Indian Defence Review

The conflict continuum has peace on one end of the spectrum and the open all out armed conflict on the other end. The concept of Grey Zone warfare refers the use of operational space for intense competition or conflict by states between one end indicating peace and armed conflict at the other extreme.

The concept of Grey Zone warfare, while not explicitly labelled as such, can be found in various historical texts and examples, albeit under different terms or contexts. Sun Tzu’s his seminal work “The Art of War” (5th century BC) describes strategies that align with Grey Zone tactics. He has emphasized the importance of winning without engaging in direct conflict whenever possible. For instance, the emphasis on deception, espionage, and undermining the enemy’s will to fight through psychological tactics mirrors aspects of Grey Zone warfare.

The Greek historian Thucydides’ in the “History of the Peloponnesian War” (5th century BC)as also the conflicts between Athens and Sparta, where both sides employed tactics that could be seen as Grey Zone strategies. These included supporting proxies, economic coercion, and leveraging alliances to weaken the adversary without necessarily engaging in full-scale warfare. The Roman Empire’s Use of “Divide and Conquer” Tactics involving strategies aimed at sowing discord among enemy factions or regions, exploiting internal divisions to weaken adversaries without direct military confrontation bears similarities to Grey Zone tactics aimed at undermining unity and strength from within.

Kautilya in his magnum opus ‘Arthshastra’ talks of ‘Tushnimyuddha’ meaning ‘silent war’ which implies all kinds of clandestine operations involving perception management, silently sowing discord amongst the target population, use of secret agents for killing and enticing the enemy into defeat. In modern times Machiavelli’s writing on statecraft “The Prince” (16th century) mentions strategies for gaining and maintaining power by use of unconventional tactics, manipulation, and indirect means to achieve strategic objectives, often without resorting to open conflict. While the terminology and context may differ, the underlying strategies employed by various civilizations throughout history share similarities with contemporary Grey Zone tactics.

In these historical examples, the principles of indirect action, manipulation, use of crafted lies and leveraging any other non-military means to achieve strategic aims resonate with the modern concept of Grey Zone warfare — a term first came into attention round 2010 and its tacticsextensively employed on industrial scales by China against its adversaries as well as its allies through the now debunked Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In the Grey Zone, adversaries engage in activities that blur the lines between war and peace, exploiting ambiguity and leveraging non-traditional methods to achieve their strategic objectives. This approach aims to achieve goals without eliciting a clear and direct military response from opponents. These actions involve cyber-attacks, information warfare, economic coercion, political subversion, legal manipulation, psychological warfare, irregular warfare, and now using social media to spread fake news and more, but all well below the threshold of war.  

These actions manifest in the form of disinformation campaigns, proxy wars, economic pressure through sanctions or trade manipulation, technological espionage to steal intellectual property and support for insurgencies or non-state actors without openly declaring war. There no iron clad actions as part of Grey Zone warfare but the actions are tailored and customised to exploit the weaknesses of the adversary.

Off late China has been in the spotlight for adopting Grey Zone Warfare to achieve global influence and undermine democracies. India has been a prominent target of its Grey Zone tactics.

There is another similar term ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ that was prescribed by two Senior Colonels of the Air Force on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization, proposing the use of diverse and unconventional methods to achieve strategic objectives in conflict, going beyond traditional military means. It suggests using a wide array of tools—economic, financial, technological, information, and more—to weaken an adversary in addition to the traditional tools of warfare comprising the military forces.

This concept advocates for exploiting an adversary’s weaknesses in all possible domains, including the military, economic, technological, and informational spheres, without being confined to traditional rules of engagement. It’s a broader concept that encompasses strategies aimed at undermining an opponent’s strength and capabilities across multiple fronts and thus justifying the unlimited scope of warfare being “unrestricted” in the means employed to achieve the desired ends.

In essence, while both the Grey Zone and Unrestricted Warfare involve unconventional means in conflict, the Grey Zone specifically delineates the space where activities exist between peace and war, while Unrestricted Warfare is a broader concept advocating for the use of diverse means beyond traditional military strategies to achieve strategic objectives.

Grey Zone Tactics against India

Grey Zone warfare involves the use of various unconventional tactics and strategies that fall below the threshold of traditional warfare but still aim to advance a nation’s interests and influence. These measures are used by China to achieve its sovereignty goals while minimizing the risk of escalation. Here are some ways Grey Zone warfare is waged:

(a) Cyber Operations. This includes system intrusions to deny availability of information systems, hacking and stealing data, corrupting data, spreading disinformation, and conducting cyber espionage to disrupt or influence a target country’s critical infrastructure, political systems, or economy without causing direct physical harm. Indian government organisations reported 19 cyber attacks in 2022. While presenting the Electricity Amendment Bill 2022, power minister RK Singh had said, “We are facing cyber attacks on our power transmission system. We know from where those are emanating……. . ”.

(b) Information Warfare. Propaganda, rumours and fake news, social media manipulation, and psychological operations are used to shape public opinion, create divisions, and undermine trust in institutions within the target nation. In their investigation into the cause of the 2012 mass exodus of North Easterners from Bengaluruthe intelligence services could trace the threatening messages to some North Eastern states that may just be a part of the story; the actual sponsor of these messages could possibly be in China. China as part of its influence operations employs various tools such as public diplomacy, elite to elite diplomacy and Confucius institutes in various universities abroad.

(c) Support to Proxy Forces.  Providing support to non-state actors, insurgents, or militias in a way that enables them to advance the supporting nation’s agenda without officially engaging in direct conflict. During the 80s and 90s Chinese support to various insurgent movementsin India’s north east was widely known and it continues till today.

(d) Economic Coercion. Imposing sanctions, trade restrictions, or manipulating financial markets to undermine the target nation’s economy or coerce policy changes without resorting to military action. Australia’s support to the pro democracy movement in Hong Kong led China to levy 212 percent tariff on Australian wines in 2020. When Australia approached the WTO against this violation of WTO guidelines, China imposed more trade restrictions as a punitive action against Australia. Some analysts termed it Chinese bullying. China hasn’t been able to coerce India economically as it has India’s smaller neighbours but that is because India is a very large economy and can shut itself to China which can be counterproductive for China which has more than 16 percent share in India imports. China has utilized economic tools to extract concessions including economic pressure, trade restrictions against Australia.

(e) Political Subversion. Using covert means to influence elections, manipulate political processes, or support political groups or movements that align with the aggressor’s interests. As per a report of Alliance for Securing Democracy, Russia and China spent more than $300 million in interference operations in democratic processes of democracies globally more than 100 times over the past decade.

A report by Centre for Study of Democracy – a Bulgarian think tank – has revealed a deleterious effect of the Chinese investments and economic activity on the standard of governance and judicial processes. The common communism thread between China and certain political groups both mainstream as well as outlawed in India can be cause of security concern as in moments of crisis with China these are known to side with China.

Also since journalists in democratic polity are known to enjoy numerous privileges they can be used to not only peddle China’s agenda as well as for espionage. The issue of political subversion by China in India is not well investigated but China is known to have employed information and cyber warfare tactics to manipulate and influence political leaders, journalists, and outcome of elections by manipulating public opinion in the USA. This has included disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and the use of social media platforms.

China has also “invaded” prestigious Universities in the West with funds for research and by buying out senior heads of departments in fields of their interest.

(f)  Irregular Warfare. Deploying unconventional military tactics such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage, or asymmetric attacks by leveraging smaller, specialized units or non-traditional military forces forms part of Irregular Warfare. The use of maritime militia and fishing boats by China in the South China Sea to bully its maritime neighbours is part of this tactics. As part of the BRI projects abroad the Chinese companies use the services of five private military companies abroad.

(g)  Legal and Diplomatic Manoeuvring. China is careful while exploiting legal or diplomatic loopholes, leveraging international institutions, or manipulating alliances to weaken the target country’s position on the global stage while proffering a justification for its own actions based on precepts and conventions of law. China uses its civilian fishing fleet to run its writ in the South China Sea to avoid legal disapprobation from the International Court of Justice.

Similarly it surreptitiously sends arms, ammunition and financial aid to insurgents in the North East India from secret funds so that India cannot invoke article 51 of the UN Charter regarding right of self defence. So real and potent is the threat of exploitation of legal loopholes by China that the External policy department of European Parliament without naming China has come out with a document, “Legal Loopholes and risk of Foreign Interference”. The Document recommends foreign interference to be restricted by criminalisation, sanctions and a ban on foreign involvement in third-party election campaigning.

(h) Military Intimidation. This involves the use of military assets to convey the threat of a potential military attack or a risk of military escalation. The massing of PLA troops at the contested borders with India opposite Galwan in Ladakh was part of this military intimidation that went awry and China suffered many casualties – much more those suffered by the Indian side. The month long joint forces exercise in Taiwan Straits to intimidate Taiwan for hosting Nancy Pelosi the US House Speaker in August 2022 that comprised 200 aircraft and 50 ships and involved firing missiles towards Taiwan were examples of this intimidation.

Similarly the China Coast Guard ships routinely indulge in ramming smaller boats of its neighbour states in the South China sea routinely such as Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia in the contested waters. The only risk of military intimidation is that it can lead to a severe miscalculation as it did in Galwan where the Chinese troops got a bloody nose and casualties nine times that of India. Indian troops despite grave provocation conducted professionally else the Chinese action could have flared an armed conflict.

China is known to have funded proxy groups and political candidates/organizations supportive of China’s world view in Australia. By supporting these groups, China aims to undermine the influence and stability of its rivals. In India China has sought to gain political influence by cultivating relationships with political leaders and institutions. This includes diplomatic efforts, economic partnerships, and strategic investments.

Countering Grey Zone Warfare

Grey Zone warfare is characterized by its ambiguity and the difficulty in attributing actions to a specific aggressor. It aims to exploit vulnerabilities, create confusion, and achieve strategic objectives without crossing the threshold that might provoke a clear and direct military response from the target nation or the international community. Countering Grey Zone warfare involves a combination of proactive measures to deter adversaries and resilience-building to mitigate the impact of such tactics. Some strategies are as follows:

(a) Active Monitoring and Early Warning Systems. Develop systems to monitor activities across various domains (cyber, information, political, economic, educational, industrial, medical, and agricultural) to detect early signs of Grey Zone attempts and respond promptly.

(b) Clear Communication of Red Lines. India needs to clearly and consistently communicate red lines and consequences for certain unacceptable actions. These should be reaffirmed and reiterated in public statements by Political leaders. Establishing and communicating policies that define unacceptable behaviour, help in deterring adversaries from crossing boundaries.

(c)  Deterrence through Capability Demonstration.  Sometimes pre-emption is the best prevention. This can be achieved through showcasing capabilities in cyber, information, economic, irregular and other domains to deter adversaries from initiating Grey Zone activities by demonstrating the ability to respond effectively.    

(d)  Enhance Cyber-security. Strengthen defences against cyber-attacks by investing in robust cyber-security measures to protect critical infrastructure, sensitive data, and governmental systems. After some serious cyber attacks directed at India’s electricity grid the government has brought in the Electricity Amendment Act 2022 comprising provisions for improving cyber hygiene of the SCADA systems and their periodic cyber audit. Similar actions are the need of the day to protect other critical systems such as banking and National Stock Exchanges, Railways Traffic monitoring Systems, the Civil Air Traffic Management System (ATMS) and Advanced-Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (ASMGCS), a complex ground surveillance system that manages air traffic at airports and in Indian Civil Airspace for safe operation of flights from take-off to landing.

(e) Counter Disinformation. Disinformation has the power to fracture societies and disintegrate nations. Due to the technological advancements and easy availability of the means of disseminating disinformation at the blink of an eye, the threat from disinformation to societies and states is so real that not only states, but even supranational organisations such as the EU and UN have taken note of this and come out with strategies and tools to counter disinformation.

The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres remarked, “Countering disinformation requires lasting investment in building societal resilience and media and information literacy”. The UN has come out with a report on countering disinformation which states that disinformation can not only effect human rights but undermine response to public policies and amplify existing tensions leading to armed conflicts. The EU on the other hand recommends regulating mainstream media platforms and demands greater transparency regarding the algorithms used to amplifying and removing harmful content.

Developing strategies to identify and counter disinformation campaigns as well as educating the public about recognizing false information and promote media literacy are pressing concerns for democratic states like India where the inalienable right to free expression sometimes come in conflict with disinformation. Indian Government has recently come out with the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023. These rules, amongst other anticipated provisions, propose setting up “fact-checking units” to tackle the disinformation through of fake news. These fact-checking units would be tasked to identify false, fake or misleading information pertaining to the central government’s functions.

The government has also come up with Information Safety Education Safety and Awareness (ISEA) initiative for the users and social media intermediaries alike to raise awareness about ethics while using social media and prevention of spread of fake/ false news. The recent raids on a China’s proxy news portal – News Click have revealed an attempt to manipulate and subvert India’s vibrant civil societies. To counter such attempts India needs to proffer a strong sovereign narrative. Global Tech giants need to be more responsive to the governments requirements and the laws of the land.

(f) Build Alliances and Partnerships. Forging strong alliances with other states and international organizations to collectively address and deter Grey Zone tactics offers a good alternative to going alone. Pooled resources and cooperation can amplify responses and increase resilience to Grey Zone attacks. Resolve of a collective response can be a strong deterrence. India US defence cooperation in the ISR domain may help India to timely deter, discern and respond to China’s grey zone attacks.

(g) Diversify Economy and Supply Chains. During the last few decades India’s economic dependence on China had increased significantly. The bilateral trade between India and China was to the tune of USD 85. 65 Billion with a large deficit and it continued to increase to USD 136. 26 Billion despite governments efforts to reduce it. Dependence on a single source comes with the possibility of economic coercion but economic disentanglement cannot be done overnight unless other sources and supply chains are identified and developed.

India has struggled to develop alternative suppliers or markets after the Galwan conflict with China in 2020and has met with some success in diversifying supply chains to minimize vulnerabilities to trade manipulations as evidenced by slowdown in bilateral trade in first half of 2023. Chinese companies have substantial engagements in India and it was growing at rapid pace which could have given disproportionate influence to these companies in India’s domestic economy and access to some sensitive industrial sectors.

After the Galwan conflict there were concerted efforts by the government to restrict engagement of Chinese companies in certain strategic sectors as also in infrastructure projects in border areas. Restrictions were also imposed on Chinese companies from consolidating and becoming industrial behemoths in any given sector. India’s booming economy and huge market provides lucrative opportunities for many nations invest here.

Normally any nation would go to any extent to appease potential investors but due to security concerns India has denied clearance to investments worth US$1.63 billion from China. However, to achieve its ambition of economic growth India needs to walk the tightrope till it fully develops its industrial capacities in various fields.

(h) Improve Intelligence and Attribution Capabilities. Since Grey Zone attacks are subtle and aggressive ones can also be couched in benignancy detecting them and ascribing the source can be a challenge. Sometimes Grey Zone attacks- especially those in cyber domain- can also be routed through a third country to conceal the identity of the true sponsor. This requires sophisticated intelligence and cyber capabilities to accurately attribute Grey Zone activities to their sources. This can help in formulating targeted responses and deterrence strategies. In this domain bilateral cooperation between likeminded democratic states can be beneficial. Investing in emerging technologies pertaining to cyber-security, AI and information warfare can assist in intelligence gathering and reliable attribution of attacks.

(j) Legal and Diplomatic Responses. Developing international norms and regulations to govern and respond to Grey Zone activities can help to some extent since these attacks are always not detectable or cannot be attributed immediately to a source. However, any stark attack should be highlighted and the sponsor named and shamed on the international stage through diplomatic efforts to act as a deterrent.

(k) Building Resilience. Authoritarian states like China will continue to pose serious challenges to their democratic rivals through innovative approaches. They also have the advantage of continuity in strategic planning and execution, as well as their investments in weaponizing political, economic, psychological, and social tools as compared to democratic states where the strategic policy reflects the political philosophy of the party in power.

A diverse and plural democratic state like India with a thriving civil society will always have divergence of views which makes infusion of divisive ideas by grey zone activists a possibility. Democracies like India need to strengthen societal resilience by investing in education, community cohesion, and infrastructure that can withstand disruptions caused by Grey Zone tactics. India must learn to intervene earlier, ensure a united approach, have an unwavering national narrative, and be prepared to use coercive economic and non-kinetic measures more frequently.

(l)  Adaptive Military Strategies. India had entered into an agreement with China on “Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement” (BPTA) signed in September 1993. This was followed with the “Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the Military Field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas” in November 1996. These CBMs that formed part of this agreement have stood us in good stead till the clashes in Galwan.

India must develop adaptive military strategies to effectively respond to instances like in Galwan, Doklam and any other hybrid threats while retaining its core values without triggering a full-scale conflict. At times India may have to undertake selective military escalation. The strategy for this must be well thought through and maintaining escalation control throughout. This will require developing capabilities for agile and flexible responses.

(m) Strategic Communication. India would need to improve communication strategies to counter propaganda and misinformation both domestically as well as internationally. Transparent and credible communication can help in maintaining public trust in government and public institutions. This can be achieved by maintaining unadulterated information flow and involving stakeholders from various sectors.

No single approach can entirely prevent Grey Zone warfare, but a combination of these strategies can significantly reduce vulnerability, effectively deter adversaries from employing such tactics against a nation’s interests and mitigate the damage caused.

Organisational Structure for Grey Zone Response

Responding to Grey Zone attacks needs an overall strategic concept to fashion a long term response. No response should be undertaken beyond this concept as it would be uneconomical, and may even prove counterproductive. The strategic concept will comprise Prevention, Pre-emption and Response.

Since the Grey Zone warfare requires a multidisciplinary approach that combines diplomatic efforts, robust defence strategies, intelligence gathering, cyber security and proactive information operations and inputs and efforts from various other stake holders from diverse domains to dissuade potential adversaries from engaging in such tactics, it is imperative to have a specific organisation to plan coordinate, execute and monitor it.

Following is a suggested structure: 

Office of Grey Zone Strategy and Policy

(a) Director/ Head. Responsible for Overseeing the overall strategy, policy formulation, and coordination of efforts to counter Grey Zone tactics

(b) Policy Analysts/ Advisors. Assists in developing policies, strategies, and guidelines for countering Grey Zone activities.

Intelligence and Analysis Team

(a) Intelligence Director. Formulating the intelligence problem, Coordinating intelligence from various other intelligence agencies, managing intelligence gathering, analysis, and assessment of potential Grey Zone threats and formulate and suggest response strategies.

(b) Analysts. Conduct in-depth analysis of adversaries’ actions, intentions, and capabilities in various domains under the aegis of the Multi-Agency Centre.

(c) Threat Assessment Team.  Monitors and identifies emerging threats, providing early warning and actionable intelligence.

Cyber-security and Information Warfare Team

(a) Cyber-security Director. Leads efforts to secure critical infrastructure, prevent cyber-attacks, and counter information warfare.

(b) Cyber Analysts/Information Warfare Specialists Detect and respond to cyber threats, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns.

Pseudo Grey Zone Team. This team also acts as the in-house Grey Team and conducts intrusion resilience check in critical infrastructure information systems.

Strategic Communications and Public Affairs Team

(a) Director of Communications. Develops communication strategies, narratives and counter narratives to combat disinformation and influence campaigns.

(b) Media Relations Specialists. Engage with media, shape public perception, and counter false narratives.

Diplomacy and International Relations Team

(a) Diplomatic Envoys/ Negotiators. Engage with foreign governments, international organizations, and allies to coordinate responses and foster cooperation.

(b)  Policy Liaisons. Maintain relationships and coordinate efforts with other nations and organizations to address Grey Zone threats collectively.

New & Emerging Technologies Wing

(a) Technology and Innovation Director. Explores emerging technologies and develops innovative solutions to counter Grey Zone tactics.

(b) Technology Analysts. Study trends, conduct experiments, and develop strategies using cutting-edge technologies.

Legal and Compliance Division

(a) Legal Auditor. Ensures operations comply with national and international laws, providing legal guidance for counteractions.

(b) Ethics and Compliance Officers.  Monitor operations to ensure ethical conduct and adherence to established guidelines.

Monitoring & Evaluation Division

(a) Performance Analysts. Evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures and monitor the impact of implemented strategies.

(b) Metrics and Evaluation Specialists. Develop metrics and indicators to assess the success of counter Grey Zone efforts.

Rapid Response and Special Operations Unit

(a) Commander. Oversees specialized units for rapid response to Grey Zone activities, including cyber response teams, information warfare units, and special operations forces.

(b) Operational Teams. Conduct covert operations or rapid response activities to counter specific Grey Zone threats.

This structure should facilitate collaboration, information sharing, and agile responses to emerging threats in the Grey Zone. It’s crucial to ensure clear communication channels, seamless coordination among departments, and the ability to adapt swiftly to changing threats and tactics employed by adversaries.

Conclusion

Responding to Grey Zone warfare without it escalating into armed conflict requires a delicate balance between deterrence, resilience-building, and strategic responses. India must understand that certain grey zone activities will always be going on and some of these may actually have little effect. As a democratic polity India is well adept at ignoring and tolerating such chaos these activities will create.

However, beyond the threshold of what is not acceptable a response would be warranted. The first response may at times be a Diplomatic Protest and Demarche highlighting the adversary’s action expressing disapproval and communicating that such behaviour is unacceptable. If this and other less aggressive counter measures are not effective India may have to be ready for selective military escalation through conduct of military exercise close to the frontier region and staging forward of troops to signal resolve without actually engaging in direct conflict.

The goal of these graded responses is to impose costs on the adversary, demonstrate resolve, and deter further Grey Zone activities while avoiding actions that could rapidly escalate into armed conflict. Each response should be carefully calibrated, considering the specific circumstances, the adversary’s actions, and the potential unintended consequences. Has India’s response been able to blunt China’s Grey Zone attacks? Well No! Have China’s all Grey Zone attacks succeeded? No! The battle of wits continues and India must shore up its capabilities and never let its guard down.