Indian Defence Review

In these 46 years since the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, I have been to Pakistan four times. The first three – in 1995, 2000 and 2004 – were at the invitation of the South Asian Media Association (SAMA) and the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA).

Besides, I have been to India at the invitation of its Ministry of External Affairs, in 1991 and 2000.

This year, it appeared to be the turn of the Pakistan authorities, particularly its Institute of Strategic Studies, based in Islamabad, to invite me as part of a team to visit Pakistan.

Given the sensitivities involved in the present state of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh and given too a desire on my part to live up to my old principle of knowing, or trying to know, the mind of the adversary, I visited Pakistan recently for a week.

The Pakistan authorities have always known of my views on the war foisted on us in 1971 and of the steps they have taken or not taken where a development of friendly relations between the two countries is concerned. I am quite certain they remain wary of anything that I write concerning Pakistan.

It was a point not lost on my hosts in Islamabad. For me, the need was to observe first-hand how Pakistanis in these times perceived the past, especially with respect to the war. The opportunity to come by that knowledge was a meeting organised by the Institute of Strategic Studies, currently headed by Khaled Mahmood, a former Ambassador and, as he so happily pointed out, a contemporary of Farooq Sobhan and the late Mustafizur Rahman. All three men joined the Pakistan Foreign Service in 1964. Sobhan and Rahman were to serve as Foreign Secretaries in Bangladesh.

The meeting at the ISS was quite an eye-opener, for a good number of young Pakistani trainee diplomats and foreign policy researchers were in attendance. What became clear within minutes of the meeting getting underway was the absence of information among the young about the causes behind the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. Obviously, there remains a tendency among the political establishment in Islamabad to shy away from a full and adequate coming to terms with reality.

These young people at the ISS interaction were obviously keen on knowing more about Bangladesh and certainly were desirous of the young citizens of both Bangladesh and Pakistan coming closer in the days ahead. But when informed that an important step towards a normalisation of ties between Dhaka and Islamabad was surely an expression of apology by Pakistan over the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army in Bangladesh in 1971, they appeared to be quite unaware of the nature of the crimes committed by their soldiers.

I cannot but add here that our hosts, the Pakistan authorities, went out of their way to make our visit — we were in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore — as substantive and pleasant as possible. Their hospitality was beyond compare. And yet interaction with such individuals as the new Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Tehmina Janjua, elicited little indication that Pakistan would be ready any time soon to say sorry to Bangladesh over the genocide of 1971.

To be sure, almost everyone in Islamabad is ready to point to the expression of regret from former President Pervez Musharraf in the early 2000s over the role of the Pakistani soldiers in 1971.

The argument that our team consistently put forward was simple: just as the Germans and the Japanese have for years been going around in contrition over the acts of their soldiers in the countries they occupied during the Second World War, Pakistan too needed to be bold about letting Bengalis and the rest of the world know, publicly, how sorry they were about the misdeeds of their soldiers back in 1971.

This absence of an expression of contrition remains a stumbling block in a normal development of relations between Dhaka and Islamabad.

A fairly good number of Pakistanis I came across are disturbed at what they consider to be the hostility of the Bangladesh government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina towards Pakistan. In their opinion, Pakistanis and Bengalis have shared a common heritage and should go ahead in a fraternal spirit to forget the past and build a new relationship in tune with the demands of the times.

On a personal level, I made it clear that I understood the nobility involved in the presentation of their arguments. But, then again, I thought it necessary to inform them that the atmosphere was spoilt when the Pakistan government, ignoring diplomatic norms, publicly went into the job of condemning the trials of war criminals in Bangladesh.

Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan did not have to bring in the resolution in the Pakistan National Assembly that was a clear and blatant interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, did he?

The so-called hostility of the Bangladesh government was generated not by any pathological hatred of Pakistan but by that single unwise act of the Pakistan government in condemning the war crimes trials in Dhaka.

My sense is that while at the social level, Pakistanis are keen about developing and nurturing friendly relations with Bengalis, it is the state of Pakistan which remains shy of tackling head-on the issues arising out of the war of 1971. That is where the problem lies. That is where avenues of cooperation between the two countries lead to a cul-de-sac.

Postscript: A Pakistani with obviously sincere feelings of friendship toward Bengalis asked me in Islamabad what I thought precipitated the political crisis between East and West Pakistan in early 1971.

My response was simple: Following the general elections of December 1970, on the basis of globally acknowledged convention, power should have been transferred to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But since the Legal Framework Order (LFO) was in the way and a constitution needed to be arrived at within 120 days of the sitting of the new parliament, the National Assembly, as called into session for March 3, should have been convened despite the opposition of the Pakistan People’s Party.

The postponement of the session, two days before the MNAs were to meet in Dhaka, changed the entire political matrix of Pakistan. Disaster then became inevitable.

Courtesy: www.southasiamonitor.org