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‘Three Warfares’: Arunachal Pradesh
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Praggya Surana | Date:01 Sep , 2017 0 Comments
Praggya Surana
is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

The Chinese have mastered the art of ‘Three Warfares’ to create the impression of legitimacy in Arunachal Pradesh. Officially recognized by China’s Central Military Commission and Communist Party in 2003, the pillars of ‘Three Warfares’ are psychological, media and legal warfare.[i]“It employs diplomatic pressure, rumor, false narratives, and harassment to express displeasure, assert hegemony and convey threats.”[ii] This statement, made in the context of South China Sea, is applicable to the Arunachal Pradesh dispute as well. It defines the modus operandi of the Chinese state.

China disputes the interpretation of the McMahon line which determines the international boundary between India and China. “In the Eastern Sector, China claims approximately 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.”[iii]

Why Arunachal Pradesh?

Arunachal Pradesh is particularly appealing to China for a number of reasons. First, the region would be a huge strategic asset in a territorial conflict with India. The Himalayas which currently limit China’s ability to attack the region will provide a protective barrier instead, allowing easy access to the Assam plains.

Secondly, Arunachal Pradesh is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama and the Galden Namgey Lhatse Monastery is Tibetan Buddhism’s second largest monastery. Both are of great importance to the Tibetan community and control over these will allow China greater control over the spiritual freedom of the Tibetans and ultimately, the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

Thirdly, it will substantially increase its shared boundary with Bhutan, a tiny landlocked nation, heavily dependent on India for its protection. This could be leveraged to pressurize Bhutan into initiating diplomatic ties with China and open up new territory for Chinese investments.

Fourthly, China would be keen to economically exploit the region, similar to its actions in Tibet. The hydropower potential in Arunachal Pradesh is 50,000 MW[iv] and its proximity to the Great Bend in the Brahmaputra means that any environmental impact of the mega-dams planned there would become an internal matter. Arunachal Pradesh also has rich deposits of mineral oils, gas, coal, dolomite, limestone, graphite, marble, lead and zinc.[v]

Finally, control over the region will allow China to project itself as a strong power which can wrest land from a regional power like India. This can be leveraged against smaller nations and force them to fall in line with respect to territorial and maritime disputes.

Non-Kinetic Warfare

China’s tools for a non-kinetic warfare often overlap with each other. Their collective aim is to perpetrate its version of the facts and plant the seed of doubt regarding the legitimate claims of other nations. China heavily relies on its state-run newspapers to further this propaganda.

The first kind of tool they rely upon are a series of seemingly innocuous claims, all aimed at creating an impression of Chinese legitimacy in the region. These focus on illustrating historical, cultural and social ties with the region. They are likely to be relied upon in the future to prove continued presence in a legal scenario, much like the nine dash line in South China Sea. China insists on referring to Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” in all its official communications. In 2017, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China issued a so-called ‘notification’ on its website on 13 April 2017 assigning names to six small towns in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.[vi]Each of these has been picked carefully based on its strategic value. For instance, Urgyeling, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama has been ‘renamed’ Wo’gyainling whileQoidengarbo could be referring to Gorsam Chorten, the only white stupa in the region which is close to Ziminthang, a tactical HQ during the 1962 war.[vii]Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang even said that the names reflected, “China’s territorial claim over South Tibet is supported by clear evidence in terms of history, culture and administration.”[viii]In 2014, the state run newspaper, Xinhua, which was further quoted by international dailies, published a map of China which included islands in the South China Sea and Arunachal Pradesh.[ix] Another trick used is advertising tourism in places in Arunachal Pradesh, like Ziro, the location of a popular music festival, as part of China; describing the Lhoba Apatanis, a local tribe as “the most beautiful among Tibetan tribes”.[x]

The second prong of this strategy tries to raise doubts regarding Indian legitimacy over the region and attempts to limit India’s exercise of sovereign rights in Arunachal. China routinely protests any diplomatic visits to the region. For instance, it lodged a protest when the Dalai Lama chose to visit the Tawang Monastery.[xi]China also strongly protested Richard Verma, US Ambassador to India’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh.[xii]It either denies visas to Arunachal residents or gives them stapled visas, harassing the local populace to drive home their point.[xiii] When Japan invested heavily in the Indian Northeast, China lodged representations protesting the recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India.[xiv]

China has made an art of implementing or discarding legal treaties as per their convenience. It obfuscates facts, invents historical proof and conveniently blames the colonial past for anything that does not fit in with their ‘perception’ of the agreed borders. It refuses to acknowledge the McMahon line with respect to its border with India, claiming Arunachal Pradesh as part of its territory while accepting the same treaty for settling its boundary dispute with Myanmar.[xv]

Conclusion

India does recognize that China is playing a long term game with the continuous barrage of assertions and diplomatic protests. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has made categorical statements rejecting various Chinese move and made unequivocal statements about Arunachal Pradesh being “an integral and inalienable part of India.”[xvi] However, it has also shied away from taking a firm stance, eg. justifying the Dalai Lama’s visit as non-political in nature. India needs to be categorical about its assertions. Another necessary step is to counter Chinese propaganda in international media and create widespread awareness about China’s non-kinetic warfare. For instance, when the Chinese newspapers showed Arunachal Pradesh and the South China Sea islands as part of China in maps, most international coverage focused exclusively on the islands. Recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as part of India by Indian allies –US, Japan and Australia must be publicized further. The Chinese strategy of creeping territorial claims through ‘soft means’ must be exposed before it is too late to turn the clock.

References

[i]Peter Navarro, ‘China’s Non-Kinetic ‘Three Warfares’ Against America’,  5 Jan 2016, The National Interest, available at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-non-kinetic-three-warfares-against-america-14808; accessed on 17 Aug 2017.

[ii]Id.

[iii] Ministry of External Affairs, India, ‘Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2726 Protection of Boundaries of Arunachal Pradesh’,  10 Aug 2017, available at http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/28844/QUESTION+NO2726+PROTECTION+OF+BOUNDARIES+OF+ARUNACHAL+PRADESH; accessed on 17 Aug 2017.

[iv] Suresh Iyengar, ‘Arunachal Pradesh has the potential to generate 50,000 MW hydro electric power’, 8 June 2016, The Hindu Business Line, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/arunachal-pradesh-has-the-potential-to-generate-50000-mw-hydro-electric-power/article8706166.ece; accessed on 12 July 2017.

[v] Water Resources Information System of India, ‘Arunachal Pradesh’, available at http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in/wrpinfo/index.php?title=Arunachal_Pradesh#Mines_.26_Minerals; accessed on 17 August 2017.

[vi] Supra note 3.

[vii] Claude Arpi, ‘Six new places in Arunachal claimed by China’, 21 Apr 2017, available at http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/2017/04/six-new-places-in-arunachal-claimed-by.html; accessed on 15 Aug 2017.

[viii]SuhasiniHaider, ‘Renaming act does not make illegal occupation legal, India tells China’, 20 Apr 2017, The Hindu, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-objects-to-china-renaming-six-places-in-arunachal/article18154281.ece; accessed on 18 Aug 2017.

[ix] Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Could this map of China start a war?’, 27 June 2014, The Washington Post,  available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/27/could-this-map-of-china-start-a-war/?utm_term=.5a8f436feae8; accessed on 17 August 2017.

[x]Geeta Mohan, ‘China usurps Northeastern tribe to corner India, prove Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet’, 17 Aug 2017, Mail Today, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-usurps-northeastern-tribe-to-corner-india-prove-arunachal-pradesh-as-part-of-tibet/1/1027599.html; accessed on 17 Aug 2017.

[xi]‘China warns India against letting Dalai Lama visit disputed area’, 29 Oct 2016, The Dawn, available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1293001; accessed on 15 Aug 2017.

[xii] Id.

[xiii]SmritiKak Ramachandran, ‘Stapled visa issue with China still unresolved’, 1 Jun 2015,The Hindu, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/stapled-visa-issue-with-china-still-unresolved/article7268941.ece; accessed on 18 Aug 2017.

[xiv]YashaswaniSehrawat, ‘China And Japan Squabble Over Arunachal Pradesh’, The Citizen, 20 Jan 2015, available at http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/NewsDetail/index/1/2229/China-And-Japan-Squabble-Over-Arunachal-Pradesh; accessed on 18 Jul 2017.

[xv]PTI, ‘Ex-Chinese diplomat says concession on Tawang can resolve border dispute, India says not possible’, 3 Mar 2017, The Indian Express, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/arunachal-pradesh-tawang-china-india-border-dispute-4552526/; accessed on 17 Aug 2017.

[xvi] Supra note 3.

Courtesy: First published on www.claws.in

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