Gaps in Maritime Security

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Cross border terrorism has taken an entirely new dimension. The Indian security establishment is on high alert to tackle the newest frontier of terror – Maritime Terrorism. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has defined maritime terrorism as:“…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.”

But in the context of Mumbai 26/11 terrorist attack, maritime terrorism now needs to be redefined as any act of terror that emanates from the sea route, whether its eventual intended target is on land or within the maritime environment. This would, therefore, include “the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility” as stated by Akiva J Lorenz: Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat, published in the Institute for Counter-Terrorism. (http://www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org/)

Of particular concern for India are Lashkar-e-Tayebba’s, also spelt as Lashkar-e-Toiba, (LeT) plans to use the sea-route to infiltrate and attack India’s oil assets in Bombay High, sabotage ports and target high value assets such as the atomic power plants located on the coast or attack INS Vikrant, India’s only aircraft carrier while it is ensconced in dry dock facilities at the Cochin Naval Base.

Bombay High, 160 Kilometers off Mumbai produces a third of the country’s oil. But what is the real security presence around these oil rigs? An on the spot check two years ago by the author had revealed that re-labeled fishing boats were hired by  ONGC to keep trawlers 500 meters away from the platforms (See Photograph). More than a year before the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack in which the terrorists came in through the sea route from Karachi, Indian intelligence agencies had warned the government on a new emerging threat-Maritime Terrorism.

Intelligence agencies had informed the government that nearly 500 LeT terrorists were being trained in the Azizabad coastal camps near Karachi to execute acts of maritime terrorism within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) as well as attack high value assets along India’s more than 7,000 kms mainland coastline. The first such six-month maritime terror training started in October 2006 got over in March 2007. In fact, the Ministry of Defence in a written reply at 15:45 IST to the Lok Sabha on March 08, 2007 made the following statement on infiltration of terrorists through the sea route:

“…The intelligence agencies have warned about the possibility of terrorists trying to infiltrate through the sea route or trying to target our offshore installations. There are reports about terrorists of various tanzeems being imparted training and likelihood of their infiltration through sea routes. India’s coastal waters are guarded by the Indian Coast Guard in coordination with the State Police and the Navy. The Coast Guard has plans to augment its strength, infrastructure and other assets to further improve its effectiveness all along the coastal areas including Kerala. Maritime terrorism, gun-running, drug trafficking and piracy are major threats that India is facing from the sea borders of the country. The measures that have been taken and planned to enhance the coastal security include regular aerial surveillance and maritime patrolling along the coast, establishment of coastal police stations in the littoral States, as part of Coastal Security Scheme, vessels monitoring system, etc.”

Fishing Vessels As Terrorist Tool

Yet, one and half years later Mumbai was attacked. Therefore, the question that needs an honest introspection is – are all these agencies along with the Coast Guard and the Navy, in the short and long term, prepared, equipped and trained in maritime counter-terror operations to thwart, prevent and deter another terror attack either on the high seas or a Mumbai 26/11 on any other location? The Coast Guard is still woefully short of fast patrol boats to prevent a suicide squad of terrorists who could commandeer a fishing boat, load it with explosives and ram into the oil rigs. Such a maritime fidayeen attack will have a devastating effect. That’s why the Navy and Coast Guard want faster patrol boats that can do this job of securing the oil rigs more effectively. “The boats that we have to assist ONGC are slow and these are an interim arrangement until we get fast boats,” says Rear Admiral, Mahendra P Taneja, Former Flag Officer Defence Advisory Group. But the Coast Guard and Navy’s request for faster interceptor boats, which can clock speeds upto 40 knots has still not been met.

As a result until those fast boats arrive, India’s crucial economic asset,  the Bombay High, worth several thousand crores continues to be vulnerable to Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) covert terrorism strikes outsourced to LeT’s maritime terror trained operatives. For nearly two years now Indian intelligence agencies were worried that Pakistan’s ISI could misuse hundreds of Indian fishing boats seized over the years by the Pakistani Navy and Coast Guard for allegedly straying into Pakistani territorial waters. In fact, the thinking within the national security establishment was that these fishing boats could be used by Pakistan based terrorists to infiltrate into Indian waters. In fact, the National Fishworkers Forum (NFF) and various other organizations representing the Indian fishermen have constantly been alerting the governments of the coastal states and the central government of the need to engage them in effective policing of coastal waters. “It is quite easy for a fishing trawler or any other similar boat to fly an Indian flag to enter Indian territorial waters. I am saying this because we are out on the seas for months together and often we hardly encounter either the Coast Guard or Navy. Our territorial waters can be easily penetrated,” says Rajendra Shantaram Meher, Chairman, Satpati Fishing Society. Satpati is around three hours drive from Mumbai.

The Coast Guard says that it will need much greater force and a larger fleet to  keep Indian waters safe. Several months ago A Rajshekhar, the then IG (West) Coast Guard was quoted in the media that the coastal force would “need more aircraft and ships and we hope the government will give us these. And you have to still appreciate we cannot be in all the places at all the time.” The fact is that India’s coastal regions remain porous and vulnerable to terrorist incursions.

Pirates as Mercenaries

Securing long coastline is a serious challenge for India. In 2007 the Government sanctioned Rs 500 crores to implement a four-year plan to strengthen the coastal security infrastructure and prevent acts of terrorism in India’s territorial waters. Strangely, while Mumbai 26/11 apparently woke the country out of slumber, security analysts have been warning about some disturbing scenarios of what terrorism in the seas could be like. In fact, the national security establishment is aware that if effective maritime counter terror measures are not put in place immediately it is quite  possible for such scenarios to come true. Like, for instance, a 100,000-ton oil tanker blows up in the Arabian Sea close to the Indian coast or a LPG tanker docked in an Indian harbour is blown up causing enormous economic loss and a high death and injury count. And now the rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia has forcefully reminded security and strategic experts that terror operations could well be outsourced to sea pirates as well. A hijacked merchant vessel carrying several thousand tons of the inflammable fertilizer ingredient ammonium nitrate could easily be turned into a mega bomb after entering an Indian harbour.

Could piracy on high seas morph into this new face of terrorism? With well armed Somali pirates wreaking havoc on shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden between Somalia and Yemen, Al Qaeda and its associate terror groups could easily outsource maritime terrorism to mercenary pirate groups. From seizing cargo ships to supertankers ferrying millions of dollars of crude oil, the Somali pirates attacked and hijacked 90 vessels in 2008 for ransom and looting cargo from wheat to chemicals. In the process they have made millions of dollars reselling these items and have now become a major security risk for Indian and international shipping industry, trade and economy. So could sea piracy be converted into a terror operation? Security experts suggest that terror groups could easily rope in pirates who have good knowledge of shipping routes, have access to satellite phones and communication links with ports in the region which enable them to access accurate satellite communication about cargo shipping lines.

Way back on August 1, 2007 the London based International Maritime Bureau (IMB) had opened a 24 hour communication hot line where callers could anonymously relay information on sea piracy, crime and terrorism. So strategic thinking on maritime terrorists pro-actively linking up with sea pirates opened up a year and half ago. IMB, a global maritime watchdog agency, set up the piracy center in Kuala Lumpur. “It is a good concept. Shipyard workers or ship crew may know something but most are reluctant to report to the police or to the ship owner because they are afraid of being detained or of losing their job,” said the centre’s chief, Noel Choong, during its inauguration. “Now we are giving them an option to report to us. It will be a big boost to fighting crime and terrorism at sea,” he said. The IMB will assess the reliability of the information before passing it to law enforcement agencies in the countries concerned, who will have to verify if the threat is real, he said. Seafarers, port workers, shipping agents, shipyards, brokers and stevedores across the world can now call this hot line telephone number +603-20310014, or fax the critical information to +603-20785769 or email it to imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org.

The IMB has warned that piracy could be on the rise and, therefore, the threat of maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean cannot be taken lightly. In fact, maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait which carries half the world’s oil trade and a third of global commerce is now seen as a realistic scenario. Some 200 ships use the straits every day to travel from Europe and the Middle East to Asia. Pirate attacks in the waterway have declined in the past three years after Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore introduced coordinated security patrols, but concerns still linger that militants could hijack a ship carrying hazardous material and use it as a floating bomb.

Security of Ports

India is inadequately prepared to tackle maritime terrorism. On December 20, 2008, weeks after the Mumbai 26/11 attack, the Union Home Secretary, Madhukar Gupta chaired a high-level meeting in New Delhi last Thursday to discuss various issues relating to the security of ports. In 2009 India will take the first steps in establishing a security architecture that aims to secure the water area related to ports and the ports from maritime terror attacks. A mechanism to coordinate the functioning of the state police, Customs and Coast Guard-the agencies that patrol in the water area related to ports-will also be set up. Several decisions taken at that meeting will be implemented this year like providing two interceptor boats to every port and detailed examination of the irregular and unregulated movement of boats including fishing boats.

Central Industrial Security Force, personnel will also be deployed inside the ports. A standard operating protocol/procedure for initiation and deployment of anti-terror commando units in the eventuality of a terror attack and their interaction with other security agencies is also being generated. But, as is self evident, a lot more needs to be done, including a comprehensive security audit of the most vulnerable ports to begin with and in a phased manner all ports, fishing harbours, jetties and landing points, must be necessarily carried out by a joint task force which has expert representatives from various agencies. Also several ports in India categorized as minor ports fall under the State Government’s control and these ports could be more vulnerable to maritime terrorism. In the meantime basic security drill like access control, surveillance systems, I-cards for employees and so on should be immediately implemented in all ports in India.

Security – Resource Mismatch

The daring piracy operations of non-state actors in the Gulf of Aden and the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack have made these scenarios come alive within the realm of possibility.  These scenarios are potential illustrations of terror’s new watery frontier. With the bombing of USS Cole off Yemen in 2000 and a similar attack on the French oil tanker Limburg two years later, the sea is indeed the new playground of Al Qaeda’s 21st Century terrorism. Is India prepared to combat and counter maritime terror? The mismatch between the security challenge and the resources available to tackle it is daunting. The Indian Coast Guard has a fleet of 76 vessels, 24 fixed wing aircraft and 18 helicopters to police a 7,600km coastline and a 2.02 million square km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In addition to this inadequacy, most of the 140 ships of the Indian Navy cannot operate in shallow waters where terrorists operate, a security nightmare best illustrated along the east coast especially along Tamil Nadu where there are nearly 400 landing points along a roughly 1000-km coastline.

The LTTE Factor

Intelligence agencies have inputs which indicate that terror groups are getting more ambitious with their maritime agenda. With the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in complete disarray as a result of Sri Lankan Army’s sustained onslaught and the recapture of LTTE’s administrative headquarters, Kilinochi, the Tamil Nadu coast has now become ultra-sensitive. Last year there were several seizures along the Tamil Nadu coast of contraband consignments meant for the LTTE. Four LTTE cadres and an Indian supporter along with ammunition including a suicide body belt and AK 56 rifles were recovered from a Sea Tigers’ boat which was apprehended by the Coast Guard while it was sailing in Indian waters. The boat lined with explosives was destroyed by the police. Commenting on this development, security and strategic expert and former Additional Secretary R&AW, B Raman, had stated that the “LTTE has been reviving it’s arms movement from India which they had discontinued after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination.” Now with the war in northern Sri Lanka decisively tilted in favour of the Sri Lankan Army, and with the LTTE finding it extremely difficult to hold on to its Sea Tigers base in Mullaitivu, analysts believe that the Tamil Nadu coast might once again be used as a supply base.

Last year the Navy, Coast Guard and Tamil Nadu Police seized more than five different consignments of explosives on their way to LTTE controlled destinations in North and Northeastern Sri Lanka. Amongst the seizures were:

• Over 6 tonnes of Alumunium based metals, used for making IEDs.
• The Tamil Nadu Police arrested three Indians and seized two tonnes of Aluminium powder from a Madurai factory.
• Four Sri Lankan Tamils and three Indians were arrested with of ball bearings that are used as shrapnel in bombs.
• Live rockets were recovered from the sea bed near Rameswaram.

These seizures last year were humble reminders of the fact that despite a strong counter intelligence network in Tamil Nadu, intelligence agencies perhaps were caught napping because the LTTE had managed to set up new supply routes and pick-up points on Indian soil. The then Director General of Police, D Mukherjee, admitted that “there are constraints of manpower. We do our best. Whatever intelligence we get we act on it. But certain things still go on.” With the 56 and 57 Divisions of the Sri Lankan Army now battling to recapture the stretch between Kilinochi and Mulaitivu on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, there is a threat perception of the LTTE sending its cadres as refugees to India. The 2008 seizures in which Indians were also arrested point to an even more serious twist. At that time SC Chandrahasan of the Organisation for Eelam Refugee Rehabilitation had pointed out that the “LTTE has been successful in hiring local Indians and that could make the conflict more serious.”

Revamping Coastal Security Apparatus

Considering the inadequate coastal security infrastructure along the vast and porous Indian coastline the issues relating to registration of boats, transponders and bio-metric identity cards for fishermen, port workers and others associated with maritime activities assume tremendous urgency. With maritime terrorism actually becoming a reality, security agencies have observed that there are several fishing harbours in India that are operational within port limits. Clearly these fishing harbours could be misused by maritime terrorists and, therefore, a clear plan of action must be enunciated to relocate such fishing harbours, taking due cognizance of the livelihood issues of the fishermen and ensuring that they are not adversely affected.

While these are issues that the Indian government is keen to address in the most effective and time bound manner, much will be achieved if a ‘mission mode’ work ethic is infused to ensure that the Indian national security establishment is in a position to deter the most sophisticated maritime terrorist attack of the future. A hallmark ground survey carried out by this author and his team of investigators three years ago is still relevant because nothing has changed on the ground. In addition to the status quo, what the rough survey does reveal is the massive task at hand when it comes to revamping coastal security. The survey randomly selected certain fishing harbours along the Konkan coast in Western India.

Most of these places are small centres of fishing, barring Dahanu Khadi, Satpati, and Vasai where trawlers are available. Of these Dhanu Khadi is the smallest, rural place, where people are a little more simplistic, and not as suspicious and street smart as the people in Vasai and Satpati.

Other places like Bordi, Khare Kuran, Kelve, do not have trawlers, they have smaller, diesel engine boats, which use more traditional floating net methods of catching fish. Their boats are not that powerful, but these also go outside Indian territorial waters.  

(There are many more fishing villages along this section of the coast but the above fishing centres were visited for the purpose of the survey)

Murud – Janjira (Estuary) Area

• The Murud- Janjira estuary is a deep estuary (at least 10 km deep) with several villages around it. Still it is quite isolated with long stretches where one could not see a soul for miles. Fishing societies affirm that they are rarely checked. Patrolling rarely happens along this stretch.
• The local Customs ’speed boat’ is actually a normal medium boat commissioned in 1998, but rotting in a mangrove near Agardanada (close to the mouth of the estuary).

Revdanda, Kashid, Nandgaon

• From Nandgaon, to Kasid, the population along the seafront is extremely sparse. The beaches are extremely rocky and the few fishing villages are in small estuaries / bays.
• Revdanda is a big fishing center along the Kundalika river. There are several fishing villages along the coast and the mouth of the river.
• The Customs has a major office with the Superintendent of Customs stationed there.
• Revdanada is also the base all patrol boats of the Raigad district police. In 2004 three new Patrol boats were purchased for patrolling the coastal waters. But instead of placing them at three different places and evenly distributing jurisdiction between the three all the boast are based in Revdanda. But with no dedicated staff these boats have become inoperable and are rotting in the mangroves.
• There is a private (commercial jetty) in the middle of the river Kundalika, owned by the Vikram Ispat Co. (Grasim Group). Large ships carrying iron ore dock there and unload there consignment, which is then transported by conveyor belt to the plant a kilometer upstream.

Alibaug – Sakar Area

• The Alibaug Sakar area is more active in terms of number of boats. The beaches here are very flat, but most boats here are small 2 / 3 cylinder engine boats.
• The two Customs offices in this area are literally non-functional. Two years ago both were locked and in dilapidated condition. Fishermen say that the Customs staff work half a day and then disappear. They hardly check the fishing cargo unloaded at the Alibaug-Sakar stretch. The police presence in this entire region from Murud to Alibaug is very minimal.

Karanja (Uran)

• Uran is just across Thane creek from Colaba. Uran is also where, JNPT (Jawahar Lal Nehru Port Trust) is situated. And the Oil/ Gas jetties of ONGC are in Nahva-Sheva.
• Karanja is the biggest fishing centre in all of Maharashtra. A lot of the trawlers operate out of the Sasoon docks in Mumbai. There is little local police presence in Karanja itself.
• There is a large Customs office in Mora (6 km from Karanja), which has recently switched to a computerized database management system. As a result all boats which operate out of this area now have numbers like (F/MOR/04/xx) earlier they were just KRJ (meaning the boat is registered in Karanja) or URN(meaning the boat is registered in Uran)
• There is a small sub-inlet off Thane creek, called Panvel creek (along Vashi/ Navi Mumbai). Here the Central Railway is building a new line and a bridge. Huge barges carrying sand sail in and offload in the area. The Ambuja Group has a jetty on Panvel creek and there is one Customs patrol vessel stationed here.

Trombay Area: (Turbhe)

• Trombay is where some extremely important Defence/ Government institutions are located (right on the coast), among these are the:

- Naval Armaments Depot.

- The Bhaba Atomic Research Centre  (BARC)

- The Trombay Refinery

- The Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers (RCF)

The CISF is tasked with security of all these institutions and the Navy looks after its own armoury. But this security presence is restricted in the sense that it is confined to guarding installations and compounds. Instead as Mumbai 26/11 has shown terrorists with marine commando training and operating in small groups need to be countered with a holistic security strategy. Currently outside the installations and such important institutional compounds there is no other security in the area barring few Mumbai police constables on the road turning into BARC.

• The Customs has an office in Trombay, but it is not very active.
• The trawler/fishing boat/ small boats traffic along the Thane creek is quite high. A lot of passenger ferries operate out of the Gateway of India too.

The Sassoon Dock Area

• This is the main Fishing Docks of Mumbai, and Maharashtra. For years the security has been lax at the docks. This is where the Mumbai 26/11 terrorists docked absolutely unhindered. Usually there is only one Port Authority guard at the entrance of the docks. But on most occasions the guard on duty is missing from the post.
• Only Trawlers operate out of the Sassoon dock.
• The dock area is extremely crowded and it is easy to get lost in the crowds especially at high tide. So it is not surprising that the 10 Mumbai 26/11 came ashore without attracting much attention and smoothly made their way into South Mumbai.
• The Sassoon dock is situated in the heart of the defence area of Mumbai (Colaba), and is close to the Naval base.
• There is no special police presence either on the ground at the docks or in patrol boats around Sassoon docks.

Assessment of Security

On the basis of this survey one can conclude that the security cover is fragile. Here is a dissection of the coastal security along a section of a sensitive coastal area on India’s west coast. It can be categorised into five different levels:

• The Fishing Co-operative
• The Customs Department
• The Local Police
• The Indian Coast Guard
• The Indian Navy

The Fishing Co-operative Society

Each centre no matter how small, has atleast one or two fishing co-operative societies.

• Every boat has a registration number. (For example the boats in a small place like Bordi are registered in Umergaon in Gujarat. Their numbers begin with UMR. Boats in Dahanu, numbers begin with DNU). But these registration numbers are not computerized and cannot easily be tracked or regulated through ‘know the boat owner’ profiling.
• All boats, have complicated system of recognition by the flags they fly, which are understandable only to the locals. Some boats belonging to one family will have additional flags of the family. (So confusing that even the Coast Guard or the Customs don’t understand it.)

Bottom line: No written rules on flag flying.

• Technically the crew of the boat cannot change. The boat has to carry papers, issued by the Society countersigned by Customs, each time it goes out to sea. But this rule is often breached. The Pass (Photopass as it is called in the local lingo) has photos of the entire crew of the boat, and is issued once for the entire season, beginning End of August to the End of May. Anyone else travelling on the boat, strict No-No.

          Bottom Line: Everyone has a photopass of the entire crew. While the rule exists, it is hardly implemented either in law or in spirit. In fact, this is a much abused system and one can bribe the society to make as many photo-passes as possible.

• The only place where the crew can get diesel is the Society, which in turn directly gets it from government companies like BP, HP IBP. Thus each time a boat has to go out, the Society gets to know. The fishermen are given diesel at a subsidised rate, but recently to prevent illegal supply to other places, the government has asked Societies to buy diesel at the normal rate, and at the end of each quarter, the oil companies give back the payment to the society.

          Bottom Line: Essentially a boat can be easily registered with a fishing harbour, a photo pass for its crew can again be easily issued and even fuel can be purchased without arousing any suspicion.

• There is nothing to stop a boat from procuring diesel from outside, but Societies, even large ones are very tightly knit, and an unscheduled movement will definitely be noticed. But local police intelligence and Customs offices hardly interact with fishing Societies to gather human intelligence. Most boats go out together to sea and come back together. They will normally move within line of sight, and normally stay close together at high seas.

Bottom Line: Maritime terrorists can easily infiltrate this system and the only way to prevent this is to involve and co-opt fishing societies and fishermen in the massive task of securing the coastline.

• Most Societies have wireless sets. Most large trawlers (nearly 80%) and many medium boats have wireless VHF sets, and Global Positioning System equipment on board. So Societies can track movements of boats through wireless.

          Bottom Line: Societies know where the boat is and what it is doing. This communication network should be linked to coastal police stations proposed to be set up along the coast.

• The concepts of Indian territorial waters (12 Nautical Miles from the coast), Exclusive Economic Zone (200 Nautical Miles from the coast) and high seas are not understood clearly not only by fishermen, but glaringly also by local policemen and Customs staff. Fishermen have often spotted large foreign mechanized trawlers fishing in India’s EEZ and sometimes even in territorial waters. Surely the communication systems on the Indian fishing trawlers can be networked to listening posts of Coast Guard and the coastal police stations, so that millions of Indian fishermen can become the eyes and ears of the Indian security establishment in the high seas and coastal areas.

The Fishing Co-operative (Machchimar Sahakari Sansthan) must become a crucial element of coastal security related activities. At the moment the Fishing Cooperative and the fishing communities across the eastern and western coasts do not have any linkage with Customs or police. Intelligence agencies hardly have any penetration in these communities. Also a major drawback is that the movement of boats from fishing harbours, jetties and other landing points on the coast is unrestricted, so its easy for a boat to either come in or sail out.

The Customs Department

There is a Customs office at every major fishing centre. Strictly in accordance with the rules and regulations and in accordance with its charter of activities, every Customs office at the fishing harbours and along the coast has the following responsibilities:

• It issues photo-passes and keeps records of various fishing crews going out into the sea.
• Issues Registration Numbers to boats after it has carried out sea worthiness checks. A nominal fee is charged for this.
• Should develop an information gathering system by generating source-based human intelligence gathering from within Fishing Co-operatives and Societies. If such information gathering systems are actually functional this would have been a significant deterrent to outsiders inimical to national interests.
• The Customs should have small speedboats (carry a crew of two or three), and should regularly patrol their area of jurisdiction. But in reality the Customs does not have speedboats and the patrol boats purchased after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts are in a dilapidated and unusable condition. Most Customs outposts on the coasts are under staffed and many are shockingly under lock and key because the Customs officers prefer to cool their heels in urban centres far away from their offices on the coast. Morale and work interest are low because the days of incentives and rewards as a result of traditional anti-smuggling operations has long receded into the past. With the opening and liberalization of the Indian economy smuggling of consumer goods, gold and gems and other such items became non-lucrative for Customs officers and staff. And over the years the much sought after Customs service has degenerated into a third rate government agency. This coincided with rise of narco-terrorism related smuggling operations in the 1990s. Dawood Ibrahim and his network of Mumbai underworld operatives also invested heavily in setting up a fleet of ocean going vessels owned by shipping companies funded by the underworld. From the 1990s smuggling operations along the Indian coast was increasingly associated with anti-national subversive activities and the Customs was neither trained nor equipped to deal with this maritime threat. Information gathered from Customs officials, serving and retired, suggest that posting to fishing centre outposts was seen within the organisation as a ‘punishment posting’. In fact, Customs officials and staff considered a posting to urban trading centres, export-import centres and large ports as ‘good posting’ because these were lucrative postings where “moolah” could be made.

On paper the Customs outposts in the fishing centres and its relatively bigger presence in ports should combine together to generate crucial coastal security inputs. But on ground the reality is that while this system has the potential for generating intelligence on activities in the high seas, this system is just isn’t operational and real security enforcement is completely absent. The Customs does not watch fishing docks. Most Customs outposts are abandoned and the staff is perpetually on casual leave. Barring having their paperwork in order the department does very little else. The joint sea patrols of the Navy, Coast Guard and Customs initiated after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts are mere eyewash. In fact, the Navy pulled out of the joint patrols soon thereafter after Naval intelligence found out that Customs officers were collecting hefty commissions from boat owners and crews of fishing boats by threatening to lodge fraudulent arms smuggling cases against them.

Local Police Station

The existing local coastal police station is not geared to tackle coastal security threats. However, the current role of these police stations give them important tasks.

• The police station has copies of registration of boats and photo-passes. The police station, therefore, should play an important role on gathering intelligence from fishing cooperatives and societies on criminal activities in the coastal region including smuggling and other related activities.
• Each coastal police station is supposed to set up check posts (chowkie) on roads with easy access to the coast. In some case the police have indeed set up chowkies on the main road leading to fishing harbours, jetties and landing points. But wherever there are checkposts or chowkies only one or sometimes two constables (unarmed) are deployed. Most check posts do not have wireless sets. These few sprinkling of check posts along the coast and the coastal police stations set up a little far away from coast are the only visible, physical police presence in the entire stretch from the coast to Mumbai.
• At the checkpost most trucks are cursorily checked. Those transporting fish carry a pass from the Fishing Cooperative or Society that mentions the quantity and value of the fish being transported. So comprehensive checks of cargo are rare and it is easy for anyone to smuggle arms into the hinterland.
• The coastal police stations are under equipped and short staffed. Such police outposts are few and far between. The coastal police force is small, untrained and low on motivation. One police station on an average has 30 police men, and controls over 60 villages. They don’t have speedboats and patrol vehicles and so their response to an emergency can be expected to be slow and confused.

Bottom Line: The existing system of coastal police is absolutely ineffective.

The coastal police is not aware of the significance of its duties. Even the basic duties of patrolling the coastal waters and coastal roads rarely happen. It is not surprising to find incongruities, for instance, three coastal boats have been provided to Raigad police in Maharashtra but no staff has been allocated to it. So three new spanking patrol boats purchased in 2004 have been pushed into a mangrove forest on the coast away from prying eyes and allowed to rot.

The Indian Coast Guard

Set up in the seventies, the Coast Guard is the strongest link in the security chain. It is very active at sea. The patrol vessels are well armed and equipped with good maritime radars. Each Coast Guard patrol vessel on normal patrol duty checks between 30 to 40 boats in a span of 24 hours. Most large vessels have their own helicopters.

• When checking of fishing boats is undertaken then it is very thorough. Cargo, papers and identity cards everything is checked. So the failure of the Coast Guard to check Kuber, the fishing trawler that was hijacked by the 10 Mumbai 26/11 terrorists, comes as a surprise. The Navy Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said in a press conference that the Coast Guard merely asked for identity cards and allowed Kuber to carry on. If Kuber was boarded and checked by the Coast Guard Mumbai 26/11 could have been foiled. A rough estimate of the probability of checking of fishing boats based on information gathered from Fishing Cooperative and Societies suggest that there is a 1/3 (33.3%) chance of a boat being checked each time it goes out to the sea.
• The Coast Guard has a well equipped air wing. The inventory includes Dorniers, Chetak and Sea King Helicopters. All these are equipped with good maritime radars and have reliable communication links with the patrol vessels.
• The Coast Guard gets regular inputs from Naval Intelligence and from RAW and Intelligence Bureau.

Bottom Line : The Coast Guard is grossly under-equipped. There are only 60 ships to patrol 7000 km. All 60 of these are never out at sea at any given point. Thus the Coast Guard is unable to carry out its duties as required. Checking at sea and boarding of boats is rare which is a cause for concern.

Indian Navy

The Navy’s mandated presence is outside the territorial waters. It is involved in tracking movements of big ships, maintaining deterrence, protecting the country’s EEZ, countering maritime terrorism in the sea, fighting piracy and keeping out foreign intruders.  The Navy generally maintains contact only with the major Port Trusts regarding activity on the shipping lanes and normally checks vessels deviating from the normal routes.

Bottom Line: The controversy over the existence of prior intelligence of a ship, Al Hussaini, setting sail from Azizabad near Karachi, followed by the hijack of fishing trawler Kuber, and the failure of both the Coast Guard and Navy to intercept either Al Hussaini or Kuber, shows the lack of information sharing and problems of coordination.

The Broad Overview

There is no single agency in control of the coast. This is a huge problem. Neither the Coast Guard nor the Navy are in complete control. This is a problem area.

• The Navy should not be involved in looking after coastal security. It is a task that will blunt the very purpose of the Navy. The Navy should be like the Army, called in only for emergency duties, and be free to train and be battle ready, engage in maritime counter-terrorism operations and power projection in the Indian Ocean region.
• The Coast Guard should have overall command of coastal security. At this point it would seem the Coast Guard only has this command on paper and does not get to know of details like the kinds of ships coming into Indian waters or to Ports.
• There should be provision to bring all other coastal agencies like the Maritime Boards, the Port Trusts to a Unified Coastal Authority or Command under the overall supervision of the Coast Guard.
• For coastal patrolling there should only be one agency, instead of having the coastal police and Customs working at cross purposes, and repeating their tasks with no coordination between the two.

Offshore Security

• The Coast Guard should be strengthened with fast patrol vessels and other assets to protect oil rig in Bombay High. The current system of hiring fishing trawlers for security duties must be done away with as soon as possible.
• Currently, perimeter security around the rigs is maintained by disallowing boats from venturing within one nautical mile of the oil rigs. But this should be increased to at least three kilometer radius.

Customs

• The Marine and Preventive wing of the Customs should be disbanded because it’s a hot bed of corruption and in any case its activities are restricted to the Port.
• This Customs department is incapable of patrolling because it has neither the requisite assets nor training to do so.
• The duties of coastal patrolling should be handed over exclusively to the coastal police.

Coastal Police

• As has been laid out in the new Coastal security plan the coastal police needs to build more coastal police stations.
• The force needs to be trained in maritime policing roles and more importantly be nautically oriented. It needs to be a separate wing altogether and not men simply drawn from the State Police. Perhaps, their training could be undertaken by the Coast Guard.
• The frequency and stringency of coastal road patrols needs to be increased and check posts need to be setup.
• Initially may be the police coastal patrol boats could be staffed by ex-servicemen from the Coast Guard/Navy.

Coast Guard

• The force needs to be empowered with enhanced infrastructure and personnel to carry out its task. It should be designated as the nodal agency for coastal security.
• It needs to be in full command of the coast and have the rights to control movements of merchant ships in and out of the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone.
• All other marine agencies should be function under a coordination agency, like a Unified Coastal Authority/Command, supervised by the Coast Guard.

The Fishing Cooperative or Society

Indian fishermen who earn their living from the sea need to be actively engaged and utilised as the eyes and ears of coastal security establishment.

Conclusion

Given these realities on the ground, the warnings issued by the India’s National Security Advisor M K Narayanan in 2007 and 2008, ended in the brutal Mumbai 26/11 attack. India’s largely ill-informed media projected this terror strike as the first case of terrorist assault through the sea route. But the first case of LeT terrorist infiltrating through the sea route was recorded in February 2008. Out of the eight terrorist infiltrators two were arrested by the Jammu & Kashmir police. Abdul Majeed and Mohammad Jameel, suspected LeT militants, were arrested by J&K police from Rajouri in March 2008. The police interrogation reports reveal that terrorists first breached coastal security along India’s west coast in February 2008. Was this is a dry run for Mumbai 26/11? According to the revelations made the arrested LeT terrorists on February 23, eight LeT militants left a coastal village in Pakistan. Once in Indian waters they were transferred to an Indian fishing boat. Manning this boat were two alleged Indian LeT operatives Asif and Abbas. On shore, the group was met by another Indian LeT operative codenamed Sameer.

The coincidences between the February 2008 infiltration and Mumbai 26/11 are uncanny. J&K police found that Jameel had a student ID card on the name of ‘Dheeraj’ from Chembur in Mumbai. All the terrorists had fake documents from Delhi and Chandigarh and they even had Voter I-cards. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Officer B R Sharma said, “The preliminary investigations have revealed that 64 voter cards are not available with us and two have been used by militants.” Similarly, all the Mumbai 26/11 terrorists had college ID cards and other such fake ID documents. Since 2007 Indian intelligence agencies had been issuing warnings of about 500 marine terrorists trained in sea sabotage waiting to enter India by the sea-route. Maritime terrorism requires deep rooted logistic support on land. This is why the latest terror threat faced by India needs new counter terrorism preparedness.