines were already operating off Kathiawar and Bombay to engage Indian warships when they came out of their hideouts.

Like India, Pakistan was not properly organized for long range maritime reconnaissance. The Government had called upon Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to perform this task. PIA employed its Fokker Friendship fleet for this purpose. The radars used were what the aircraft were equipped with for weather detection, which was meant to look upwards and ahead, with a downward decline of no more than seven degrees on a level flight. Despite these limitations, the reconnaissance flights started on 30 November. One such flight was sighted by the south-eastern task force off Okha base, on the Kathiawar coast, on the morning of 3 December.

According to Fazal Muqeem, this task force almost passed over the Pakistani submarines deployed in the area, but they were unable to engage them as the order for starting hostilities had not yet been released. The Pakistani naval chief had supposedly asked for an air strike in the late afternoon, but this was not carried out, and “by not giving sufficient notice of starting hostilities to the navy, a good opportunity of attacking the Indian task force was missed by the Pakistani submarines.”

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The Indian air attacks started on the morning of 4 December and were kept up throughout the day. A mission of two aircraft flew very low over the harbor and hit an oil tank at Keamari, setting it ablaze. At the same time, the two supporting airfields at Malir and Badin were neutralized. Rocketing and strafing harbor facilities were kept up with increasing intensity. This air action diverted Pakistani attention from the two task forces which were approaching Karachi. The first contact was picked up by Karachi radars about 2100 hours at a distance of 40 miles.

The Pakistani naval chief had supposedly asked for an air strike in the late afternoon, but this was not carried out, and “by not giving sufficient notice of starting hostilities to the navy, a good opportunity of attacking the Indian task force was missed by the Pakistani submarines.”

As the Indian Navy had appreciated correctly, the Pakistani arc deployment led to a dispersal of resources to the extent that there was a distance of some 100 to 150 kilometres between ships. The formations Indian naval task forces had adopted were such that either of the two could converge on a selected hostile ship in isolation from others and silence it if it discovered the attacking force before the missile boats reached the harbor. The western task force off Makran made the first move to attract the Pakistani flotilla’s attention.

About 2330 hours, the Pakistani destroyer Khyber, on patrol about 70 miles off Karachi, signaled having detected the southeastern task force. Pakistan naval headquarters asked repeatedly whether Khyber had not mistakenly picked one of their own ships. This exchange of signals gave away the Khyber’s location and identity. Once given permission to engage, Khyber attacked a ship of the Pakistan Navy, and when an Indian ship attacked Khyber1 it broke in two. The minesweeper Muhafaz rushed to Khyber’s aid, but was also attacked and sunk.

This engagement was so sharp and swift that despite the exchange of fire, as events proved later, the element of surprise had not been dissipated. While sinking, Khyber signaled that it had been hit by an aircraft bomb. That evening, the IAF attack was so devastating that the Karachi harbor defences were in a state of utter confusion with fires blazing all over, their flames reaching the skies and illuminating the harbor area for miles. The Pakistani naval authorities did not believe the report, as it was inconceivable to them that an aircraft could hit a ship in darkness. Before more information could be exchanged, the ship went silent.

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A shore establishment however reported having seen the glow of “a big fire” on the horizon at sea. A fast patrol boat sent out to investigate reported having found the Muhafaz burning 40 miles off Karachi. The first person the patrol boat picked up was the captain of the minesweeper. He reported having been hit by what he thought was a missile. It appeared that both Khyber and Muhafaz had been hit simultaneously. In this engagement the Indian Navy claimed to have sunk another destroyer, Shahjehan, and the minesweepers Tughril and Tipu Sultan, although these losses are not confirmed by Pakistani sources. It is likely that these vessels were badly damaged but later retrieved by the Pakistan Navy. Boats were dispatched to pick up the Khyber’s survivors, but they returned empty with the excuse that the sea was choppy. About 70 survivors were picked up the next day after an extensive air and sea search following the Indian Navy’s withdrawal from the area.

The Pakistan Air Force in the area was equally benumbed. It is said that the Pakistani naval chief eventually woke up his air force counterpart in the early hours of the morning and pleaded for immediate air support.

In this confusion the Indian missile boats reached their targets, the oil storage tanks standing out on the radar screen from the surrounding clutter, and let their magazine of missiles dart out in fury, setting ablaze the remainder of the oil, which was by now flowing in bylanes adjoining the port. Surprisingly, all the shore guns and missiles of the defences were turned skywards in the belief that the attacking weapons were air-to-ground rockets. This shock action of the missile boats and the resultant devastation unnerved the Pakistan Navy. It was completely paralyzed, and this enabled the Indian task forces to make a getaway with ease.

The Pakistan Navy repeatedly asked for air support throughout the night of the raid, knowing fully well that no such aid could materialize in the hours of darkness. The Pakistan Air Force in the area was equally benumbed. It is said that the Pakistani naval chief eventually woke up his air force counterpart in the early hours of the morning and pleaded for immediate air support. Reportedly, the answer was: “Well, old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in future.” The missile boats created such a scare among the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy that all seagoing commanders pleaded absolute vulnerability of their craft against their attacks without the possibility of retaliation. For them, the fight was unequal, and drastic changes were needed in the concept of naval operations. For better protection of the fleet they suggested withdrawal of ships inside the harbor. This, they argued, would ensure protection against missile attack. The ships would of course become vulnerable to air attack if concentrated in this manner, but according to them such a concentration could provide deterrent antiaircraft cover with the ship guns.