China’s fifth white paper, published in December 2004, outlines the objectives of a military policy focused on Taiwan1. Weaponry and equipment are identified as “the crucial material and technological basis for pushing forward the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics” and “building a strong military by means of science and technology”. Addressing the Cross Strait’s issue as the main concern for the PLA, the 2004 White Paper favours a more offensive posture around the concept of “offshore defensive operations”.

”Air strikes” are now listed as the Air Force number one mission while the Second Artillery’s role as a deterrent – “deterring the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China and carrying out nuclear counter attacks” – is supplemented by a role for offensive tactical/conventional pre-emptive strikes -”precision strikes with conventional missiles”. Decided by Deng Xiao Ping in 1992 and fuelled by economic growth, the current transformation of the Chinese military will serve to convince Taiwan and the United States that the PLA can win a military confrontation over the “renegade province” while giving China a world power status.

I – Strategic Concerns

“Win local wars under the conditions of formationalisation”

China sees itself as a weaker military power in a unipolar world where the US and their allies modernise their military and implement the Revolution in Military Affairs while initiating wars against smaller states like Serbia or Iraq. In his memoirs, Liu Huaqing – Commander-in-chief of the Navy (1982-88), Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989-97) - stresses on the technical inferiority of China’s military – when “to become a grand nation you need a modern army”2.

The PLA works on long-range land attack cruise missiles which benefit from Russian, Israeli and captured US cruise missile technologies. It had extended the range of the subsonic anti-ship missile based on the French EXOCET and is developing the YJ-12/YJ-62, a supersonic anti-ship 300 km cruise missile.

This “informationalisation” challenge requires investments. Still a wanted career in many circles, the PLA can hardly attract the smartest elements of the society with its low wages and the White Paper underlines new solutions like the “Strategic Project for Talented People”3. The growth of China’s defence expenditures in the last three years (170.778 billion yuan/2002; 190.787 billion yuan/2003 ; 211.701 billion yuan/2004) is officially related to the personnel : “increase of the salaries and allowances of the military personnel4.

“Breaking the blockade against China’s maritime security”

Drawing the lessons from the second Gulf War (1990-91), the Chinese Military Commission defined in 1993 a new doctrine of “active defence”. Liu Huaqing, the then Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission, explains in his memoirs that “if we don’t choose offensive tactics in the battles we cannot achieve our overall objective of strategic defence”5. China’s new wealth and centre of gravity has shifted to its “gold coast” putting the emphasis on maritime air defence which has been traditionally the weaker side of the PLA6. Following on this new principle of “active defence” with the concept of “offshore defensive operations”, Chinese fifth White Paper reveals the basis for a doctrine of joint operations.

This new doctrine contributes to enhance the PLA’s credibility, influence the Taiwanese electorate against secession and bring the American politicians to stick to their one China policy and think twice before committing an overstretched and weaker US military against a stronger PLA. In that new context, the White Paper stresses that: the Navy has expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations. China sees Taiwan – like Japan and the Philippines – as an outpost of America’s military presence on its shores. General Wen Zongren called for the breaking of the “international forces’ blockade against China’s maritime security” to enable “China’s rise7 So far, Beijing has been powerless to change this situation.

Chinese aviation industry depends on imports for propulsion, avionics and fire control.

The PLA’s missile firings demonstration around Taiwan in March of 1996, failed to achieve their objectives: two American carriers, moved alongside the Chinese coast undeterred and the Independence Party won the election in Taipei. American electronic reconnaissance aircraft incident in 2001, the deployment of seven American aircraft carriers off the coast of China in July 2004, and the basing of US and Japanese aircraft on the islands of Xia Di west of Okinawa, further underlined how the US military can operate at will on the maritime borders of China with the support of a stauncher Japan which now calls Taiwan a strategic concern8.

II – A Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs Reforming The Military Procurement System

In his memoirs published in 2004, Liu Huaqing, the former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, explains how he decided back in 1995 to reduce the gap with the major powers through technology and reform the inefficient weapons procurement process. He lamented the poor level of China’s aircraft and computers industries and stressed the vital importance of electronic warfare techniques in any future conflict. In a 1996 speech, Li Peng, then Prime Minister, sanctioned Liu Huaqing’s move declaring that China should attach “great importance to strengthening the army through technology”.9 The defence industrial reforms implemented in 1995-98, unlike the one adopted earlier, appear successful.

Chinese defence firms have gradually improved their R&D and production processes and quality. General Li Jinai, the head of China’s General Armaments Department, has acknowledged in 2003 the marked improvement in national defence scientific research and in building of weapons…the best period of development in the country’s history10.The growing funding for weapons procurement, the “demilitarization” of COSTIND and the creation of a General Armaments Department GAD (April 1998) have transformed the military industrial complex. T

he new COSTIND no longer manages PLA’s acquisitions and factories but regulates the eleven state-owned civilian enterprises. This reform separates the buyers and the contractors and introduces a competitive bidding system for PLA’s contracts11.

Obtaining And Absorbing Foreign Technologies Since Tiananmen

As Liu Huaqing stated in his memoirs, buying foreign weapons is an intermediary step to learn foreign techniques and fill gaps in capabilities and time. China’s ultimate goal is to access the industrial capacity to produce advanced weapons without foreign technical assistance12. The October 2003 first manned flight of the Shenzhou-5 spaceship stands as a proof of Chinese ability to absorb successfully foreign technologies.

Market analysts predict that in volume, China’s 600 shipyards could overtake Korea’s number one ranking and eliminate the European civilian shipbuilding industry by 2015.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States supported PRC’s military modernisation against the former Soviet Union, encouraging their allies to develop military technical ties with the PRC. The embargo following the Tien An Men massacre limited Chinese access to Western military technologies but reopened the flows of hardware and knowledge from China’s former friend and foe, Russia.

However, the liberalization of Cold War-era Western COCOM export controls on dual-use products and technologies allowed China to circumnavigate the arms embargo and purchase machine tools, marine diesel and jet engines, stealth, radar and laser technologies to move towards advanced weapons production13.

The space program was made possible by PLA’s access to American, Russian and Ukrainian rocket technologies14 The United States have concluded that the assistance provided by Hughes to China in 1994 in order to resolve failures experienced with Chinese rockets launching American satellites contributed to the “increased reliability of their launch vehicles” including two road mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and one submarine launched intercontinental missile15 which have benefited from American solid fuel rocket engines technology and Russian missile mobile transporters technology and possibly MIRV technology. For targeting, China has used some guidance inputs from commercial US Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) and from the European Union Galileo system.16.China’s anti-satellite weapons program (ASAT) has been related to a deal between the British micro-satellite maker, Surrey Satellite Technology and Beijing’s Qinghua University.

China has two remote-sensing satellite programs and is interested in electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance satellites. China has launched smaller satellites for oceanographic research and possibly imagery missions, communications and navigation as well as micro satellites for electro-optical, radar and probably imagery missions.

The PLA works on long-range land attack cruise missiles which benefit from Russian, Israeli and captured US cruise missile technologies. It had extended the range of the subsonic anti-ship missile based on the French EXOCET and is developing the YJ-12/YJ-62, a supersonic anti-ship 300 km cruise missile. China has also deployed its first land-attack missile derived from the Silkworm/Styx but powered by a turbo-jet. Three short range surface to-air-missiles have been successfully produced in the 1990s with American, French and Italian technologies for both the Army and the Navy with the HQ-7 derived from the French CROTALE being now the standard weapon.

China quietly completes the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag in Dalian while negotiating with Russia for the purchase of the carrier based variant of the SU-27. This development is an example of a successful Chinese deception of US and Western watchers

China also develops a long range air defence surface to air missile, the HQ-9, merging Russian, Ukrainian and American technologies. Again variants of this missile are produced for the Army and the Navy, the latter being tested at sea on a trial platform17. Russian radar and data link have been incorporated into the current air to air missile being developed for the PLAAF18.

Chinese aviation industry depends on imports for propulsion, avionics and fire control. As part of the liberalization of export controls by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), jet engines were sold to China. Rolls Royce Spey engines and Russian AL-31FN aero-engine are onboard the Super-7 and the F-10 fighters, while a turbofan engine and a combat radar are being developed19. The Sukhoi partnership may allow Shenyang to manufacture its own variant of the SU-27/J-11. The J-12 stealth fighter project is a tentative response to the American 5th generation F/A-22 Raptor fighter. The PRC has tried to address the stealth design problem through the import of composite materials technology20, high performance computers and software21. Eurocopter and Sikorsky are major partner in China’s helicopters developments with benefits to the Z-10 attack helicopter program. China has started developing UAVs for reconnaissance, surveillance and strike, converting retired fighter aircraft22.

Chinese publications claim that their aircraft technology is on a par with Europe for manoeuvrability but lags behind for engines and materials. Accessing key European technologies is needed to help reduce a growing gap with American 4th and 5th generation fighters. Acquiring European 3rd and 4th generation fighters would help train better pilots.23

Charging about 10 percent less than its competitors, the Chinese shipbuilding industry now ranks third in the world24 Market analysts predict that in volume, China’s 600 shipyards could overtake Korea’s number one ranking and eliminate the European civilian shipbuilding industry by 201525.The shipbuilding sector also supports the new priority given to the Navy. Four classes of submarines are under construction, all genuine designs with French or Russian influence and foreign components like German diesel engines and Russian propellers.

The nuclear ballistic missile submarines Project 09-4 and the nuclear attack submarines Project 09-3 should be operational before the end of the decade26 and carry the underwater-launched anti-land and anti-ship missiles. Influenced by the original French AGOSTA built for the Pakistani Navy, the conventional attack submarine Project 039 SONG class produced in Wuhan and Shanghai stands as a proof of Chinese ability to design its own submarines. Based on the Russian KILO purchased in the late 1990s with some additional inputs, the YUAN class (2 units so far) is a further step towards indigenous design incorporating Chinese and Russian anti-ship cruise missiles and torpedoes. Two pairs of two medium range and long range air defence destroyers Project 052B and 052C also merge Chinese and Russian electronics and weapons with Ukrainian electronics27 and license produced gas turbines.

New airborne tank, infantry fighting vehicles and Chinese HUMVEE copies strengthen the power-projection capability of the PLA Airborne Army and PLA Navy Marines.

Two follow on to the Project 051 LUHU class fitted with Russian SA-N-6 long range air defence missiles are under construction in Dalian while two prototypes of a stealth frigate built in Shanghai/Hudong and in Guangzhou will supplement the earlier JIANGWEI II frigates demonstrating Chinese progresses in naval design. China has doubled its sealift capability in the past five years and is about to lay down its first large amphibious assault ship capable of carrying air cushion vehicles and helicopters. Five other classes of amphibious vessels and crafts are under construction. Two large fleet support ships have been commissioned in the past two years supplementing three older units. Last but not least, China quietly completes the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag in Dalian while negotiating with Russia for the purchase of the carrier based variant of the SU-27. This development is an example of a successful Chinese deception of US and Western watchers. With the destroyers and support ships built in the past four years China has acquired the vessel to accompany a carrier task group.

Chinese naval command and control capabilities are based on the technology acquired from Italy and France28 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. New naval weapons have come to maturity like a copy of the French naval gun29 and a copy of a Dutch point defence gun. Older missile patrol crafts based on Soviet designs are being replaced by a fast wave piercing catamaran designed with the assistance of Australian technicians.

Foreign technologies are helping the PLA Army modernizing its battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers with Israeli-designed amour, guns and gun sight systems while Russian tank gun-launched laser-guided missiles give greater striking distance to its latest tanks30. Several of them are being equipped with a sophisticated high-powered laser, which increases the vehicle’s defensive and offensive capabilities to disable the enemy’s guidance optics and defend against helicopters31. New airborne tank, infantry fighting vehicles and Chinese HUMVEE copies strengthen the power-projection capability of the PLA Airborne Army and PLA Navy Marines.

III – Missiles, Force Projection And Credibility

Strategic Deterrence Or Tactical First Use?

China does not seek nuclear parity with the United States, several hundreds nuclear weapons being just enough to launch a nuclear counter-attack. In two original doctrinal moves, China deploys conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles for possible first use and praises the operational advantages and reduced collateral damages of neutron weapons for supporting a landing operation. Targeted against critical Taiwanese and American facilities in Asia, possibly as far back as Pearl Harbor, China’s missile forces is expected to grow to over a thousand missiles with the introduction of new Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)32 and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) supplemented by intermediate-range ballistic missiles33.

Contrary to nuclear weapons, neutron bombs can be used within the Chinese borders and are not restricted by a no first use statement.

The 10 000 km DF-31 ICBM and its mirved SLBM variant aimed at the United States will replace the older liquid fuelled single warhead DF-5. Access to Russian imaging satellites and the creation of a small Chinese imaging and radarsat constellation to penetrate cloud cover should allow the PLA to target some Taiwanese and American bases in Asia34. Contrary to nuclear weapons, neutron bombs can be used within the Chinese borders and are not restricted by a no first use statement35.

At sea, China is devising an anti-carrier architecture reminiscent of the Soviet anti-carrier strikes with ballistic and cruise missiles, launched from land, surface, submarine and air platforms. During its Liberation-2 exercises, the PLA has made public its concept of using ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers. The feasibility of such an attack requires excellent tracking and an active auto director to reacquire a fast moving target36. The PLA also uses fighter-bombers fitted with Russian anti-radar and anti-ship missiles37, submarines fitted with cruise missiles38 and four Russian built SOVREMENNYY destroyers (32 supersonic cruise missiles)39. Long range targeting will be provided by ship and air borne sensors (SEARCHWATER/AWACS) and observation satellites purchased from Russia. Chinese submarines should delay the progression of a battle group, forcing American carriers responding to a crisis to operate further away from Taiwan.40.

Force projection and jointness

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991 China has sought a joint reaction force with advanced weaponry. It includes three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven special operations groups, and one regimental-size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery.

The marine corps is mainly composed of two combined-arms 6,000-man brigades deployed in the South Sea Fleet.41 Its mobility is being augmented by the construction of new amphibious vessels including a future large assault Landing Ship Dock and several air cushioned vehicles. China currently has 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels and has doubled the size of its amphibious fleet in the past decade. The PLA airlift should be improved by the purchase of Russian heavy transport aircrafts and medium-lift helicopters from Russia42 and by its Z-10 attack helicopter43

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991 China has sought a joint reaction force with advanced weaponry. It includes three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven special operations groups, and one regimental-size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery.

The 2005 US DoD report to the Congress on the PLA summarized the transformation of China’s air defence from “point defence of key military, industrial, and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign doctrine capable of effective offensive counter-air (OCA) and defensive counter-air (DCA)”. 4th generation fighters44 and advanced air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles now give the PLAAF parity with Taiwan and Japan. In August 2004, China received the final delivery of four Russian surface-to-air missile (SA-10) while relying on the French designed CROTALE/HQ-7 for short range air defense. Under this architecture, the PLA will reduce its opponent’s ability to conduct air operations over China by targeting its bases and refuelling tankers.

The completion of the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag in Dalian should be interpreted as being primarily an air defence platform as explained in the memoirs of Liu Huaqing: “as we were considering the issue of the war in the Taiwan strait, we realised that land based aviation was a waste of money because we would need more and more planes and airfields. If we have an aircraft carrier we don’t need to augment the number of aircraft, just modify them and it will be less costly. Moreover, the carrier will act as a force multiplier”45. The carrier will allow longer flights over Taiwan and extend the area of operations for surface ships and submarines by providing air cover46.

China’s 2004 White Paper stresses the importance to reform its logistical system. Joint logistical support at military area commands and integration into the joint tri-service logistical support system started in the Jinan Theater in July 2004. All logistical support resources of the three services are transferred to the joint logistics system for unified management and employment. In May 2004, the PLA also started a unify its medical support system47.

Conclusion

Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs advocating missile strikes, attacks on satellites and the first use of neutron weapons should help “the inferior to defeat the superior” and convince the United States to avoid a confrontation over Taiwan. Even though at the present stage the PLA does not possess the ability to conduct and support logistically an Overlord styled operation on the coasts of Taiwan, it could destroy key facilities and infrastructures with missile strikes and bomb the beaches using neutron weapons to neutralize the bunkers and suppress the entrenched opposition without direct combat. Elite divisions equipped with light-weight air-defence systems and airborne/amphibious tanks could then out-range the guns on Taiwan’s older tanks and secure airfields, ports and beaches where PLA’s regular troops could land.

The objective would be to bring the war to a quick conclusion before the build up of a substantial American expeditionary force. With an improved military credibility Beijing hopes to secure a political solution with Taipeh without resorting to violence and gain a new stature on the international scene, removing the American pressure on its borders.

Notes

1. China’s National Defence, CND,12/ 2004

2. LIU HUAQING, Memoirs, Beijing, 2004.

3. Xinhuanet, 27/12/2004

4. CND, 12/2004

5. LIU HUAQING,Ibid., pp.636-638.

6. Finkelstein, D., The Chinese PLA in 2020, 5/26/2004

7. US DoD, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress, MPPRC 2005

8. Japan’s White Paper, 2005

9. Quoted in the GAO report to Congress, 1999

10. Quoted by MEDEIROS, E., S. (RAND), Statement before Congress, 2/6/2004

11.Ibid.

SHAMBAUGH, D., Modernizing China’s military, 2003., pp. 225-283

12. LIU HUAQING, Ibid.

13. US DoD, MPPRC/1999

14. Galileo could help the PLA to develop satellite navigation system and precise targeting for missiles, FISHER, R., written testimonies before Congress, 2/6/2004

15. STATE DEPARTMENT , 12/18/1998, Review of APSTAR II/Long March/2E

16. 4/19/2005, International Herald Tribune.

17. HQ-9/FT-2000

18. SD-10

19. Qinling-turbofan engine for JH-7 derived from Rolls-Royce-Spey engines

20. British/Petroleum/America and Sikorsky

21. US DoD, MPPRC, 1999

22. US DoD, MPPRC., 2005

23. Naval and Merchant Ships, NMS, 4/2005

24. 9 millions tons, 17% of the world’s orders (2004)

25. http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news

26. JL-2

27. 052C features a phased array C-Band radar (160km range in broad search mode/longer in spot mode; can track 150 aircrafts).

28. Selenia and Thomson-TAVITAC

29. Creusot-Loire-COMPACT

30. Type-98

31. China Reform Monitor, April 26, 2004

32. CSS-6/CSS-7

33. DF-21-X/DF-25

34. The PLA intends to have 8 radar and electro-optical imaging satellites from 2006 to revisit any target twice a day. Russia/ Mashinostroyenia is offering Kondor-E designed to guide supersonic cruise missiles from space; FISHER, Ibid.

35. NMS, 9/2004

36. POMFRET, J., China raises defence budget again, Washington Post, 5 III 2002

37. SU-27/30 and JH-7 fitted with Kh-31/Kh-59MK

38. 8 Russian KILO submarines fitted with CLUB missiles

39. SS-N-22 MOSKIT/SUNBURN/180 km

40. US DoD, MPPRC, 2004

41. FISHER, R., Ibid., 2004

42. IL-76/Mi-17/171

43. US DoD, MPPRC, 2005

44. SU-27/30 & F-10

45. LIU HUAQING, Ibid, 2004

46. NMS, 2 2005

47. CND, 2004