Indian Defence Review

Russian BMD Ventures

Post-Soviet Russian BMD architectures, while being as vibrant as those of the US, exhibit a different character. The primary arm of Russian BMDs is their theatre defence platforms which integrate both ABM and air defence roles as operationally compatible components in a comprehensive-tiered architecture. The chunk of Russian forays revolves around S-300, S-400 and the futuristic S-500 programmes. S-300 is developed in two variants, namely, S-300P (SA-10/PMU Grumble) and S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator, SA-12B Giant).8 S-400 (SA-20 Triumf), Russia’s new showpiece air defence system with ABM utility, is an upgrade of S-300 with over 400 km range.9

“¦US BMD expansion that would influence the security calculus of second-tier powers like Russia and China, which in turn will flow down to the third tier of technology-developers like India, Pakistan and Iran, among others.

The system is envisioned for both extended air defence as well as BMD roles with its capability to target short- and medium-range missiles, aircraft and other aerodynamic threats with effective ranges up to 3500 km.10 S-500 is the ambitious project planned to match US midcourse interceptors with an intended exo-atmospheric range of 3500 km. In the post-S‑400 phase Russia would be working on compact and manoeuvrable fifth-generation air defence/ABM systems which “combine the elements of air, missile and space defence for targeting enemy system deeper into space” – implying an intention to gain greater exo-atmospheric capabilities.11

Other Prominent Players

A handful of other countries have made notable inroads in BMD technology development. China is known to be developing strategic air defence systems with ABM capabilities, though publicly opposing missile defences. Known Chinese projects include FT‑2000 and variants of the Hongqi system (Hongqi-2, ‑9, ‑10 and ‑15), assumed to be based on Russian systems such as S-75 and S-300 PMU. Propelled by HQ-9 and HQ-15 missiles, FT-2000 is intended to achieve interception coverage of between 150 and 200 km. Israel also has achieved major milestones in interception technologies. Besides Arrow 2, it has developed a series of strategic air defence systems, namely the Barak anti-ship missile, Spyder, Hawk, Shavit and Nimrod, all with varying augmented air defence capabilities.12

India is the latest entrant with the development of two systems, Prithvi Air Defence Experiment (PADE) and Advanced Air Defence System (AAD) – intended to be deployed by 2015. The project was launched in 2000 to attain an indigenous BMD capability on the lines of Arrow‑2. Though the first interception test on 27 November 2006 was achieved at 50 km range, the project aspires to attain capability for two intercept modes, to hit a target within four minutes at both exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric levels. With the 500-plus km Greenpine as its pathfinder, the PAD system is powered by a liquid-fuel first stage and a solid-fuel second stage, and carries active radars. The endo-atmospheric AAD would be a lower-tier air defence system with 15 km range. Its first two tests in December 2007 were declared successful as it managed to intercept the target on both occasions.13

Notes:

1. See Obama for America, “A 21st Century Military for America: Barack Obama on Defence Issues,” at <www.barackobama.com/pdf/Defense_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2009.
2. PAC-3 is single-stage mobile system with a hit-to-kill capability and can carry 16 missiles at a time. For more on PAC-3, see “Lockheed Martin Patriot PAC-3”, Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, at www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/pac-3.htm.
3. With Mach-9 velocity, Arrow 2 is an endo-atmospheric ABM. It uses an initial burn for a vertical launch, a secondary burn to sustain its trajectory, and destroys missiles through a blast fragmentation warhead. See www.israeli‑weapons.com/weapons/missile_systems/surface_missiles/Arrow/Arrow.html
4. THAAD entered the manufacturing phase in 2000. A single-stage rocket with thrust vectoring to boost it beyond burnout, THAAD operates in conjunction with the X-band radar. The latest operational test in July 2010 was a success. See www.defenselink.mi/specials/missiledefense/tmd-thaad.html.
5. GBI, comprising a booster vehicle and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), flies to a projected intercept point upon threat identification. The EKV uses its in-built propulsion and guidance control for final-seconds decisions to acquire the target, perform identification and steer itself to the warhead. See “Testing: Building Confidence”, BMD Fact Book, Missile Defense Agency, 2009.
6. The Aegis system integrates SPY-1 radar, MK41 vertical launching system and long-range surveillance and tracking system. Together with X-band radar, Aegis can track and engage multiple targets simultaneously.
7. The aircraft crew operates the laser at altitudes of around 12,000 metres, by flying over friendly territory and scanning the horizon for the plumes of rising missiles. For more on ABL functioning, see A. Vinod Kumar, “Airborne Laser Aircraft Rolls Out”, IDSA Strategic Comments, 6 November 2006.
8. S-300P is designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft. It has been modified several times, the recent variants being S-300PMU-1 (SA-10D) and S‑300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit).
9. S-400 consists of an upgraded S-300 missile, multi-target radar, and observation and tracking vehicles which can simultaneously track and guide missiles to multiple targets. For more on S-400, see www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.52/ system_detail.asp.
10. On 6 August 2007, Russia deployed the S-400 Triumf air defence system in Elektrostal outside Moscow. See “Russia unveils air defence, eyes U.S. missile shield”, 6 August 2007, at http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-28848420070806?sp=true
11. Statement by Russian Air Force Commander, Colonel General Alexander Zelin; see “Russia working on missile to hit targets in space”, Times of India, 9 August 2007.
12. Israel is also researching a short-range interceptor called “Iron Dome” and a medium-range interceptor called “Magic Wand”. See www.israeli‑weapons.com/israeli_weapons_missile_systems.html.
13. “Advanced Air Defence Missile Test-Fired”, The Hindu, 6 December 2007.

BMD in 2030: Technological and Political Paradigms

The previous sections evaluated the evolution of BMD technology to impart a perspective on existing technological templates. This section moves forward to forecast the probable/possible direction of BMD technology through an assessment of hypothetical technological and political paradigms likely to develop in the next few decades that will shape the nature of BMD technologies in 2030.

Technological Paradigms

The longer the period of technology forecast, the greater will be the challenges to predict accurately. Technology futures have often been denoted by imaginative narratives, largely in the realm of science fiction. However, technology forecast has been undertaken through rigorous scientific methods also. Various tools for futures research have been developed by Spyros Makridakis, Bertrand de Jouvenel, T.J. Gordon, T. Modis, M. Dublin, among others.1 They include methods such as Delphi (tacit knowledge), analogy (study of another comparable system), extrapolation (observation from the sample system), statistics (based on variables to be predicted) and causal relations (studying the phenomena). Besides, there are other analytical methods like genius forecasting, simulations, scenario building, cross-impact matrix, decision trees, etc., which are used for futures research.2

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Though these methods have inherent limitations, adapting suitable models for specific cases or an assortment of methodologies can drastically influence and assist forecasts. For example, use of comparatively easier denominators like the study of the system/technology’s evolution and position in the probable/possible “life curve” or the “road mapping” of this evolution can help in forecasting the functional or structural progress of technologies. Often, the key to such approaches towards forecasting lies in identifying the trends, mapping the possible/probable innovations and imagining revolutions on a particular technological construct, an approach this chapter prefers to pursue. While trend identification has been done in previous sections, the task now is to outline the possible or probable route of innovations, potentially influenced by causal relations from political and technological drivers.

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Like many military technologies, development cycles of BMD have spanned ten- to twenty-year periods. Hence, one could start with the assumption that most of the baseline technological paradigms in BMD development exist and are not expected to dramatically alter in the next two decades, but for a few systems. This could facilitate easier mapping of the probable/possible route of the technological development process currently underway and identify the potential innovations in their future evolution. As a causal relationship variable, strong political drivers could shape the progress of these developments or radically change their character. However, a focused study of this evolution could also be done in a ceteris paribus approach,3 implying that technological lifecycles would move in predictable phases of conceptualization, development, maturity and consolidation, and that political drivers will not evolve in a manner that will dramatically transform the nature of technological development in a limited period of time. The causal impact of political drivers could, however, be inducted at appropriate levels to infer the possible shifts in the development lifecycles or influences on the conceputalization processes.

For example, in the US pursuits, various development periods like C1, C2 and C3 of the SDI Organization (SDIO) phase or Block I, II and III of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) phase carried a five- to ten-year development period from conceptualization to development maturity of technology baselines. Yet, most of the matured technologies took an average of ten to fifteen years to complete the development lifecycle before moving into deployment phases. While technological templates remained constant during this period, the nature of decisions on conceputalization or development was influenced by political drivers, including change in the strategic environment and the influence of political leaderships or ideologies. The US BMD development since the SDI years embodies this phenomenon.

While the Cold War dynamics influenced the nature of SDI-era technologies such as Brilliant Pebbles and directed energy programmes, the end of the Cold War and change in dispensation affected only the development programmes, not the technological concepts, many of which continued to be pursued with new nomenclatures. Though political factors such as the ABM Treaty affected the development of space-based interceptors, the concept remained strong as the US continued to vouch for military uses of space platforms. The ABM Treaty, despite being a major political driver, could only block the deployment of BMD systems, but not its continuing research and development.

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Assuming that MDA would take another ten to fifteen years to realistically deploy its contemporary technologies for a comprehensive nation-wide layered defence, the space for the next fifteen years or so after this phase could be devoted to conceptualizing revolutionary BMD models. Here too political drivers could influence and dramatically alter this process. While assuming that the BMD architectures two decades from now could inevitably be advanced manifestations or matured models of the current baselines, the revolutionary innovations expected beyond that period could be compatible with the political environment prevailing at the time. Though imaginative thinking could prevail, technological paradigm predictions of a twenty- to thirty-year period would be as challenging as forecasting political paradigms.