On 3 Apr, 1989 Ross Munro published an article on India – as the Superpower Rising, primarily focusing on its military might. It talked about India quietly transforming itself into regional superpower with a dominant military. The hypothesis was researched by many. Some scoffed at such an idea. They said since Rajiv Gandhi visited China and the relationship with China was improving, India should seriously consider cutting its force levels. Coincidentally that year, Pakistan launched cross border terrorism to gain Kashmir and weaken India. Over the next decade, thousands perished in India as the consequence that nearly brought the two countries to the brink of war. Certainly India showed no sign of superiority or power in dealing with Pakistan. Operation Parakram that ensued took the wind out of the prophecy. When India pulled its troops back after staying nearly one year at the brink, Pakistan took the credit of having deterred India from taking a drastic step. Indian Army whined about the significant loss of superiority over its adversary in combat power.

Diplomacy and credible military are the means of achieving peace and stability; together they constitute the elements of power projection. There cannot be power without economic strength. Strong economy cannot obtain power without the muscle of the military to secure.

India then took a different turn focusing on its economy and building strategic capability. Over the next two decades India established a consistent economic growth of 8%. A triad nuclear weapon delivery capability is in the making so also a credible command and control structure. Building a blue-water navy was seen as a necessity. Long strategic reach of its air arm supported by aerial tankers is today a reality. Professionalism of its military is acknowledged and it’s potential to be of stabilising influence. India’s space programme is growing steadily. It has established ability to recover space capsule reliably and accurately. Lunar orbital mission is given a go-ahead and manned missions are under study. India is one among very few countries that have proven ability to design, produce and launch satellites.

India’s global mission is dictated by our Constitution. It states that India shall “endeavour to promote international peace and security; maintain just and honorable relations between nations; foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples”. India is still to take the lead towards regional stability for which peace is essential. Diplomacy and credible military are the means of achieving peace and stability; together they constitute the elements of power projection. There cannot be power without economic strength. Strong economy cannot obtain power without the muscle of the military to secure. The military has no legs witout indigenous capability – the capability to design, develop and produce. Such a capability is not possible without the vision, effort and attitude. Attitude is dictated by national Morale and Will.

An American strategic analyst observed: “India’s armed forces are powerful, but they play a smaller role in security policy-making than their counterparts in almost all other countries”. This attitude must change. Military diplomacy is an important part of external relations that needs to be recognised and vigorously pursued. The world is not necessarily friendly to a weak and vulnerable state. India has a destiny to fulfill.

More hill tops are physically guarded these days than ever in our history. Besides, ITBP and BSF have been raised just for the purpose of the strength of which is continually expanding. This syndrome has prevented out-of-box solutions like effective monitoring by other means or deterrence of severe punishment if infringed.

Thus we see India reaching out to take a regional role and a power in its own right. Prime Ministers have expressed India’s regional interests over an area that stretches from the Gulf of Aden in the West to Japan in the East. Regional interests do not mean much unless India is ready to face regional responsibilities. The crucial decade would witness whether India faces such a responsibility boldly or withdraws to battling internal politics and turmoil. India must pursue independent policy that would nurture trust and interdependence with nations in the region particularly, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The US National Intelligence Council Report -2004 states that “rise of India will present strategic complications for the region. India seeks to bolster regional cooperation both for strategic reasons and the desire to increase its leverage with the West. As India’s economy grows, governments in SE Asia – Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and other countries may move closer to India to help build a potential geo-political counter weight to China while India will seek to strengthen its ties in the region without excluding China”.

The Defence forces had to handle clandestine threats such as the Purulia arms drop, terrorist activities like aircraft hijacking, fighting piracy over the high seas and poaching in our coastal waters, counter infiltration of smugglers and terrorists from across our borders and now combat global terrorism. It is now the declared policy of the Government that internal security is to be one of the primary duties of the military. The three services need also rise to meet any contingencies arising such as natural calamities, civil disturbance when it goes beyond the control of the police and in combating terrorism. The military must be ready to manage essential services like communication, railways, aviation, harbour and ports if they get seriously affected by civil disturbances. It is necessary that they are familiar and fully integrated with civil in order that the take over when inevitable would be smooth. Airspace management of civil and military over the entire country should be integrated and yet each maintains its independent role. Where and when necessary, the military must be prepared to support the police and para-military forces in their operations against terrorism. This calls for a very capable, integrated and highly trained military.

The current status of the military in India falls well short in its ability in coping with all the demands described. Mr K Subramanium rightly conveyed his apprehension in demanding that “a high power commission to go into the entire question of role of Indian Armed Forces for the 21st century, their sizes, composition, equipment, personnel policy, training and their relations with other friendly powers. That is to be the first step in modernising the Indian Armed Forces”. The Sixth Report of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence conveyed similar apprehension while recommending that the government should urgently set up a formal institutional mechanism with adequate support structures to monitor the state of our Defence preparedness and to oversee progress on Defence programme modernisation /upgradation /acquisition/ re-equipment apart from achieving speedy decision-making on crucial issues affecting national security. Modernisation is not just about inducting modern weapon systems and advanced technology. It is also to do with running the military in a most cost-effective manner, as a professional service and not as government jobs. Regrettably, the pulls are towards the latter that must be desisted.

Current Status and Remedies

Structure and Credibility

No reform in the decision-making structure of the military has been made since instituted by Lord Ismay in 1947. While the size, elements, composition, structure, capability and posture of the Indian Defence Forces should be dictated by national objectives, what we have today is that inherited from the British Raj at the end of the World War II. Modern weapons are acquired and they just replace the earlier weapons without any changes in the structure of the forces or their overall sizes. No serious analysis has been done to the ratios in the sizes of Army, Air Force and Navy in spite of Revolution in Military Affairs driven by technology and globally evolving military tactics and strategies.

Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence.

Today, India possesses one among the world’s largest military manpower but relatively poor in firepower and in certain operational capabilities such as mobility and ability to conduct operations effectively overseas. Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence. The scar is about having to physically guard every inch of our border. Failure of intelligence and monitoring the border led to Kargil infiltration and so in the case of Chinese invasion. Such instances make us rush troops and leave them there permanently to guard but not putting enough effort to improve intelligence. More hill tops are physically guarded these days than ever in our history. Besides, ITBP and BSF have been raised just for the purpose of the strength of which is continually expanding.

This syndrome has prevented out-of-box solutions like effective monitoring by other means or deterrence of severe punishment if infringed. We need to obtain the cost of guarding our borders and explore means of doing it more cost-effectively. We need to have developed special weapons and mobility means in hills. We have not explored seriously unmanned means to monitor and gather intelligence along and across the borders that could reduce troop deployment. Our Forces have not acquired adequate skills in languages which are vital for intelligence gathering and analysis, especially learning Chinese language.

When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT).

Learning the foreign language opens up the possibility to understand the thinking process and their strategy and not merely translating books and papers. We waste effort on non-productive effort. For example, a large body of government employees of nearly 100 is kept busy translating engineering manuals in the Air Force written in English to Hindi which are never read!

Equipment

Combat systems availability for training and operations is poor though the inventory is large. Among major powers, other than members of erstwhile Soviet Union and China, Indian Forces probably have the largest non-available inventory. Significant proportion of equipment held by Indian Forces is obsolete or awaits spares. Management of logistics chain is primitive. CAG has criticised all the three Services for holding large stock of unusable and wasteful inventory costing hundreds of crores of rupees and a sizeable proportion of combat equipment lying unfit for operations. When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT). But it makes no sense if the Air Force cannot maintain serviceability better than 50 or 60%. If that be the case, we could well have procured less but put more money to ensure better availability. Indian Air Force serviceability and availability are lower than international norms.