Indian Defence Review

The briefing on 12th April 1984
From left to right standing we can recognize: Second from Left Major Bahuguna, AVM Dalaya, Lt Gen P N Hoon, Maj Gen Shiv Sharma, Lt Col Pushkar Chand and fourth from right Captain D S Gusain

Between 1980 and 1983 shadow mountaineering was underway on the peaks in and around the Siachen Glacier with both India and Pakistan sending reconnaissance patrols to the region. Additionally Pakistan was continuing to permit International Expeditions to cross the Saltoro and explore the region to its East.

Amidst all this criss-cross happening on the mountains, occasionally, either side returned with some tell-tale remains of the expeditions coming in from the other side. While this would have naturally aroused suspicions in both the camps, the Indian response was to continue sending its own expeditions and patrols to show the flag and return to base. That is why even though this cat and mouse game was going on in the Saltoro area, things were under control and no military intervention, leave alone occupation was envisaged, at-least on the Indian side.

However, all this came to head in August 1983 when Pakistan unilaterally extended the Line of Control in one of its protest notes and formally staked claim to the entire region lying to the West of an imaginary line joining the last mutually demarcated point NJ 9842, with the Karakoram Pass. This set the alarm bells ringing in the Northern Command of the Indian Army as the cat was finally out of the bag.

It was in these circumstances that an unusual rendezvous of sorts took place on the Siachen Glacier near Bilafond La around late August/first week of September 1983. Pakistan’s SSG troops, who had crossed the Bilafond La and established their camp on the Siachen Glacier came almost face to face with the Polar Bear II recce patrol sent by India.

The Polar Bear II Patrol consisted of a mix of men from the Ladakh Scouts and 4 Kumaon. They were tasked with assembling a fiber glass hut on the glacier. The parts of this hut, which had been heli-dropped on the glacier had scattered over a wide area due to the strong winds. With great difficulty the team managed to put together a ramshackle shelter of sorts, just enough to protect the troops from strong winds. That is when the patrol was spotted by the Pakistani helicopters.

With no instructions to engage and no plans or provisions to camp overnight the Indian patrol returned back to its base. However, as confirmed by both Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan and Gen Pervez Musharraf in their respective books, the Pakistani troops camped on the glacier for about 10 days before being forced to turn back due to the inclement weather and lack of supplies.

From here on it was a race to the glacier as Commanders on either side, having been alerted about the other’s presence, knew that an attempt would be made to occupy the heights as soon as the weather cleared.

Despite faster access to the passes from the Pakistani side, with their road-head being only a day’s turn round from the heights, it was India which ended up occupying the Saltoro Ridge. One of the key reason, inter alia, for this success was the realization that speed and time were of essence for the Operation.

It was decided to heli-drop a platoon of soldiers each near Bilafond La and Sia La while simultaneously dispatching the troops on foot to link up with them. This decision helped India achieve complete surprise and occupy the high ground before the Pakistanis could react. The task of rapidly positioning troops at their designated positions was to be done by helicopters (hepter).

Log book showing Fg Offr Manmohan Bahadur’s landing on the Glacier on 6th October 1978

For this it was necessary to mobilize all the rotary winger sources available in the region at that time and these included 114 HU (Helicopter Unit) at Jammu, 131 FAC Flight (Forward Air Control) at Udhampur and No.663 Air OP (Observation Post)Squadron at Srinagar.

Set up on 1st April 1964 for the role of transport and casualty evacuation, 114 HU was to be stationed at Leh. Its first Commanding officer (CO) was Squadron Leader (S/L) Arvind Dalaya and its initial workhorse was the French Alouette III popularly known as the Chetak. In 1978, 114 HU was head quartered in Jammu with a detachment in Leh.

So when Colonel Kumar proposed a recce mission to Teram Kangri and Lt Gen Chibber approved air support for it, the responsibility fell on this unit. The Chetak was an under powered machine which was not designed to operate at the heights envisaged. Therefore to prepare for this task Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Sambyal and Sqn Ldr A S Mann conducted an aerial recce over the glacier on 3rd August 1978.

Log Book showing the Cheetah sorties on the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th of April 1984 by Fg Offr Kurane and Fg Offr R R Srinivasan

Thereafter on 20th September 1978 Sqn Ldr Kaushik and Flying Officer (Fg Offr) Manmohan Bahadur flew the first supply sortie over the glacier to drop rations for Kumar’s team and on 6th October 1978 Sqn Ldr Monga and Fg Offr Manmohan Bahadur landed the hepter on the glacier to evacuate an injured Captain M P Sharma.

It was only in 1981 that the 114 HU also acquired the lighter French Lama hepters popularly known as Cheetah has they were more suited for Operations at high altitude.

131 FAC Flight was established in Pathankot in 1974 with the primary objective of providing accurate details of enemy targets to the fighter aircraft and its first CO was Sqn Ldr M S Sekhon. Based in Udhampur, it had a fleet of Cheetahs and was being commanded by Wing Commander C S Sandhu between 1982 and 1984.

On the Left we can see Fg Offr R R Srinivasan with Capt. VMS Kolkal outside the AF Offr Mess in Leh in the first week of April 1984

At that time the Indian Air Force also serviced and maintained Air OP Squadrons for the Army. These Squadrons operated with the Cheetah helicopters and their Pilots were officers from the Artillery Regiment because the primary role of these Units was to control and direct accurate artillery fire on enemy targets.

The 663 Air OP Squadron AF at Srinagar commanded by Col G S Hundal, had two flights consisting of five Cheetahs each, with 3 AOP Flight AF looking after the Leh/Ladakh region and 19 AOP Flight AF looking after the Srinagar region.

All these units were actively involved in providing air support to the Indian patrols, recce missions, expeditions and troops stationed in Srinagar and Ladakh region. Along with the MI-8’s and the fixed wing aircrafts they were to play a vital role in what was to unfold later.

By February 1984 it had become very clear that the pre-emptive action planned by the Army would require establishment of posts at very high altitudes for which air support would be the lifeline. Around 16th February 1984 a meeting was held to discuss all the Air aspects of the Operation. This was attended by Lt Gen Somanna, Director Military Operations, AVM S K Mehra, Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) [ACAS (Ops)], Air HQ, Maj Gen Amarjit Singh, Major General General Staff (MGGS), Northern Command, and Brig V N Channa, Commander 26 Sector.

AVM Dalaya, Lt Gen Hoon and Brigadier J L Malhotra discussing the Air aspects at the Base Camp

After assessing the air threat, it was concluded that it would not be possible for PAF to operate fighter aircrafts from Gilgit and Skardu airfields and its capability of providing air support in Siachen from Chaklala and Peshawar was also negligible.

It was also opined that considering the limited helicopter support available Pakistan would not heli-lift troops at Bilafond La and Sia La and both the Governments would not sanction the use of air power lest it escalate the conflict. This meeting was followed by another meeting around 7th March 1984 between Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh, Chief of Air Staff (CAS) and Gen A S Vaidya, Chief of Army Staff(COAS), during which details of heli-lift off 60 personnel to posts on the glacier, reconnaissance and air maintenance required using fixed wing aircraft, MI-8’s and Cheetahs was finalized.

For reasons of security and surprise, it was agreed that only minimum and inescapable aerial and photo reconnaissance would be undertaken.

As March approached planning for the Operation gained momentum. Helipads were being constructed for the MI-8’s and Cheetahs at Sasoma and the base camp. Dumping of aviation turbine fuel (ATF) was proceeding as planned and additional storage capacity was being created for it.

On 31st March the final clearance was received from the Army Head Quarters for commencing the Operation. The Air Force had positioned six Cheetahs under Wing Cdr Sandhu and two MI-8’s under Wing Cdr K K Sangar at Thoise for the Operation. While 13th April was chosen as the day the heli-borne assault team would land at the designated landing zones and head for the passes.

For the Air Force, Operation Meghdoot commenced on 3rd April 1984 when Fg Offr Kurane and Fg Offr R R Srinivasan started conducting recce sorties over the proposed camps and landing zones and the task force started preparing for all eventualities. A Forward Joint Operation Centre was set up at Partapur on 6th April 1984 by Air Cmde Misra and it was decided to position a Forward Air Controller (FAC) each at Sia La and Bilafond La.

Since there was no Air Defence Direction Centre in the area therefore ZU-23 and SAM-7 crews were familiarized with the distinction between own and Pakistani heptrs to avoid friendly fire incidents. Regular sorties were to be flown by the MI-8’s to the glacier and the Forward Logistic Base (FLB) to dump equipment and later on transport heavy guns as under slung loads.

On the 12th of April Lt Gen Hoon, Air Marshal Wollen, AVM Dalaya and Maj Gen Shiv Sharma visited the Base Camp and carried out an aerial reconnaissance of Bilafond La and Sia La. Due to the inclement weather and continuous snowfall it was decided to drop the troops about 3 kms short of Bilafond La and 6 kms short of Sia La.

Finally on 13th April 1984, around 5/5:30 in the morning, the troop deployment under Operation Meghdoot commenced when the first pair of Cheetahs piloted by Sqn Ldr Surinder Bains and Wing Cdr Sandhu and Sqn Ldr Rohit Rai and Sqn Ldr Biswas respectively took off from the Base Camp.

On that day the Cheetah task force flew about 17 sorties and dropped 30 odd soldiers on the glacier. Unfortunately the heli-drop near Sia La could not be undertaken due to bad weather and the hepters had to turn back.

This picture was taken by S/L Rohit Rai and he recognizes (Standing): Second from Left Pilot Officer Kulwant Singh, third Flt Lt Kulwant Singh, fifth Fg Offr Pundir, Centre (with the red scarf) Wg. Cdr. C S Sandhu, seventh Sqn Ldr S S Bains, eighth Sqn Ldr L G S Bajwa and on the extreme right Sqn Ldr AJS Rao. Sitting on the extreme right is Pilot Officer Antony and sitting right below Wg Cdr Sandhu is Flt Lt Mahinder Singh

Thereafter on 17th April when the weather opened up around 32 sorties were flown with the available six Cheetahs to ensure that all the troops were on their positions on the glacier and the ridge as per plan. By this time the foot columns had also started establishing their camps on the glacier at their designated places.

‘During that time, at that altitude and in those conditions the only sound we ever wanted to hear was that of the hepters in the sky. The thunderous roar of the Cheetahs not only gave us a sense of relief but also reassured us, that we were not alone in the icy vastness and there was indeed someone to whom we could look up to…literally’, recalls Lt Gen Kulkarni (Retd.).

The morale boosting effect of the hepters and the terrific camaraderie between the foot soldiers and the pilots during the Operation is quite evident from what Col Paramvir Yadav (Retd.) has to say even today. “Walking every day to link up with the Bilafond La heli-borne troops we used to see the MI-8’s carrying clothing and equipment to the FLB. On 16th April 1984 a small red bag was dropped from one of the MI-8 flying right over my column. I thought it would contain chocolates for all of us but it had something which I cherish till this day. Wrapped around a stone was a hand written note by Wing. Cdr K K Sangar saying ‘Dear Paramvir, Keep it up. We are with you every day/night for every assistance. With love to all of you, Wing Cdr K K Sangar 109 HU’.  I did not know Wing. Cdr Sangar then and have never met him till date but his note has always been with me”, fondly recalls an emotional Yadav.

While the extra ordinary coordination and jointness exhibited by the Army and the Air Force ensured speedy deployment of the heli-borne troops to their locations and helped India achieve complete surprise, the swift link up of these troops with the ground forces ensured a smooth supply line and enabled quick consolidation and domination of the Saltoro Heights.

There can be no doubt that the Cheetahs and the MI-8’s, piloted by their indomitable air warriors piercing through the clouds, together with the heli-dropped troops and the gutsy foot columns marching on the Glacier, were the real sky messengers without whom there would have been no Meghdoot.

Author’s Note:

While there are several Units of the Air Force which undertook vital missions during the initial troop induction and deployment phase of Operation Meghdoot, the objective herein is to give the reader only a conspectus of the air aspects of the Operation.