The India-Russia strategic relations with its embedded military ties have been, in the past 15 years, buffeted by the turbulence of international upheavals and domestic events. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war have quite dramatically altered the dynamics of this strategic relationship. The emergence of a unipolar world with the USA as the sole superpower impinged adversely on a once ‘special’ relationship and forced both Russia and India to review their geo-political calculations in the light of a changed geo-political environment.

While a brave front was kept up, the reality was that the capability of the Indian armed forces with 80% of its hardware from Soviet Union, remained severely compromised for an unacceptably long period.

Having earlier claimed for itself a leading role in the non-aligned movement(NAM) as a counterweight to the two superpower-led blocs, India found itself searching for identity and place in international affairs with the demise of one superpower. India had neither the economic clout nor any other attribute of power to be reckoned with in the world political arena. The rise of insurgency and secessionistic tendencies, both within the country and in its neighbourhood, shifted the focus of defence and security to internal stability. A fortress-mentality protectionist economic model, based on the Soviet pattern, was abandoned and India reached out to global donors for economic rejuvenation. In a suddenly unfamiliar scenario, India began to address its own economic vulnerabilities which stood out in stark contrast to the success of the Asian Tigers. Its somewhat diminished stature forced India to assess the world through the prism of its own interests.

At the same time the Russian domestic scene underwent major convulsions. The high residual costs of the collapsed Soviet model manifested itself with the economy in disarray and starvation on the streets. The Russian leadership abandoned its ideology based foreign policy and the special relations with India became a casualty. Russian leadership, dominated by ‘west’ oriented members, adopted a neutral stance towards India. Two schools of thought emerged. One comprising academics and defence industry professionals, were for continuing the special relations with India, which they argued, could stem the wave of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across the Central Asia. Additionally, the income accruing from India’s import of Russian arms would be crucial to Russia’s transition to a free market economy. The other school of thought, comprising foreign ministry incumbents, were of the opinion that Pakistan had a vital role in fulfilling Russia’s immediate concerns of foreign policy and security, and that Islamic fundamentalism, boiling over in Russia’s southern flank would be best tackled by working closely with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. That the second school prevailed was demonstrated by the change of policy by Russia in supporting the Pakistan sponsored UN resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. This policy somersault was followed by Russia severing all support to Najibullah in Afghanistan, much to the consternation of India. The strain in Indo-Russian relations was again manifest in Russia reneging on the cryogenic engine and transfer of technology deal under intense pressure from the USA. The huge debt run up by India for purchase of arms from the erstwhile Soviet Union, amounting to over $16 billion became another issue of dispute. The rupee-ruble exchange rate and the repayment scheduling developed into irritants in the relations and it was much later that a mutually agreeable deal was hammered out.

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries.

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in many defence plants closing down in Russia and CIS countries and the impact on Indian armed forces was severe. Product support, just satisfactory in the good times, was completely curtailed. Spare parts and consumables like tyres and split-pins were in short supply and the Indian military had to drastically cut down on operational training to conserve available stocks for any contingency. While a brave front was kept up, the reality was that the capability of the Indian armed forces with 80% of its hardware from Soviet Union, remained severely compromised for an unacceptably long period. Many delegations from India went to Russia and the CIS countries, carrying suitcases filled with dollars and searching for spares and equipment urgently required to raise the availability of tanks, ships and aeroplanes from the alarmingly low levels of 25-30% to an operationally acceptable minimum of 50%. In Russia however, a near chaotic situation obtained, and the cash-strapped country arbitrarily raised the cost of spares by as much as 500-1000%. The Indians had to make emergency calls to South Block, Delhi, for release of additional funds to meet these inflated dollar demands.

During this period of uncertainty, no new weapon systems were procured by India. With an inherent lag in the procurement process of 3-4 years, items ordered in 1991-92 materialised only in 1996-97. While some indigenisation was attempted in India, success was limited and later, this attempt came under attack by Russia for infringement of the IPR convention. However there were some positives also during this difficult period. While Russia went along with other permanent members of the UN Security Council in condemning India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Russia did not impose any sanctions against India. Russia also progressed the deal to build two light water 1000 mega-watt nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. This was despite the USA putting pressure on Russia to scuttle the deal. This move helped in restoring some confidence among Indians that Russia still valued its relations with India. Again, during the Kargil operations in 1999, Russia set aside red tape to fly urgently required military spares and equipment into India.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations. During his visit to India in October 2000, major weapon deals worth over $3 billion-under negotiations for a long time-were finalised. The India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission was upgraded from the level of defence secretaries to the level of Defence Minister on the Indian side and the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of defence exports on the Russian side. In the last five years the major weapon systems acquired or contracted for include the Su-30 MKI multi-role fighters, IL-78 aircraft as platforms for the Indian AWACS, Mi-171V helicopters, Kilo-class submarines, frigates, Ka-31 AEW helicopters, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov now renamed as INS Vikramaditya, MiG-29K carrier compatible fighters, T-90 tanks, AAMs, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles and various types of radars. The value of the projects under the defence cooperation programme till 2010 is $10 billion +. It is estimated that nearly 800 Russian defence production facilities would be kept in operation by Indian defence contracts. It is entirely another matter that an ageing manpower, obsolescent machinery and dependence on exports, mainly to India and China are pointers to looming problems in the making, both for the Russian military industrial complex and for countries largely dependent on Russia for weapon systems. Before analysing the current situation it would be instructive to examine the background that gave rise to the special military relationship between India and Russia.

Pakistan has been a beneficiary of US benevolence for a long time. The doctrinaire approach of Eisenhower and Dulles gathered Pakistan into the ambit of SEATO and CENTO. Weapon systems from the Western bloc flowed into Pakistan, ostensibly to counter the communist threat. Military linkages strengthened between Pakistan and the USA. Despite Pakistan’s known animosity and its so-called ‘unfinished agenda’ of wresting control over the state of J&K, India’s protests to the USA were dismissed, and assurances given that these weapons would not be used against India. India’s stand that no gun has yet been fabricated that would shoot only in one direction was vindicated by later events. And the USA was reluctant to sell weapons to India for fear of offending Pakistan. Britain and France laid down unacceptable conditionalities for transfer of arms and technology to India. Left with no other alternative India turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons, immediately attracting criticism for having allegedly abandoned its non-aligned status. The Soviet Union willingly gave Mi-4 helicopters, AN-12 and IL-14 transport aircraft and later agreed to set up MiG-21 production facilities in India at Nasik for airframes, at Koraput for aero-engines and Hyderabad for avionics. The military debacle of 1962 underscored the requirement for better war preparedness and modern weapon systems. The USA established a chain of radars along the northern belt, but its offer of a ‘defence umbrella’ was not acceptable to India. A request for F-104 Starfighter jets was turned down by the USA.

The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country.

India once again turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons. More variants of the MiG-21 were inducted and over a period of time the IAF’s combat force included the Su-7, the MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and the MiG-29. The helicopter force comprised Mi-4, Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-24/35 gunships and the heavy lift Mi-26. IL-14, AN-12, AN-32 and the IL-76 constituted the transport segment. The army got the T-54 and T-55 tanks, the amphibious PT-22 and PT-76. Later the T-72 tanks were inducted. 130 mm artillery guns, multi-barrel rocket systems for short range area saturation and a host of other infantry weapons were operationalised by the army. Pechora and OSA SAMs, Kvadrat misiles, Schilka tracked AA guns and the twin barrel Zu guns were procured for air defence. The Indian Navy inducted Soviet submarines, OSA missile boats, Petya patrol crafts, Nanuchka corvettes, Kashin class destroyers, landing crafts and motor torpedo boats. The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country. But one of the drawbacks has been the over-dependence on imported design with consequential negative effects on our own research and development sector and the stunting of indigenous genius.

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries. A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences. A dependable India could be an important bulwark against the US-Pakistan, China-Pakistan and US-China strategic and quasi-strategic alliances. And a dependent India in an economic partnership where the advantage lay with the Soviets could be a profitable long term investment. It can be seen that in this special relationship, India’s needs were matched by Soviet Union’s strengths and Soviet Union’s requirements were matched by India’s strengths. As long as the international geo-political equilibrium was not unduly disturbed, this relationship was destined to flourish.

A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences.

The acme of this relationship between the two countries was the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. One of the provisions of the Treaty was the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and for immediate mutual consultations in case either country was subjected to external attack. Some analysts have argued that this particular provision dissuaded China from ‘leaning’ on our northern borders when almost the entire Indian military was engaging the Pakistanis during the 1971 war. There were many occasions during the war when aeroplane loads of war-waging material was flown into our airbases as replenishments. India accomplished its war objectives and it did so by employing weapons which were predominantly of Soviet origin. The propaganda value of Soviet weapons having humbled western arms was immense and came as a big boost to the Soviet military industrial complex.