Indian Defence Review

The Structure of the Indian Army.

The structure of the Indian Army was designed by the British to serve the twin purposes of a Garrison Army and an Expeditionary Force. We in our own wisdom have kept the structure largely unchanged with only a few minor modifications. Without going into the gory details we shall point out two surviving vestiges of the bygone era.

Structures like the Areas and Subareas, meant mainly for garrisoning function still exist. The justification now being given is of ‘ local administration ‘ of permanent infrastructure but in reality usurping the meagre infrastructural resources for themselves. The Embarkation Headquarters in port cities go back to the day when the British needed the facility to go to the mother country. Today these organizations carry out the duties of customs agents, at great cost to the nation, when there is no dearth of such agents in civvies streets.

At the macro level and from the functional level the Army consists of four basic structures (see the diagram below)

(click to enlarge)

These structures are linked to each other through formal and informal chains. The system as a whole is characterized by a lack of flexibility and a closed pyramidical structure with no internal corrective mechanism. The corrective agent, ‘Enemy’ lies outside the system and can cause system change or collapse through defeat in war. In the bargain, the nation may pay the price in terms ofdestruction or slavery.

Tasks

•  Command Structure

• Goal setting for military efficiency
• Monitor and check military efficiency
• Planning for utilization of resources to achieve goals
• Transmission of orders, execution and supervision
• Evaluation of performance and rewards and punishments

•  Logistics structure

• To provide logistical support according to plan.
• Be responsible to the command structure for all actions and omissions.

•  Fighting support structure. Ditto as above except the type of support is different.

Fighting Structure.

• Achieve goals set by command structure .
• Be dependent on logistic and combat support structures for carrying out the same.

This macro system is repeated in every structure till we come to the bottom of the pyramid, where we have the individual fighting soldier. Depending on the level of analysis the whole system would then form the structure for higher magnitude. Till we reach the top of the pyramid. These structures have a tendency to behave like living organisms and the informal linkages within the system could vary from time to time. At best of times they would be based on old boy network, school ties, regional affiliations and at worst ‘Lena-Dena’ (give and take).

In terms of paradigms, the system closest to the standing army is a captive emergency power plant at a hospital. The criticality of the emergency power at the hospital makes it incumbent to have a capacity slightly higher than the maximum load. Thus there is an inbuilt factor of redundancy. The plant truly gets tested in an emergency. It is run periodically for a short duration for tests and checks but usually at low load. Thus, a large number of weak or broken parts only get exposed during a real situation. The system is insensitive to the environment and unless the hospital administration is very watchful, expansion of the hospital may well see the emergency capacity falling short of new requirements.

The relevance and importance of the backup system is only realized during an emergency. Therefore, in normal times, there is a tendency to neglect it.

A Path Toward Prescription.

Having thus far seen the motivational factors, their behavioural manifestation, organizational goals and the reality of the existing organization, we come to the important prescription part. The cardinal underlying principle in this part is to systemically link up the possible individual aspirations with organizational goals. Since the foundation of our analysis is based on time-tested wisdom, there is a fair chance of success. [xxiii]

Military efficiency in the present structure is solely dependent on the command structure. At a time of crisis, military efficiency will have a direct linkage with the basic instinct of self-preservation. But military crisis or war are both transient phenomena and also rare- India has not fought an all-out war since 1971. Thus in day to day running of the army, military efficiency takes a back seat and is given low priority. One possible solution is to have a parallel inspection structure, independent of the command structure to keep a check on the military efficiency. This will divorce the powers of execution and evaluation. The level of operation of this structure is a matter of detail. But to be effective it must have teeth. It must have powers of reward and punishment at par with the command structure. The German army had a system of inspectorates responsible for their arms and service with direct input into the high command at the summit of the pyramid. The system of checks and balances thus created will induce sufficient motivation to accord high priority to military efficiency.[xxiv]

This will also help us get at the truth of state of readiness, systemically. Due importance given to military activity will automatically cut down on the unsoldierly activities helping the men regain their ‘Izzat’.

The second part of military efficiency is the administration which encompasses provisioning, maintenance and healthcare. In the present scheme of things the subordinate or lower military structure is totally dependent on the ‘tail’ for goods and services and with no control over the quality. Parallel to the command structure, we could think of creating a structure of ‘user satisfaction check’ on a nine-point scale to link up the self-interest of the services with the satisfaction level of the users.

The parallel structures are not detrimental to efficiency as two of the world’s best-standing armies, the Soviet Red Army and the German Army of WWII practiced them. The Commissar system of Red Army does not fit into our democratic system. But the German system can. The check on the services is long overdue and may well reduce the corrupt practices to some extent.[xxv]

Truth and truthfulness are the most challenging among the organizational goals as it is directly linked to the national societal milieu.  The one measure that could be effective is the army’s legal system. The example will have to be set by the top leadership.  A degree of ruthlessness in this regard is highly desirable. The parallel system mentioned in the earlier paradigm will also help in creating an atmosphere wherein truthfulness will be prudent and untruth likely to be discovered and punished.

Nothing affects a soldier’s Izzat and prestige in society more adversely than the constant use of soldiers in unsoldierly tasks. The use of soldier servants in Peace stations and peace establishments is a glaring example.  Although under field conditions, there is no choice. Abolishing this system is the need of the hour unless we wish to go the way of para-military forces and civil police that have seen mutinies on this issue. We must remain ahead of the curve and act rather than react.

In order to create a climate of mutual respect, it is necessary to create a climate of ‘equity’, not equality. Thus on the issue of basic human needs like food, shelter, clothing and medical help, there should be no discrimination. Obnoxious measures like a special officer’s rations do violence to the principle of ‘equity’ and have no place in the modern army.

Finally, the army system thatis run during peace time at ‘sub optimal load’ has to periodically be run at high intensity. This is necessary to make the ‘passengers’ to leave the system. This could be buttressed by the ‘silver hand shake’ incentive (not a ‘Golden Hanad shake’)as once the heat is turned on, the passengers and freebooters would not need too much motivation. This has become all the more necessary as the army’s infrastructure has reached a breaking point due to the disaster called ‘cadre review’. The running of the system in high gear like in the post 1962 period, will help the process of weeding out and buy us time to face the dangerous decade ahead.

Conclusion.

The structural approach to creating a motivational environment advocated here is neither fool-proof nor a complete solution. The perfect solution would be to have the right men with all the soldierly attributes and motivations to man the army. The problem is, can we ever find such men in the numbers required? We live in an imperfect world and finding perfection is impossible. This approach has the merit of taking action in the right direction. This author is aware that this issue has been engaging the attention of the leadership of the army for over a decade or more. But we have been found wanting in terms of action as we seem to have got bogged down in flood of words and impractical or utopian ideas.

There are two glaring but deliberate omissions in this essay. One is the monetary incentive and the other is creating a national spirit opposed to regional or sectarian impulse.

Talking about the monetary incentive as motivation. This author carried out an opinion survey in Defence Services Staff College Wellington 1979. (34th Staff course). The results of that survey showed that over 70 percent of respondents mentioned ‘job satisfaction’  as their primary motivation. Only 10 percent mentioned money and the rest gave patriotism, a spirit of service, or power as their motivation. It is true that the environment in Wellington, with its excellent administration and creature comforts, monetary issues did recede in the background. Also, it is accepted that a small size sample survey of Staff college students can hardly be called representative.

But on the other hand, the results of the survey are significant as the staff college alumni go on to populate the higher echelons of leadership in the army.  In the same survey, when asked to name the most influential leader, the response was mainly confined to regional historical figures like Shivaji, Guru Govind Singh, et al. This shows the difficulty in the creation of national ideals and idols. [xxvi]The effort at this has to be at the national political level and armed forces have very little leeway. This would need an entirely new approach and a separate essay.

It is hoped that this analysis will generate enough ideas on prescription in the minds of intelligent readers. Two points that need emphasis while thinking of motivation are,

Structural reform

Caution while applying ‘modern’ techniques and alien values to the detriment of traditional ones.[xxvii]

The Army, the critical last resort of the Indian state, cannot afford the luxury of responding to the crisis in the decade of dangerous eighties. We have to anticipate and prevent crises rather than just react. A twenty years breather will then surely take India into the front ranks of developed nations. We have a secure and bright future if we navigate the dangerous eighties successfully. Prophet Moses  roamed the deserts of Sinai for 12 years so that the Jews born in Egyptian slavery die before he settled in the promised land. Though not so drastic, it is time we re-examined the structures of a bygone era and bring them in tune with current realities.